「一中帝國大夢」討論會

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*因篇幅所限，與會學者的發言已經稍加潤飾。

主持人：

譚若思教授，四位討論人，以及在場各位貴賓大家好。今天非常高興大家能參加《中國大陸研究》季刊主辦的「一中帝國大夢」座談會。本刊主編林碧炤副校長原來要親自主持這次的座談會，但因臨時奉校長指派公出，由我代理。譚教授是非常資深的中國問題專家，目前是哈佛大學費正清中心資深研究員，也是德州大學奧斯丁校區政府系的教授。譚教授的「一中帝國大夢」（The New Chinese Empire）在台灣翻譯出版後，引起台灣內部很多玩家。今天很高興能邀請譚教授和四位討論人到國關中心來，就譚教授書中的主要觀點進行對話。為了讓譚教授精確地表達他的觀點，我們請譚教授以英文介紹他的新書，以及回應與談人的看法。接下來，我們就先請譚教授引言。

譚若思教授：

Is China still a Soviet-type regime? Is it a normal Third World authoritarian country? Is the regime just one more dynasty, like the Ming or the Ching, painted red? None of the
three gives the full picture.

Some say an extraordinary phenomenon, market Leninism, has come into existence on Chinese soil. Others say China today is a “transitional society,” a theory based on other countries where we know what the transition was to. The US President in the 1990s twice referred to China as “a former Communist country,” as if “transition” has pretty much occurred. There is some confusion here.

The strength of the Beijing regime is disputed. Some say the center is losing power to the periphery, including in the crucial area of revenue. Others say that the Chinese party state, bereft of ideological appeal as it may be, has never been stronger.

Our confusions are partly because there have been two influential ideas that are both flawed. “Culture is destiny,” runs one view, and everything will be different in China because of Chinese culture: Marxism was different; democracy, should it come, will be unrecognizable.

Second, in the 1990s especially, there was a powerful school that said “economics first.” If China makes it economically, a modernized politics will automatically come as a by-product.

In fact, politics is destiny for Beijing in the near-to-medium term. I argue that a tradition of governance that is ancient and aspects of a mentality that went with it have been used as a basis by a Marxist-Leninist party state. This extends autocratic empire into an era otherwise done with multinational empires. The last one to disappear was the Soviet Union.

Understanding the state should help us with a few questions. Will the PRC meet the fate of the Soviet Union? As the political system changes, can it do so smoothly and gradually, or must there be a crunch? In foreign policy, does the Beijing regime view today’s acceptance of American power as an aberration, and believe that China eventually be supreme in Asia again; or, on the other hand, is China settling quietly into the international community?

How can I speak of empire? First, China’s three biggest provinces are in territory that historically was not Han Chinese: Tibet, Xinjiang; and the southern part of Mongolia. These territories were frequently in history separate regimes that dealt in an international fashion with the dynastic court of China. In the Tang, for instance, Tibet was an equal of the Chinese polity and defeated it in battle. The Mongols ruled China for a couple of centuries. The atmosphere in these three territories is semi-colonial, so in this sense China is an empire.

Second, China is the only major power that expects to acquire substantial additional territories. Taiwan, of course, and a large number of islands in the South China Sea. These are all claimed by Beijing and the Beijing military has plans to take them all when
the capacity to do so is there. There is also much territory on China's inner flank.

Mao in 1964 remarked: "The Russians took 1.5 million square kilometers from us and we haven't yet presented our account." He repeated that remark almost verbatim to Henry Kissinger in 1973, although he had added a few hundred thousand kilometers by then. There is a large piece of today's Kazakhstan that China has consistently said is Chinese territory. China is the only major power with a list of unsatisfied additional territorial demands.

The third reason to use "empire" is that there are traits of the imperial state in the Beijing polity. One was that the jurisdiction of the Chinese Emperor—who called himself "the Son of Heaven" to make his relation to the cosmos, not just to territory, quite clear—was all under Heaven, and it was culture and way of life, not lines on a map, that set the Chinese apart from their neighbors. They did have neighbors, not on the maritime flank but on the inner Asian flank, and most of them were nomadic peoples who gave the Chinese trouble because their form of warfare using horses was something the Chinese frequently could not cope with.

So China did not have experience in dealing with other polities on an equal basis. The theory was that there was only one civilization; Chinese civilization was co-terminus with civilization. The non-Chinese were called barbarians, and they had to be fitted into the world view of the Confucian monarchy. They were not so fitted as independent states but as peoples who were perhaps rebelling against the Emperor but who were ultimately his subjects.

Today, this tradition is reflected in Beijing's reluctance to discuss disputed islands in the South China Sea as an international question; they will discuss the issue bilaterally but mostly not multilaterally. Historians in China read back into history a situation whereby the Uighurs in Xinjiang, the Tibetans, the Mongols, and the Manchus were always "brotherly nationalities within our country," rather than separate polities. This conception borrows heavily from Stalin's theory of national minorities, as well as from the traditional Chinese worldview.

Another trait of this Chinese state was that it had a sense of superiority but it was not regularly aggressive; it was even quite passive. There is no great contradiction between the two. The Chinese Emperor often felt: "Why bother with the barbarians? They are not worth it and leaving them alone might be the best policy." So this traditional Chinese empire was arrogant but it also had an aspect of modesty or defensiveness. Many a dynasty would have been quite happy if the barbarians would just stay on the steppe and China would not interfere with them. But they wanted Chinese tea and silk.

The PRC perpetuates this dualism. Toward Taiwan, Beijing is presumptuous. The Vice President of Taiwan was called by Beijing "the scum of the Chinese race," not a p
hrase we would expect in the international community. But Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian get away with an actual Taiwan independence. The Beijing state has been ineffectual in doing anything about it. Yet the presumption toward Taiwan continues even as a practical passivity is evident.

Third trait, this imperial state had a doctrine. Fortunately for everyone, it wasn’t a theocracy. The center of gravity of the philosophy of the Chinese polity was statecraft, nothing to do with the supernatural. Confucianism was fundamentally an ethics.

But there was orthodoxy and there was heterodoxy, and it was wise to know the difference. The Chinese state invented a whole series of fictions to cope with the failure of orthodoxy to prevail, so the dynastic histories would write the story as if orthodoxy had prevailed even if it had not.

Tamerlane, the great Moslem leader at the time of the Ming Dynasty, was depicted in the Chinese histories as having paid tribute to China. He hadn’t. He discovered the Chinese lie and set off on an expedition to Beijing to convert the Chinese Emperor to Islam. He died on the way; otherwise history might have been different. But normally the Chinese court got away with rewriting history.

In the PRC at the lowest point, in the 1960s, when Mao was defying the Soviet Union and the United States alike and soon lost the two close friends it had, Albania and Vietnam, the slogan went up in Beijing: “We have friends all over the world.”

To some degree, in the PRC the role of Heaven has been replaced by the role of History. Heaven’s will was the guiding light for the emperors. History’s movement is for the party-state. Does that mean Hu Jintao believes in the Marxist stages of history? Probably not. Does that mean Hu Jintao has a historical confidence that is a residue of the mental structure of those historical stages of Marxism? I believe he probably does.

The Chinese state was a blend of Confucianism and legalism. Confucianism is well known. It’s a hierarchical ethics. The situation of the ruler is analogous to the father of a household; the officials were actually called “father and mother” officials. The people, by analogy, were children, to be nurtured but also condescended to by the ruler.

But the Chinese polity would never have lasted so long if it didn’t blend Confucianism with legalism: the law and order philosophy of Han Fei and others. Confucianists said human nature is good. Legalists said it is bleak, people only understand force. A weak state, said Han Fei, will have five rewards to every five punishments; an effective state will have three rewards to every seven punishments.

The Confucians taught the people about their duty and how they should obey the rules. The legalists told the ruler how he should exercise power. The Chinese polity kept swinging back and forth between a dominant Confucianism and a dominant legalism, but the two were in symbiosis, Confucian harmony and legalist toughness. The Confucian

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scholars were superior men but they were also authoritarian.

The PRC half-century—half of it Mao’s twenty-five years, half of it post-Mao—can be understood as, first of all, a neo-Confucian quarter-century: moral socialism, doctrine to the fore, the reign of virtue. The second period can be seen as neo-legalism: Deng Xiaoping and his imitators saying: “We will have rules and regulations; you can believe in socialism if you wish, you can not believe if you wish, as long as you don’t oppose it, but you will obey.”

The reason why China has made a successful shift away from almost everything Mao did is that they have updated the symbiosis between Confucianism and legalism, with the balance tipping to neo-legalism.

By Confucianism here I don’t mean that Mao believed in the doctrines of Confucius. But Mao did believe in the functional role of a doctrine in authoritarian rule; there has to be a doctrine for power to be secure. And Jiang Zemin came up with the “Three Represents” a few years ago. Implausible it is, but he felt that there had to be a doctrine. Where, as in both the dynastic polity and the PRC, truth and power are said to emanate from a single source, it is hard to have free expression. The Falun Gong Buddhist meditationists found out that a single moral universe still exists, for their religious doctrines were interpreted by the Communist Party as political doctrines, which they are not. But any world view that is not the CCP’s own is a challenge.

In summary, this half-new/half-old state in Beijing is one that comes from above not from below; it is uneasy with being one power among others; it feels special but often compromises; it is the guardian of a doctrine.

主持人:

谢谢谭若思教授的引言。接下来请台大政治系石之瑜教授发言。

石之瑜教授:

本書對關於中國的現象提出很多批評，對於外人常感於中國諸多表象有所憂慮。作者接受近文化研究者對中國的解構，同意中國不是社會科學意義中的State。作者同時藉由東方主義智慧，提出認識中國的新方案。

共黨國（pp. 81～91, p. 100, p. 109, p. 273, p. 336），發現兩者不盡相同，因此對於
解放機緣何在沒有把握，於是樂觀悲觀兼而有之，不過對現代化歷程終將隨帝國崩潰
而發生深信不疑。

作者舉出許多例子，說明共黨國如何延續帝國行徑，並嚴詞批評之。氣憤的深
層動機可能有二。第一，作者在書中承認，他對於自己早年曾經在一個自願或不自
解的情況下，配合過共黨國的行爲，有所反省。第二，作者對於自己所屬國家近年
的帝國行徑焦慮不安，投射於中國。我們來比較一下譚教授在這本書裡面對中國的描
述，如果把中國三個字拿掉的話，我們再去問問世界上其他人，這些描述最像世上
那一個國家？不知情的第三人事後許以在批評美國攻打阿富汗與伊拉克。比如
說譚教授說「僅存的主要分裂主義帝國」（p. 16）、「受命於天」（p. 22）、「任性
而令人困惑」（p. 33）、「掩飾個性，和特殊的歷史感」（p. 35）、「有史世界最霸
道的國家觀念」（p. 37）、「攻擊別國，忘記教條」（p. 52）、「內政思想延申到國
外」（p. 55）、「自己爽，其他人卻通通討厭的世界觀」（p. 60）、「武力背後想當
然耳是正義」（p. 63）、「攻擊別國還會認為是對一個次等民族施威」（p. 63）、
「本國人身分可以和第三種身份重疊」（p. 197）、「它的多元不在於政治，而在於種
族」（p. 201）、「對外一昧霸道，卻邀求世界尊從」（p. 299）、「爭霸，看不起第
三世界」（p. 302）、「關係不睦，永遠是別國的錯」（p. 318）。當然這可能是在講
中國，但是回頭看看美國，不同的讀者心中恐怕各有定見——那一個是大巫那一個是小
巫？

譚教授在書中也流露出了這種不安。他內心對美國有一些批評，但是把這種行徑
投射到一個想像的中國，說成是中國的帝國主義行徑，就可以舒服地在帝國之不安。
這點從他對蓋達組織的批評就可以看出來端倪。譚教授兩三次提到，蓋達組織是隨意
殺人的組織（p. 320），就像中共極權政體一樣。但槍決如幼童阿里之類的平民或性虐
待伊斯蘭教俘虏不算隨意殺人呢？譚教授描述了「蓋達組織列為攻擊目標的民主自由
陣營」（p. 253），但反對民主自由就是蓋達攻擊的動機嗎？假設某一東突激進派
系發動伊斯蘭激進分子到上海去把金茂大廈轟掉的話，不知道譚教授如何判斷，到底
是那個激進派系隨意殺人，還是證明了中華帝國內部分離，終將崩潰？

其實類似這種很多言不洽的事的地方，多不勝數。這不是一個翻譯的問題，他必須
藉助於 種模糊苟可的模糊字句，才能在衆所公認的現象外，製造出 種模糊的連結，
進而延伸出他想像的中國。如所謂「自由化要像戈巴契夫」（p. 35）的說法，但俄國
算是自由民主的範式嗎？秘魯前總統薩佩來打國會的時候，和俄羅斯的前總統葉爾欽
炮轟國會的時候，美國媒體解讀的意味全然不同，一昧貶低而讚揚。又比如譚教授
舉例說毛澤東曾聲言過「朝鮮、台灣等民族」（p. 224），想影射毛也同意台獨，但毛講
話時台灣本不屬於中國，這話是對日本講的，目的是反帝反共，不能就此認定他也主
張台灣與中國屬於不同族。譚教授說北京「在東亞搞軍事擴張」（p. 304），但為何他
不提 E P 2、無預警電送或戰區防空系統等背景？他還批評到訪哈佛大學的「在潭民
演講不能公開辯論」（p. 313），但哈佛為什麼不拒絕他往訪，而要接受他的要求？另

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外，他一方面說台灣人「不統不獨的立場越走越明」（p.226），但又說「鼓吹台灣獨立獲得廣大群眾共鳴」（p.228）？這種模棱兩可的陳述是本書主要的論證手法，其實是在幫助作者建構他自己需要的中國。

第三、中華帝國論譚教授感到氣憤的原因，應當是中國的發展不能符合近代化的史觀。所以，作者想把中國重新譏回近代化的史觀。譚教授對於中國是不是一個有本質內容的現象，有二種不同的看法。他一方面認為古老、不變、統一、同文同種的中國，根本是個神話（p.60），也認為所謂一個中國誇大同質性（p.206）。這點做文化研究的同仁應當都會同意。但另一方面，作者常假定中國有其不變本質，因此說骨子裡一貫是個帝國（p.59）、穩屹於孤立的顯赫當中，不會變（p.97）、帝國跟今天的霸國是一樣的，是持續存在的（p.148）、併吞台灣不符中國民族利益（p.231）。

羅原來一開始讀的意思，中國這個民族根本就是模擬實踐出來的，但他接著又寫得好像有中國這麼一個民族客觀地存在，因此說中國再怎麼變還是中國（p.273），必須看清萬變之中的不變（p.309），而且更說這個政權完全沒有改變（p.334）。


最有意思的作法是譚教授的批判。中國人的確有華僑的概念，譚教授認為這表示中國人不承認華僑已經變成其他國家國民，因而暗藏了一種沒有明言的種族主義。相較於台灣在選舉的時候，大量的有台僑、華僑身份的外國人，爭取選票投票，譚教授竟然用台灣來當中國的反面，真是個非常大的諷刺。他想藉由台灣批判中華帝國文化，卻不經意的揭穿了台灣的中國特性。台灣讀者仍然必須感謝譚教授的是，他願意降低民主的標準，把一個只有選舉技術的國家，說成是民主國家。但是假如有一天，中國也學會了投票的技術，那譚教授要怎麼辦呢？

主持人：

謝謝石之瑜教授。蕭高彥教授是否也能談談您對於譚若思教授觀點的看法。
蕭高彥教授：

本書的基本觀點是將中國共產黨所統治的中國定位為「傳統中國與現代主義的結合」，分析其統治型態與現代性基礎 (第 1 與 2 章)、歷史基礎 (第 3 至 6 章)、一化帝國與周遭民族與國家 (第 7 至 9 章)、一中原則所象徵的外交政策 (第 11 章)，以及中國未來的前景 (第 12 章)。

作者認為中國迄今仍然不構成現代意義的國家。他引用 Anthony Smith 區分的種族國家與公民國家，認為現代的公民國家需要通過公共文化以及公民參與方能形成。中共承續了中國傳統的「帝國」政治觀，因為版圖遼闊、種族複雜，所以通過高壓的專制統治，以及傳統的政治符號與政治想像來建構正當性 (p. 7)。

作者認為當代中國還未從「種族國家」邁入公民國家或公民國族之列，當代中國所運用的仍是傳統漢人的文明觀念 (p. 28)。所以作者認為中國文明的基本政治特色是一種「不對稱性的二元對立格局」，也就是「漢族」與其他「蠻族」之間「我尊他卑」的政治邏輯，中國並基於此種階級的國家觀念，揉合孫堅除法的傳統統治，發展出「整乾坤」的外交觀念 (p. 51)。

在這個理論取向下，作者分析從秦漢迄晚清的歷史，以及辛亥革命後孫逸仙、蔣介石、毛澤東如何在不同的時空背景下，運用這種中國式的帝國治術。作者認為改革開放以後的中國雖然在本質上並未改變，但已有若干發展。這些發展包括：以歷史結構而言，是集儒學法、棄教條而保權力結構，也就是「棄馬保列」，因而發展出強調法律秩序的威權主義；其次，在馬克斯主義與列寧主義分道揚鑣之後，排拒西方思想調補價值空虛的可能，但允許引用不反對社會主義統治的中國傳統價值。最後，在九○年代由民族主義補補政治價值的缺口，完成了中國共產黨新的統治正當性基礎 (pp. 152~156)。江澤民提出的「三個代表」只不過是在後改革時代，當馬克斯主義式微後，為黨國的專制政治提出的一種菁英主義的論述而已。

在作者處理的邊陲國家中，台灣是唯一發展出以民主正當性為基礎，並在制度上落實了民主主義，民主政治，乃至公民國族的政治共同体。作者稱讚台灣的民主化，並主張美國應當改變冷戰時期的思維 (pp. 22~23)，這在台灣已經引起廣泛的討論，茲不贅述。

本書基本觀點非常清楚，作者對於中國政治文化史，以及中共的歷史有深入的知識，而且文筆明白暢快深入淺出，讀來令人興味盎然。但在以較為嚴格的學術角度加以審視，作者雖然提出了一些重要的問題，但由於本書針對的讀者群不同，並未提出嚴格意義下的學術分析。舉例而言：

第一，作者關注的焦點顯然是中國共產黨統治之下中國的「政體」或「國家的政治狀態」。作者提出的文明史觀或許可以解釋國家思想的歷史淵源，但以「國家主權」為核心論述所承繼的富國強兵觀念，似乎仍是現代意義的國家觀，而與中國傳統文明有本質上的差異。

第二，中國共產黨畢竟是在毛澤東時期進行左傾烏托邦共產主義的實驗後，由極
擅主義式全能國家開始侷縮，成為統治菁英獨佔政治機器，並搭配非政治化的市民社會。這樣的支配結構，究竟是放在西方十九世紀以來後革命的國家社會演化，還是中國傳統的政治治術？雖然二者均扮演一定的角色，但問題的根本可能還是後革命的統治結構問題。中國文化因素只是在這個歷史時空脈絡下，自然產生的輔助性資源。二者的主客關係，可能需要有較深入的釐清。

第三，以探尋革命的文獻而言，作者比較接近托克維爾以及韋伯所主張的傳統延續性。托克維爾認為法國大革命的激進創新只是一種表象，其本質在於落實在君主時代都無法想像的中央集權國家。韋伯的傳統型支配，則與法治型和charisma型支配並列。基於作者描述的基本特色，中共統治的型態顯然接近於傳統型統治，並且將毛澤東時代所具有charisma色彩加以刻意降低。這些都是作者並未深入分析的理論課題。

最後，本書的風格比較多作者個人的價值判斷，讀者閱讀後不免有極化的反應。當然，作者之目的並非純粹學術研究，而有影響美國乃至世界各地公共輿論的目標，因此採取這種論述策略毋寧是有效而令人理解的。不過，學術辯論較濃厚的讀者可能會期望作者能夠提供更深刻的理論探駁。

主持人。

謝謝高彥教授的發言。接下來請耿煬教授談談您的看法。

耿煬教授：

我想先將「中帝國大夢」做個定位。

如大家所知道的，本書作者曾受李前總統、陳總統邀訪與接見，所以，我們大概可以猜到，本書對大陸的發展議題，應該屬於比較「悲觀論」的一派，有點像何清漣的「中國的陷阱」以及章家敦的「中國即將崩潰」兩書也都在台引起相當的迴響。但相較同類著作，謝若思教授的「中帝國大夢」，恐怕就更加深刻，同時更加悲觀。因為像何清漣的「中國的陷阱」，主要從經濟轉型導致的社會動蕩着眼，而章家敦的「中國即將崩潰」，則從開放競爭觸發的內外狹義立論，對他們兩位而言，「問題」或許還是一時的；但依照謝教授的看法，中國問題的根源，在其非常「中國」的部份，而這部份的病態，幾乎是無可改道、緩解的。從這個角度說，「中帝國大夢」的觀點，可說更其悲觀，極其宿命。

根據謝教授的主張，當代中國的問題，主要源於中共政權本身，但想深刻了解此一政權，則須回溯其「帝國式」的文化傳統與實踐。僅從切入的角度而言，何、章的著作，便不可同日而語。加以作者博古通今，其論述常能將個人觀察、思考心得，

注① 本發言稿的修訂，承蒙中研院史語所邱部生副研究員指點審定，在此致以謝忱。
以及專家意見治於一爐。當然，書中最精采的部分，還在揭露當今政權與歷史帝國間，無論決策或治事風格，均存在許多差距網合的地方。作者分析深刻處，常讓人讀者拍案叫絕。

但既然參與本書的評論，個人還是希望再閱讀此書的某些不解或疑點，就效於譚若思教授。

第一個問題涉及本書的分析方式，其"從傳統開始當代"的做法，是否易流於"靜態"（static）或"命定"（teleological）？也就是說，如果透過歷史傳承和文化遺業，試圖理解持續演化的當代政體，是否將長於分析其不變的部分，而短於解釋其變化、運通的部分？甚至，是否因爲戴上"傳統"眼鏡，再來觀察"當代"，結果所見"當代"表現異常靜態，且與"傳統"貌異神合？但就一般社會變遷歷程而言，即便"政權本身"封建老大、故步自封，吾人仍須考量"外在環境"的壓力刺激，方能推知其是否須不斷調整適應？就此而言，即使解釋標的在政體何以不變，吾人仍須納入環境因素，而非只專注政權本身的沿襲傳承。

其次，譚氏所言的"傳統制約"，是否近乎絕對，是否無法超越？一則吾人絕難證明，源於"帝國"傳統的政體，將無法涵容於現代國家制度、無法適應法治、民主等觀念、無法棄棄"天朝心態"而與各主權國平等往來。再則，若傳統制約果難超越，且將嚴重阻礙進化，則傳統所謂的"中國問題"，應該不單中國獨有，反係所有非西方國家的共同宿命？

退一步說，即使"傳統"的影響永難減滅，"傳統"未必只能就"靜態"理解，吾人爲何不能還給"傳統"一個"創造性轉化"的可能？對此，許多新儒家的大家，還有林毓生、金耀基等先生－他們談政治的部分比較少－都持類似立場。因此，吾人不免質疑：若真要追溯、涵泳於中華文化之中，理解的層次不應僅限於表象、靜態層面，更應深入內在，探索其創造轉化之可能。綜合上述，個人對本書的第一個疑問是，傳統是否絕對制約當代？如果是，那麼吾人所關照的傳統，是否內涵創造轉化的可能？

個人的第二個問題是，"以帝國詮釋傳統中國"是否合適？答案當然見仁見智，但本書相關論證，恐不免失之片面。作者似乎發現，封建帝國背後的儒家文化，仍潛藏不少正面因子，例如歷朝氣象清明者，在其"政體"與"道統"之間，常具一定緊張關係（如甘懷真氏著書）。或因作者未採"同情理解"，以致對傳統"創造轉化"的可能，始終視而未見。

其次，本書固然重徵引，唯其涉及"中華帝國"的描繪，則多出自早年－尤其費正清先生一輩－西方學者。後者對傳統中國的解讀，較諸一些近晚的詮釋，其局限相當明顯。一般而言，早期的解讀，較側重帝國的集權統治，而後來的著述，則多強調前者的力所不及②。例如，有學者主張，傳統中國在"中央國家"之外，還保有極

②當然，嚴格說來，農業帝國奉行"均富、教化"理念、資本主義國家追求"重商、發展"，所設目標既

③固然，國家能力恐怕無法一概而論。
為活躍的「地方社會」（可参考 Gary Hamilton 的文集）；當然，也有學者認爲，傳統中國的國家—社會之間，一向存在積極能動的「第三領域」（如黃宗智等所持）。因此，若將「傳統中國」視為「中華帝國」，不免將忽略帝國之外的生機與能動—此無疑為前述「環境刺激」的源頭、「創造轉化」的活水。

舉例而言，若僅專注「老大政權」本身，漠視民間的自主，吾人恐難確切掌握台灣的轉化過程，也難以前瞻未來的未來走向。此原因有二。首先，台灣自能起步於「帝國」傳統，且相較中共統一，兩蔣無疑更深地封建習氣，國府故能步步前行，中共何須受制於「帝國」傳統？其次，論及台灣的轉型空間，誰能忽視八〇年代的社會運動？換言之，即便「封建」如國府者，仍不免為回應民間訴求，因而有所超越變通，吾人何能漠視民間社會的力量？綜合上述，作者何須以「帝國」看待傳統中國？且屢屢凸顯中共的「帝國」本色，輕忽政權與民間的實際互動及其因而創新的新機？此個人第二份的不解。

個人最後一個問題是，吾人究應自「特殊性」抑或「共通性」著眼，來理解當代的中國？這跟譚教授指引當時所提的「文化角度」與「社會觀點」是深刻相關的。因為對多數「比較政治」學者而言，中國所面對的問題—以及解決問題的辦法—其實大同小異於多數開發中國家。但另方面，仍保留數數衆的學者，主張自獨特的中國文化切入，分析當代中國的特殊問題。兩立場見仁見智，難分高低。

譚教授的觀點，無疑立基於中共政權的特殊性。只是論及其種種問題，卻又無法相區隔於其他第三世界的威權體制。就此而言，本書所處理的當代問題，恐難充份展現所採「文化角度」的必要性。此外，另一個可能存在的弱點是，若將他一比較，則中國所面對的形勢，恐怕一點都較他國還嚴峻。此亦個人無法同意中國區「悲觀論」之處。此個人最後一部份的質疑。

針對本書，雖然個人仍有部份疑問。但無論如何，如洛杉磯時報獎所代表者，論及當代中國，本書確甚具有成功、重要、而且極富挑戰性的著作。

事實上，若自「東方學」（Orientalism）的角度著眼，將此書視作西方詮釋中國的典型案例，以其內容為「文本」，展開二度、後設的解讀，亦必饒富趣味。正如本書的副題所言，What It Means for the United States（此對象當然也可被改為 Americans 或 Westerners），我們從書中可以清楚看到，西方人將預設何種立場去理解「非西方」的中國。另方面，就個人直覺而言，譚氏分析中國的立論，似乎以中共「反封建」的革命修飾符號？這樣的出發點，是否延續自五四氛圍，透過同情共產革命的費正清，再轉移到嫡傳弟子譚若思身上？果然如此，則本書或可被視為研究六〇至八〇年代間美
國「中國觀察」界的驚點，吾人當可從中了解，此一社群如何與其過想了解的對象，展開「修辭分享」的關係。當然從這點來看，就「封閉傳統」的觀點，去批判革命政權的所作所為，似有特別的質疑。

我的發言到此為止，謝謝。
主持人：

谢谢彭教授的发言。现在请李教授谈谈您的看法。

李教授：

谭教授这本书对中国的批判和反思，让人印象深刻。作为一位来自台湾的学者，对谭教授这本书，今天我提供几点评论供大家共同讨论。

我读这本书时，看到国二一个字，感觉到这件事情。在我们的认知中，帝国主义总是被马克思主义或社会改良用作批判资本主义。今天帝国或帝国主义的字眼会出现在中国的讨论中，我感到一个概念真的是被建构的，而且它具有相当现实的历史相对意义。

如果我没有记错，老子说到世界上有一句名言－「以家观家，以国观国，以大观大」。这句话的意思是说从家到国、从天上，每个层次的境界是地位自己独特的属性，而且每个层次都拥有独特的替代、转换、化约作其他层次的利益。

我还记得特别提到，如果一个国家是一个帝国的话，作为现在形式的中国，它表现的形式跟过去很不一样。而且如果一个国家是一个帝国，基本上它是在追求主权的实现。如果从历史上发展过来的国家，仍然被设定是一个帝国，如果它做为一个帝国被批判、被反思的话，其实我们更应该去批判、去反思到底人类对主权的追求合理不合理？是不是人类对主权的追求到了应该被反思的地步？

今天我们批判、反思中国是一个帝国的时候，其实要更深一层的去反思主权的概念是不是可以做为人类继续追求的一个目标？如果对主权的追求，最后在各种条件的配合下变成帝国的话，那就表示追求主权是具有高度的独占性和排他性。我了解这种发展，也许真的就是人类必须思考的方向。再提到一个例子，现在欧盟又东扩，涵盖很多国家。欧洲正在向帝国的主权的一条路，可是它在某种意义上也可以被视为新型的帝国。我要特别提到，如果欧盟做为一个新形式的帝国，中华在追求主权的情境下变成帝国，两者之间的差异性其实相当大。不管是不是美国决策者或美国学者，如何去看欧盟或帝国，以及中国被当成帝国的差异性，我想这是值得深思的问题。

我个人认为，谭教授在解释中国例子时，非常想深刻的去理解中国，甚至是重建中国历史。这也并没有什么对错，因为历史本来就是被建构的。如果建构成功，后来中国历史可能就跟着这样走。但是在解释中国历史，同时要重新理解中国的时候，就涉及到国与国之间，或世界不同族群之间是否可能他理解的问题。人类要面对的不只是相互理解，而且要在相互理解的基础上相互接受。多元主义其实充满矛盾的，应该发展出「你不经过我我不理解你」，或者「我不经过别人不理解我」。更重要的是，如何能够通过宣示「可以相互理解」的基础上，彼此相互接受。在普通的男女之间、族群之间、社会生活之间，这是一个基本的命题，但也是一个非常严肃的课题。
現在中國正在進行一個「和平崛起」的政治經濟工程，它正在尋找各種論述來保護它的崛起。如果美國學者或美國決策者，面對所謂「和平崛起」的中國，純粹把它理解為帝國的話，我認為只是從二元對立的方式去理解，無助於問題的解決。如果要展現一個更積極的後現代精神，應該容許多元的存在，進一步相互接受。

人類未來的和平、良性秩序統一世界上的這些強權，包括美國、中國、歐盟、俄羅斯在內。如果這些強權仍停留在傳統主權的思維下，我認為走不出這個路來。中國也可批評美國是個帝國，甚至美國批評歐盟是一個新形式的帝國，中國也批評歐盟是另外一種新形式的帝國。互相批判為帝國，對問題有解決嗎？我認為沒有。人類現在最嚴重的問題就是互相批評為帝國的時候，其實是在爲自己所屬的群體即將成爲一個帝國而辯護。這樣子是解決不了問題的。

現在回到我一開始提到的「以家觀家，以國觀國，以天下觀天下」這句話，我們必須承認全球的利益完全不能只從美國中心或中國中心或歐洲中心去界定。如果只從自己的本土主義理解如何重建世界的秩序或和平，我認爲是不會有結果的。反而會重複循環不同的形式的排他現象，製造各種形式的異端。最後，我做爲一個台灣的住民，對譚教授的分析，在情感上是認同的。深層閱讀這本書之後，我提出以上的想法就教於各位。謝謝！

主持人：

謝謝四位與談人的發言。現在請國關中心丁永康副教授發言。

丁永康教授：

基本上研究中國有二派，一派叫唱衰論，一派叫振興中華論。二派仍在辯論中，各說各話。我從理論與實務面來講，因爲我個人覺得中共政權不會衰敗。以SARS來講，中國的控制能力是非常強的。我看了「中國即將崩潰」後即反問，該書作者是否有考慮到中共控制的能力？控制跟崩潰是二種力量在競賽的。傳統中國怎麼崩潰？清朝明朝中華民國在大陸怎樣崩潰？那個東西會不會發生在中華人民共和國上？中國人歷史的研究，外國人是絕對無法比的，外國人對歷史研究的比較透徹的，他認爲如果能在四十年到五十年把反腐敗搞好的話，這基本上是一個長命的政權。今天的中國共產黨一直要把自己比喻成清朝，像康乾乾，尤其是雍正王朝。

傳統中國是一個家天下，現在的中共是一個黨天下。黨天下的繼承人一定在政治局常委中挑出來的，江澤民是從政治局委員裡挑出來的，其他都是從政治局常委裡面挑出來的，基本上也是符合傳統中國挑繼承人的問題。那我要說的問題是。今天的中國人民共和國，會不會跟傳統中國的政權性質有雷同的地方？這也就是我認爲中共政權在短期內不會崩潰，說不定是一個長命政權，而台灣要如何應付這個一個長命且日益強大的政權？
主持人：

现在是否请谭若思教授综合前面几位教授的观点，谈谈您的回应。

谭若思教授：

Thanks to distinguished colleagues for their learned attention to my book. It is my honor to participate in the seminar with them. Most participants raised important points, which I cannot do full justice to in my brief final remarks.

Prof. Shi (石之瑜教授) does not engage much with the themes of "Yi Zhong diguo da meng." As in a criticism of me in "Lienhe bao," he is like a man with a head ache and a sprained ankle who calls the Fire Brigade to complain. His head ache is Iraq and Afganistan. His sprained ankle is Chen Shui-bian. But he directs his pain toward "Yi zhong diguo da meng"- attacking the Fire Brigade for not helping his head and ankle.

Actually, the role of Beijing's dictatorial political system, my book's theme, in determining Taiwan's future should concern him. But it does not. Instead, his emotions are unhinged over his head ache of Iraq and his sprained ankle of Chen Shui-bian. Nor does he mention Tibet or Xinjiang. How can he weigh whether the PRC is an empire or not with no attention to these areas?

The issue of Chinese tradition's relation to Chinese communism is an important one. All Shi can do is call me a racist for even venturing to analyze it. Actually, despite his prattle about Orientalism, I am a universalist. The problem with the political system in Beijing is not that it's Chinese but that its autocratic.

The drama of China yesterday, today, and tomorrow is mostly about universals, not about an essentialized Chinese tradition. Han Fei is a universal voice for a tough politics just as is Thomas Hobbes. Ming subjugation of Yunnan and Qing subjugation of Xinjiang was similar to British subjugation of India or Japan subjugation of Korea. The 6/4 moment in Beijing was a universal one. The pro-democracy students' references to Gandhi and Jefferson were universal notes. The dictatorship's tanks, likewise, spoke a universal language of saying "No" to voices from below. Forget Orientalism. End this boring talk about racism.

Shi questions my motives at every turn. He says I'm "angry" that Chinese empire does not accord with modernization theory, but I never broached modernization theory, nor am I attached to it. Most ridiculous, he says I came to Taiwan in the spring to inject an anti-China perspective into Taiwan domestic politics! I am an author of a book and my only aim was to have the book read by as many interested readers as possible.

Almost as amusing is his idea that I criticize the Chinese empire to divert attention
from the crimes of the American empire! This little game of who is "big witch" and who "little witch" is kindergarten stuff. It's also nothing to do with the book under discussion. You also have to wonder, if the US is as evil as Shi claims, why so many tens of thousands of Chinese and Taiwan want to go there to study.

AD: Shi thinks Mao's talk of "Taiwan nationality" has no implication for Taiwan's potential nationhood, because at the time Mao spoke Taiwan was not controlled by China but by Japan. Actually Mao's statement was extra significant precisely because he was then at one removed from Taiwan's situation. This passage shows Shi's inability to conceive that any Chinese polity could possibly be colonial.

Often he quotes me wrongly. Once is serious: he says I equate Al Qaeda and Beijing. I actually said: "Jiang and Hu Jintao never face the voting choice of the Chinese people, any more than does Al Qaeda's head Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda will kill anyone; PRC executes to punish particular behavior. But there is no accountability in either case. The Chinese state is at once a foe of the anarchy of wanton terrorism and a semi-terrorist outfit itself." Shi chose to omit the crucial distinction that Al Qaeda kills indiscriminately. He is confused about the meaning of terrorism. The inadvertent killing of civilians in warfare is not the same as the random murder of innocents for a political purpose.

No one can deny bad behavior by the American military in Iraq. But from that Shi, in LHB, leaps to Bush's belligerence, ignorant and arrogant American intellectuals such as me, my interference in Taiwan politics, and damage to Cross Strait Relations. This emotional chain is just an excuse for not analyzing each issue seriously.

He underplays the meaning of Taiwan's democracy for Chinese civilization and (in his LHB article) scoffs that a gap between dictatorship and democracy does not explain Beijing's hostility to Taiwan. He is wrong. Taiwan democracy is a danger to the Beijing party-state, because Beijing is afraid its own people might get democratic ideas. He doesn't seem to believe in Taiwan's democracy. "If we really were a country based on human rights," he sneers, "We would draw a clear line between ourselves and racists like Ross Terrill." Oh. Perhaps he does not believe in the democratic political process, only in the victory of his side? In the seminar he even hints at a dark parallel between the Chinese empire and another regime just as bad - in this case Taiwan.

Shi should be concerned with Beijing's ambitions. Instead he attacks American ambitions. Many ordinary Taiwan folk I met are very concerned about the new Chinese empire's build up of offensive weapons in Fujian, even if their professors have weightier matters on their minds.

Really, the Chinese state and the American are two different topics. But let me say this: when the US makes a mistake, the people have a chance at the next election to correct it with a new set of leaders. And when the US intervenes militarily, it does not stay
to colonize. Yet Beijing, since the Qing Dynasty, has colonised Tibet, Xinjiang, and other places.

No one can deny the reach and influence of the USA beyond its borders. But this "hegemony," as Beijing calls it, is mostly the result of the free choice of individuals. The forces that promote "American hegemony" are immigration to the U.S. from the entire world, open information, technological prowess, the appeal of American popular culture, and a free market. Both the US and the PRC are multicultural, but in different ways. The multicultural character of American society is mediated to the level of government by the votes of individuals. In an empire, the "natives" (British empire style) or "minorities" (USSR or PRC empire styles) are building blocks within a higher design from the imperial center.

No country, not China, nor Japan, nor Russia, is imperial by nature. Between the 1930s and the 1960s, Japan changed from a hard-edged, dissatisfied empire to a well-behaved, prospering democratic nation. One day a liberalized China will shed its imperial role and mentality.

Shi's last sentence is sad. Elections in Taiwan are just "technically" democratic. He is correct, in a way: democracy is about elections and rules. The intellectual zealot or academic snob wants democracy to be an outcome, so that HIS vision of the world will come to pass. But it is not so. Democracy is a method for a free people to handle its differences. It doesn't guarantee a fully happy outcome each time. But the self-realization of the individual - don't intellectuals value that? - can ask nothing less than just that freedom to choose.

Prof. Xiao (萧高彦教授) has given a close reading to my book and an accurate and rich summary of its themes. He grasps my analogy between the Confucian-Legalist dichotomy, on the one hand, and the Marxism- Leninism dichotomy on the other. This explains the adaptation by the PRC of the use of law and doctrine in authoritarian rule - it rebuts the simple-minded points about "tradition" raised by some other speakers.

Although Prof. Xiao finds the book lacking in rigor, he has engaged with its themes in a civilized fashion, for which I thank him. It is possible that I have treated the relation of culture and power in dynastic China too much in the light of modern states - that is a risk in bringing history and the PRC period into mutual examination. Prof. Xiao gives no concrete examples so I leave the matter there.

On his second point, it is not fruitful to choose between seeing Mao's dictatorship as belonging to the variety seen in the West starting in the 19th century, or belonging to Chinese autocratic tradition. I have argued that it was a blend of Lenin and aspects of the Chinese autocratic tradition. Nowhere do I say, as some contributors seem to think, that what Mao took from the Chinese past was the essential Chinese past, or the best of the
Chinese past, or the essence of Chinese culture.

On Prof. Xiao's third point: it is not an easy question to assess the relative authoritarianism of the Mao era and various Chinese reigns such as that of Qin Shihuang. I take the view that the control in Maoist China was probably tighter than in nearly all Chinese dynasties, but it remains a question subject to different views.

I do not think it is law-plus-charisma, but law-plus-doctrine, that provides the essential blend of PRC authoritarianism. It it were the former, after Mao's death, Deng would not have been able to maintain the Chinese Communist state as he did.

Finally, Xiao wants more theory and less popularization. This and the view of Prof. Keng (耿飆教授) that my writing is clear and transparent cancel each other out! I suppose both cannot be correct.

Prof. Keng Shu is careful, stimulating, and fair to my book. He makes an interesting comparison with He Qinglian's book and Gordon Chang's book. In a sense, says Keng, "Yi Zhong diguo da meng" is more "pessimistic" than the other two because it offers a "predestined" fate for the Communist political system. Yet this is just another way of giving structure to the proximate issues that He and Chang deal with. To use an earthquake metaphor, I have offered the "fault lines" of the system. An economist or a journalist can demonstrate what will bring the final pressure to provide the occasion of the earthquake, and perhaps say when this will come.

My purpose in the book was not, despite Xiao's impression, polemical or political. It was, as Keng suggests, to illumine the nature of the PRC state, especially its debt to China's past. But I say to all the distinguished discussants, do not overlook that I call the PRC state a Leninist-imperial state. The focus in this symposium is on the imperial. That has struck a nerve, perhaps, because people of Chinese descent are uneasy with the idea that their culture has produced autocracy. Do not be uneasy! All the ancient polities were autocratic. The difference in the Chinese case is that it endured so long and became part of the modern scene also. But please, in addition, pay attention to the impact in China of Stalin and Lenin.

As for Keng's worry about a "static" or "teleological" approach to tradition, there is certainly such a danger when a political scientist dares to bring past and present together. However, recall five points. I did not start with the past; I was led to the past by my research on Mao Zedong, who, inescapably, directed me to Chinese tradition by virtue of his obsession with Qin Shihuang, Zhu Geliang, and other figures and events from old China.

Second, "Yi Zhong diguo da meng" is at pains to say China was NOT unchanging, and Chinese tradition was extremely various. Prof. Shi complains that I say "China has an unchanging nature." What I do say is that certain institutions (e.g. dynasties,
emperors) and certain imperial mentalities reasserted themselves and reinvented themselves throughout Chinese history, despite periods of massive interruption; that is simply a fact. I also point out that the CCP only draws on those aspects of Chinese tradition which suit it.

Third, the legacy of the past is appropriated as the current tasks of governance lead today's political leaders to solve familiar, recurrent problems. The geography of China, for example, itself draws a Beijing leader toward techniques of control and mystification used by past emperors.

Fourth, I acknowledge the forces for change, including environmental factors and forces from outside China, that Keng mentions. This is one reason why I insist that the PRC HAS TO CHANGE because the contradictions building up between politics and the socioeconomic reality are great. The teleologists are perhaps those who see the CCP's monopoly on political power continuing indefinitely into the future.

Fifth, the Chinese political system's roots in the past will complicate any future effort at democracy. In this respect, I suggest my colleagues glance at Russia's troubles from the direction of its double past, one Communist and one Tsarist.

At the end Keng wonders if my position is not similar to the CCP's "anti-feudal" revolutionary rhetoric. Leaving aside that the whole notion of feudalism in Chinese history has been overblown, especially by Marxists, this point has a wistful truth. In Chinese communism's origins at the time of the May Fourth Movement, the individual was valued and autocracy was opposed. Alas, by comparison with this period and the experiments with democracy and federalism of the early 20th century, 1949 was a counter-revolution that revived a half-dead Chinese autocracy. The "satire" Keng notes is in fact a tragedy: the dream of Communist liberation turned into its opposite of autocratic nightmare.

As an empirical matter, from the "sixties to the eighties" Western political science was never historical in its treatment of the PRC. That is one reason why "Yi Zhong diguo da meng" has shocked some people, including scholars in Taiwan. They are comfortably used to a brick wall between the study of Chinese history and the study of the PRC.

I thank Prof. Li (李英明教授) for his compliments and also for his candid, revealing reaction to my use of the term "empire" in discussing China. In saying this has hitherto been a Marxist way of criticizing the West, Li implies, correctly, that empirical work on China and empire - other than Western aggression - has been lacking. I welcome his surprise and suggest others learn from it. I hope Li's memory of Lao Zi is accurate for the saying he cites is striking.

Prof. Li is correct to say that the PRC does not appear to be an empire. The point is
of importance. China's anti-imperialist nationalism became a cloak for its own imperialism. At one and the same time Beijing wept for "lost" Hong Kong yet also repressed Tibet. This is why I speak of the PRC as half way between empire and modern nation.

Li's reflection on my use of empire's implication for our thinking about sovereignty is most interesting; as is his discussion of the EU in this connection. It raises the question - too big to go into here - whether the real successor-order to an age of imperialism will be more and more sovereign states, or some leap to "international community." Prasenjit Duara's work, of course, has much to teach us here.

I'm afraid Li's dream of multipolarity can not go far. In fact it has usually led to war. Yes, nations should treat each other with respect. But order or hierarchy has worked better for peace and stability than a collection of powers juggling places. Such multipolarity preceded both WW1 and WW2.

Nor does Prof. Li, or any of us, know how Beijing will behave when it is strong enough to reclaim all those territories it believed were once part of the Chinese realm. Meanwhile, please cast a glance at what China is doing to Burma. Hegemony anyone?

Li wants a world where "the world's interests" are not interpreted from any one center, whether American, China, the EU or wherever. Until we have true international authority, that does not seem possible. Meanwhile it is the US that is the least parochial great power. It happens to be the beacon of the two values that have carried all before them in recent decades: individual freedom and free markets. For that reason, for better or for worse, and certainly not for ever, the US takes the lead. I think we may be better off this way than under any immediately available alternative.

Prof. Ding raises the pessimism-optimism dichotomy, as does Keng. It has some validity but not much. I clarified my position by stating I am optimistic for China once it gets past a resolution of its political problem. It is hard to see how anyone who esteems China's civilization and people, as I do, could think China will be best served in its next phase by the Communist party-state as presently constituted.

Ding is skeptical that the PRC could "collapse" as did the Ming, Qing, and ROC in 1949. I would only say that, to my knowledge no dynasty or other regime in Chinese history has ever come to an end without violence. Does Ding assert that the monopoly on political power by the CCP will continue for ever?

Prof. Ding (丁永康教授) says the Chinese Communist party-state is strong. I agree. He says control and collapse are opposites and in a formal sense that is true. But in Chinese history as in all history, draconian control does not necessarily ensure long life for a regime. In modern times the democracies, which offer the safety valve of elections and free expression, have endured for decades and even centuries, while all modern
authoritarian regimes have had short or comparatively short lives.

I do not find that stability is to be found through authoritarian control. The lesson of modern history is different. The brittleness of dictatorship threatens stability, without the safety valve of freedom, collapse indeed can lie just around the corner.

I like Ding's idea of "jia tian xia" and "dang tian xia." I must say the latter appears to buttress my point that China is only halfway between empire and modern state. Short or long term survival is not a major issue. More germane is whether the change away from the CCP's monopoly on political power can be smooth or whether there will be a big bang.

A couple of broader issues to conclude. The gulf between a system "from above" versus a system "from below" is not well grasped by any of the discussants. This is where the imperial-Leninist system runs out of adaptability. Keng says a role for law and elections in the villages can appear in an authoritarian system. True, but these alone do not turn a system from above into a system from below. A "dang tian xia" outlook seems to me out of place in a world that has recently seen the collapse of most Communist governments.

I am a little surprised that scholars who live through the building of a polity from below in Taiwan do not have more historical vision about how important this is by comparison with a polity dictated by "heaven" or "history." The PRC is the last remaining multicultural empire. The second-last one was the Soviet Union. Beijing's hold over Tibet, for example, resembles Moscow's hold over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuanian in Soviet days. Historically, Beijing didn't try to rule distant peoples, but embraced many nearby ones into China. The PRC, similarly, does not HAVE an empire; it IS an empire. Perhaps for this reason many Chinese people, even distinguished professors, are unconscious of the imperial reach of the Chinese party-state.

主持人：

谢谢谭若思教授以及所有与会学者的参与。今天的讨论让我们更清楚地了解谭教授在书中的观点，以及台湾学者对于相关议题的相同或不同见解。由于时间的限制，我们的讨论到此结束，希望以后还有机会邀请大家共同参与《中国大陆研究》活动的活动。谢谢。