Chapter Two

Travel in Fantasy

I almost wish I hadn’t gone down that rabbit-hole—and yet—and yet—it’s rather curious, you know, this sort of life! I do wonder what can have happened to me! When I used to read fairy tales, I fancied that kind of thing never happened, and now here I am in the middle of one! There ought to be a book written about me, that there ought! And when I grow up, I’ll write one—but I’m grown up now . . . . (AIW 39)

*Alice in Wonderland* has long been considered as a work of fantasy literature. However, the meanings behind this fantastic mode are seldom explored. Psychoanalytic theory is one of the very few theories that treat fantasy as a significant issue. From Freud, Lacan to Žižek, discussions on fantasy have never diminished. For psychoanalysts, fantasy, being often misunderstood as a means of escape from the present constitution and restraints, is de facto inherently connected to reality. In other words, fantasy and reality are interdependent, for reality supports the exertion of fantasy, and fantasy protects and has relations with reality. This makes fantasy differ from the simple imagination of a subject.

Freud’s idea of the uncanny is similar to fantasy, since these two are both developed in the gray area between reality and imagination. The uncanny refers to feelings of a person when something familiar becomes queer and shocking, or when something long repressed in the unconscious emerges again in a frightening form. The event of the uncanny thus has relations with reality, bringing closely the relationship
between reality and imagination. A travel in the fantastic world would be and should be an uncanny one, because it is influenced by social conditions or politics of the real world through transgressive ways of reflections, metaphors, satires, etc. Embedded in the frame of fantasy, the protagonist not only overstrides the restrictions of home and launches her/his sail toward the place of the other, but also highlights and brings into question the sociopolitical conditions of a society.

The motif of travel is significant in fantasy literature. The protagonist in fantasy literature usually acts as a traveler, who adventures from places to places and encounters numerous seemingly possible but nonsensical events that are implausible in reality. During these adventures, the protagonist is identified as either a nomadic traveler or a sedentary one. Inspired by the Deleuzian theory of nomadology and becoming, Islam proposes that a nomadic traveler is the one who undergoes the process of becoming-other and who travels on the supple line, whereas a sedentary traveler only returns to the same point without any self-differentiations. Moreover, while in reality becoming-other is simply a transformational identification, in literature of fantasy becoming-other adds a symbolic metaphysical sense. It is also different from the being-other of metamorphoses, which are all along popular in fantasy literature. In this chapter, psychoanalytic theory of fantasy on literary analysis will be explored first, followed by discussions on nomadology and becoming in travel theory. Connecting these two theories will provide us a deeper view on the

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1 The meaning of the uncanny will be elaborated more in this chapter.

2 However, an uncanny travel is not necessarily a fantastic travel, for the feeling of the uncanny may also be experienced by a traveler in the real world.

3 The definition of becoming-other and its differences from being-other will be discussed later in this chapter. In brief, becoming-other is not an imitation, a metaphor or an analogy; it is in the never-ending process of emitting particles that have affinity with the particles of the other. However, being-other is a fixed organ-like imitation of the other.
realm of the fantastic travel that Alice undertakes in the subterranean Wonderland.

I. Fantasy: From Psychoanalytical Perspectives to Literary Analysis

For Freud, fantasy is a psychical formation which primarily generates images from substitution, condensation, displacement, etc. Freud carries out many clinical experiments with regards to fantasy of the analysand, such as the case studies of the Wolf Man and the Rat Man. In the case of the Wolf Man, the analysand has a dream which is so real that it takes time for him to realize that it is only a dream. Dreaming of lying in the bed at night, the Wolf Man sees the window open suddenly, and there are six or seven white wolves sitting on the tree. Feeling that he is being eaten up by the wolves, he screams while waking up and is soon tended by his nurse (Freud, “The Dream and the Primal Scene” 29). Freud’s analysis of this “earliest anxiety-dream” scenario (“The Dream and the Primal Scene” 32) of the Wolf Man is that the Wolf Man had witnessed the sexual intercourse of his parents when he was little. The scene has greatly influenced his unconscious and his psychosexual development. The dream of the Wolf Man stages the Wolf Man’s long repressed memories in an uncanny way, establishing the relationship between the fantasy-scenarios of dream and the experience of everyday life.

Regarding reality as a construction, Freud proposes that reality is itself

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4 Freud concludes that the wolves in the Wolf Man’s dream may refer to a father-surrogate of the Wolf Man, so that the dream implies the Wolf Man’s fear of his father, who was going to dominate his life (34). The formation of this dream is the Wolf Man’s wish “for the sexual satisfaction which he was at that time longing to obtain from his father” (34). However, his wish fails and results in “terror, horror of the fulfillment of the wish”; consequently, he takes flight from his father to the nurse (36). The reason that causes his terror (the picture that conjures up the Wolf Man’s nightly workings of sexual desire and frightens him away violently from his wish-fulfillment) is, according to Freud, the fear of castration—“the picture of copulation between his parents” (36). For more discussions and analyses on the Wolf Man’s dream, see “The Dream and the Primal Scene” in Volume XVII of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (1955).
“discursively constructed,” implying the “discovery of the fundamentally discursive and imaginative nature of memory; memories of past events are continually being reshaped in accordance with unconscious desires” (Evans 60). The unconscious, which reshapes memories, in fact has inseparable relationship with reality, as that is in the example of the Wolf Man. It constructs the discursive and imaginative nature of memory. Because of the Wolf Man’s case, Freud asserts that “some part of the latent material of the dream is claiming in the dreamer’s memory to possess the quality of reality, that is, that the dream relates to an occurrence that really took place and was not merely imagined” (“The Dream and the Primal Scene” 33). Lacan accepts Freud’s idea in his interpretation of the Wolf Man study: “[I]t is in relation to the real that the level of phantasy functions” (Four Fundamental Concepts 41). After Freud, discarding the traditional misunderstanding that fantasy is a means of escape from reality, Lacan and Žižek establish their analyses of fantasy on this inseparable relationship between reality and fantasy.

Lacan focuses the analysis of fantasy on the account of desire. He clearly states that the dream is not a fantasy to fulfill desire; instead, “desire manifests itself in the dream by the loss expressed in an image at the most cruel point of the object” (Four Fundamental Concepts 59). Fantasy, therefore, has protective function, resembling a screen that veils something significant, such as the fear of castration, and pinpointing the lack in the Other which would be emerged from the psychological process of fantasizing (Evans 60). While the subject intends to fulfill his desire through fantasy, he will only find out that fantasy in his name of desire-satisfaction is merely “a vain detour with the aim of catching the jouissance of the other” (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts 183). Fantasy is “the support of desire” (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts 183).
**Fundamental Concepts** 185) and desire is articulated but not fulfilled through fantasy. In Lacanian clinical treatment, the analysand needs to traverse such an unconscious fantasy, which would be reconstructed and elicits a modified mode of *jouissance*, which characterizes the analysand's unique fantasy scenario (Evans 61).

Incessant analyses on fantasy in psychoanalysis bring us to Žižek, who follows his predecessors to uncover the veils of fantasy and to further put focus on art, culture and ideology. By using examples, such as the various designs of the lavatories and architectures as well as the ways of washing dishes in different countries, Žižek points out that the externality indeed materializes ideology. Fantasy works within ideology through the fantasy-scenario, which not only conceals the horror of the real but also “creates what it purports to conceal, its ‘repressed’ point of reference” (Žižek 7). Again, the idea that fantasy is interrelated with, instead of opposing to, reality is specified. Based on this presupposition similar to Lacan, Žižek proposes seven features of fantasy in his *The Plague of Fantasies* (1997): “fantasy’s transcendental schematism,” “intersubjectivity,” “the narrative occlusion of antagonism,” “after the Fall,” “the impossible gaze,” “the inherent transgression” and “the empty gesture.”

Like the Kantian “transcendental schematism,” which is “a fantasy [that] constitutes our desire, [and] provides its co-ordinates . . . ,” fantasy, for Žižek, is not a

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5 Take the various designs of the lavatories for example, each represents the ideology of a specific country:

In a traditional German lavatory, the hole in which shit disappears after we flush water is way in front, so that the shit is first laid out for us to sniff at and inspect for traces of some illness; in the typical French lavatory, on the contrary, the hole is in the back—that is, the shit is supposed to disappear as soon as possible; finally, the Anglo-Saxon (English or American) lavatory presents a kind of synthesis, a mediation between these two opposed poles—the basin is full of water, so that the shit floats in it—visible, but not to be inspected. (Žižek 4)

These dissimilar designs among German, French and Anglo-Saxon lavatories reveal the German “ambiguous contemplative fascination,” the French “hasty attempt to get rid of the unpleasant excess as fast as possible” and the Anglo-Saxon “pragmatic approach to treat the excess as an ordinary object to be disposed of in an appropriate way” (5). These diverse designs implicitly manifest a country’s attitude toward life, materializing each country’s ideology through the externality of its lavatory.
way to realize desire, but “teaches us how to desire” (*The Plague of Fantasies* 7). The desire in the subject’s fantasy is the desire of the other, which is crucial in the subject’s formation of identity. Fantasy is thus characterized by intersubjectivity, in which it tells the subject what others see in him and what he is to the others (9). Fantasy is also “the primordial form of narrative, which serves to occult some original deadlock” (10). It rearranges fundamental antagonism into the fantasy-scenario, being presented as a narrative in which what has long been repressed emerges. This narrative of fantasy cannot leave out the issue of gaze, which is an impossible gaze “by means of which the subject is already present at the act of her/his own conception” (16). Žižek also states that fantasy is not the transgression of the Law or the fulfillment of desire in hallucination; on the contrary, it is “*the very act of its [the Law’s] installation*” (14). When the subject wants to transgress or to violate the Law, his very act designates this unfluctuating Law instead. Although fantasy does not transgress the Law, it has the feature of implicit inherent transgression, maintaining “a distance towards the explicit symbolic texture sustained by it” (18). Fantasy is also an empty gesture, which, under the appearance that the subject has free choices, is merely a symbolic one destined to be rejected and, if chosen, it would not take place, either. Žižek thus suggests that “the act of taking the empty gesture” is “to treat the forced choice as a true choice” (29). This treatment, in relation to Lacan, exemplifies one of the ways to practice “traversing the fantasy,” for the subject will suspend “the phantasmic frame of unwritten rules which tell him how to choose freely” (29).

Following Lacan’s analyses of fantasy, Žižek brings us closer to understanding fantasy’s relation to everyday life; the notion of fantasy’s inseparable relationship
with reality should be, again, emphasized. For psychoanalysts, fantasy is in relation to reality, against the traditional view that fantasy provides a means to escape. If applying psychoanalytic theory of fantasy to the analysis of fantasy in literary texts, it turns out that fantasy no longer merely represents the impossible, the transcendence and the escapade. It indeed has relations with the living reality in its fantastic narratives. The fantastic thus should be designated as a mode, where “a number of related genres emerge” (Jackson 7). Therefore, fantastic narratives could be presented in various genres in relation to reality. That is why Rosemary Jackson in her *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* (1988) subverts Tzvetan Todorov’s notion presented in his *The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre* (1975): in contrast to Todorov, who discusses fantasy theoretically by concentrating on its generic characteristics, Jackson proposes that the fantastic is in fact a mode of writing which “enters a dialogue with the ‘real’ and incorporates that dialogue as part of its essential structure” (36).

Although fantasy literature provides a free imaginative place for those repressed people in a rigid society and opens up “a space of uncertainty” (Shires 267), it is not totally discrete from reality. Žižek states that fantasy “mediates between the formal symbolic structure and the positivity of the objects we encounter in reality” (7). It is indeed situated in the intermediate zone between reality and imagination. As Todorov points out, “the concept of the fantastic” is “to be defined in relation to those of the real and the imaginary” (25); Jackson further states that the “fantastic exists in the hinterland between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’, shifting the relations between them through its indeterminacy” (35). Since fantasy occupies the intermediate zone between reality and imagination, its in-betweenness erases the distinction between them, covering
“points of disjunction between the imaginary, symbolic, and real” (Feldstein 173). While the “distinction between imagination and reality is effaced,” the uncanny effect will be easily produced (Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’” 244). Fantasy thus becomes one of the places to create and to develop what Freud discusses—the uncanny.

The term “uncanny” comes from the German “unheimlich,” which literally means “unhomely”—the unfamiliar, the uncomfortable and the strange. Interestingly, the uncanny also has another totally opposite meaning, the “heimlich” (“homely”)—the familiar, the comfortable and the intimate. The word unheimlich could be deemed as the “sub-species of heimlich,” for heimlich means either the familiar or the concealed and the dangerous, developing its meaning “in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich” (Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’” 226). Therefore, the term “uncanny” has two kinds of meaning which seem contradictory to each other but actually coexist in equilibrium: the “uncanny” refers to feelings which are supposed to be familiar but now become queer and frightening. It coincides with what arouses fear, dread and horror, bringing what “ought to have remained secret and hidden” into light (Schelling, qtd. in Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’” 225). Factors that would turn frightening things into uncanniness are, for instance, “animism, magic and sorcery, the omnipotence of thoughts, man’s attitude to death, involuntary repetition and the castration complex” (243). Therefore, the uncanny is not something novel or alien, but “something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression” (241)—the uncanny thus presents the return of the repressed, projecting a subject’s unconscious desires and anxieties out to the surface.

Freud’s theory of the uncanny provides a way to read fantasy literature; as
Todorov suggests, “[T]he literature of the fantastic illustrates several transformations of desire. Most of them do not truly belong to the supernatural, but rather to a social form of the uncanny” (131). Fantasy literature transforms reality in a way resembling the discovery of the uncanny, which “uncovers what is hidden and . . . effects a disturbing transformation of the familiar into the unfamiliar” (Jackson 65). The hidden, being often regarded as the taboo, is long repressed for the sake of the intact social system; the uncanny return of the repressed thus, for Freud, has “countercultural effects” (Jackson 70). Although it seems that fantasy literature has threatened the social norms through its transgressive sense, Jackson proposes that fantasies not merely serve as countercultural forces but also serve “to re-confirm institutional order by supplying a vicarious fulfillment of desire” (72). This proposition, again, confirms the inseparable relationship between reality and fantasy.

Many of the metamorphoses in fantasy literature connote the uncanny relationship between reality and fantasy. As one of the popular motifs in fantasy literature, metamorphosis refers to the change of shape into another which is other than oneself. It elicits differences from physical changes, which would induce uncanny feelings toward the individual’s self and make the subject’s identity disputable. Ovid is the master and precursor on the topic of metamorphosis. His *Metamorphoses* explores many kinds of shape-changing in literature. The most famous one is “Apollo and Daphne” (899-902): because of Cupid’s revenge, Apollo crazily falls in love with the daughter of the Peneus, Daphne, who never loves him. Apollo keeps chasing the fleeing Daphne, who ultimately runs out of strength and asks her father to destroy her beauty. Peneus thus changes her daughter into a laurel tree, which is appointed by the infatuated Apollo as his sacred tree thereafter. In
Huang 19

Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, the supreme divine power is the main cause of shape-changing. According to Jackson, Daphne’s transformation has a “teleological function,” realizing her desire to free from her female body (81). However, changes in post-Romantic fantasy are “without meaning and are progressively without the will or desire of the subject” (81). These changes in post-Romantic fantasy are, in fact, the “expressions of unconscious desire” (62), instead of the supernatural events. Metamorphosis in Post-Romantic fantasy would thus bring uncanny feelings to the subject. It helps to draw the subject’s desire and fear out through transformation of the unconscious familiar to the presentation of the unfamiliar.

In conclusion, fantasy has uncanny relationship with reality, in which the repressed has been returned and the desire is always going to be fulfilled. Moreover, fantasy literature further mediates reality and the unconscious in textual form, in which the uncanny effects are in symbiosis and the metamorphosis is one of the expressive ways to present the unconscious desire. These psychoanalytic readings of fantasy help us to explore the meaning behind many of the so-called “fantasy literature,” instead of nominating it without probing into its latent significations. Besides elucidating on the issue of fantasy, the role of the protagonist—the subject in fantasy—in fantasy literature requires our attentions. The protagonist in fantasy literature usually adventures from one place to the other as a traveler, encountering various amazing events in the fantastic world. This kind of travel is indeed an uncanny travel; it brings out the protagonist’s unconscious desires and fears that are connected to living reality. The issue in the following part of the chapter falls on the role of the protagonist by employing travel theories, exploring conditions under which
the protagonist, as a traveler in the fantastic world, would become a *real* traveler.6

**II. Travel: From Nomadology to Travel Theory**

Fantastic travels in the literature of fantasy are travels which dig out the long repressed desires and fears of the protagonist, presenting the unconscious through uncanny events encountered along series of adventures. These uncanny events could be mediated through the usage of dreams, revelries, or hallucinations, in which the metamorphosis, alienation, and doubling would be employed as expressions. Take Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland* as an example. Having long been repressed as an educated child, Alice hankers to travel out and to encounter with novel things. She wants exciting adventures, which are realized through the medium of dream in *Alice in Wonderland*.

Since the narrative of fantasy “serves to occult some original deadlock” (Žižek 10) and “bears witness to some repressed antagonism” (Žižek 11), it presents what has long been repressed in the protagonist’s mind. The narrative of primordial fantastic travel in Wonderland has presupposed that Alice adventures as a traveler. Alice’s role as a traveler is thus pre-scribed in the story. Under the framework of the fantastic travel, Alice is a traveler adventuring in the fantastic world of her dream. However, whether she becomes a real traveler or not is worth attention: what is a “real” traveler? How to become a “real” traveler in the fantastic world? These issues will be discussed on the basis of Deleuzian theory of nomadology and becoming in addition to Islam’s

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6 Islam states that sedentary travel “hardly deserves to be called ‘travel’ at all” (vii-viii), but nomadic travel is the one that “deserves the name ‘travel’” (vii). He also mentions that the sign of the supple line in nomadic travel “expresses the real event of the travel” (67). Therefore, in Islam’s sense, a real travel is a nomadic one, not a sedentary one (The meanings of nomadic and sedentary travels will be discussed later in this chapter).
travel theory, which puts Deleuzian concepts into his theory of travel ethics. Therefore, in this part, Deleuzian concepts of nomadology and becoming will first be introduced, followed by Islam’s travel theory.

A. Nomadology

Nomadology is a study that puts attentions on the nomads. It is the essence and knowledge induced from the observations and analyses of the nomads, i.e. the war machine, which cannot exist without its opposing but interdependent counterpart, the State apparatus. Thus, both the war machine and the State apparatus are taken into concern in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, especially in Chapter Twelve “1227:Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine.” The State apparatus is reigned by the power of sovereignty, building walls and fortresses to resist the outside forces of nomads, which are multiplicities occupied in the open space. The State and the nomads are demarcated and seem to be two separate entities, and the war machine is “irreducible to the State apparatus” (Deleuze and Guattari 352), for they coexist as a pair. The war machine is usually regarded as the negative “stupidity, deformity, madness, illegitimacy, usurpation, [and] sin”; it is “the pure form of exteriority,” in contrast to the State apparatus which constitutes “the form of interiority” (354)—the normality, rationality and legitimacy. However, it should be clarified that the demarcation between the State and the nomads is not so absolute. There are always fissures and irruptions that would muddle their distinctions. Therefore, the war machine could be deemed as “located between two heads of the State,” which enables the nomads “to pass from one to the other” (355).
B. Sedentary Space and Nomad Space (Rhizome)

On the one hand, the space of the State apparatus is the sedentary space which is constituted merely of points. The State apparatus is confined to the fortress it builds and the law it creates. Boundaries in this sedentary space are very clear and rigid, confining people to formed walls inscribed by the law and providing them with a perceived identity. Sedentary space is thus homogeneous, limited and closed with its own concern “to conserve”: it is by definition “the perpetuation or conservation of organs of power” (Deleuze and Guattari 357). Power controls, and people can only have freedom as long as they do not break the law. Hence, no intensive speed of a moving body could be accounted here; only a moved body’s intentional movement along a fixed route could occur. The route on this striated space resembles the arborescent structure of a tree, which “plots a point, fixes an order” (7) and “centers around organs of power” (358); it is thus by nature the “pseudomultiplicities” (8). Deleuze and Guattari analogize the striated sedentary space to the space of Chess, which is the game of State. Each piece of Chess is given related power and coded quality: “[T]hey have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations derive. They have qualities; a knight remains a knight, a pawn a pawn, a bishop a bishop” (352). The space of Chess is sedentary in the sense that the route for each piece of Chess is fixed and the identified knight, pawn, and bishop could only go from one point to the other structurally, displaying the interior nature of the State apparatus.

The nomad space, on the other hand, is the non-rigid space on which the war machine rambles, being constituted by supple lines instead of points. It is the smooth space without the confinement of laws and walls. Everyplace can connect to any other
places and everyplace could be the center of this space. In other words, the nomad space is interconnected, centerless and fluid, all of which signify its characteristics as heterogeneous and smooth, like the game of Go. In contrast to chess, which is “an institutionalized, regulated, coded war, with front, a rear, battles,” Go is “war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is a semiology” (Deleuze and Guattari 353). For Deleuze and Guattari, the smooth space is a field without fixed boundaries and enclosures, but with transitory boundaries of fluctuating and with “a very particular type of multiplicity: nonmetric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities that occupy space without ‘counting’ it and can ‘be explored only by legwork’” (371). In a word, the nomad space is the smooth space of the rhizome.

*Rhizome* occupies an important place in Deleuzian theory. The rhizomatic smooth space of the war machine is in contrast to the arborescent striated space of the State apparatus discussed above. While there is a center in the tree branch structure, the rhizome is acentered and interconnected. The rhizomatic represents the characteristic of the nomads, and the composition of rhizome parallels the space of the war machine. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “[A]ny point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be”; this differs from the root-tree that has a point and an order (7). The heterogeneously interconnected rhizome is an “antigenealogy” (11), which is opposed to the regular pattern of a tree. It has “neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions” (8). Therefore,

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7 The antagonisms and relationships between the game of chess and the game of Go, and between the State apparatus and the war machine are concluded briefly by Deleuze and Guattari: “The ‘smooth’ space of Go, as against the ‘striated’ space of chess. The *nomos* of Go against the State of chess, *nomos* against *polis*. The difference is that chess codes and decodes space, whereas Go proceeds altogether differently, territorializing or deterritorializing it” (353).
the anti-hierarchical rhizome has multiplicities, being composed of abstract supple
lines (the line of flight) on the plane of consistency, the smooth space of affects, on
which multiplicities “fill or occupy all of their dimensions (9).

C. Plane of Consistency and Deterritorialization

The plane of consistency has continuums of intensity in the surface, while
emitting particles to perform deterritorialization in the beneath. It is the “body without
organs” (BwO) (Deleuze and Guattari 270), which does not really mean without
organs but without organizations, constituting of haecceities along intersecting lines.
Haecceities consist of “relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles,
capacities to affect and be affected” (261); it is the essence of the nomadic. The plane
of consistency inscribes deterritorialization, leading the subject to extract unformed
elements (the atoms, the corpuscles, the molecules or the particles) in order to enter
the zone of affinity with the particles of the other, and further leading the subject to
the process of becoming-other. However, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that even
though deterritorialization is characteristic of the rhizome, the war machine and the
plane of consistency, “it is inaccurate to say that the State apparatus is territorial: it in
fact performs a D [deterritorialization], but one immediately overlaid by
reterritorializations . . .” (508). In the same manner, it is inaccurate to assert that the
rhizome consists merely of lines of deterritorialization. It also contains lines of
territorialized segmentarity, but these lines would “explode into a line of flight,
[which] is part of the rhizome” (9).

Deleuze and Guattari propose eight theorems of deterritorialization in A
Thousand Plateaus. All of these theorems will influence the process of a subject’s
becoming, providing insights into how deterritorialization functions. Firstly, “One never deterritorializes alone; there are always at least two terms” (174). The first theorem shows the initiation of the process of becoming, referring that becoming needs two terms, the subject and the other. Secondly, “The fastest of two elements or movements of deterritorialization is not necessarily the most intense or most deterritorialized” (174), pointing out that the intensity of deterritorialization in becoming is not the same as the speed of a subject’s movement. Thirdly, “[T]he least deterritorialized reterritorializes on the most deterritorialized” (174). This third theorem indicates that the least deterritorialized is the minor other that will reterritorialize on the most deterritorialized, i.e. the subject, in the process of becoming. Fourthly, “The abstract machine is . . . effectuated not only in the faces that produce it but also to varying degrees in body parts, clothes, and objects that it facializes following an order of reasons” (175), stating that becoming is something about molecules, instead of molars. Fifthly, “[D]eterritorialization is always double, because it implies the coexistence of a major variable and a minor variable in simultaneous becoming” (306). The fifth theorem indicates that becoming is always double; it is a simultaneous becoming of the subject and the other. Sixthly, “[I]n non-symmetrical double deterritorialization it is possible to assign a deterritorializing force and a deterritorialized force . . . it is the least deterritorialized element that always triggers the deterritorialization of the most deterritorializing element” (306-307). The sixth theorem designates that it is always the other that triggers the becoming of the subject. Seventhly, “[T]he deterritorializing element has the relative role of expression, and the deterritorialized element the relative role of content” (307). This theorem shows that, in becoming, the content is asymmetrical to the expression,
but it is also carried to a zone of indiscernibility where its distinction to the 
expression ceases to be pertinent. Finally, “[O]ne assemblage does not have the same 
forces or even speeds of deterritorialization as another” (307), suggesting that each 
block of becoming does not have the same forces or speeds of deterritorialization. 
These presumptions and conditions of deterritorialization in a subject’s 
becoming-other and in the other’s becoming something else are the basis of the 
discussion on becoming.

D. Becoming Theory

As a whole, the other will trigger the becoming of the subject. If successful, the 
subject will deterritorialize herself/himself on the plane of consistency and will 
undergo the process of becoming, having proximity with the particles of the other. 
When the subject is becoming-other, it means that the other reterritorializes on the 
subject. This other will also be in the process of becoming something else, because, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, “deterritorialization is always double” (306). The 
other’s reterritorialization at one time and deterritorialization at the other time form 
the never-ending block of becoming. Same is the subject’s: “that which one becomes 
becomes no less than the one that becomes—block is formed, essentially mobile, 
ever in equilibrium” (305). If a painter draws and presents a bird, the painter can be 
becoming-bird only on the condition that the bird itself undergoes “the process of 
becoming something else, a pure line and pure color” (304). The painter could be 
becoming-bird merely when the bird reterritorializes itself on the painter and 
simultaneously undergoes the process of becoming-line or 
becoming-color—becoming is a “mutual transformation” (Flieger 53).
Becoming is thus always in the middle of the process which never ends. It has “neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination . . . . A line of becoming has only a middle” (Deleuze and Guattari 293), progressing on the line of flight which leads to the absolute deterritorialization of becoming-molecular. In Brian Massumi’s words, “becoming begins as a desire to escape bodily limitation” (94). It is “a process, a line of flight between states which displaces and disorients subjects and identities” (Flieger 43). The deterritorialisation makes the molar subject the body without organs, which are populated only by pure intensities and brings the subject to becoming-minoritarian. For Deleuze and Guattari, “all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (291). No matter what kind of becoming a subject undergoes, becoming will lead the subject to the indiscernible zone with the minor other and to form alliance with the pack of whatever kind of the minoritarian. Becoming starts with the destabilization of the molar identity, escaping the confinement of power and becoming destratified. It is minoritarian in the sense of quality instead of quantity, for it disposes of identity and subjectivity. Therefore, there are becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-animal, etc., but there is no becoming-man, for man represents the molar, the majority and the powerful center, whereas “becomings are molecular” (Deleuze and Guattari 292). Furthermore, “all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-woman” (Deleuze and Guattari 277), for the reason that woman is the right opposite of man who stands for reason and power—it is woman that “blocks or jams the conceptual machinery that grounds man” (Colebrook 11).

Becoming-other, however, never means to become the other; it is neither an imitation. Becoming-other is to emit particles that are proximate with the other’s particles and takes on “certain relations of movement and rest because they enter a
particular zone of proximity” (Deleuze and Guattari 273). That is, the subject has affinity with the movement, rest, speed and slowness of the particles that he/she is becoming. Masumi provides a general explanation, stating that becoming is “a tension between modes of desire plotting a vector of transformation between two molar coordinates” (94). It produces a trajectory of in-betweenness that has neither traveled by the subject nor the other—“a state of transit between ‘molar’ (organic) entities” (Shukin 149). It should be clarified that becoming-other differs from the bodily metamorphosis in fantasy literature. While we say that Daphne changes her shape to a laurel tree, she becomes the tree itself, which is fixed and comes to an end. She does not deterritorialize into particles that have proximity with the particles of the laurel tree; neither does she pass between points and progress along the trajectory of the in-between. Instead of undergoing the process of Deleuzian becoming-other, Daphne becomes the other.

Daphne’s being-other is ordered and limited, in contrast to the fluid becoming-other on the line of flight. Deleuze and Guattari instance the wasp-orchid relationship to exemplify the line of becoming. While the wasp collects and spreads pollen, it becomes the “liberated piece of the orchid’s reproductive system”; the orchid, asymmetrically, becomes “the object of an orgasm in the wasp” (Deleuze and Guattari 293). This becoming is double: the wasp is becoming-orchid and the orchid is becoming-wasp. They are both progressing on the line of flight, and passing between points of the wasp and the orchid. Neither do they imitate the other nor become the other. They encounter the other and “form a rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari 10), effecting deterritorialization and reterritorialization on the plane of consistency. This multilinear “line-system (or block-system) of becoming” is in
opposition to the punctual “point-system of memory,” which has reterritorialization function (Deleuze and Guattari 294). The discussion points out an important aspect of becoming—becoming is “an antimemory” (294). Becoming-other is the imperceptible transformation of the subject into another which is different from the molar entity of the other and her/his original self. The subject also breaks away from the confinement of memory, which would reterritorialize the boundary and limit the subject to a pre-constructed identity.

**E. Travel Theory**

Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, Islam in his *The Ethics of Travel* explores the nature of travel in terms of Deleuzian nomadology and becoming-other theory. However, before discussing Islam’s travel theory, one thing needs to be clarified, i.e. the definition of travel. In this regard, Georges Van Den Abbeele provides us a key in his “The Economy of Travel”: “[T]he very notion of travel presupposes a movement away from some place, a displacement of whatever it is one understands by ‘place’” (xiv). The notion of travel should basically involve the change of place; “a voyage cannot be restricted or circumscribed within a place unless it is to cease being a voyage” (xiv). In Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland*, Alice is constantly shifting from one place to another—penetrating through the rabbit hole, Alice adventures to the long low hall, the Caucus-race, the White Rabbit’s house, the mad tea-party, the garden, etc. The road often opens itself up in front of Alice, leading her to places that she is involuntary or unintentional to go. Hence, she scarcely fixes herself at one point for too long a time, but always leaves places behind.

In addition, in his “Montaigne’s ‘Of Cannibals’,,” Michel de Certeau has
proposed three stages of the structure of a travel account:

First comes the outbound journey: the search for the strange, which is presumed to be different from the place assigned it in the beginning by the discourse of culture . . . . Next comes a depiction of savage society, as seen by a “true” witness . . . . The third stage is the return voyage, the homecoming of the traveler-narrator. (69-70)

Structurally speaking, stories that conform to the above three stages could be deemed as a de Certeauian travel account. In Alice in Wonderland, firstly, Wonderland floods with strange creatures, whose nonsensical behavior draws Alice to interpret them as rude and uncivil in contrast to the above world. The only rule in Wonderland is that there is no rule. After gradually generalizing this rule in her mind, Alice constantly expects something strange to take place, “I know something interesting is sure to happen” (AW 40). She is always eager to know what is going to occur next, constantly questing for differences and searching for the strange. Secondly, Alice then becomes what de Certeau states, the “true” witness in the other land. However, Alice’s true witness always leads her to interpret this nonsensical world with norms and doctrines she learns from school. Thirdly, after a series of adventures in the foreign land, every traveler has her/his return voyage, and so does Alice. Alice’s waking up after her evidence in the court brings this journey to an end and takes her back to the place of her departure—with her head in her sister’s lap in the land reigned by the Victorian queen. The structure of Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland tallies with the de Certeauian travel account. Combining Van Den Abbeele’s and de Certeau’s theories, these concepts inform that the requirements of travel should at least contain an other place, the foreign other, and the return. Moreover, travel founds on the crossing of
boundary to an other place, which would later bring the traveler to encounter the other and to return.

**F. Crossing Boundary**

Crossing boundary is necessary to travel into an other land. The threshold that situates between these two worlds is worth attention, since it plays the intermediate role of connection. While crossing boundary, the threshold functions like the bridge connecting two separate places. It should be paradoxically staged “to be crossed, and enact ‘the between’ that divides and joins spatial locations” (Islam 5). Usually, this threshold encloses people inside by the power of the State apparatus. Outside this restriction of power are those nomads, the war machine. After the overstriding of or passing through the borders, travelers will find themselves within an unfamiliar region where things and inhabitants take place in a culture dissimilar to the world of their departure.

According to Islam, a real traveler’s overstriding of lines should be unconscious: “Only the experience of disorientation remains as the trace of the intensive force of duration that the ‘moving body’ endures in the course of the passage” (67). It is this unconscious crossing that signals the attributes of the supple line and identifies the real travel. Besides traveling along the supple line in the nomad space, the real nomadic travelers will spontaneously encounter the other, which makes them undergo the process of becoming-other. However, sedentary travelers, journeying as a representational practice of their world of departure and traveling continuously within the confinement of power and memories, will only return to the same without differences, because power “cannot do without the inscription of boundary” (Islam 38).
and memories “always have a reterritorialisation function” (Deleuze and Guattari 294).

G. Nomadic Travel: Encounter with the Other and the Speed of Intensity

Encountering the other is an essential element for the nomadic traveler. To encounter the other does not merely mean to meet the other, but also to develop intersubjectivity with her/him. While communicating with the other, both sides will come to a common notion after “a mutual affecting of forces takes place” (Islam 40). They will forget their pre-existent memories, and these two individuals will “adapt themselves to one another” (40). These presuppositions bear upon the art of becoming: each side cannot be taken as a term “which becomes the other, but each encounters the other” (Deleuze and Parnet 6-7, italics mine). However, guarding herself/himself against encountering the other, a traveler could only be called “the representation” if he/she is unable to break away from the confinement of culture to meet the other and always judges things from fixed perspectives without shedding her/his molar identity.

Becoming-other as a nomadic traveler also requires a traveler’s speed of intensity, as Islam points out: “The speed is the secret of encounter; it is the necessary preparation for hearing the call of the other” (41). A real traveler will journey with speed of intensity, even though he/she is confined to the narrowest space, whereas a sedentary traveler merely changes locations although he/she moves forward for a long distance. For Islam, the former harbors the secret of becoming a nomadic traveler, the one who is worthy of the name as a “traveler” and who travels on the supple line experiencing becoming-other on the plane of consistency, while traveler of the latter only goes from one place to the other in a movement without the speed of
self-differentiating forces but with the consequence of returning to the same, the fixed location. In conclusion, a nomadic traveler will encounter the other while traveling along the dissolving boundaries of the smooth space, but a sedentary traveler only stands for the representation of her/his original culture without encountering the other. Moreover, the nomad moves by gathering body of forces, while the non-nomad moves with “pseudo-movement” (Islam 28) and returns without differences.

A case in point of the real traveler is Mrs. Moore in E. M. Forster’s *A Passage to India* (1924). Mrs. Moore encounters Dr. Aziz “without the insistent memories of the boundaries: it is a meeting without pre-condition”; she also travels light on the supple line, making “the journey from the club to the mosque as if carried along the smoothest of smooth passages, as if the barrier between the two cities has melted, as if she has long forgotten the memories of the Mediterranean waters” (Islam 54). Mrs. Moore is a nomadic traveler who encounters the other and travels on the smooth nomad space, undergoing the process of becoming-other as a nomadic traveler—an antimemory one. However, Adela Quested defends herself by distinguishing and distancing herself from the natives, unwilling to shed her identity as the major molarity of the colonizer into the minor molecularity of the colonized. She represents the sedentary traveler who cannot traverse the line into the other. She builds fortress to defend herself, doing pseudo-movements and returning to the same without any differences.

The combination of the psychoanalytic theory of fantasy on literary analysis and the theme of nomadology in travel theory brings us to a widely recognized but seldom discussed theoretical field—the fantastic travels, which are adventures in the form of the subject’s fantasy, being exerted through imagination, hallucination or dream.
Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland* exemplifies such fantastic travels. It is a fantasy exerted through the expression of the protagonist’s dream, in which Alice adventures from one place to another, revealing her eagerness to travel and leading her to encounter with numerous uncanny events. The world of fantasy (as well as dream) is itself a rhizome, a smooth supple space, where things and thoughts are pieced together in disjunctive, condensed, or substitutive ways. Time, like space, reaches illimitably and immeasurably in the world of fantasy; it crosses the limit of the chronological time. Subjects in the world of fantasy will slide the present into multidimensional time and space. However, as discussed in the earlier part of this chapter, fantasy is always inseparable from reality, for it is the suppressed unconscious scenario which in several aspects has relations with reality. Fantasy is

the primordial form of *narrative*, which serves to occult some original deadlock . . . . [N]arrative as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental antagonism by rearranging its terms into a temporal succession. It is thus the very form of narrative which bears witness to some repressed antagonism. (Žižek 10-11)

By exploring fantastic narratives, the prime deadlock could be examined and analyzed. These narratives are closely related to reality for they are the long repressed in the subject’s unconscious and are now drawn forth through the usage of various reflections in the narratives. Narratives of fantasy hence provide a way to examine reality, and the task in this thesis is to analyze the role of Alice as a traveler through the fantastic narratives in *Alice in Wonderland*. As discussed above, a real traveler is the nomadic one, encountering the other along the smooth rhizomatic space with speed of intensity, whereas a sedentary traveler is secluded from the other by being
enclosed within fortress without encountering the other and travels along striated lines with pseudo-movements. These discussions on the nature of the traveler leads to a question: is Alice a nomadic or a sedentary traveler, or neither of the both? The following chapter will try to answer this question by focusing on the spatiotemporality of Wonderland and analyzing how traveling spatiotemporality influences Alice’s role of becoming a nomadic traveler.