

Chapter II

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

News media do not operate in a social, political, economic, and ideological vacuum. Before facts can speak for themselves, they have to be selected and then situated within a framework of understanding (Tuchman, 1978; Parenti, 1986). In countries with totalitarian regimes control over mass media is much tighter (Zhao, 1998). But even in the most democratic countries “people need the invisible elite, which will lead them in a proper direction” (Media Education Foundation, 2003). So even in a democracy there is still the group of people who decides what is good and bad for the populace. While economic dependency of one country on another can also influence news coverage (Kenny, 1993; Tang & Chan, 1990; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Altschull, 1984; White, 1990), propaganda remains the factor that has the biggest impact on international news coverage (Herman, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Wang, 1995; Culadze, 2000; Kara-Murza, 2000; Krisko, 1999; Pochepcov, 2001). By comparing Taiwan’s and Mainland China’s coverage of Lee Teng-hui’s Japan visit, this study can help understand the differences of the media and the political systems across Taiwan Strait.

There is no society in the world in which one can not feel the influence of ideology (governments’ or editors’) in news reporting. Mass communication literature is replete with scholarship proposing that news is not merely a vehicle for transmitting facts about remote political events but a source through which institutionalized ideology is conveyed. Researches have demonstrated that this can be accomplished in mass media messages through the choice of words used to depict participants and events (Altheide, 1980; Fishman, 1980), the manner in which events are framed (Tuchman, 1978; Rachlin, 1988), the tone and emphasis of the report (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), the selection and omission of events (Davis, 1990), or through the use of typification and relationships to reify certain labels for persons, events, and situations (Adoni & Mane, 1984). We would apply these assumptions in our analysis of coverage of Lee’s

visit. Given that Taiwan and China pursue different goals, have their respective points of view on the cross-strait relations, it seems that, whether intended or not, news contains values or preference statements which through stylistic variations in lexicalizations and structure, ideology would be expressed and positions be promoted in both Chinese and Taiwanese newspapers, and differences in ideology can also appear among Taiwan newspapers. More detailed review of news making theorization and conceptualization can enlighten this and provide the basic for the designing the thesis's analysis.

I. THEORIES AND CONCEPTIONS ABOUT NEWS

1. STRUCTURAL FACTORS ON NEWS CONTENT

News content has been examined in terms of its dependence on economic factors, such as the relationship between sources coherent with financing and media (Kenny, 1993), and a country's international news coverage in terms of its economic dependence on other countries (Tang & Chan, 1990).

Shoemaker and Mayfield (1987) observed that the ideologies of people who finance the media determine media content. When the power elite completely finance the media, news content should reflect the ideas and values of the elites. When a newspaper receives financing or funding from other sources (not political), its content will most likely influenced by those sources (owners and advertisers). This appeared to be gradually happening in China since the mid-1980s when the media's state revenues dropped sharply as a portion of national income. The state still claimed rights to tell media what to do. But, with the state's budget in the red, it had scant spare money to give incentives for this (White, 1990). Thus, previously unimportant sources of funds for media, such as advertising, became more important than before. Changing content of Chinese (especially Shanghai) media in the 1980s was mostly related to the recent by emerging factor of audience. As constituencies expanded, and as their special interests became more recognized for their contributions to the economy, newspapers could occasionally follow

suit. White (1990) observed that China press on the example of Shanghai in 80s could be divided into three types: 1. “organ papers” (jiguan bao); 2. “influential papers”; 3. evening papers and other media that carry much community and entertainment news. The second type of papers is much more interesting for analysis. These papers’ budget partly relayed on advertisement. Their partial independence from Party was sometimes recognized to be a source of their high influence. The striking example here would be the *World Economic Herald*. In early 1989 the *World Economic Herald* made attempt to break the apathetic media atmosphere by reporting the student democracy movement (Yu, 1992). Being independent of Party financing, it not only began to provide more cultural and nonpolitical coverage, but gave people the opportunity to express their sympathy with the student democracy movement that had just begun in Tiananmen Square (Hsiao & Yang, 1990). The “Herald Incident”, which took place between April and May 1989, marks a milestone in the history of Chinese journalism.

Altschull (1984) believes that media can be financed in four different ways. In the *official* pattern, the state finances the media, and content is determined by rules, regulations and decrees. Some news media may be state enterprises, some may be directed by government regulations and some may be controlled under a network of licensing arrangements. No nation is free of official controls, which vary only in the degrees of autonomy permitted. In the *commercial* pattern, advertisers pay for the media, and the content reflects the views of advertisers and readers. Even under planned economies, some commercial influences can be detected, although they are exerted only indirectly. In the *interest* pattern, the content of the medium echoes the concerns of the financing source, such as a trade union or religious organization or any other body pursuing specific ends. In the *informal* pattern, media content mirrors the goals of relatives, friends or acquaintances who supply money directly or who exercise their influence to ensure that “the tunes of the one who pays the piper” are heard.

Not all the media in a country have the same relationship between piper and pay-master. Altschull recognizes that there are differences in the financing of different media and of different

media outlets within a country, even within such archetypal social system as the United States and the former Soviet Union. Moreover, one pattern may be combined with others and interact in various ways. Mass media systems will exhibit different types of financing relationships to varying degrees at different levels of the system and at different points in time.

In his analysis of the factors of international news coverage, Ostgaard (1965) argues that government influence, the ranking of a country, bilateral trade situation, cultural contacts, military and economic assistance are the major factors influencing the flow of international news.

One of the most widespread misunderstandings is that in a country with well developed democracy mass media channels will have complete freedom. People usually think that the most democratically developed country is USA, and all her media are free in deciding their editorial policies. To debunk this common myth, Robert W. McChesney (1997) and Eileen R. Meehan (2005) looked into the factors influencing the content of TV entertainment and news programs. They based their analysis on two widespread concepts which media use in excuse for their sometimes terrible choice of the TV program content, saying that they are just *windows* of the world, and *mirrors* of our souls. Thus, what we want to see- we get it. On the contrary, McChesney's and Meehan's research documented that it was Advertisers and the Big Five Companies, owners of the majority of United States media, (the Disney Company, General Electric, News Corporation, Time Warner, and Viacom) who consider what we will see and hear, what we need and what we must know. Advertisers are guided by their economic interest. At the same time the Big Five companies' heads decide which news we will see, and under what angle we must receive the information about the outside world. Many times, while taking these decisions they are guided not by consideration of covering an event as comprehensively as possible, but to show just the theme side of the coin which the elites want us to know. It appears obvious that even in the United States, considered by the whole world as the most democratic country, the elite's invisible hand is directing the general populace through news and entertainment.

Looking at the media as a business sphere, the major factors that affect the coverage of international news include ownership types, organizational resources, political ideology and professional ideology which often change in tandem with economic-political development (Seymour-Ure, 1974; Hoyer et al., 1975). Understanding of the structural factors which influence news content is very important for the present research. A close examination of the economic relationship between Taiwan and mainland China reveals that there may exist a inter-dependency relationship between the two sides. On the one hand, Taiwanese businessmen have built many factories and mills in the People's Republic of China, contributing to the latter's economic develop. On the other hand, Taiwan by situating major economical resources on the mainland has tied herself to China. There is not just a between-state dependency, but also all kind economical dependency of every single Taiwan businessman who has properties in China. It is no wonder that news coverage of both banks increases in Taiwan's and mainland China's media, subject to each's state policy and the economical interests of the media owners and advertisers.

While media set the agenda for the public, it is the power structure that sets the agenda for the media. Media coverage symbolizes, reproduces, and even dramatizes the distribution of social power. News, as Sigal (1986, p.29) writes, is "not what journalists think, but what their sources say". Although mass media perform a crucial transformative role, Hall (1982) argues, the primary definers of social reality are those whom the media turn to, i.e., their accredited sources in government and other determinant institutions. The media play in Woollacott's term, a role of "structured subordination" to the "primary definers", reproducing the "primary definitions" that come from the authorities (Woollcott, 1982). Structural-functionalists regard the media as an integral part of the overall social system in which powerful organizations, strata, groups and individuals have privileged access to the media. Gramscian Marxists see the media as the central loci of struggle for ideological hegemony waged both between and within unequal classes in society (Williams, 1977). The media may be relatively, even substantially,

autonomous in democracies but they are ultimately bounded by the larger structural relations of power.

2. THE PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES ON NEWS

Edward Herman first proposed a “propaganda model” in 1986 (Herman, 1986), and then refined the model with Noam Chomsky two years later (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). As Herman suggested, the term “model” was used because it is possible to stipulate a set of systematic behavioral actions and reactions of the media that are not necessarily formalized or quantified. They nonetheless impact or determine news content. Herman and Chomsky argued that the framework of this propaganda model operates in a world where media are private and formal censorship is absent. This model is powerful and controversial precisely because these media are assumed to be independent and free from political and economic control. As Hirsch and Gordon (1975) have pointed out, a free and representative press in a political democracy is expected to satisfy at least two criteria in order to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities, namely, full political independence from the government and a reasonable degree of commercial independence from the direct influence of the pressure groups and advertisers. The propaganda model, however, suggests that the mass media not only fail to meet those criteria, but sometimes even serve as instruments in campaigns of ideological or national interest mobilization.

News media do not operate in a social, political, economic, and ideological vacuum. Before facts can speak for themselves, they have to be selected and then situated within a framework of understanding (Tuchman, 1978; Parenti, 1986). The propaganda model proposed by Herman & Chomsky (1988, p.2) argues that there are five “news filters” operating in the news selecting process in the United States:

1. the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms;
2. advertising as the primary income source of the mass media;

3. the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and “experts” funded and approved by this primary sources and agents of power;
4. “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and
5. “anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism.

To examine the two important concepts of Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, political ideology and national interest, Shujen Wang (1995) compared and contrasted the *New York Times* and *Newsweek’s* coverage of the 1980 South Korean student demonstration and the 1989 Chinese student demonstrations. One of the most important findings of this study is that media serving, either intentionally or unintentionally, as instruments in ideological and national interest mobilization. Wang suggests that in a cold war context, ideology serves as a more important news factor than national interest in influencing the American media’s foreign news coverage.

However, Herman and Chomsky’s model can be applied only to the democratically developed countries, where there is no direct or rigid government control over the media. Concerning our research, this model could be applied only to Taiwan. Mainland China’s government uses the other methods of propaganda, which can be understood by referring to some of the theorizations and research made by Russian and Chinese scholars.

The term propaganda was widely used in the times of Cold War between the USSR and the USA. Much Russian research say that our emotions fall under the influence of propaganda’s attack on the psychological level. Analyzing the various emotions which propaganda can arose in people, Russian sociologist Culadze (2000) distinguishes positive from negative propaganda. *Positive (constructive) propaganda* brings different persuasions and convictions to consumer in an easy to understand form. The goal of positive propaganda is to improve social harmony, enhance mutual understanding, and provide education for people commonly adopted values. Positive propaganda fulfills educational, communicatory and explanatory functions. Positive propaganda does not pursue manipulation goals. On the other hand *Negative (destructive)*

propaganda imposes different persuasions on people, according to the principle “The goal excuses any methods”. The goal of negative propaganda is to kindle social animosity, escalate social conflicts, and intensify contradictions in the society. The creation an “enemy image” helps to close people around the propagandists, impose on the people their intended persuasions and stereotypes. The basic function of negative propaganda is the creation of illusions in the favor of the propagandists.

However, Culadze’s model of differentiating positive from negative propagandas is not without fault. For example, in reality the only difference between positive and negative propagandas is that the former does not use straight lies. While the latter manipulates the messages and hides some facts. At the same time, negative propaganda in the process of creating an “enemy image” sometimes can perform some positive functions, as during war times, closing all the people of one particular nation around the idea of defense against the enemy.

On basis of varying goals of propaganda’s psychological influence, Kara-Murza (2000) and V.G. Krisko (1999) proposed the following forms of propaganda:

- *Propaganda of creation*- It promotes the construction of a new society, and induces all the people to take part in this process of creation;
- *Propaganda of firmness and heroism*- It calls upon all the people to withstand the fortitude costs of the process of building a new society, demonstrate heroism and self-sacrifice, and, on their examples, propagate mass heroism;
- *Propaganda of education*-It informs about actions of the government, leaders or the party; informs about economic and military power of a particular state; promotes one certain type of life (for example Capitalist or Socialist); presents one certain system of values as the only correct one;
- *Propaganda of destruction*- It is aimed at the ideology of a hostile state, attempting to convince its citizens that the system of values of this hostile state is deeply vicious

and faulty; and the canonized people are nothing but mentally diseased or worse, even criminals;

- *Propaganda of division*- It unleashes national, religious, social conflicts;
- *Propaganda of frightening*- It frightens leadership and civilians of the other country by demonstrating or proclaiming economic and military power of their state;
- *Propaganda of despair*- It accents bad economic and social situation in the other (hostile) country so as to convince the people that the hostile government does not care and does not pay attention to the needs of its society;

Modern world history has informed us that all or one of these propaganda models have been applied at one time or another by countries of nearly all types.

Propaganda has also been divided into white, grey and black according to the sources of information it uses (Pochepcov, 2001):

- *White propaganda*- It quotes official sources (for example, refers to the information from the government organs). This kind of propaganda appears to be undisguised, uses checked data and does not mask its goals;
- *Grey propaganda*- It does not always reveals its sources of information, but uses both checked and non-checked data. It tries to juggle opinions with facts to thrust forward the source's own opinions, conclusions and views;
- *Black propaganda*- It always hides its real sources of information; sets misleading mass consciousness as its main goal.

All these propaganda types exist in modern times even in democratic countries, such as when a TV channel or newspaper is lobbying the official point of view (white propaganda), or to create a feeling of sensation (grey propaganda). At the same time, black propaganda is widespread in countries with authoritarian regimes.

The central place in propaganda theory is the so-called *propaganda message*- the information fulfilled in a proper and appropriate manner in accordance with propaganda goals. According to L. Voitasyk (1981), there are two elements which propaganda message must have:

1. Saturated information about facts and their estimation from the propaganda side.
The most important part of the propaganda message is facts, they reflect intentions and ideas of the communicator and the recipient's needs;
2. Slogan (or call), the goal of which is to unite people around one issue or idea.
Slogan (or call) always contains some directions on the action which is expected from the people to whom this message intend to reach;

Facts used in the propaganda message can be divided into established, distorted, and false (Repko, 2000). For the propagandist, "facts" are just building materials which have no independent value. Separate and disconnected facts can be combined or juxtaposed together in one entirely by constantly repeating them. Frequently, the propaganda message is camouflaged under everyday ordinary discussions. Or, vice versa, it could be presented in a bright, vivid form, which draws away attention from the content of the message. Almost every propaganda message is built in such a way, as its interested addressee (recipient) and the interests of the addresser (communicator) are hidden in the message. Thus, there exist two levels in the propaganda message: *superficial* and *deep-laid* (Pochepcov, 2003). On the superficial level the message is built from the addressee's position, while on the deep-laid level the message is built from the position of the addresser's interests.

As in the former USSR, propaganda has been presented in mainland China's policy and media news reporting. To talk about the China Communist propaganda and the party's policy toward media, the Communist ideology must be understood first. Following Yu (1964) we can define four basic elements of communist ideology, which were formulated earlier in the 1950s and 1960s:

1. *Class Consciousness* is one of the fundamental concepts of the propaganda and agitation systems. Because the Chinese Communist revolution is a process of class struggle, the purpose of propaganda is to “awaken, heighten, and sharpen the class consciousness of the masses”.

2. *Mass Line*. “The fundamental policy of the Party”, as was announced in *People’s Daily*, “is the policy of mass line”. It is a policy to which almost every Communist Party member refers in almost every speech for every occasion, talking about the “harmonious unity with the masses”, “the viewpoint of the masses”, “wisdom of the masses”, “sanction of the masses”, etc.

3. *The United Front* is important because it suggests not only the direction of Communist propaganda but also some of the strategic and tactical principles of mass persuasion.

4. *Unity of Theory and Practice*. “If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution”, declared Mao in his article entitled *On Practice* “you must participate in the revolution... All truths are obtained through direct experience”.

These were at least the basics of ideology that served the Chinese Communist Party well up to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and during its early years. There was much theoretical discussion of the relationship between the mass media and the Chinese Communists political culture under the angle of the ways in which the Party used the communication system to mobilize and control the population, to raise the level of political consciousness, and to accelerate the making of the Maoist Man and a modern China (Pye, 1979). Through mass media the Communist party very often used and still tries to use the method of propaganda of firmness and heroism: they build a lot of “model heroes” through which the Party tries to convey and set the examples for the masses. Authorities have used and controlled writers at each turn in the Party’s line. The control was tight and ubiquitous. Though the reforms and open-up launched by Deng Xiaoping since the late 1970s have led to some degree of loosening up of the tight control. However, the Party still succeeds almost every time to control the mass media with more flexible strategies and tactics, although media outlets now pursue market interests more than the Party’s ideology or policy.

Inasmuch as the state monopolizes “correct” legal interpretations, the media could only uphold state policy and ideology. Enforcing ideological conformity and muting dissents are among the key roles of the Chinese media. Media persuasion in China appears to be backed by coercive state power. Its media rarely tolerate deviation from the official policy and obviously do not play the “public” role in the classical and idealized Anglo-American sense in which people are engaged in rational discourse about issues of major consequence. In fact, the very concept of a “public sphere” may be dubious in China, where the primarily top-down media are conduits, interpreters, and enforcers of legal and policy pronouncements.

Tighter press control briefly returned after the aborted democracy moments in Spring 1989. With the waves of economic enthusiasm sweeping across China since 1992, when restrictions in *nonpolitical* areas were being relaxed. More and more newspapers in their search for economic profit understand that they have to satisfy the public by meeting its needs. More market rules and independent-opinion articles appeared, although they were mostly on *social or entertainment* topics. Ideology and propaganda are still prevailing in newspapers’ political columns, especially in party-run newspapers.

However, instead of directly defying state ideology in the post-1989 decade, the media have learned to invent a set of more innovative and devious approaches for coping with the terms of having to please “two masters”- the party and the public (Lee, 2000), they have improvised a variety of seemingly paradoxical strategies to stimulate audience interest without stepping beyond official bounds. Journalistic culture has changed considerably since the 1980s (Polumbaum, 1990). Newspaper editors confess in private that their front pages endorse planned economy, their second to eighth pages support mixed economy, and their ninth to sixteenth pages advocate market economy. This situation was unimaginable before the beginning of the 1990s.

Zhou He (2000) argues that China’s party press is now being transformed from a strict mouthpiece into what he calls the “Party Publicity Inc.” Its present chief mission is to promote

the party's images and legitimacy by means of softened messages rather than full-scale ideological indoctrination and brainwashing of the people. The outer ideological limits remain to be set by party, but within them the press has gained greater room for maneuvering. This is especially prominent in *nonpolitical* spheres and in mass circulation metro (dushi- 都市) dailies.

Propaganda considerations and market attentions would inform that there should be some variations in covering Lee Teng-hui's visit to Japan in 2007 in China's different newspapers although the basic key should remain the same. While in Taiwan the newspapers are expected to exhibit the overall ideological diversity of the island and their publishers. This thesis shall document these similarities and differences in its data and analysis.

3. FRAMING

Framing is an unavoidable part of the process of manufacturing news from everyday reality. When journalists seek to organize and make sense of what happens, they engage in a cognitive process called news framing (Parson & Xu, 2001). Framing is an important act because it has the potential to influence public opinion about a reported occurrence and the people involved in it (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). What people think about a mediated event and how they act on that news depend partly on the facts that journalists choose to play up or down in their reports (Massey, 2000).

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) argue that news is a socially constructed reality that imperfectly reflects whatever objective reality journalists are reporting. The same as a newswork routine, framing takes place when journalists "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text" (Entman, 1993, p.52). Entman also found news frames to be both mentally stored principles for information processing (e.g., the Cold war frame long imposed internationally) and characteristics of the news text. For example, Entman found that the US media depicted the US downing of an Iranian passenger plane as a mistake, while the Soviet downing of a Korean passenger plane as a moral outrage (Entman, 1991).

Through keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and images emphasized in a news narrative, Entman said “frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so- and others entirely invisible” (p.7). Typically, a news story is built by parsing the gathered facts into two categories: those that will become a story and those that will be kept tucked away in the reporter’s notebook (Massey, 2000).

The potential impact of framing can not be underestimated. “One of the media’s most powerful effects is setting the agenda by choosing what (themes) to emphasize... ignore or suppress” (Ashley & Olson, 1998, p.263). How a news story is framed- which themes are embedded into it- contributes to the public’s interpretation and opinion of events that they cannot witness directly (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tuchman, 1978). The thematic emphases that journalists built into their stories provide audiences with cues for making sense of the reported event (Goffman, 1974).

Teun A. Van Dijk (1988) in his work on framing analysis says that there are three major aspects of discourse: sentence forms, meaning, and speech acts. He argues that we have to operate not only on what may be called a microlevel of description: sounds, words, sentence patterns, and their meanings, but also on a macrosemantic level with “macrosyntax”, which for the most news stories, is characterized by the inverted pyramid structure and by the rules of source attribution. An inverted pyramid refers to a sequential organization of structural elements, such as headline, lead, episodes, background, etc. The signifying power of these elements varies in the same descending order. For example, the headline is the most salient cue to activate certain semantically related concepts in the readers’ minds; it is thus the most powerful framing device of the syntactical structure. A lead is the next most important device to use. A good lead will give a story a newsworthy angle, suggesting a particular perspective to read and view the event reported.

Framing also could be explained by influence of a nation’s major political ideology. Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998, p.150) found that “the dominant ideology of the

nation...appeared to function as a major source of framing' in American and mainland Chinese newspaper coverage of a widely publicized international conference. They defined "dominant ideology" as the shared worldview and values of a national majority. And they suggested that its effect on journalists framing choices could be filtered through another source of ideological influence- journalists' occupation norms. These two researches also acknowledge the potential influence of "elite ideology", which they define as the values that a governing political party or coalition seeks to instill through its public policies. They note that these values are often scarcely different from those shared by a majority of the polity.

Pan and Kosicki (1993) in their work on framing analysis conceive news text as consisting of four structural dimensions: syntactical, script, thematic, and rhetorical. They assume that framing analysis as an approach to analyzing news discourse mainly deals with how public discourse about public policy issues is constructed and negotiated. Pan and Kosicki argue that framing analysis have to pay close attention to the systematic study of political language, the coin of the realm in political communication that is often ignored or only dealt with in a highly abstract manner.

Given the different political and media philosophies and structures, it can be expected that the framing of Lee Teng-hui's visit to Japan, as a politically sensitive topic, would be different among the media of the two places.

4. MEDIA, POLICY MAKERS AND PUBLIC IN MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN

As has been discussed above, mass media do not exist in a political and social vacuum. They are "players" in this news creating process, with each taking its respective part. An understanding of these "players", their roles, and their relationship, shall inform on the nature of news coverage by media in Taiwan and China.

James F. Larson and Jiande Chen's comparative study (1992) looks generally at the contemporary relationships among the media, foreign policy and public opinion. Their study

touches upon five aspects in the process of choosing and covering international news: The Media, Policymakers, The Public, Events and Processes, and The Press-Policy Relationship. It then argues that the contemporary context demands additional attention to both transnational processes and cultural context. Each of the process's components which influences on the news content deserves more detailed discussion with reference to the politics and media in Taiwan and China.

The Media- The present study also builds on earlier work by Cohen (1963), who examined the observer, participant and catalyst roles of the press in relationship to foreign policy. Cohen referred to the competing demands for privacy in diplomacy and negotiation versus openness and publicity in news reporting as "...the massive central issue..." in debates among scholars, politicians and journalists about the role of media in foreign policy. Since the public have to rely on the media for information and views about outside environment, conceptual approaches which treat the news as political narrative (Bennett & Edelman, 1985) and constructed reality stems have gained popularity.

According to *Taiwan Yearbook 2006*, Taiwan has more than 100 registered newspapers with about 30 being published regularly. About 4.5 million copies are printed daily. With a population of about 23 million and more than 100 newspapers, Taiwan has become one of the richest media societies in the world. When press restrictions were lifted in 1988, 70 new newspapers entered the market. At the same time appeared political parties other than the ruling government party. All these dramatic changes have led to a new concept of media role: *social common carrier* (Zhu, 1991). Pan (1989) notes, "although the media are privately owned, audience never see the press as someone's private property, but a symbol of social justice and ethics". However, some scholars and observers argue that nothing had happened in Taiwan's press, but just the change of the "owner". Before 1988 there was KMT who showed the direction of covering to the press, and nowadays, it is the owners of the newspaper or the advertisers.

There are more than 2,000 newspapers in mainland China. The press system in China mirrors the main policy' line. Under CCP monopoly of politics and state ownership or dominance of the economy, the Chinese press is virtually a branch of the Party and government. Even the "private" media feel the Party's great influence. Media spread and propagate the leadership's policy, coupled with explanations and examples, to the masses. Thus, the government tries to mobilize the public to participate in its development programs. Some newspapers still are trying to provide some alternative, opposite-to party points of view, or dilute the propaganda in their coverage. They have to do it under a high level of camouflage or otherwise face possible detentions and pressures.

The Policymakers- Also need to be sharply defined are the roles played by elected or appointed government officials in the media-foreign policy relationship. Cohen (1963) suggests that the press acts as a participant in the policy process both by providing information to policymakers and by receiving information from them. The reverse formulation is that policymakers depend on the media to learn what is happening in the world and also use the media as a primary means to convey policies to both policymakers and the public at home and abroad. It is also too easy to place the emphasis mostly or entirely on one side or another of the press- policymaker relationship, usually in favor of media influence on policy.

In Mainland China the ruling and dominant party is the Communist Party that decides on all issues of foreign policy. No other alternative source of power exists in the country. Political power, on the other hand, in Taiwan has been divided between the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Chen Shui-bian, a DPP member, took office as President in 2000, ending more than 50 years of Kuomintang rule in Taiwan. Although only one ruling party is governing Taiwan, the other parties and people there have always had the opportunity to speak out and participate in the political life.

The Public- The role of the public is also very important to any theory of the media and foreign policy. In a democratic political system the assumption is that an enlightened public will

receive politically important information through the press and in turn will provide input to policymakers.

The population of Mainland China is nearly 1.3 billion people. The population of Taiwan is about 23 million- almost 50 times less than China's. The first Taiwanese democratic presidential election was held in March 1996. Since then Taiwan people have got an opportunity to influence and participate in their political life. In Mainland China for nearly 60 years there has been no election in its contemporary democratic sense. The Chinese people have little power to influence the decisions made by their policymakers. More and more people in both places also feel the need to operate and have an access to worldwide information through the Internet. The only difference between Taiwanese and Chinese users is that in China they have an Internet censorship, which controls the information and sources the Chinese users can access. Jonathan Watts (2005) informs us about this Chinese phenomenon of Internet censorship under a wide variety of laws and administrative regulations. In accordance with these laws, more than sixty Internet regulations have been made by the PRC government, and censorship systems are vigorously implemented by provincial branches of state-owned ISPs (Internet Service Providers), business companies, and organizations. The escalation of the government's effort to neutralize critical online opinion comes after a series of large anti-Japanese, anti-pollution and anti-corruption protests, many of which were organized or publicized using instant messaging services, chat rooms and text messages. Although the existence of an Internet police task force, estimated at more than 30,000, has been known for some time, attention is mostly focused on their work as censors and monitors. Countless critical comments appearing on Internet forums, bulletin boards, blogs, vlogs or any major portals such as Sohu and Sina are usually erased within minutes.

Events and Processes- Another conceptual consideration in the study of media-foreign policy is the nature of the events, issues or social processes under consideration. It makes a great deal of difference whether one is considering the relationship of media to foreign policy in the

case of a summit meeting, a war, strategic arms control negotiations, or a terrorist incident. Conceptually, it is sometimes very difficult to separate the event or process from the media and media coverage, as illustrated by the increased frequency of “media events”, those occasions such as summit meeting, inaugurations, funerals and other occasions of state which are planned and designed with the media in mind (Katz, 1980). Although Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Japan in 2007 was not a diplomatic one designed by the Taiwan government, as a potentially influential on China-Taiwan and China-Japan relationships it is worth of a closer examination.

The Press-Policy Relationship- Bennett (1990) has hypothesized that mass media will tend to “index” the range of voices and viewpoints in the news according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic. The hypothesis takes as its point of departure the following norm: “Culturally speaking, it is generally reasonable for journalists to grant government officials a privileged voice in the news, unless the rage of official debates on a given topic excludes or “marginalizes” stable majority opinion in society and unless official actions raise doubts about political propriety” (Bennett, 1990, p.104).

Although the Chinese Communist government tries to save its autonomy and keep at distance from the worldwide processes, China can not and does not exist in a vacuum. World processes inevitably influence the internal affairs in China. Nowadays Chinese media system can not escape the impact of a world globalization process. China’s national response to global challenges so far has been to “attack poison with poison”- competing on transnational media giants’ terms by organizing state media conglomerates to stimulate “managed competition” (Lee, 2003). In PRC now there are 15 press conglomerates; 3 radio, TV and Film conglomerates; and 12 Internet conglomerates. All are state or Party controlled.

The original impetus to approve the first press groups in the mid-1990s might have come from the practical necessity to manage the ramifications of the state’s decision to sever media subsidies. Eager to dislodge its financial responsibilities, the state used the core and affluent Party press as a sponge to absorb the unprofitable, chaotic, and disobedient “small papers” and

magazines (Chen & Lee, 1998). Having long poured Marxist scorn on western media conglomerates, Beijing suddenly rationalized that these state media conglomerates, if armed with sufficient economy of scale, would preempt post-WTO foreign challengers. Now China boasts of having twenty-six press groups, eight radio and television groups, six publishing groups, four circulation groups, and three motion picture groups. State policy is moving unmistakably toward further media consolidation (Zhao 2000).

However, while the media giants flexed their political muscles, with government backing, to unlock the Chinese market in the 1990s, they have paid decreasing, even negligible, attention to foreign news in general and Chinese news in particular (Lee, 2003).

McChesney (1999) characterizing China and her mass media as “Rich media, poor democracy”. On the other hand, some researches think that “Chinese government has moved slowly but surely away from propaganda to public relations” (Chen, 2003). Attempting to address the issue of recent institutional changes in China, Chen observes that the Chinese government at all levels seems to attach increasing importance to communicating with the public via public relation channels. Chen has to admit that whilst her respondents tended to define government public relations as an ideal in terms of relationship building associated with the two-way symmetric model, which is based on the exchange of information that is issued in both mass media and it’s publics. In practice, they often handled the media relations by following only the one-way or asymmetric model, where there is little feedback from the audience. Nonetheless, the PRC government has now successfully mixed propaganda with public relations practices in delivering key messages to its people.

For decades prior to the late 1980s, Taiwan’s authoritarian government tightly controlled the media and used it as a political tool and ideological apparatus (Hong, 1999). However, the globalization and liberalization trends of recent years have had their influence, and since 1990s Taiwan’s media has been liberalized at a much faster pace than much of the rest Asia. Even to the late 1980s Taiwan media were marked by contradictions. Since 1949, after the Kuomintang

was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war and retreated to Taiwan, the island had been ruled by the KMT, with most of the last five decades been characterized by a one-party authoritarian regime. Logically, from 1949 to 1987 the media were controlled by the KMT (Hong, 1999). The five patterns of media control: 1. direct control through state monopoly of the media; 2. control by licensing and self censorship; 3. emergency regulations and national security legislation; 4. pressure on the press; and 5. violence against journalists observed by Rubin (1993), were visible in Taiwan, making Taiwan an anticommunist society with a closed, communist-like media system (Hong, 1999).

Table 2.1 Pre-liberalization Press Censorship in Taiwan.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Government Actions</i>	<i>Confiscations and Bans</i>
1980	16	9
1981	19	13
1982	27	23
1983	33	26
1984	211	176
1985	275	260
1986	302	295

Source: Taiwan Communiqué, published by International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan in 1987.

In the early 1980s when the liberalizing trend was spreading across the world, the authorities took tough actions to nip the media’s liberalization efforts in the bud (Tien, 1988). This government’s resistant attitude led to a big increase in confiscation of and bans on publications.

Table 2.1 above clearly shows this.

These numbers are shocking. In the first seven years of the 1980s when globalization trend was spreading across many countries, the Taiwanese government’s actions aimed at checking the media’s “liberal tendency” increased by nearly 20 times, and confiscation and bans increased more than 30 times.

In the late 1980s, political opposition parties were allowed to form. Government actions against the media were remarkably reduced, and the ban on new newspaper registrations was

lifted, creating the opportunity for different voices to be heard in Taiwanese society. The swift expansion of the media industry brought to the point where new newspapers were allowed to publish from January 1988, and the previous limit of 12 pages was removed in the same year (Rampal, 1994). Table 2.2 below shows the proliferation of newspapers following liberalization.

Table 2.2 Proliferation of Newspapers after the Liberalization.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of newspapers</i>
1987	31
1988	122
1989	195
1990	211
1991	237
1992	270
1993	274
1994	300
1995	357

Source: Directorate- General of Budget, Accounting and Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1996.

Within less than 10 years after liberalization, newspapers had mushroomed, experiencing an 11-fold increase. This was the breakpoint in the establishing contemporary relations between media and policymakers in Taiwan. Twenty years later, Taiwan media are now free in reporting any political issues and dissenting views.

II. RESEARCH ON NEWS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Ever since Taiwan and China began to resume some limited exchanges, research on news across the Taiwan strait has been the attention of scholars. Some discovered the differences between covering of one event by two or three different internal Taiwanese newspapers. Others analyze the difference in coverage of one particular event by two newspapers from different countries. Some of the research analyze the difference in coverage of international news. However, no research analyzed any issue which has impact on both banks of the Taiwan Strait and occurs in a third country. A review of these studies and analysis of international news shall

inform on the present research comparing Chinese and Taiwanese newspapers' coverage of Lee Teng-hui's visit to Japan in May-June 2007.

1. ANALYSIS OF NEWS CONTENT

In their well known "Bad News" studies the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980) argued that the contextual structure of news is not simply an incomplete description of facts but a specific kind of reality reconstruction according to the norms and values of society. Describing the coverage of a labour dispute in Great Britain the Glasgow researchers found that the press typically chose lexical items to denote workers and their actions in more negative terms than those items chosen to denote actions of the employers. For example, the workers "demand" while the management "offers".

Herman and Chomsky (1988) revealed how a cross-section of US media covered the deaths of popular clerics in nations either supported or opposed by American government and concluded that in an "enemy" state the victim is described in terms that make the victim appear deserving while in a friendly states the victim is portrayed as un-deserving.

In a study of the characterization the actions of early Vietnam War protestors by news media in the United States, Halloran, Murdock, and Elliot (1970) reported that the lexicon chosen contained overwhelming negative connotations such as "thugs", "mob", "horde" to signal which side was in the "right". They argued that support for the police is symbolic of subordination to the rule of law in Western democracies and therefore to demonstrate that the police are upholding order even when they are reported to be agents of violence, such agency is not expressed by the press in the more active first position but rather suppressed in passive sentences and nominations (e.g. "many demonstrators injured"). And in a comparison of US press coverage of El Salvador and Soviet reporting on Afghanistan, Downing (1988) found both media portrayed the guerrillas in dismissive terms that served to delegitimize their status while focusing on how their atrocities disrupted the infrastructure of society.

Based on a content analysis of evening newscasts by the three television stations in Taiwan, Lo., Cheng & Lee's study (1994) examines the patterns of news sources selection and presentation in television news. They found that television news relies heavily on government officials who are primarily middle-aged men in executive positions located in the capital city of Taipei. Their findings suggest that the central government officials in Taipei appear to be the primary definers of social reality. TV news portrays only a very limited view of the society. In conclusion, this study suggests that with the management and content tightly controlled by the state, Taiwan's television news consists primarily of such official rituals as meetings or ceremonies.

2. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS

Lee's visit to Japan involves Taiwan and Japan. Since China has had rather negative view of Lee for his pro-Taiwan independence stance and for his proclaimed remarks on China, the visit was of high interest, deserving attention and comments by the Chinese media. Research has examined similar analysis on international news covered by media in different political systems. A brief review of selected literature shall help with clarifying for the present research as well.

Research on across-time comparison of representations of one country in the newspapers of another is abundant. These studies examine not only the number of stories about foreign countries in the newspapers, but also the media use of frames and selecting words. One interesting recent research is by Zengjun Peng's (2004) on the "Representation of China: An Across Time Analysis of Coverage in the *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times*". She examined the coverage of China by these two newspapers between 1992 and 2001. Findings show that coverage of China increased significantly over time with the overall tone remaining negative. Stories were presented in political frames and ideological frames which were mostly unfavorable.

It is inevitable and common sense that the majority of population sees foreign countries through the mass media's frames. Mass media being our major information source about foreign countries, their frames in turn influence people's perception about foreign countries. Jowon Park (2002) examined how Korea and Japan are covered differently in American Television news. The analysis showed an imbalance in the coverage between the two countries. In terms of news amount and rank of the news stories, Japan was treated as more important than Korea in US television news coverage (Park, 2002).

Research by Parsons and Xu (2001) discusses the difference in coverage of American's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 by the *People's Daily* and the *New York Times*. Their study compares textual choices made by the papers across the ten days of post-bombing news and commentaries. The findings show that both newspapers adopted short-term, issue-oriented frames of references that paralleled each's respective government official statements:

Table 2.3 Frames in China's and America's Coverage of Chinese Embassy Bombing

Chinese News Frames	American News Frames
International bombing	Accidental bombing
Genuine apology not given	Apology not-accepted
American disrespect	Anti-American hysteria
Spontaneous protests	Choreographed protests
US media bombs	Chinese propaganda
American hegemony	Puppet imagery

Parson & Xu, 2001

The root of these contrary frames was US military intervention in Bosnia. China's government has long cited American intervention around the world as a threat to national sovereignty, whereas the American framed their European involvement as a humanitarian effort. Textual

analysis shows that these contrasting frames were never more evident than in coverage of student protests outside the US Embassy in Beijing. In the *New York Times* the protestors were negatively seen as “choreographed” by China’s government. While the *People’s Daily* called the student protests “spontaneous”.

Considering the different political perspectives on Taiwan and China relationships and on Lee Teng-hui the politician, it appears reasonable to predict a similar pattern in reporting issues concerning either Taiwan or China or both by the media in Taiwan and in China.

3. COMAPARISON OF NEWS IN TAIWAN AND MAINLAND CHINA

Contradictory and multifaceted changes have characterized Taiwan’s press coverage of mainland China. On Taiwan since the late 1980s, old anti-Communist propaganda has given way to press fever for mainland reporting, what was followed by a coexistence of paradoxes in the 1990s. These developments reveal patterns of interaction between sociopolitical changes and the behaviors of news organizations.

Ideologically, in the beginning of 1990s the official press took the orthodox anti-Communist stance. The KMT-owned *Central Daily News* was the leading mouthpiece. The military *Youth Daily News* and the *Taiwan Daily News*, controlled by the Department of National Defense, were explicitly designated as vehicles for “political warfare” against the Communist regime across the Taiwan Strait. Staffed by military personnel, these two papers were both conservative and intolerant of liberal intellectual critics (Lee, 1994).

Ran Wei (2000) observes that, under martial law, for a long time, no newspapers except the official ones, the *Central Daily News* and the *Youth Daily News*, were allowed to handle mainland China reporting to fulfill their mission as state propaganda apparatuses. Mainland Chinese news had been off-limits to privately owned papers in the name of “maintaining national security”. Besides, news articles about mainland China contained nothing but anti-Communist slogans, thus readers did not have much interest in this sphere. The coverage was characterized

by one critic as “little in amount and devoid of substance” (Rong, 1994). The monopoly of the official press over mainland China reporting was broken in the mid-1980s when the KMT-led government, in an effort to strengthen its anti-Communist publicity campaign, granted the “Big Two”, the mass circulated the *United Daily News* and the *China Times*, the privilege of starting their own in-house mainland publications libraries to process mainland news. They relied heavily on secondary sources, mostly foreign news agencies, such as Reuters, Associated Press, United Press International, Agence France-Press, and Kyodo; mainland Chinese news agencies, namely Xinhua and China News Service; publications from Hong Kong; and Taiwan’s official Central News Agency.

Mainland China reporting in Taiwan is no longer taboo. The sweeping political reforms have created a liberal and tolerant climate that enabled Taiwan journalists to cover the mainland firsthand and to conduct one-on-one interviews with top mainland officials. Mainland news now became a key basis for competition among the Taiwanese newspapers (Ran Wei, 2000), intensified competition added fuel to the aggressive and sometimes reckless pursuit of breakthroughs. At the same time, democratic transformation in the press sphere has given rise to ideological diversity among political parties. The range of press ideology now covers pro-unification and pro-independence tendencies, with the middle position calling for “status quo”, or peaceful coexistence between Taiwan and mainland China.

Scholars from both banks of the strait contributed their research findings on news coverage of political, economic and social/cultural issues in the respective media in Taiwan and in China. A number of valuable researches were published in 1994 by *National Taiwan University Journalism Forum* (台大新聞論壇). Although the research were published 13 years ago, their findings remain enlightening on today’s media of across the Taiwan Strait. The special issue asked fundamental questions, such as how Taiwanese newspapers cover Chinese news and how Chinese newspapers cover Taiwanese news. Each of these part has the analysis of coverage in political (mainland China’s press coverage of Taiwan – by He Zhou 何舟, Taiwanese press

coverage of mainland China- by Chang Rong-hong 張榮恭), economical (China's press coverage of Taiwan- by Zhu Jianhua 祝建華, Taiwanese press coverage of mainland China- by Wei Ai 魏艾), social and cultural (China's press coverage of Taiwan- by Chang Tsan-kuo 張讚國, Taiwanese press coverage of mainland China- by Wang Zhenbang 王震邦) spheres.

Several works published in the *Journalism Forum* deserve discussion. Zhou He 何舟 research shows the changes in Mainland China media's reporting on Taiwan political issues process. First of all the number of coverage has increased, coverage of Taiwan issues mostly concentrates on "One China" idea or on Taiwan parties' political activities, the majority of political news were covered in a negative perspective, however, there has been noticed slow movement toward taking a more neutral perspective. He says that these slow changes do not appear to be in all topics, some stamps still have been used widely in dailies, such as: Taiwan government has been called "puppet government" (偽政府), before lifting the press and party ban Taiwan had been "politics under a high pressure" (高壓政治), and after lifting the ban it became "Chaotic politic" (混亂政治), DPP is a "party struggling for Taiwan independence" (台獨黨). Yu Xu's 俞旭 research on the relationship between politics and China overseas edition dailies in reporting Taiwan issues also confirms that big changes in reports on Taiwan are mostly appearing in non-political spheres. Reading articles on political, especially controversial issues, you have to read between the lines, than you can understand how influential party's control remains in overseas editions.

In Chang Rong-Kong's 張榮恭 research on Taiwan media coverage of Mainland China news, she comes to the conclusions that in reporting China's political issues Taiwan media exhibit objectivity and no prohibition, responding to the island's people interest in economic and social news about China political coverage is reducing, the number of hostility statements toward China also reduced, Taiwan media pay a lot attention to the Mainland China political issues but there is a big difference in reporting it among the media. Li Yingming 李英明 in research on the

comparison of Taiwan media coverage of Mainland China issues on the example of *United Daily* and *China Times*, also confirms that even though both dailies do not say it directly, but in overall reports “holistic expectations” (宏觀性期望) about China can be felt.

One more example of “instruction” for the other journalists was written by a mainland China researcher named Zhou Jianmin 周建閩 (1994). This article reflects even more extreme ideological points of view. Zhou gives us the main principle of what Chinese media must do while covering Taiwanese news or issues related to the cross-strait relations between the two banks. He argues that journalists have to cover these issues from the side of “peaceful unification, on the principle of one country two systems”. And if someone would use the term “independent Taiwan” or promote this point of view he would be “struggled and guided by public opinion and the media” (輿論引導及輿論鬥爭).

No less interesting is the research by Ke Huixin 柯惠新, Liu Lai 劉來, Zhu Chuanyan 朱川燕, Chen Zhou 陳洲, and Nan Jun 南雋 (2005). Using method of content analysis, they examine reports on Taiwan’s devastating 921 Earthquake in 1999 and its related news in six newspapers from mainland China, HongKong, and Taiwan. The findings show on the one hand surprising unanimity in coverage of the event by Mainland China and Hong Kong papers, and on the other hand, differences in coverage and evaluations of the event among Taiwan newspapers. The size of the coverage was also different in all three regions, Hong Kong media devoted much more space to this event than China did. Of no less interest were the findings on differences in frequencies on each topic. China and Hong Kong dailies more frequently discussed the topics such as the “disaster itself” (災情), “causes and affects (原因與影響) and “explanations” (解釋). While Taiwan media were much more concentrated on the “consolation and relief activities in the disaster area” (慰問與救災). This study is also of importance for this thesis, because it analyzed the same two Taiwan dailies, *China Times* and *Liberty Times*, and compared them with Mainland China papers.

A group of mainland China's scholars, Ma Hui 马汇, Zhang Xiaofeng 张晓峰, and Tong Bing 童兵 (2006) argue that mass media of both mainland China and Taiwan fulfill a very important function in the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China. They noted that during all periods of confrontation between the two banks, the newspapers performed some very important functions as: 1) a dialogue; 2) a "stabilizer" in this relation; 3) a "push hand" (facilitator) in the cross-strait communication; 4) and as participants in the process of cooperation and negotiations between the two banks. The research by these mainland China scholars seemed to regard their mass media not as propaganda in the relations between two banks, but more as a channel, providing opportunities for communication between the Taiwan Strait and for better understanding of the events of mutual interest. Their research suggests that there could be neutral or comprehensive reporting rather than just negative remarks in China's newspapers in covering Taiwan.

While signs of changes in China's media are being observed and documented, there remain taboo areas, i.e., the Chinese media must uphold and obey official central CCP positions. For instance, any independence movements, religious matters or environmental crises fall within the taboos. A new religious movement Falun Gong and SARS crisis are among these taboos.

Chiung Hwang Chen's (2005) research on coverage of Falun Gong movement by Xinhua information news agency demonstrates that while economic reforms and political relaxation since the 1980s might have expanded the media's latitude, the press, especially state-owned media outlets, still function as agents for the Beijing regime. Their analysis shows that the day after crackdown on Falun Gong, *Xinhua* has consistently reported on the effect of the campaign against Falun Gong. Support for the government's action, according to *Xinhua*, flooded in not only from Chinese Communist Party organs, the military, civil servants, and media, but also from non-Communist parties in China, academic and science circles, health and legal professionals, ordinary people, or, virtually as the agency puts it, people from "all walks of life".

Chen's findings evidence how the Xinhua journalists, through news frames, construct particular parameters within which to assess the "reality" about Falun Gong. Most articles in the Chinese press signified the illegal status of Falun Gong and tried hard to demonstrate that this unlawful group in fact is "highly organized, fully functional... organization". Referring to it as the "evil cult" of this "tight organization".

Between November 2002 and July 2003 the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) erupted in China, and spread as far as to Hong Kong, Canada and Taiwan. According to World Health Organization's (WHO) Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR) 2003, in total all over the world there were 8,096 known infected cases and 774 deaths. While in PRC the numbers were 5,328 infected cases and 349 deaths, in Hong Kong- 1,755 and 299 comparatively, in Canada- 251 and 43, and in Taiwan- 346 and 37. Ernest Zhang & Kenneth Fleming (2005) examines the characteristics of the Chinese print media's censored SARS. They noted that the Soviet Communist model proposed by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) for controlling the media content is still applied in China's coverage of SARS. These three control strategies are: 1. appointing of editors by departments of propaganda at various levels; 2. issuing directives by the Party through its propaganda departments to guide media content; and 3. reviewing and criticizing the press by the Party. The coverage of SARS shows that this three-way control model may still present in China's news coverage of events that involve the country's interests or images.

Lee Teng-hui since his pronounced stands on Taiwan as a separate state from China has been criticized in Chinese media. In Taiwan he is equally controversial. He is seen in nearly diametrical perspectives by the pro-independence and pro-unification groups and media. Research on how China and Taiwan newspapers covered this controversial political figure's visit to Japan in May-June 2007 thus appears to be worthwhile as it helps to understand the changes that have been taking place in media in China and in Taiwan.