Chapter Four

Alice as a Traveler: Nomadic or Sedentary?

Down, down, down. Would the fall never come to an end? “I wonder how many miles I’ve fallen by this time?” she said aloud. “I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the earth. Let me see: that would be four thousand miles down, I think—. . .—yes, that’s about the right distance—but then I wonder what Latitude or Longitude I’ve got to?”

(. . .).

Presently she began again. “I wonder if I shall fall right through the earth! How funny it’ll seem to come out among the people that walk with their heads downwards! The antipathies, I think—. . .—but I shall have to ask them what the name of the country is, you know. Please, Ma’am, is this New Zealand? Or Australia?” (AIW 13-14)

Down! Down! Down! The fall brings Alice to a dislocated land with unlimited time as Aion and with smooth open space as rhizome, which differ from the limited Chronos and the striated State apparatus of the above-ground world. The underground is neither New Zealand nor Australia. It is, in opposition to the well-regulated surface, a chaotic anarchical land of wonder without measure. Since Wonderland’s spatiotemporality cannot be specified by using the above-ground logic, Wonderland’s creatures also deviate from Alice’s common sense and judgment—they are not the stereotypical Victorian gentlemen or ladies but are nonsensical inhabitants who follow the peculiar law and logic of their own—the law of lawlessness and the logic of
illogicality. What the creatures say always make the issue or the problem more confused, for their norms do not confirm to the social norms of the surface world.

Wonderland is also a production of Alice’s fantasy in the form of dream-scenario; it is “a representation of the unconscious” (Feldstein 150). The dreamscape of Wonderland is driven by Alice’s unconscious desire to travel, being accompanied with her fears of disidentification. The whole Wonderland becomes the frame of desire, in which Alice’s repressed desire and fears are emerged out to the surface—desire to adventure to a world with vivid images, exciting conversations and foreign other, and fear of any changes of growing or shrinking. Although in Alice in Wonderland the other is one of the products of Alice’s dream, it cannot be “reduced to an internalized aspect of subjectivity,” for it is a “self-contained set of signification” and “insists on the alterity of the unconscious: it has its own demand, its own desire, its own time, and its own linguistic effect . . .” (Feldstein 156). How Alice handles the communication gap with the other would bring the issue to different outcomes. With low comprehensibility and high complexity of conversations, how does Alice view and feel about the other in Wonderland? How could she achieve intersubjectivity with the other, and could she integrate into the packs of the other?

As Leed suggests, “Nonterritorialized human relations are grounded in the conditions of motion, [and] in chance encounters . . .” (234); Alice’s relationship with Wonderland’s delirious inhabitants draws forth the issue of encountering the other in travel. To encounter the other does not merely mean to meet the other, but to have intersubjectivity with them or, better, to enter the zone of proximity with the particles of the other, which further needs speed of intensity. This does not mean a subject’s rapidity or celerity in motion, but her/his affects, i.e. individual haecceities. In the
affinitive zone, pure affects refer to both the subject’s and the other’s particles’ pure relations between speed and slowness, and rest and movement, which occupy the plane of consistency, leading the subject to the process of becoming. Therefore, to encounter the other and to keep speed of intensity are both significant factors for a subject’s becoming-other. It is to encounter the other with speed of intensity that a subject could free herself/himself to travel on the smooth open space. This chapter thus tries to analyze the condition of Alice’s encounter with Wonderland’s creatures as well as her traveling speed, which would lead to realization or disturbance of Alice’s becoming-other as a nomadic traveler in Wonderland.

I. Encountering the Other

Deleuze’s idea of becoming does not suggest that two subjects transform their identity to become the other, but “each encounters the other” (Deleuze and Parnet 6-7, italics mine). To encounter the other does not simply means to come across the other, but to have intersubjectivity with her/him as well. In encountering the other, the traveling subjects will respect the differences between their and the other’s cultures. They do not impose their cultures or concepts onto the other. Instead, they will remove their molar identities into molecules in order to have affinity with the other’s molecules. Both sides will come to a common notion and “a mutual affecting of forces takes place. In the process of this molecular encounter, ‘two bodies adapt themselves to one another’ . . . This is the art of taking flight and becoming” (Islam 40). This common notion brings “a joyful becoming of multiple bodies in encounter” (Islam 107). Nevertheless, becoming is not equal to being, and “adapt to” does not mean “change to.”
Massumi also states that “[b]ecoming-other orchestrates an encounter between bodies” (98, italics mine). To encounter the other will not necessarily bring the subjects to becoming-other. However, to undergo the process of becoming-other, the subjects certainly need to encounter the other, because “becoming is always double” (Deleuze and Guattari 305). It is double in the sense that becoming needs two terms to initiate its process: the subjects will undergo the process of becoming-other, and the other will be in the process of becoming something else. This is “the concept of heterogeneous couplings with maintained difference, an encounter but not an assimilation, a paradoxical identification that dislocates identity” (Flieger 55). If the subjects and the other do not encounter one another, becoming will never be launched out. Encountering the other is thus an anti-memory one, for it disturbs the subjects’ thoughts and disorients their identities, making them break away from the epistemological confinement of memories, nationalities, or whatever things pre-constructed and limited. The subjects make themselves feel free to integrate into the life of the other but not becoming the other, because they go the middle way, the way which passes between points and which is neither the originality nor the alien, but the way of the intermezzo—to be in the never-ending process of becoming-other, a “betweenness” which could only be “experienced, not attained” (Flieger 43).

The issue of anti-memory has been briefly discussed in the previous chapter on Alice’s short anti-memory beginning of her travel following the White Rabbit from the Victorian land to the underground world. What leaves unsaid about anti-memory in the previous chapter is that it is the catalysis for the subjects to encounter the other, so as to further the process of becoming-other. In order to encounter the other and enter the zone of affinity with the other’s particles, the subjects need to undo their
pre-existent memories, because, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “Becoming is an antimemory. Doubtless, there exists a molecular memory, but as a factor of integration into a majoritarian or molar system. Memories always have a reterritorialization function” (294). Although there are molecular memories, these molecules always integrate into a greater molar entity. Therefore, memories would disturb becoming because of their reterritorializing functions, making the subjects limited by the past as molar entities and thus unable to encounter the other freely.

Memories here indicate long-term memories, which represent the ineradicable pre-constructed knowledge of a nationality. These long-term memories are “arborescent and centralized (imprint, engram, tracing, or photograph)” (Deleuze and Guattari 16), for they are fixed immobile ones being long confirmed and deep rooted. However, short-term memories are exceptions. They are not subordinated to the control of law: they can “act at a distance, come or return a long time after, but always under conditions of discontinuity, rupture, and multiplicity” (16). Short-term memories can spring up at any point and at any time. It seems that they are forgotten and distanced, but they will suddenly spring up under certain conditions—all of which are characteristics of the rhizomatic network, the war machine. Therefore, in encountering the other, if there are indeed memories in the subjects’ mind, they certainly are short-term memories, which include “forgetting as a process” (16) and which are rhizomatic in nature.¹

Islam, borrowing but deviating from Deleuzian theory, has many discussions on travelers’ encounter with the other. He brings Deleuzian concept of becoming onto the

¹ The distinctions between long-term and short-term memories are made clear here. In this thesis, except the particular indication of the rhizomatic short-term memories, others in this thesis refer to long-term memories.
theory of travel, stating that nomadic travel is “to do with encounters with otherness . . . it is a performative enactment of becoming-other” (vii), and “one has to forget the memories of the same, and encounter the other” (37). In contrast to the real travel of a nomadic one, sedentary travel has nothing to do with encounter; it is an immobile travel of always being the same. For Islam, the distinctions between encounter and representation are: a nomadic traveler will encounter the other, undoing memories without returning to the same and undergoing the process of becoming-other on the plane of consistency, whereas a sedentary traveler will only be the representation of the same and return to the same without any differences. If travelers adventure by possessing their culture’s standard norms in mind, they turn into a walking incarnation of the mnemonic machine of that culture, which symbolizes their epistemological origin. As the machine of mechanical representation, these travelers are sedentary in the sense that they merely move from one fixed point to another on the striated space, traveling only to assert themselves as normalized people of their originality. They also build invisible walls to enclose themselves inside, protecting themselves from outside influences and preventing themselves from encountering the other. They are supremely aloof and self-conceited. While limiting themselves within the walls of selfhood, sedentary travelers often view otherness as inferior, vile and undeveloped.

Islam provides an example of the sedentary travel by analyzing Robinson Crusoe as the representation of his original culture. In Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Robinson drifts to a desolate island. He does not integrate into Mother Earth or enjoy the beauty of Mother Nature there. Instead, he “draws circles, constructs fences, erects walls in an endless pursuance of boundaries” (Islam 2). He is confined to these
self-build boundaries around himself: inside these walls is the country of England being rife with English logocentric norms and codes. Robinson never goes anywhere but within the boundaries of England; he brings with him the “portable territory” (Deleuze and Guattari 320). He makes himself the representation of England wherever he goes. Asserting himself as an imperial pioneer, he makes Friday his slave, giving Friday a name, a religion, and a master. This master-slave relationship is certainly not the result of Robinson’s encounter with the other, but his exploitation of the other. Encountering the other should be developed on the basis of equipollence in order to bring both sides onto a common notion. This common notion is achieved not by power, but by agreements and concordances. It is brought out through a natural progress—from travelers’ shaking of molar identities, to their integration into the life of the other, and ultimately to deterritorialize themselves into particles which is affinitive with the other’s particles on the plane of consistency, leading the subjects to progress becoming-other as a nomadic traveler. Such a process is the true encounter with the other. However, in Robinson’s case, he only passes by the other without any encounter with the other. He is a typical sedentary traveler. If Alice’s travel is like that of Robinson’s, we would say that Alice is a sedentary traveler, not a nomadic one.

Alice meets numerous inhabitants while traveling in Wonderland. Whether she could discard her innate beliefs to encounter the other is one of the significant factors that will decide the kind of a traveler she would be. In Wonderland, the first creature Alice notices is the White Rabbit, a character showing up intermittently from the beginning to the end of the story. He resembles a guide who directs Alice to the land of wonder. Nevertheless, Alice never has a good talk with him. Her first word to the White Rabbit is “[i]f you please, sir—,” which receives no reply (AIW 22). The
creature whom Alice has long conversations with in the beginning of her travel is the Mouse. However, Alice excitingly pours out words about her cat Dinah, forgetting the fact that the cat is naturally a mouse-killer. Even in the airy Caucus-race, one of Wonderland’s nonsensical games in which everyone “began running when they liked, and left off when they liked” (AIW 31), Alice does not merge into the crowd. She physically plays the game but spiritually stands aside as an imperial observer, concluding that “the whole thing [is] very absurd” (AIW 33). After the Caucus-race, although Alice listens to the Mouse’s tale, she misunderstands and interrupts the tale by constantly judging things with the interpretive schema of her living society, which do not apply to the law of Wonderland. If Alice cannot get rid of the confinement of the above-world doctrines but constantly hits upon them, she can hardly achieve intersubjectivity with the other or an encounter with the other. Instead, she would always be a monotonous representation of the “mnemonic machine” (Islam 39).

Alice does not have any interactions with creatures until she comes across the Caterpillar in the thick woods. The Caterpillar hears and replies to what Alice says; Alice listens to and gives response to the Caterpillar as well:

“Who are you?” said the Caterpillar. . . . Alice replied, rather shyly, “I—I hardly know, sir, just at present— at least I know who I was when I got up this morning . . . “What do you mean by that?” said the Caterpillar sternly. “Explain yourself!” “I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, sir,” said Alice, “because I’m not myself, you see.” “I don’t see,” said the Caterpillar. (AIW 47)

The conclusion Alice makes here is that “[w]ell, perhaps your feelings may be different . . . all I know is, it would feel very queer to me” (AIW 48). Conspicuously,
they do not come to a common notion, not to mention to “adapt themselves to one 
another” (Islam 40). Carroll italicizes the word “me” to emphasize that Alice comes 
from a different world, which has different concepts and values from Wonderland. As 
a “moved body” (Deleuze and Guattari 386), the fortress Alice builds for herself is 
still as firm and solid as it was before. She cannot travel light as long as “the house of 
the tortoise, the hermitage of the crab” (Deleuze and Guattari 320), the incarceration 
she is imprisoned in, does not break down.

Alice is eager to find someone to talk with. When she has a chance to chat with 
the Duchess, the narrator describes that Alice is “feeling quite pleased to have got into 
a conversation” (AIW 61). Afterwards, while meeting the Cheshire Cat in the garden, 
she feels “very glad she had someone to listen to her” (AIW 86). In Wonderland, the 
Cheshire Cat is the one whom Alice regards as a friend. He seems to be very 
concerned about Alice, asking her “How are you getting on?” and “How do you like 
the Queen?” (AIW 86). Alice feels comfortable that she has someone to talk with. She 
desires to have intersubjectivity with somebody. However, Alice’s conversations with 
the creatures in Wonderland scarcely enact any intersubjectivity. Alice always behaves 
as “the object of information, never a subject in communication” (Islam 29). No “we” 
would appear in this land of wonder. While Alice tells the Mouse that she would not 
talk about Dinah anymore, she says: “We won’t talk about her any more if you’d 
rather not,” and the Mouse cries: “We, indeed! . . . As if I would talk on such a 
subject!” (AIW 27). The Cheshire Cat also tells Alice that “we’re all mad here,” a 
“we” which Alice disproves as well (AIW 66).

Conversations often end up with absurdity and disagreement. A case in point 
occurs when confronting with the nonsensical response from the Frog-Footman, Alice
concludes that “there’s no use in talking to him” (*AIW* 59). She cannot help but thinking that it is really dreadful “the way all the creatures argue. It’s enough to drive one crazy” (*AIW* 59). The mad tea-party is also so ridiculous. Alice even decides that “I’ll never go *there* again!” (*AIW* 78). (However, according to the rhizomatic nature of Wonderland, it is true that she can never go back *there* again if she is intentional.)

Alice tries to have a talk with Wonderland’s creatures. However, she can never get rid of the pre-existed perceptions of the Victorian State apparatus, continuously thinking how rude and uncivil the creatures are: when the Frog-Footman is talking to Alice with his eyes looking up into the sky, Alice thinks decidedly that he is “uncivil” (*AIW* 59). In addition, when March Hare asks Alice to have some wine but there isn’t any on the table but tea, Alice angrily says that “it wasn’t very civil of you to offer it” (*AIW* 70-71).

Apparently, Alice cannot integrate into the nonsensical packs of Wonderland, often using words such as *strange*, *uncomfortable*, *uneasy*, *uncivil*, *uncommon*, *wrong*, *queer*, etc., which are usually negative in the perspective of her cultural background, to describe her Wonderland experience and Wonderland’s creatures. She is fixed to the identity which is “a construct created from experiences on the surface world that have been transposed to Wonderland” (Feldstein 152). Her identity is constructed in close relation to the Victorian social context. She views things from “the standpoint of the State,” seeing “the originality of the man of war, his eccentricity, necessarily appears in a negative form: stupidity, deformity, madness, illegitimacy, usurpation, sin” (Deleuze and Guattari 354). The nomads and the smooth space they occupy are viewed by the State apparatus as the barbarians and the wasteland. Alice thus views creatures of Wonderland as savages without any etiquette. Having such a criterion in
mind, Alice can hardly become a nomadic traveler, who can travel light and proceed
to what the old saying goes, “While in Rome, do as the Romans do.”

Concerning Alice’s desperate attempt to encounter the frantic other, it is worth
our attention that the abstract and the smooth space of Wonderland has impacts on the
characteristics of the creatures living here. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel has
addressed in *Philosophy of History* that “the natural type of locality” is “intimately
connected with the type and character of the people which is the offspring of such
soil” (79-80). Similarly, Sherer mentions that in Carroll “place and character cannot
be detached, for one immediately generates the other” (5). Characteristics of a place
will influence the types and features of its inhabitants. For Wonderland, its space is so
illogical that no map can be drawn as representation; consequently, the creatures
living in this soil are so nonsensical that no rule can be set to describe, except the rule
of *no rule*. While “[s]oft countries . . . breed soft men” (Herodotus, qtd. in Islam 6),
the illogical space of Wonderland breeds nonsensical creatures, and the strict doctrine
of the Victorian society breeds Alice with rigid concepts of manner. Thus, Alice
always feels contradicted and offended by Wonderland’s creatures, for she cannot fit
into their lives and conversations. She cannot accept Wonderland’s “nomad thought,”
which “does not lodge itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in
an element of exteriority . . . it rides difference” (Massumi 5), because she embodies
the thought of logos from the rigid State apparatus.2 This thought of logos helps

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2 Deleuze and Guattari talk briefly about “nomad thought” in *A Thousand Plateaus*. For them, nomad
thought rejects classical image of thought, allies with a singular race instead of a universal thinking
subject, and declines to ground itself in an all-encompassing totality (379). Nomad thought is one
example of Deleuze’s ethic of affirmation. Deleuze proposes that there are two kinds of thought: an
active or affirmative one and a reactive one. Colebrook expounds that an active thought is creative:
“[I]t realises itself as the formation of concepts and as an event of life” (8). On the contrary, a reactive
thought merely simulates the “adherence, representation, replication or faithful copy of some prior truth
or meaning” (8). Nomad thought thus represents an active and affirmative one, whereas thought of
assert Alice’s identity by reestablishing precedence in all its “temporal, spatial, political, and interpretative” senses (Bivona 161). If Alice constantly refers to the above world instead of trying to shake off its shadow, she can hardly encounter any creatures, but only represents a “mnemonic machine” (Islam 39).

Like Defoe’s Robinson who prevents himself from encountering the other by seeing himself superior to the natives in a foreign island, Alice in Wonderland has never achieved, in Deleuzian sense, an encounter with any creatures. Constantly possessing Victorian mores and doctrines in her mind, Alice imprisons herself within the invisible solid walls she builds around herself. She “tries to make sense of this estranging encounter by recalling her experience of institutional architecture in the form of the schoolroom” (Wolfeys 37), i.e. the above-world schoolroom of doctrines and norms. Mark Gabriele even concludes in his “Alice in Wonderland: Problem of Identity—Aggressive Content and Form Control” that, for Alice, “rules and a sense of control are a matter of life and death” (389). Therefore, Alice as a traveler stands for the representation of the Victorian culture. She merely goes from the same and returns to the same. She travels, but her travel only reinforces the border between her and the foreign creatures. Trying to judge creatures and events in Wonderland with logic of the world above, she and the creatures continuously conflict or disagree with each other, or sometimes they even talk whatever they like without regarding the others. Alice also lacks the desire to understand the other. She has once distracted while the Mouse is telling a tale. She is thus accused severely by the Mouse with the saying that “You are not attending!” (AIW 34). The enclosure Alice inscribes herself represents the “inflatable, portable territory” (Deleuze and Guattari 320), hindering her from logos stands for a reactive one.
encountering the other as a nomadic traveler.

II. Traveling Speed and Movement

To move with intensive speed on the line of flight/escape will advance the subjects’ deterritorialization, which further accelerates the process of Deleuzian becoming-other. It needs to be first clarified that only moves with intensive speed can the subjects advance on the line of flight, because “speed is the secret of the supple line of the nomadic traveler . . . a question of becoming” (Islam 56). To have intensive speed does not suggest that the subjects progress as rapidly as lightning, or adventure to a place farther away. It is to proceed light without the burden of the past and to deterritorialize freely into particles which enter the zone of proximity with the other’s particles that we say the subjects have the speed of intensity. What makes it speed does not depend on rapidity or distance. It is characterized as an “immanent speed of self-differentiating forces” (Islam 39). With intensive speed, the subjects are enabled to move on the line of flight, which is the continuum of intensity that inhabits the surface of the plane of consistency. Beneath the plane of consistency undergoes the deterritorialization of the subjects into particles. The relations between the particles’ movement and rest, and speed and slowness are called by Deleuze and Guattari the haecceities. A haecceity is a “mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance” (Deleuze and Guattari 261). Therefore, it can be conjectured that haecceity is the mode of individuation of the relations between two deterritorialized subjects’ particles, elements, or molecules. In short, the subjects need to proceed light as an anti-memory one and to have haecceity in recomposing all the affects of relations (the relations of speed and slowness, and rest and movement) with
the other’s, so that the subjects can move on the line of flight with speed of intensity, regardless of how quick the subjects progress or how far they go.

In travel, if travelers undo their past memories to become anti-memory in the place of the other and to adapt themselves to the culture of the other, both of these will bring travelers to forget the past and to extract deterritorialized particles to enter the zone of proximity with the other’s particles, drawing forth the process of becoming-other in encountering the other. Such a travel has intensive speed which enables the travelers to travel light on the line of flight above the smooth space. No matter how far travelers go, to travel light conduces to their intensive traveling speed and leads to a nomadic travel. On the contrary, if travelers adventure to a far-away place but still confine themselves to the self-build walls of their past memories, they do not really journey to any places at all—this kind of travel is a sedentary one without the intensive speed. It can only be called a movement which brings travelers to return to the same without any differences. Deleuze and Guattari illustrate the differentiations between speed and movement:

a movement may be very fast, but that does not give it speed; a speed may be very slow, or even immobile, yet it is still speed. Movement is extensive; speed is intensive. Movement designates the relative character of a body considered as ‘one,’ and which goes from point to point; speed, on the contrary, constitutes the absolute character of a body whose irreducible parts (atoms) occupy or fill a smooth space in the manner of a vortex, with the possibility of springing up at any point…only nomads have absolute movement, in other words, speed; vertical or swirling movement is an essential feature of their war machine” (381).
Therefore, having speed does not mean to travel fast and quick. Rapidity and distance are usually linked to speed; however, they are not the prerequisites for speed. Speed may be slow or immobile. It is the travelers’ deterritorialized parts which activate as body without organ on the plane of consistency in the manner of a vortex that we call it speed. Speed makes travelers to spring up at any point on the smooth open space. Contrarily, Deleuze and Guattari state that, having gravity as its essence, the well-defined directions in the striated space would “restrict speed, regulate circulation, relative movement, and measure in detail the relative movements of subjects and objects” (386). No matter how far travelers go, traveling with the past memories and the imperial attitudes of molar identities lead travelers to travel on the striated space of the State apparatus. This kind of sedentary travel makes no speed for self-differentiation forces but induces only a pseudo-movement that will return travelers to the same without changes. Travelers become doing relative movement as a “‘moved body’ going from one point to another in a striated space” (386). They are sedentary travelers, in contrast to nomadic travelers who are repeatedly doing absolute movement of self-difference as a “moving body” (371), in which speed is incarnated, enabling travelers to spring up at any point.

A movement is a relative one, because travelers’ movement never really moves to any places at all, but always being confined to the self-build enclosures. It is speed that makes movement an absolute one. Travelers will have speed and will be really brought to the place of the other after their encountering with and integrating into the other. Colebrook elaborates Deleuze and Guattari’s relative movement and absolute movement, pointing out that this two dynamic senses of movement are “a political movement as the organization of a ground, identity or subject; and a molecular
movement as the mobile, active and ceaseless challenge of becoming” (1). It is, therefore, not hard to find out the interrelations between relative movement and the State apparatus, and between speed of absolute movement and the nomads. The nomads have speed; they encounter the other while moving on the line of flight on the smooth open space, deterritorializing themselves to undergo the process of becoming-other. Nevertheless, people of the State only do relative movement on the striated space of the State apparatus without having speed, limiting themselves within firm walls of molar identities without ever changing.

That is why in the game of Chess, under regulated instructions, the pieces can only go from one point to another—they are only doing relative movements on the closed space. However, in the game of Go, without any specified rules, the pieces can array themselves randomly—they have speed, doing the absolute movements on the smooth open space. Deleuze and Guattari mention that

in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim of destination, without departure or arrival. (353)

Speed is unlimited, unconditional and unbounded, but it also has its laws— “the laws of the nomos, of the smooth space that deploys it, of the war machine that populates it” (386). Speed is what makes the nomads the nomads: “If the nomads formed the war machine, it was by inventing absolute speed, by being ‘synonymous’ with speed”
Speed, therefore, is one of the important factors to the process of becoming. Alice seems to have speed when she travels to numerous places, such as the long hall, the Caucus-race, the White Rabbit’s house, the woods, the Duchess’s house, the mad tea-party, the croquet ground, the sea and the court. It seems that Alice is affected by what Islam calls “the urgency of speed and dwells in shifting dwellings” (11), because “the primary attribute of the supple line is speed (intensity)” (60). It has been discussed that the transition of Alice’s traveling places is smooth. Alice travels on the supple line of the smooth open space, in which place “dissolves as Alice departs from it,” explaining “why there is no backward motion in Wonderland” (Sherer 5) and why Alice cannot go backward if she is intentional. No intentional backward motion is there for Alice; only unintentional detours would happen. Therefore, both the speed of movement and the smooth interconnected space make Wonderland geographically unmappable. The more Alice wants to go to a place, the more she is unlikely to be there. Hence, in the long hall, Alice shrinks to fit the size of the door but forgets to bring the key (AIW 17), and then she grows to catch the key but turns out to be too big for the little door (AIW 21). She is destined to make detours until she finds the law of travel in Wonderland—travelers would have speed merely when they shut away the confinement of memories (the goals, aims, destinations, etc.) and travel freely in the timelessness and on the smooth space of Wonderland.

Alice cannot choose which place she wants to go, and she has no destination in mind, either. Although she desires to enter the lovely garden, in her travel she happens to go to places that happen to be there. She springs up at any point on the line of flight: without questioning the appearance of a door on a tree, she starts to accept the law of Wonderland where things are always surprisingly illogical and interesting. A door on a
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tree can no more frighten her. Even though the door suddenly leads her back to the long hall, she makes no surprise, merely saying to herself that “‘Now, I’ll manage better this time’ . . . began by taking the little golden key . . . [and] nibbling at the mushroom” (*AIW* 78). For a moment, Alice seems to have speed and to travel on the line of flight to a farther-away place, for she breaks away the law of the above world and starts accepting the law of Wonderland. However, her elimination of the past memories lasts only briefly, running short of forces to deterritorialize herself into particles and to enter the zone of proximity with the other’s particles.

As a whole, Alice fails to emancipate herself freely in Wonderland and, therefore, she does not have traveling speed in her travel. The Victorian codes she holds immobilize her from being a traveler with speed of intensity. Her recall of memories encircles her in a self-centered world, making a “portable territory” which “guards against the speed and the intensity of the molecular and the chaos of the outside” (Islam 59). She falls through gathering body of forces and represents the “moved body” (Deleuze and Guattari 386). No matter how far she goes, she is always in the Victorian world, trying to understand Wonderland “by conjuring memories of past experience and applying them to each situation she encounters” (Feldstein 161). Therefore, she does not travel on the line of flight as a “moving body,” not to mention to deterritorialize herself into particles that are closet to the other’s particles. She might have rapidity and celerity because of her constant changing of places, but her shifts do not make her travel an immanently speedy one with self-differentiation forces. She moves with a heavy burden of the past, which hinders her from traveling light on the line of flight.

However, nomads can even move without really moving: “We can say of the
nomads, following Toynbee’s suggestion: *they do not move*. They are nomads by dint of not moving . . .” (Deleuze and Guattari 482). The nomadic travelers have speed of intensity even though they stay still. They can also have speed even though they are confined to the narrowest space. It is because they liberate their molar entities to decompose into particles on the spot, making themselves the “body without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari 270) and making their individualized haecceity the relations of movement and rest between their and the others’ particles. They could encounter the other with speed of intensity without at the same time moving to other places.

Nevertheless, Alice does not move to anywhere while moving. Without escaping the space of representation, although progressing forward and confronting a series of adventures, Alice’s movement only returns her to the same. She is unsuccessful to endow the parts of her body with relations of movement and rest, and speed and slowness of the other’s particles that will lead her to the process of becoming-other. Her travel is not a perilous absolute movement that exceeds cultural boundaries, but only a relative movement that moves without traveling speed of intensity.

What is in urgency is to transform Alice from the “moved body” of a sedentary traveler to the “moving body” of a nomadic one. Since, according to Islam, “[D]welling is ontologically primordial; beneath the surface of a rigid boundary and the visible frame of representation, there lie the primordial forces of shifting difference, ever-changing boundaries and the speed of becoming” (77), Alice as the representation of the above thus still has opportunities to make what has long been repressed beneath emerge out, i.e. to elicit the force beneath, which would break the rigid boundaries and convert herself to a nomadic traveler.
III. Nomadic or Sedentary

Nomadic traveler is one who decomposes into particles on the plane of consistency and then recomposes by having affinities with the other’s particles to form a different haecceity, i.e. to becoming-other while encountering the other on the line of flight with speed of intensity. Sedentary traveler, however, is one who never changes, moving on the striated closed space and doing relative movement with topological charts in mind. A nomadic journey should be a *spiritual* one, which is “effected without relative movement, but in intensity, in one place: these are part of nomadism” (Deleuze and Guattari 381). A spiritual voyage does not mean a journey with the traveler’s spirit, but with the traveler’s spiritual renewals during and after the travel. According to Marina Warner, Alice’s supernatural adventure is in fact a *spirit* one (187), instead of a spiritual one. Her idea comes from one of Carroll’s proposing three degrees of consciousness on how “a Human being to be capable of various psychical states”—a form of *trance*,3 in which the subject is apparently asleep, migrating “to other scenes, in the actual world, or in Fairyland . . .” (“Preface” 464). Alice’s journey to Wonderland belongs to the form of trance, a spirit one, in which the sleeping Alice’s immaterial essence transfers to the Fairyland (Wonderland). In short, a spiritual voyage is a nomadic one, in which the subject travels with intensive speed of the absolute movement, whereas the spirit voyage like Alice’s is not necessarily a nomadic one; it all depends on whether the subject has changed after her/his journey. If Alice becomes grown-up after her journey to Wonderland, her adventure will not only be a spirit one but also a spiritual one, making *Alice in Wonderland* a

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3 The other two degrees of consciousness are the ordinary state and the “eerie” state. For more details, please see Carroll’s “Preface” in *The Penguin Complete Lewis Carroll* (1982).
bildungsroman.⁴

In *Alice in Wonderland*, the rhizomatic space of Wonderland and its timelessness found the basis of Alice’s traveling framework, which is similar to the spatiotemporality of a nomadic travel. However, Alice has problems in liberating elements of her body to encounter the other with speed of intensity. While Alice faces Wonderland’s nonsensical events, although there are possibilities that she can be becoming-other when she becomes larger and smaller after drinking juice, eating cakes and biting mushrooms, these changes of size can only be called “becoming the other” or “being-other” which is different from Deleuzian “becoming-other.” For Deleuze, becoming-other does not mean to become the other. It always goes the middle way, which is a progression that never ceases becoming. The line of becoming constantly “passes between points” and “comes up through the middle” (Deleuze and Guattari 293). The middle does not mean the average. It is “where things pick up speed” (25). To becoming-other, the subject does not change any of her/his appearance. Only, immanently, the subject’s decomposed particles will thereafter become proximate with the other’s particles. However, becoming the other is a transformation that changes the subject into a different person, animal, plant, or some other shapes. It is a process that comes to an end, having its beginning and its destination.

Alice’s changes of size make her become a physically different person. These

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⁴ Northrop Frye et al. in *The Harper Handbook to Literature* (1997) write that bildungsroman is “a novel of education from youth to experience” (74), such as Charles Dickens’s *David Copperfield* (1849-1850), James Joyce’s *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916), and Saul Bellow’s *Adventures of Augie March* (1953). Bildungsroman could also be called “an APPRENTICESHIP NOVEL . . . ‘a story of development,’ and . . . ‘a novel of education’.” (74). If Alice grows up and becomes mature after her adventure to Wonderland, *Alice in Wonderland* will be a story of Alice’s development and a novel of education, because Bildungsroman puts focus on the spiritual, psychological and moral growth of the protagonist.
changes are the metamorphoses in fantasy literature that transform a person into another. Alice’s transformations in Wonderland are fixed, coming to an end and with purposes. She either becomes larger or smaller to a fixed size after eating cakes or mushrooms. In Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, it is the supreme divine power that causes the shape-changing. Other forces in fantasy literature come from the magic of wizards, witches, elves, fairies, goblins, demons, etc., all of which are persons or spirits that exert the supernatural power. In *Alice in Wonderland*, however, it is the force of the illogical nature that alters Alice’s size totally for twelve times “with no divine intervention, [and] no magical incarnation” (Wang 7). The former eleven times are driven by eating cakes and mushrooms, drinking juice and even once by fanning the White Rabbit’s fan. These metamorphoses are elicited by Wonderland’s magically

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5 In his essay “Aspects of Metamorphosis in Alice,” Irving Massey has analyzed that there are six aspects of metamorphosis in *Alice in Wonderland*: “(1) natural metamorphoses (2) metamorphoses of antithesis or dialectic (3) metamorphoses related to language, especially at the beginning and end of each book (4) the revolt of words (5) the metamorphosis of the character into the author (6) an antimetamorphic principle” (76). This thesis focuses on one of the types of the first aspect, “natural metamorphoses.” Irving further divides the “natural metamorphoses” into four types: “(1) physical or biological changes (2) changes and problems of identity (3) metamorphoses into one’s own aggressive or bestial self (4) metamorphoses of caricature” (76). The “physical or biological changes” of the “natural metamorphoses” are the main concern here in discussing Alice’s changes of size in Wonderland.

6 Alice’s twelve alterations in size in *Alice in Wonderland* are: (I) shrinking to ten inches high after drinking a bottle on the table in the long hall (17); (II) growing over nine feet high after eating a cake under the table (21); (III) shrinking again into two feet because of fanning White Rabbit’s fan (24); (IV) drinking a little bottle in the White Rabbit’s house, and then growing up to hit the ceiling and to kneel down on the floor (39); (V) eating a cake which is transformed from a pebble and shrinking small enough to get out of the White Rabbit’s house (44); (VI) shrinking rapidly after biting the mushroom in her right hand after meeting the Caterpillar (53); (VII) growing up into the sky after eating mushroom in her left hand and is thus mistaken by the Pigeon as a snake (54); (VIII) transforming to her normal size after eating two mushrooms carefully (56); (IX) biting the right-hand mushroom again to shrink to nine inches high to avoid frightening creatures in the Duchess’s house (56); (X) nibbling the left-hand mushroom to raise herself to about two feet high before going near the large house of the March Hare (67); (XI) nibbling the mushroom again to be a foot high to get in the little door to the garden (78); (XII) growing up automatically while sitting in the court of justice (113-14) and, finally, recovering her normal size and waking up to find herself on the bank (124).

7 Sophia Wei Wang in her MA Thesis “Disrupting the Ladders of Hierarchy: Metamorphosis in Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*” focuses on Alice’s metamorphoses. Wang counts Alice’s changes of size for totally thirteen times, since she adds Alice’s waking up to the normal world as the thirteenth metamorphosis (13-14). However, the thirteenth one is problematic, for “waking-up” does not involve any changes of size like the pervious ones, but only change of situations.
illogical characteristics, each being accomplished through certain individual medium (cakes, mushrooms, fans, etc.). The twelfth one is much more particular than the pervious eleven ones, for, in the court of justice, Alice grows up automatically without any intermediaries: “Alice felt a very curious sensation, which puzzled her a good deal until she made out what it was: she was beginning to grow larger again . . .” \(\textit{AIW 113-114}\). Anything could happen in the inconsistent Wonderland, and nothing more peculiar could surprise Alice again. After Alice’s first experience in growing and shrinking by drinking and eating things, she knows such an illogical rule in Wonderland, a rule that she might grow or shrink if she drinks or eats something. Therefore, later in her adventure, she knows how to eat foods with a purpose to control her size: being afraid of frightening the creatures in the Duchess’s house, Alice begins “nibbling at the right-hand bit again, and did not venture to go near the house till she had brought herself down to nine inches high” \(\textit{AIW 56}\).

Alice’s metamorphoses are not an on-going process which passes between points. She might sense an uncanny feeling in her mind, for the shrinks bring her back to the size smaller than a baby—a size that she is still in the womb of her mother, and the growths lead her to experience a novel feeling that she will have after growing up. Her metamorphoses thus have two sides of connotations, to shrink and to grow, or to the past and to the future. According to Rabkin, “The fantastic reveals not only our deepest fears, but also our greatest aspirations; not only our hidden shames but also our finest hopes” \(226-227\). While Alice has a chance to fulfill her hope to travel to an exciting world, the shrinks and the growths are her unconscious fears of disidentification that emerge out to the surface as the uncanny return of the repressed: the fear of once being closed within the wet and the dark mother-womb, and the fear
to quickly grow up as an adult, or it could be said that they are Alice’s fears of losing unified self-image and of changes.

These long repressed feelings are now drawn out in Alice’s dream in the manner of metamorphoses, making what had been remained unconscious familiar to become unfamiliar. Her fantastic metamorphoses thus have inseparable relationship with reality, bringing the secret and the hidden into light. Nevertheless, Alice’s metamorphoses’ indication for the past and the future is not the kind of past-future indicated by Deleuze on the discussions of Aion. Aion is a continuous floating line that eludes the present and heads for the past-future at the same time (Deleuze and Guattari 262). Alice’s metamorphoses, however, can only head for the future at the one time and back to the past at the other time. They go merely one of the extreme ways. They make Alice become the other.

There is once for a moment Alice senses the feeling of going both ways at the same time. The event that continuously heads for two directions at one time is called by Deleuze “the pure event”: “The agonizing aspect of the pure event is that it is always and at the same time something which has just happened and something about to happen; never something which is happening” (Logic of Sense 63). Deleuze proposes that the events in Wonderland are also pure events, which he refers to in the very first sentence of his The Logic of Sense: “Alice and Through the Looking-Glass involve a category of very special things: events, pure events” (1). After drinking a bottle labeled “DRINK ME,” Alice shrinks to ten inches high. Accordingly, while she sees a cake with currants marking “EAT ME,” she eats it anxiously in order to know what is going to happen next: “Which way? Which way?” (AIW 18). When Alice is expecting metamorphosis, she tries to sense which way she is going to be—whether
she would become much smaller or larger than the present ten inches. At the moment of conjecturing further changes, Alice not only pays attention to one side (to become smaller) but also anticipates the other side (to grow larger). She eludes the present and stretches toward both directions. All of these are a few examples of the pure events or, more specifically, of pure becomings.

As Deleuze points out, no matter it is growing larger or shrinking smaller, it is “at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present” (Logic of Sense 1). This moment of sensing the way of alteration explains the moment and the characteristics of “pure becoming without measure” (Logic of Sense 1). Nevertheless, this moment does not last long, and it is not the becoming which never ends. Alice’s metamorphoses always stop at a fixed size with a definite outcome. They are limited and measured, as “a particular subject having a particular largeness or a particular smallness at a particular moment” (Logic of Sense 1). Alice still fails to achieve Deleuzian becoming in Wonderland, not to mention that she would be becoming-other as a nomadic traveler, even though there are possibilities for her in the short moment of becoming before each metamorphosis.

8 Deleuze is inspired by Plato’s concepts in his Philebus and Parmenides: ‘hotter’ never stops where it is but is always going a point further, and the same applies to ‘colder,’ whereas definite quality is something that has stopped going on and is fixed;” “. . . the younger becoming older than the older, the older becoming younger than the younger—but they can never finally become so; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but would be so. (qtd. in Deleuze 2)

He further theorizes Plato’s ideas and proposes two dimensions of thing: “(1) that of limited and measured things, of fixed qualities . . . (2) a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad, which never rests. It moves in both directions at once. It always eludes the present . . .” (Deleuze 1-2). Alice’s metamorphoses are good examples to distinguish these two dimensions of thing. In one dimension, when Alice’s metamorphosis comes to an end with a fixed physical change, this metamorphosis is limited, measured and with fixed qualities. In another dimension, the moment that Alice expects further changes (no matter it is to become lager or smaller) is the same moment of a becoming without measure.
IV. Becoming-Wonderland

The ones who undergo the process of becoming in Wonderland are those creatures living there, such as the White Rabbit, the Mouse, the Caterpillar, the Cheshire-Cat, the Hatter, the March Hare, the Mock Turtle and so on. They grasp the knack of holding the smooth space like those of the nomads sticking onto the desert or the steppe with speed of intensity. They are all in the process of becoming: having speed of intensity, they deterritorialize themselves to emit particles in order to have affinity with the other’s particles, which, in this case, are the particles of Wonderland itself. Wonderland’s deterritorialized elements are the illogicality, the nonsense, the eccentricity, and the madness. While the creatures encounter the illogical nature of Wonderland and enter the proximate zone with Wonderland’s particles, they no longer resemble a usual rabbit, mouse, caterpillar, cat, hare, turtle, etc. in the common sense of the above world. They are not what they are supposed to be, for they become the product of the war machine of Wonderland. They are the emancipated parts of Wonderland’s madness, and Wonderland becomes the internalized spirit of them; these becomings exemplify the simultaneous becoming of the subject and the other. Wonderland triggers the becoming of creatures there; these creatures are in the process of becoming-Wonderland, while Wonderland reterritorializes itself on these creatures and deterritorializes itself to the process of becoming something else, i.e. of becoming the internalized spirit of those creatures. Thus, these creatures do not remain the same or become Wonderland. They go the middle way: they are in the process of becoming-Wonderland (of becoming-illogical, of becoming-nonsensical, of becoming-eccentric, and of becoming-mad).

In encountering the other to initiate the process of becoming, the object that the subject is becoming
Creatures, therefore, can speak and talk in the illogical Wonderland. Their words and behavior are so nonsensical, always confusing Alice by their excessive unreasonable contents. In the mad tea-party, while the Hatter finds that his watch is “[t]wo days wrong!” he tells the March Hare:

“I told you butter wouldn’t suit the works!” . . . “It was the best butter,” the March Hare meekly replied. “Yes, but some crumbs must have got in as well,” the Hatter grumbled: “you shouldn’t have put it in with the bread-knife.” The March Hare took the watch and looked at it gloomily: then he dipped it into his cup of tea, and looked at it again: but he could think of nothing better to say than his first remark, “It was the best butter, you know.” (AIW 71)

This conversation lacks any common sense. For Alice, it is sheer nonsense. Like what the Cheshire-Cat says when he first meets Alice: “we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad” (AIW 66), all creatures in Wonderland are mad in an unusual way. They seem quite simple as a normal man, but what they say or do is merely irrational.

is one which is whatever minoritarian. However, this object does not exclusively refer to a person of minority (a woman, a child, etc.). It can also be an animal, an insect, and a plant: there are not only becoming-woman and becoming-child (Deleuze and Guattari 248), but also becoming-animal (244), becoming-rat (233), becoming-dog (244), becoming-vegetable (272), becoming-wasp and becoming-orchid (293-294). More importantly, the object could be a thing, an abstract idea or any other inanimate one: there are becoming-mineral (272), becoming-intense (232), “becoming-elementary, cellular, molecular, and even becoming-imperceptible” (232). Since “all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (291), the illogicality, the nonsense, the eccentricity, the madness and the frontier of Wonderland are all regarded by the majority as something minoritarian, abnormal and illegitimate. Therefore, if the creatures encounter Wonderland, there are possibilities that they could be becoming-Wonderland (becoming-illogical, becoming-nonsensical, becoming-eccentric, and becoming-mad).

Besides, Deleuze has precisely discussed becoming-mad in his The Logic of Sense. He uses becoming-mad as something becoming unlimited (7). He thinks that Carroll’s doubles (“the gift of meaning . . . which precedes all good sense and all common sense”) stand for “the two senses or two directions of the becoming-mad” (79). He instances the doublet of the Hatter and the March Hare: “each one of them lives in one direction, but the two directions are inseparable; each direction subdivides itself into the other, to the point that both are found in either. Two are necessary for being mad; one is always mad in tandem” (79). In this thesis, becoming-mad is categorized as one of the consequences of becoming-Wonderland or, in other words, one of the outcomes after encountering Wonderland.
Although they become different from what they should be, these creatures do not physically transform into the other. They are in the immanently perpetual state of becoming—becoming-Wonderland.

The difference between “becoming” and “becoming-other as a nomadic traveler” consists in the fact that to undergo the process of becoming does not need to cross a geographical boundary to other place as that of a traveler. A subject could be becoming-other, becoming-Wonderland, or becoming whatever minoritarian, even though he/she stays at a standstill. However, to becoming-other as a nomadic traveler prescribes the fact that the subject positions as a traveler, for whom crossing boundaries to other places is indispensable. The creatures that are inhabited in Wonderland do not travel to any other places at all. They could be in the process of becoming while encountering Wonderland. However, they could not be a nomadic traveler, except they cross boundaries to make the change of places carried out.

In Wonderland, the Cheshire-Cat is the one who undergoes the process of becoming-other as a nomadic traveler. Like the other creatures, he encounters Wonderland by deterritorializing himself into particles, which have relations to speed and slowness, and rest and movement with Wonderland’s particles. The Cat is becoming-Wonderland with speed of intensity. Moreover, the Cat holds the smooth space, because he could spring up at any point flexibly. Some parts of his body (e.g. the tail and the body) could first slide on the supple line into another interconnected space, and some others (e.g. the eyes, the ears and the grin) would follow slowly. The Cat abstracts himself from one place to another on the smooth space of Wonderland. He is not, for this reason, disembodied into parts; instead, he travels to other interchangeable place parts by parts. He is a traveler who knows very well the nature
of Wonderland, and is excellent in utilizing Wonderland’s nature to make himself
even travel smoothly among diverse places. He is not only an expert traveler of
Wonderland, but also a nomadic one—one that is becoming-Wonderland as a nomadic
traveler.

In addition, concerning the White Rabbit, he is the only one creature who
shuttles to the above world and passes back to the underground: while Alice is still
sitting on the bank, she sees the White Rabbit running to and jumping down a large
rabbit-hole (*AIW* 11-12), which brings the White Rabbit and Alice to the subterranean
world. The White Rabbit disappears in a moment with intensive speed. He knows how
to encounter Wonderland: after the fall, Alice runs close behind the White Rabbit,
hearing him say, “Oh my ears and whiskers, how late it’s getting!” when he turns a
corner. However, the White Rabbit is soon out of sight after Alice turns the corner
(*AIW* 14-15). The White Rabbit not only travels freely between two worlds. He sticks
onto the smooth space of Wonderland, for, just in a moment, he travels to another
interconnected place of the rhizomatic underground. He appears and runs away many
times throughout Alice’s adventure, always failing Alice to catch him or to know
where he comes from and flees to. The White Rabbit, like the Cheshire-Cat, is in the
process of becoming-Wonderland as a nomadic traveler.

As far as Alice is concerned, she fails to take in the process of becoming-other
while encountering numerous creatures in Wonderland. However, she has already
launched into the process of becoming-Wonderland. Besides changing physically, she
has also been influenced internally by Wonderland’s illogical and nonsensical nature.
The illogicality and nonsense of Wonderland slip through the fissures of Alice’s
invisible self-protective walls around herself. Although advancing within Victorian
portable territory, Alice has been influenced unconsciously by the underground world. She tries to identify herself by constantly referring to the above world, but what she remembers has already been distorted by the illogical nature of Wonderland. Alice forgets how to speak good English, saying “Curiouser and Curiouser!” \((AIW 20)\), instead of the correct “more curious.” She drops who she herself really is from memory, asking bewilderedly “Who in the world am I?” \((AIW 23)\). She also forgets how to do simple multiplication, calculating that “four times five is twelve, and four times six is thirteen, and four times seven is—oh dear! I shall never get to twenty at that rate!” \((AIW 23)\). Besides, she mistakes London for the capital of Paris, and Paris for the capital of Rome \((AIW 23)\). She cannot even remember verses of a simple song. Alice tells the Caterpillar: “Well, I’ve tried to say ‘How doth the little busy bee’, but it all came different!” \((AIW 49)\); instead, she has sung “How doth the little [crocodile]—” \((AIW 23)\).

The altered poems in *Alice in Wonderland* can best express how the uncanny feeling is induced in Alice’s mind, a feeling that results from the natural influence of Wonderland. In the case of the poem “How doth the little busy bee,” the first stanza of this poem is:

\[
\text{How doth the little busy bee} \\
\text{Improve each shining hour,} \\
\text{And gather honey all the day} \\
\text{From every opening flower!} \ (AIW 23 \text{ n.5})
\]

However, the first stanza of Alice’s twisted poem is:

\[
\text{How doth the little crocodile} \\
\text{Improve his shining tail,}
\]
And pour the waters of the Nile
On every golden scale! (AIW 23)

According to Gardner’s note, “Most of the poems in the two Alice books are parodies of poems or popular songs that were well known to Carroll’s contemporary readers” (AIW 23 n.5). Alice as an educated child should be very familiar with the poem, “How doth the little busy bee,” and should not forget its lines. Her alterations of words and phrases are thus peculiarly strange, inducing an uncanny feeling in Alice’s mind. The poem which should be very familiar to her now becomes queer. That is because she starts to be influenced by the illogical nature of Wonderland, gradually heading for the requisite process of anti-memory for being a nomadic traveler. In the twisted poem, not only the bee turns out to be the crocodile, the content of the poem changes, too: from the bee gathering honey all the day from every flower into the crocodile pouring the waters of the Nile on very scale. The new poem still makes sense, but it is so queer for Alice. Alice’s bewilderment makes the poem a seemingly correct but strangely uncanny one—an uncanniness which is much more queer and frightening than the mere change of the cute bee into the cruel crocodile. Alice is gradually influenced by the illogical nature of Wonderland, because what she definitely should remember now escapes her mind and induces an uncanny feeling in her mind.

Originally, Alice behaves as a courteous child, always trying to be as polite and well-mannered as she can be. However, no longer murmuring to herself when something contradicted happens, Alice becomes aggressive and impetuous at the end of her travel: when she hears the Gryphon say that the jurors are busily writing down their names lest they would forget them before the trail terminates, she bursts out saying “Stupid things!” (AIW 111). More irrational and violent than she used to be,
Alice erupts hysterically at the court of justice:

“No, no!” said the Queen. “Sentence first—verdict afterwards.”

“Stuff and nonsense!” said Alice loudly. “The idea of having the sentence first!”

“Hold your tongue!” said the Queen, turning purple.

“I wo’n’t [won’t]!” said Alice.

“Off with her head!” the Queen shouted at the top of her voice.

Nobody moved.

“Who cares for you?” said Alice (she had grown to her full size by this time). “You’re nothing but a pack of cards!”

At this the whole pack rose up into the air, and came flying down upon her; she gave a little scream, half of fright and half of anger, and tried to beat them off . . . . (AIW 124)

Alice becomes madder and more uncivil than she used to be. In the Cheshire-Cat’s words, Alice is mad, or she would not be here (AIW 66)—a madness that Alice can no longer deny.

Many of Alice’s memories escape her while she travels smoothly on the rhizomatic space of Wonderland and travels within the time of Aion that eludes the present. In her travel, she is also a bit influenced by the illogicality, the eccentricity, and the madness of Wonderland. She has already taken on the initial process of becoming-Wonderland like those of the creatures. Wonderland kindles Alice’s becoming, and Alice is becoming-Wonderland while Wonderland is simultaneously becoming something else, a spirit or a concept. In this respect, Alice tallies with a nomadic traveler, who encounters the other (Wonderland) unconsciously through
deterritorializing herself into particles that are closest to Wonderland’s particles. Therefore, latter in her journey, she becomes madder and more irrational than she used to be. However, her becoming-Wonderland is initiated because of the great power of Wonderland’s inherited illogicality, eccentricity and madness, all of which disable Alice from having opportunities to antagonize or to disprove their influence. Alice lacks the will to encounter Wonderland voluntarily and willingly. Her encounter is an unavoidable and an inescapably forced one. This reluctance reveals in her defective encounter with Wonderland’s creatures. She cannot integrate into the life and the belief of the other, falling short of the will to understand those creatures. From the perspective of being a nomadic traveler, Alice needs more endeavors to accomplish “While in Wonderland, do as Wonderland’s creatures do”\textsuperscript{10} in order to accelerate the progression of becoming-other as a nomadic traveler.

To conclude, Wonderland, like the surface of the “desert, steppe, ice, and sea” (Deleuze and Guattari 493), is a smooth space without fixity of points. In Alice in Wonderland, a place will surprisingly lead to another place of wonder; the entrance will suddenly appear before eyes, guiding the traveler to the next adventure. Alice never stops in one place for a long time. She dwells in the shifting dwellings. In this sense, it seems that Alice resembles a nomadic traveler who cannot dwell in one place too long because speed and motion are the essences of movement. However, the secret that Alice travels smoothly lies in the nature of Wonderland with supple lines as well as the interchangeable and interconnected network. It is not that Alice who does not want to choose the route but she cannot. The mysterious force of Wonderland opens the passage for her: the rabbit-hole leads to the long hall; meeting the Mouse

\textsuperscript{10} This saying, “While in Wonderland, do as Wonderland’s creatures do,” is appropriated from the old saying “While in Rome, do as the Romans do.”
there leads Alice to the Caucus-race. Then, following the direction pointed by the
White Rabbit, she comes to his house. To be accused of intruding into the Rabbit’s
house, she runs into the thick woods . . . etc. The road seems imperceptibly to have
been decided for Alice, conducting her ultimately to the court of justice where the
King and the Queen of Hearts are nonsensically interrogating the Knave who is
impeached for stealing tarts.

Although Wonderland embodies the supple line and the time of Aion that would
bring Alice to travel light and to elude the present, Alice is problematic in
becoming-other, since she keeps being captive in the representation of Victorian
norms which make encounter with the other and deterritorialization with speed of
intensity impossible. Therefore, Alice never travels light, never erases the memories
of her departure place, and never progresses with speed that would take her out of the
confinement of the Victorian culture. It is really paradoxical that Alice travels in a
smooth space as a nomadic traveler, but still progresses within the portable territory
which only reinforces the border and keeps herself from encountering the other. Her
memories of the Victorian world hinder her from becoming-other, for becoming is
always “anti-memory” (294). She thus limits herself in the traveling incarceration. As
a mnemonic machine, she cannot traverse the line and leave the doctrines behind and,
therefore, is unable to free herself to encounter creatures in Wonderland. Her
progression is merely a “pseudo-movement” (Islam 28). Thus, even though
Wonderland provides Alice with possibilities of becoming-other, Alice guards herself
against Wonderland’s offers and constantly possesses Victorian norms in mind. If she
can get rid of this mnemonic machine and free herself in Wonderland, she would be
carried along in this smooth space on the supple line with speed of intensity and,
naturally, would undergo “becoming-other” as a nomadic traveler. However, without the ability to “muster force enough for the final move” (Islam 52), Alice in her travel is on the brink of becoming-other as a nomadic traveler.

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11 Islam uses this description on Adela Quested’s condition in Forster’s A Passage to India. Unlike Mrs. Moore who travels light in India, Adela falls back into the boundary of colonial city and rudely questions Aziz for the total of her wives. She only returns to the same as a sedentary traveler (52).