Chapter Four

Spatial Triad in Paris and in Venice

To change life [...] we must first change space.
(Lefebvre 190)

Since the practice and the theory of time and history have occupied a privileged position in Western Marxism and social science, spatiality has been relatively peripheral for much too long. As Foucault suggests, “Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic” (70). Traditionally according to the ideology of A/Not-A dichotomy, “time is defined by such things as changes, movement, history, dynamism; while space [...] is simply the absence of these things” (Massey 256-57). Time, as the privileged signifier, becomes the key point and equals change or movement, whereas space, defined by absence and lack, equals the lack of these characteristics associated with time. However, it was not until the 1970s that “there has been a growing interest within social and cultural theory in questions of space and place” (Barker 290). Especially at the end of the twentieth century, the so-called epoch of space, a French Marxist named Henri Lefebvre emerged and became perhaps the most influential figure, a “leading spatial theoretician in Western Marxism and the most forceful advocate for the reassertion of space in critical social theory” (Soja 1989, 47). Therefore, this chapter attempts to make use of Lefebvre’s recondite theory of space for the purpose of interpreting Winterson’s The Passion and enriching its concealed connotations from the perspective of spatial dialectics. Within the spectrum of the trialetics of spatiality, this chapter sets its goal in analyzing how the spatial triad functions in two metropolitan spaces, Paris and Venice, which inevitably influence the characters in their individual ways. As Roland Barthes demands, “The City is a discourse” (92). These two cities in Winterson’s novel must subsume some significant
meanings, perhaps suitable for applying Lefebvre’s epochal theory of spatiality to the elucidation of the intrinsic eminence of these two cities in the study of space.

Born in 1901 in Hagetmau in the Pyrenees, Lefebvre, as a French “metaphilosopher” who influentially opens up and explores the limitless dimensions of the social spatiality, is “highly critical of previous ontologies that describe space strictly in geometrical terms, as an ‘empty space’” (Benko 50). Due to his interest in “developing a unitary theory of space that also defines space as process” (Liggett 245), Lefebvre’s masterwork La Production de l’Espace, published in 1974 and translated to English in 1991, “illustrates his ability to synthesize different disciplines and approaches [...] [and] to emphasize the integral importance of physical dimensions and spatial categories such as boundaries and regions in everyday life” (Shields 5). Rejecting “empty container” and “abstract category” notions of space, Lefebvre unconventionally advocates “the active—the operational or instrumental—role of space, as knowledge and action, in the existing mode of production” (11). In The Production of Space, Lefebvre’s assertion that links the social with the spatial now has been widely accepted in geography and sociology. Hereafter, spatial knowledge, for Lefebvre, plays the role of “a source and stimulus for radical openness and creativity” (Soja 1996, 48).

In his succinct introduction in The Production of Space, Lefebvre contends that the development of the ever-changing notion of space in the history of human thought should begin with Descartes, who put an end to the Aristotelian tradition, in which space and time are among the categories useful for “the naming and classing of the evidence of the senses” (1). In Cartesian logic, instead, space enters the realm of the absolute and comes to dominate all senses and all bodies by containing them. Then, Kantian space belongs to “the a priori realm of consciousness” and partakes of “that realm’s internal, ideal [...]
structure” (2). Next came a group of mathematicians who appropriated space and time as follows: space, in opposition to the doctrine of categories, becomes a mental thing. In the modern field of epistemology that inherits “a philosophy of space revised and corrected by mathematics” (3), the status of space is still regarded as that of a mental thing or mental place. With the advent of the school of Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes, the focus of space, Lefebvre argues, moves from mental to social, so that capitalism is thought of as a primary matter influencing spatial practice of a given society. Therefore, as a Marxist, Lefebvre combines different fields of the physical, the mental, and the social, thereby presenting one of his most conspicuous accomplishments in the field of space—threefold dialectics within spatialization:

1. **Spatial practice**, which embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation. Spatial practice ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion. In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society’s relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of *competence* and a specific level of *performance*.

2. **Representations of space**, which are tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to ‘frontal’ relations.

3. **Representational spaces**, embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art (which may come eventually to be defined less as a code of space than as a code of representational spaces). (33)

The first one of the spatial dialectical triad, spatial practice, known as the perceived

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2 In Soja’s term, spatial practice is what he calls Firstspace, which occupies the focus of attention in all the spatial disciplines.
space (l’espace perçu), secretes the society’s space; “it [spatial practice] propounds, and presupposes it [society’s space], in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it” (38). That is to say, by deciphering the society’s space, the spatial practice of a certain society can be revealed. This spatial practice embodies a close association between daily reality and urban reality; the former refers to daily routine, while the latter “the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, ‘private’ life and leisure” (38). Moreover, spatial practice includes “typology, urban morphology and the creation of zones and regions for specific purposes” (Shields 162), creating “the space of a partial city, with our familiar work, home, school, shopping routines at the center” (Liggett 249). In this view, space is dialectically produced as human space through everyday practice. To sum up, spatial practice is defined as materialized, socially produced, and empirical space, which is “directly sensible and open […] to accurate measurement and description” (Soja 1996, 66).

The second sphere, representations of space,3 known as the conceptualized space (l’espace conçu), is “the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, […] all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived” (38). In whatever society or mode of production, this is the typical dominant space, a room of epistemological power. Furthermore, representations of space can be defined as “the logic and forms of knowledge, and the ideological content of codes, theories, and the conceptual depictions of space linked to production relations” (Shields 163). These representations construct “self-referential worlds, or detached ideologies that then can be used instrumentally to create certain kinds of space” (Liggett 248). This conceived space is tied to the relations of production and to the order “constituted via control over knowledge, signs and codes” (Soja 1996, 67).

3 Representations of space, in Soja’s term as Secondspace, become the principal space of utopian thought and vision, particularly for semiotician, decoder, artists, and poets.
The third sphere, representational spaces, also translated as spaces of representation, known as the lived space (l’espace vécu), is one space directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and thus belongs to “the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’, […] of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe” (39). It is inhabited and used not only by artists, writers, and philosophers, but also by ethnologists, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, and other students of such representational spaces, all of whom endeavor to describe and actively transform, rather than decipher, the worlds we are living in. In contrast to representations of space, this is the dominated space, which overlays physical space and makes symbolic use of its objects, thereby tending toward “coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs” (39). Representational spaces, in a sense, are discourses of space, which offer “complex re-coded and even decoded versions of lived spatialization” (Shields 164). In other words, serving as an essential pillar of Lefebvre’s metaphilosophy, these lived spaces of representation are “the loci of meaning in a culture” (Liggett 251) and “the terrain for the generation of ‘counterspaces,’ spaces of resistance to the dominant order” (Soja 1996, 68). Teeming with politics and ideology, with the real and the imagined intertwined, and with other material spatial practices, these dominated spaces are those of the peripheries, the margins, and the marginalized, as the chosen spaces for struggle, liberation, or emancipation. For instance, the Vietnam War Memorial has been universally recognized as a profound representational space, acknowledged as the core of America’s national identity.

In addition to the aforementioned definitions, Lefebvre proposes a germane example of the body to illuminate the application of, as well as to facilitate the understanding of, his esoteric triad of spatiality. From the consideration of the body, “social practice

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4 In Soja’s view, the third space of Lefebvre is synonymous to Soja’s Thirdspace, with “its foregrounding of relations of dominance, subordination, and resistance; its subliminal mystery and limited knowability; its radical openness and teeming imagery” (1996, 68).
presupposes the use of the body” (40), such as the use of the hands, members, or sensory organs. In other words, social practice, in terms of the body, refers to all of the usages of the body. As discussed previously, social practice belongs to the field of the perceived, that is, the practical groundwork of the perception of the external world. As for the realm of the conceived, representations of the body “derive from accumulated scientific knowledge, disseminated with an admixture of ideology” (40). This accumulated scientific knowledge includes that of anatomy, physiology, sickness and its cure, or the body’s relations with nature, with its surroundings. Lastly, bodily lived experience is highly complex and quite peculiar, owing to the intervention of the culture with its illusory immediacy. Another example to put Lefebvre’s theory into practice is the era of the Middle Ages. Firstly, spatial practice, in this particular epoch, accommodated the network of local roads near peasant communities, monasteries, and castles, the cardinal roads between towns, and the pilgrims’ and crusaders’ ways. Secondly, representations of space were based on Aristotelian and Ptolemaic conceptions modified by Christianity, including “the Earth, the underground ‘world’, and the luminous Cosmos, Heaven of the just and of the angels, inhabited by God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost” (45). As for representational spaces, they established the foci of a vicinity, such as the village church, graveyard, hall and fields, or the square and the belfry; they, in Lefebvre’s term, were “interpretations […] of cosmological representations” (45).

Moreover, Lefebvre especially accentuates the comparisons and relations between representations of space and representational spaces, seeming to forget spatial practice sometimes. But in effect, Lefebvre, when delving into the importance of the threefold spatial trialectics, has included the field of spatial practice in the other two fields. For instance, before we conceive or live in any space, the first step is to perceive the space in front of us. In other words, the category of spatial practice subsumes that of representations of space and representational spaces, both of which should be examined
in order to present the condition of spatial practice. In this regard, we can observe the applications of both representations of space and spaces of representation in spatial practice; likewise, through analyzing representations of space and spaces of representations, we can scan how spatial practice is produced as human space by means of everyday practice.

In light of Lefebvre’s spatiality, representations of space are certainly abstract in social and political practice, and the settled relations between objects and people in the represented space are subject to a logic that “will sooner or later break them up because of their lack of consistency” (41). Representational spaces are in need of no rules of consistency or cohesiveness, for a “[r]epresentational space is alive; it speaks” (42, emphasis added). It holds an affective kernel or center and envelops the loci of passion, action, and lived situations; thus, it is directional, situational, relational, fluid, and dynamic. Playing a substantial role in the production of space, representations of space intervene in and modify spatial textures which are informed by effective knowledge and ideology, by way of construction, that is, by way of architecture, as a project ensconced in a spatial context and a texture. By contrast, associated with imaginary and symbolic elements, representational spaces generate the products of symbolic works which uniquely appear in the artistic works, writing-systems, fabrics and so on.

More importantly, the reason why Lefebvre discreetly advocates a triad, rather than a binary, of spatiality, lies in his promulgation that the perceived-conceived-lived triad “loses all force if it is treated as an abstract ‘model’” (40) and that the perceived, conceived, and lived realms should be interconnected. In Lefebvre’s dialectical viewpoint, spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces contribute in different ways to the production of space according to their qualities and attributes […]. Relations between the three moments of the
perceived, the conceived and the lived are never either simple or stable […].

(46)

Apparently Lefebvre aims to emphasize not the fixed antagonism between A and Not-A dichotomy resulting from the conventional binary oppositional reductionism, but the dynamic oscillation among more than two dialectical spaces. Likewise, in my interpretation, his three aspects of ontological trialectics of spatiality, while dependent on one another, can never be completely understood in isolation or epistemologically privileged in separation, for they operate together at all times. If the focus is placed on the stabilized antagonistic dichotomy, it is very easy to entrap the analysis in the deadlock, ensuing no opportunity of further subversive implication. Hence, the dialectically oscillatory relations between spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces highlight the significance of being in the postmodern milieu that interrogates the ostensibly seamless Western episteme of binary tradition. It is this dialectical connotation in Lefebvre’s spatial triad that this chapter tends to apply to Winterson’s novel, attempting to unearth both Lefebvre and Winterson’s possible similarities. This chapter will begin with the analysis of different spatial triads in Paris and Venice individually and then concludes from examples found in the novel that what kind of city Paris and Venice belong to.

Since Lefebvre has limpidly elaborated the definitions of and the interrelations of the threefold different spaces in any given society, or precisely speaking, in any mode of production, what background will this chapter be based on to scrutinize the effects of space on the characters rather than the effects of the characters on space? As Lefebvre himself proclaims, “Every space is already in place before the appearance in it of actors.

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5 My intention to use the word “dialectical” is to emphasize the constructive interaction between Lefebvre’s spatial triad rather than the rigidity of any binary opposition. In this sense, dialectical relation does not simply indicate the relation of two parts; rather, it refers to the positive, active interaction of more than two parts, such as Lefebvre’s spatial trialectics.
This pre-existence of space conditions the subject’s presence, action and discourse, his competence and performance” (57). It is exactly this pre-existence of space earlier than that of people that inspires me to interpret *The Passion* again from another theoretical perspective.

First of all, the focus should be placed on the city of Paris, a symbol of sovereignty and rationality, which, for some characters, has an important part in the first half of the novel. Take Napoleon Bonaparte as an example. In a few years after the 1789 revolution, General Bonaparte was turning Italy into the fields of France, believing that he was the center of the world, so that “for a long time there was nothing to change him from this belief” (13). From Henri’s observational depiction, after becoming an Emperor, Napoleon was the most powerful man in the world at that time, so powerful that “[h]e called the Pope from the Holy City to crown him but at the last second he took the crown in his own hands and placed it on his own head” (13). At first, Napoleon’s act of crowning himself signifies an ambition to construct his own authority which originates from himself rather than from another authority. That is to say, he tries to overthrow the former ruling power by constituting a brand new one called a Napoleonic authority, with which he even begins to “make a name for himself” (16). As we know, the first step to dominate a space is to make those living in that space believe the dominator qualified to rule it. Thus, the way of Napoleon’s crowning himself consolidates his omnipresent power in the dominated domain and inaugurates the next step to encroach on his assumed promised land, which Napoleon egoistically believes, includes the whole Europe.

Other than his ontological authority, Napoleon desires the total control of space too. According to Henri’s description, wherever Napoleon goes, straight roads are built, buildings are rationalized, and street signs are changed to celebrate a battle (112). On the

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6 As mentioned above, *The Passion* is generally divided into two halves: the first half is Paris and the other Venice.
one hand, those roads, buildings, and street signs belong to the realm of spatial practice. On the other hand, using the same way of power-building, Napoleon organizes his own representations of space, which, in Lefebvre's perspective, refer to “the primary space of utopian thought and vision, of the semiotician or decoder, and of the purely creative imagination of some artists and poets” (Soja 1996, 67). The Napoleonic representations of space, realized in Paris, have authoritatively dominated the whole city and dogmatically regulated which place belongs to whom. For instance, Patrick, whose left eye can put the best telescope to shame, is assigned to stay on the top of a purpose-built pillar, from which he can “look out across the Channel and report on the whereabouts of Nelson’s blockading fleet and warn our practising troops of any English threat” (22). Henri, called a dandy by others on account of the habit of cutting his toe-nails once a week, is circumscribed to spend eight years in the army, mostly in the kitchen, learning the way to stuff a chicken and to slow down the cooking process. As for other soldiers, they are confined to the space where they are ordered to go, even heading toward a great danger like the stupendous sea: on July 20th, 1804, Napoleon insisted on launching 25,000 men in fifteen minutes to risk crossing the Channel for the purpose of invading England unexpectedly, but only ended up with two thousand men drowned due to the capricious weather. More cruelly, in the very next morning, “2,000 new recruits marched into Boulogne” (25), most of whom were not seventeen and were “asked to do in a few weeks what vexes the best philosophers for a lifetime; that is, to gather up their passion for life and make sense of it in the face of death” (28). All of the people living under the influence of Napoleonic representations of space are destined to follow Napoleon’s instruction, even blindly transforming their passion for family, romance, or religion into that for Napoleon himself. As Henri vividly describes, “All France will be recruited if necessary. Bonaparte will snatch up his country like a sponge and wring out every last drop” (8). The Napoleonic representations of space not only expand its ruling power to
every corner of its territory but also exclude those who do not conform to the legitimate norms, such as Madame de Stäel, who is exiled by Napoleon because “she complained about him censoring the theatre and suppressing the newspapers” (8).

Furthermore, this kind of Napoleonic representations of space allows Napoleon himself no room for making mistakes as well.

Bonaparte always claimed he knew what was good for a people, knew how to improve, how to educate. He did; he improved wherever he went, but he always forgot that even simple people want the freedom to make their own mistakes.

Bonaparte wanted no mistakes. (103)

Since Napoleon has been considered a new Messiah by people living in the turbulent period of the Revolution, his preponderant conceptualized space not only prescribes other characters’ domain of activity but also restricts his room for making zero mistake in life. It is no wonder that Henri, disillusioned by Napoleon’s perfectionism, ultimately announces more than once: “I don’t want to worship him any more. I want to make my own mistakes” (86) and “He [Napoleon] doesn’t understand I want the freedom to make my own mistakes” (157). As mentioned previously, no one is capable of maintaining the permanence of representations of space, which will sooner or later be broken up owing to the lack of consistency. Without exception, Napoleonic representations of space are doomed to fail, and another new power will emerge and settle its representations of space over the old ones.

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7 As Lefebvre asserts, “Representations of space have at times combined ideology and knowledge within a (social-spatial) practice” (45). In this sense, Napoleonic Paris, also called Napoleonic conceptualized space, commingles a kind of Napoleonic ideology and knowledge in a social-spatial practice, such as those straight roads, buildings, and street signs. This Napoleonic ideology and knowledge is intended to regulate people’s action and function in a given society. Therefore, in Napoleonic conceptualized space, residents, whether civilians or soldiers, are born to abide by the emperor’s unilateral arrangement, such as where to eat, to sleep, or to work. Without personal free will, the residents of Napoleonic conceptualized space are only puppets in Napoleon’s hand, whereas the marginalized outsiders, like Henri and Villanelle, have potential for eluding this suppressive power.
In contrast to representations of space, representational spaces, directly lived by inhabitants and users, exist in Paris too. These spaces of representation refer to those of the dominated, the marginalized, or the neglected. The first example of a representational space is the kitchen tent, to which Henri is taken by a Lieutenant because Henri cannot crack a walnut between his finger and thumb. Even when being assigned to clear chickens out and wring their necks, Henri, acting as a coward, has not prepared himself yet, saying, “They [chickens] could have been dead, should have been dead, but for the eyes” (6). It is ironic enough to see how a slaughter-oriented soldier is afraid of the chicken’s eyes. Besides Henri, in the kitchen tent there is a fleshy and corpulent cook, who goes out whoring most nights and abuses those prostitutes inhumanely. In terms of Lefebvre’s theory of space, this kitchen tent in Napoleon’s army functions as a representational space, where the femininely-weak like Henri or the over-fatty like the cook survive but contribute nothing to the whole troops, let alone to their country. As a space of the marginalized, the kitchen tent stands for one of the restricted areas suitable for those who are unqualified to be intrepid soldiers. Nevertheless, the marginality of the kitchen tent might be one of the subversive resistances against Napoleonic representations of space and one of the possible reasons to bring about the Emperor’s downfall in the end. To put it in another way, the fact that the kitchen tent is incompatible with the rigorously disciplined army of Napoleon conveys that there are still some spaces exclusive of the monarchical oppression in the ostensibly highly disciplined army. And these marginalized spaces will be very likely to become one of the latent subversive potentialities in Napoleonic conceptualized space.

The second example is special camps, to which Napoleon himself orders vivandi ües to be sent. “The vivandi ües were runaways, strays, younger daughters of too-large families, servant girls who’d got tired of giving it [sex] away to drunken masters, and fat old dames who couldn’t ply their trade anywhere else” (38). They are in the lowest level
of social class, who, unlike the town tarts aware of protecting themselves and charging what they want, are expected to “service as many men as asked them day or night” (38). In special camps, those maltreated prostitutes serve as the only exit of soldiers’ carnal desire in one way, whereas in another, their tribulations expose the hierarchically unfair treatment of humans and the potential break to Napoleon’s hegemony. The *vivandières* are so miserable that “[t]he well-padded town tarts took pity on them and were often to be seen visiting the camps with blankets and loaves of bread” (38). But to Napoleon’s soldiers, who suffer from the agony of the war, the word *vivandières* only means “an optimistic army word” (38). On the one hand, the special camps, like the kitchen tent, are incongruous in the line of the strictly trained army, owing to their lack of discipline and their purpose of sexual satisfaction. On the other hand, the special camps correspond with the spaces of the peripheries, the margins, and the marginalized, that is, the chosen spaces for possible subversion against the governing Napoleonic representations of space. Accordingly, those special camps of sexual service, parallel to spaces of representation, speak in their way, laying bare the deliberately ignored fissures of Napoleonic seamlessly imperious cosmos, inclusive of the unstableness of class division, the fragility of hegemony, and the injustice of patriarchy.

The next example is the billiard room, which originally belongs to one of male-dominated fields but in the novel becomes a female-manipulated domain where women’s power takes the advantageous position over men’s. According to Domino’s

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8 The billiard room is also where Henri first encounters Josèphe, who “bent and moved as though she wore nothing at all, making beautiful parallel lines with her cue” (34). Despite being attracted by Josèphe at first sight, Henri still insists on focusing his passion on Napoleon only: “She [Josèphe] eluded me the way the tarts in Boulogne had eluded me. I decided to write about Napoleon instead” (36). However, funny to say, after Henri decides to write about Napoleon, he still cannot stop the feeling of jealousy: “Now and again I caught her Majesty [Josèphe] watching me, but if our eyes met, she smiled in that half way of hers and I dropped my eyes. Even to look at her was to wrong him [Napoleon]. She belonged to him. I envied her that” (36).

9 The character Domino is a midget, who knows how to make the Emperor (Napoleon) laugh better than anyone else. He is said to wander into France by mistake several years ago, saving “the lady Josèphe from the hooves of a runaway horse” (29), so that Josèphe recommends him to her husband eager for a groom
description, in her penniless days, Josèphine “challenged officers to play her at billiards” (29). If they won, they could stay to breakfast; if she won, they had to pay one of her more pressing bills. Surprisingly she never lost. Even the most powerful man on earth at that time, Napoleon, could not beat her at billiards. What a bizarre situation! Judging from Lefebvre’s spatial theory, the billiard room can be compared as one form of representational spaces, which turn upside down the opposition between male superiority and female inferiority. As a counterspace of resistance against the dominating Napoleonic representations of space, the billiard room, similar to a representational space, generates the functions of capsizing the inveterate phallocentric superiority and of fabricating a new kind of feminine ascendancy. However, only in that privileged space can Josèphine enjoy the supremacy of defeating every man from every level of society, good or bad, old or young, dull or smart. Although Josèphine is Napoleon’s only love on earth, she, as a woman, is still subject to the patriarchal dominating power, which defines the meaning of her existence as the machine of giving birth to man’s children. Once Josèphine steps outside the billiard room, which potentiates the construction of her limited feminine power, she is inevitably classified into the dominated group, like anyone else under Napoleonic representations of space. In this view, it is not surprising to read the tragic outcome that “[h]e [Napoleon] divorced the only person who understood him, the only person he ever really love, because she [Josèphine] couldn’t give him a child” (13). Through Josèphine’s case, the billiard room can be regarded as an embodiment of representational spaces, where the patriarchal superiority complex is interrogated by Josèphinean power and as another potential site to challenge Napoleonic representations of space.

The fourth example of revealing the existence of representational spaces is the

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he can keep. Though Domino’s loyalties to Napoleon are mixed, he definitely loves both Josèphine and the horses.
church, which should be the house used to spread the words of god and instruct people to live a pious life. But in the novel, Henri feels that “[w]e’re more or less religious in our village and we honour the priest who tramps seven miles to bring us the wafer, but it doesn’t pierce our hearts” (9). Obviously the church in Henri’s eye does not function as well as it is supposed to do. Moreover, the priest, who should devoutly devote himself to the service of the church, acts differently from his given duty, as Henri delineates, “I never told my mother that the priest had a hollow Bible with a pack of cards inside” (12). In the case of Georgette, Henri’s mother, the purity of the church is contaminated due to her father’s deed of bribe. After Georgette escapes from her house at fifteen, for she intends to be a nun but is forbidden to, her father “was scouring the area and leaving bribes at any religious houses he passed’’ (11), which makes her elope with a slow-witted but kindly man, Claude, who marries her and becomes Henri’s father. Judging from the aforementioned examples, the space of the church is transmuted from a holy space to a corrupted one, where the doctrine of god no longer maintains its regulating power over people. In this sense, the church in *The Passion* can be compared to an example of representational spaces, which, serving as the counterspaces against representations of space, offer the possibility of subversion in the fragments of the dominant space.

The final example to demonstrate a space of representation in Paris lies in Patrick’s eccentric experience of witnessing three goblins while he is coming through the woods. According to Patrick’s experience, in “a fine night in July, just dark, with the moon up and a great stretch of stars” (39), he sees a ring of green fire and recognizes, by the shovels and beards, three goblins, not elves, sitting in the middle. Keeping silent, Patrick overhears them discussing their treasure, which is “stolen from the fairies and buried under the ground within the ring of fire” (39). But he is smelled by one of the goblins, and all of a sudden they disappear, a ring of fire with them. Not until checking around for
a few moments does Patrick take off his boots and creep to where the ring of green fire was. He realizes he is in a magic place where there is no sign of burning on the ground but the soles of his feet tingled. Being exhausted in digging all night with nothing found, he goes back for his boots, which have become no bigger than a thumbnail. From Patrick’s odd experience, the magic place, where the ring of green fire used to be, functions as another space of representation that, in need of no rules of consistency or cohesiveness, rallies the imaginary and symbolic elements. It is only in this heterodox space that some fictional creatures, such as goblins or elves, are likely to be present with human species. Indeed, this magic place filled with the imaginary and symbolic elements can only be noticed by Patrick, who, empowered with telescopic eyesight, is a marginalized character due to his unusual gift. As discussed above, Patrick does not act like a qualified soldier good at killing enemies; rather, he is merely used by Napoleon to observe the remote situation and report to the emperor. In this sense, the magic place can be compared to one form of representational spaces, which integrates the real and imagined elements and, along with the other representational spaces such as the kitchen tent, special camps, and billiard room, become a force of “counterspaces” against the ruling order.

Analyzed through the examples above, Paris, in conclusion, belongs to the field of conventional cities, where representations of space dogmatically overwhelm spaces of representation to some extent. Therefore, Napoleonic Paris, city of dreams, becomes a representative of the rationalized city, that is, an ideal location for the emperor to exhibit his sovereignty and prestige at will, in spite of his inability to eradicate the subversive intimidation deriving from spaces of representation. By means of the city of Paris, Winterson, like Lefebvre, demonstrates the significance of symbiosis among spatial

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10 The reason why Patrick takes off his boots is that one of the goblins says, “No one with mud on his boots can enter our secret chamber” (39).
practice, representations of space and representational spaces.

Secondly, my emphasis is extended to the city of Venice, a living city, which plays a vital part of influencing the characters. At the very beginning of section two “The Queen of Spades,” Villanelle graphically delineates the external features of Venice, a watery city, as follows.

There is a city surrounded by water with water alleys that do for streets and roads and silted up back ways that only the rats can cross […].

This is the city of mazes. You may set off from the same place to the same place every day and never go by the same route. If you do so, it will be by mistake. Your bloodhound nose will not serve you here. Your course in compass reading will fail you. Your confident instructions to passers-by will send them to squares they have never heard of, over canals not listed in the notes. (49)

From Villanelle’s perspective, the city of Venice seems quite different from a traditional city, such as Napoleonic Paris, which is required to be built up on the basis of a central power. In Villanelle’s Venice, the roads or streets that represent the power of dominant authority yield to the water alleys—Venetian extraordinary spatial practice—that are made not from any imperial might but from the city’s nature. As Villanelle says, “Although wherever you are going is always in front of you, there is no such thing as straight ahead” (49). That is to say, what constitutes Venice, in Lefebvre’s terms, lies in representational spaces more than in representations of space, for the latter focus on the rigid hegemonic control while the former focus on the dynamic fluidity of liberation and emancipation. Although Venice contains more representational spaces than representations of space, this watery city, like Paris, simultaneously contains both elements of the former and the latter. As Lefebvre asserts, “In Venice, the representation of space […] and representational space […] are mutually reinforcing” (74).
For instance, the only observable example of representations of space in Venice is a public garden made by Napoleon, who captured the city of Venice in 1797 and tore down four churches Villanelle loved in order to make it. No wonder at that time Villanelle responded coldly, “Why did we want a public garden?” (52). Obviously that public garden signifies Napoleon’s attempt to dictatorially regulate the development of spatial practice in Venice, those watery alleys, for the purpose of disseminating the influence of, as well as maintaining the stability of, his power all over the Europe. As Henri states, “The only rational place in the whole city [Venice] is the public garden” (112). The space of the public garden in Venice is a distinctive domain, in which only those-in-power can determine what kinds of flowers should be planted, how to place those plants in order, and who should be responsible for plants’ lives. In a sense, the space of the public garden, serving as a representation of space, divulges uncompromisingly the full aspects of domination, especially in the interests of the ruler. As Villanelle comments on Napoleon’s ambition of standardizing the mercurial city of Venice, “[I]f we had [a public garden] and if we had chosen it ourselves we would never have filled it with hundreds of pines laid out in regimental rows” (52-3). Without question, Napoleon’s intention of making use of the public garden as a representation of space to govern Venice by force may face more obstacles than what is expected and may fail in the end.

Besides belonging to the space of the dominator, the public garden is also where Napoleon places his only love, Joséphine, after divorcing her. As mentioned previously, Joséphine is able to manifest her unusual potentiality of feminine power merely in the billiard room, where no one can beat her at billiards. Once leaving her magic space of representation, Joséphine falls a prey to the patriarchal surveillance and supervision, being imprisoned in the public garden in Venice, one of Napoleon’s unsuccessful
representations of space. Even though she is deprived of the talent of challenging chauvinistic egoism at billiards and of the right of being Napoleon’s legal spouse, Joséphine, with her talent for botany, still inaugurates a new life of being a botanist bringing people over a hundred different kinds of plants. As Henri says, “[I]f you ask her [Joséphine] she will send you seeds for nothing” (155).

After examining how Napoleon fails to control Venice, the city of mazes, in the same way as he does in Paris, that is, by constructing representations of space as the monarchal center, we should focus our attention to representational spaces in Venice, which express a special kind of Venetian oppositions against any form of Western epistemic oppression. The first example of representational spaces explicitly existing in Venice is the Casino, where Villanelle works at first, raking dice and spreading cards and lifting as many wallets as she can. Also, Villanelle plays her androgynous role in the Casino by “dressing as a woman in the afternoon and a young man in the evenings” (62), letting those visitors decide which sex is hidden behind the disguising clothes. Generally speaking, it is understandable for a woman, working in the Casino full of drunkards and gamblers, to dress as a boy for the sake of avoiding unnecessary troubles and dangers. But Villanelle keeps on explaining, “I wore my yellow Casino breeches with the stripe down each side of the leg and a pirate’s shirt that concealed my breasts. This was required, but the moustache I added was for my own amusement. And perhaps for my own protection” (55, emphasis added). From Villanelle’s words, the act of dressing as a boy implies that she does it not only for her protection but also for her amusement. Born as the only girl with webbed feet in the entire history of the boatmen, Villanelle has been

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11 The reason to call the public garden in Venice as an unsuccessful representation of space lies in the fact that although Napoleon has conquered Venice in appearance, the city of the interior “do[es] not lie on any map” (114), which means Venice has not been orderly rationalized as Paris has. The original purpose of the public garden is to regulate the chaotic, anarchic status quo of Venice systematically, but as the novel describes, the development of Venice follows the city’s inward rhythm rather than the dominator’s outward manipulation.
used to muddling her gender identity by external camouflage, so that she can construct an unstable identity between two sexes and enjoy the indeterminacy in the face of those puzzled pleasure-seekers.

Other than dressing as a boy for the amusement, Villanelle encounters a mysterious woman nicknamed the Queen of spades, and is sexually attracted by her. Villanelle recalls the first time of their chance encounter: “Still she [the Queen of spades] did not speak, but watched me through the crystal and suddenly draining her glass stroked the side of my face. Only for a second she touched me and then she was gone and I was left with my heart smashing at my chest and three-quarters of a bottle of the best champagne. I was careful to conceal both” (59). Apparently Villanelle is attracted by the arcane Queen of spades at first sight, even expecting her to show up every night. After dating for several times, Villanelle, still disguised as a man or as a soldier sometimes, kisses the Queen of spades finally, while at the same time cannot help wondering, “Could a woman love a woman for more than a night?” (69). Surprising to say, when Villanelle exposes her female identity to the Queen of spades, the latter only responds smilingly, “I know” (71). Therefore, from the angle of spatial theory, both Villanelle’s acts of cross-dressing and falling in love with a woman, along with her webbed feet, can be explicated as being affected by the subversive elements in a representational space. In other words, the space of the Casino, functioning as a space of representation, in one way interrogates the artificial dichotomy of sexual distinctions and in another exhibits the anti-traditional aspects of a female protagonist like Villanelle. Without staying in the representational Casino, Villanelle would never be a spokeswoman possessed of the dazzling feminine strength, with which she is capable of changing her gender identity at will, loving men and women in turn, and learning “the secret ways of boatmen, by watching and by instinct” (53). On account of displaying its subversive connotation by means of Villanelle’s unorthodox behavior, this heterogeneous Casino not only belongs to a space
of the marginalized but also refers to the epitome of “counterspaces” in opposition to Napoleon’s imperialistic colonization.

The second example to illustrate the characteristics of a representational space in Venice is the bridge, which for Villanelle stands for a meeting place, a neutral place, a casual place. Firstly, in a watery city like Venice, the most popular and practical transportation system is through the boats, which use the water alleys to go everywhere or to conduct business on the river. This phenomenon results in the fact that Venetians in the world of the novel relatively seldom make use of the bridge, which hence becomes an marginalized space like a representational space. Secondly, in Villanelle’s viewpoint, the bridge means differently to different people. “Enemies will choose to meet on a bridge and end their quarrel in that void. One will cross to the other side. The other will not return. For lovers, a bridge is a possibility, a metaphor of their chances” (57). As a directly lived space, the bridge provides the enemies with a place of choosing their destiny and the lovers with one of fulfilling their love. Furthermore, the bridge, Villanelle believe, has a metaphysical meaning that each of us is standing on a living bridge of connecting both Devil and God and that none of us wishes to prefer either side at the cost of the other. In Villanelle’s words, “This living bridge is tempting to all and you may lose your soul or find it here” (57). Accordingly, the complexity of the meaning of the bridge, along with its scarcity of usage, reveals its fluidity and indeterminacy, as a representational space does.

In addition to interpreting Venice from Villanelle’s standpoint, we should never overlook Henri’s impression of the city of disguises. After undergoing a series of tough hardships and enduring the severity of zero winter, Henri and Villanelle finally arrived at Venice in May 1813. As Henri depicts his first glimpse of Venice,

Arriving at Venice by sea, as one must, is like seeing an invented city rise up and quiver in the air. It is a trick of the early light to make the buildings
shimmer so that they seem never still. It is not built on any lines I can fathom but rather seems to have pushed itself out, impudently, here and there. To have swelled like yeast in a shape of its own. (109-10)

For outsiders, Venice is so complex and unstable that not even the most powerful Napoleon can rationalize this city of madmen. Likewise, for Henri, not until getting lost in Venice for five days does he ultimately realize that the city of Venice is alive and that it always changes overnight. As he portrays his bizarre experience about the churches in Venice, “Everywhere, I found a church and sometimes it seemed I found the same square but with different churches. Perhaps here churches spring up overnight like mushrooms and dissolve as quickly with the dawn” (112). This living city in general matches what Lefebvre defines as a representational space, thus confusing Henri, a traditional soldier with a weak heart, who feels uneasy anywhere except in a small room of San Servolo, another magic space of representation. Bewildered, Henri confesses, “I have tried to count [the buildings], but it is a living city and no one really knows what buildings are there from one day to the next” (158).

So far as San Servolo is concerned, it is a place possessed of diverse meanings for different individuals in the novel. From the perspective of other characters, including Villanelle, San Servolo immures the mad who cannot be responsible for their behavior, lose the ability to tell right from wrong, and are dangerous to other human beings. Take Henri as an example. He was charged with murdering Villanelle’s husband, declared insane, and sentenced to life imprisonment in San Servolo. But from Henri’s perspective, it is this madhouse that makes him confidently proclaim, “[F]or the first time in my life I realized that I was the powerful one” (138). Only in San Servolo, the space of the peripheries, the margins, and the marginalized, does an exile like Henri feel a sense of belonging and a sense of power, with which he starts to work on a barren garden there on the one hand and keeps a notebook of his stories on the other hand. In the garden of San
Servolo, Henri plans to plant some grass for Patrick, set a headstone for Domino, and even plant a cypress tree for himself. After Villanelle teaches him “to find joy in the most unlikely places and still to be surprised by the obvious” (156), Henri goes from his room in the morning and makes the journey to the garden very slowly because he wants to feel the walls with his hands and to get a sense of surface, of texture. Moreover, whenever in the garden, despite having a spade and a fork, Henri often digs with his hands, in order “to feel the earth, to squeeze it hard and tight or to crumble it between [his] fingers” (157). In other words, the space of San Servolo offers Henri the sense of being home, the feeling that he, as an outcast around the world, has never experienced before. Eventually he is satisfied to say, “Where would I go? I have a room, a garden, company and time for myself. Aren’t these the things people ask for?” (157). San Servolo, serving as a representational space, does become the only protective shelter from the aggressive dominant authority, especially for the dominated, the weak, or the passive, like Henri.

From the aforementioned scrutiny of Venice, the importance of this city of uncertainty in the novel has been clearly pointed out. Similarly, in discussing space, Lefebvre considers the city of Venice not only a work but also “a space just as highly expressive and significant, just as unique and unified as a painting or a sculpture” (73). Moreover, Venice, Lefebvre asserts, “combines the city’s reality with its ideality, embracing the practical, the symbolic and the imaginary” (74). In The Passion, Henri and Villanelle could be the only two who know how to appreciate the beauty and uniqueness of Venice, though from different perspective, as Lefebvre has done in The Production of Space. Like Paris, Venice is the second model city that displays the condition of spatial symbiosis among spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces; unlike Paris, Venice is a special city where, with regard to spatial practice, the strength of representational spaces is stronger than that of representations of space. That is to say, in the city of Venice, the subversive counter-force existing in representational spaces has
completely been manifested, so that representations of space cannot thoroughly dominate Venice orderly. As Villanelle’s mother compares Paris with Venice, “What’s Paris? Just a few boulevards and some expensive shops. Here [Venice], there are mysteries that only the dead know” (118). Maybe those mysteries are embedded in the scope of Lefebvre’s spatial theory and in need of further examination.

In conclusion, after applying Lefebvre’s spatial trialetics to the interpretation of Winterson’s novel, this chapter has exhibited the meanings and functions of different spaces existing in Paris and Venice, both of which have their peculiar spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces. Besides, this chapter also demonstrates the effects of diverse spaces on the characters who, whether consciously or unconsciously, have different responses to different places and further experience a certain level of transformations in personality. More importantly, what Lefebvre essays to highlight is not the oppositional, but the trialetical, relationship of threefold spatialization in any given society. For instance, Paris is a city where representations of space are relatively more overwhelming than spaces of representation, whereas Venice is just the opposite. But whether in Paris or in Venice, representations of space and representational spaces are mutually reinforcing each other so much that neither of them can exist without the other in the spectrum of spatial practice. So far as the novel is concerned, Lefebvre’s spatial triad is observable in Paris and in Venice, both cities that Winterson arranges as the basic framework of the development of the story and the growth of the characters. Napoleon succeeds in controlling Paris but fails in rationalizing Venice, ultimately being deprived of power and exiled to Elba; Villanelle travels from Venice to Paris and back to her hometown again, undergoing a series of life experiences: loving a woman, marrying a fatty cook, having a daughter, and losing Henri in the end; Henri escapes from Paris to Venice and is imprisoned in San Servolo, experiencing being an impotent soldier for eight years, feeling as a dislocated outsider, and re-finding his
position and value in the madhouse finally. Under Winterson’s exquisite disposal of the
correlative relations between the city space and the characters, the essence of Lefebvre’s
dialectical theory of spatiality is completely presented. As Lefebvre once said, “[S]pace is
never empty: it always embodies a meaning” (154).