"At any rate I’ll never go there again!" said Alice, as she picked her way through the wood. “It’s the stupidest tea-party I ever was at in all my life!”

Just as she said this, she noticed that one of the trees had a door leading right into it. “That’s very curious!” she thought. “But everything’s curious today. I think I may as well go in at once.” And in she went.

Once more she found herself in the long hall, and close to the little glass table. “Now, I’ll manage better this time,” she said to herself . . . .

As Alice in Wonderland begins, Alice gets tired of sitting on the bank, questioning “what is the use of a book . . . without pictures or conversations?” (AIW 11). The world of the book Alice desires is one with vivid images and exciting conversations. Hence, the sudden appearance of the White Rabbit saying “Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!” (AIW 11) does not astonish her at the spot. It is when the Rabbit “actually took a watch out of its waistcoat-pocket, and looked at it, and then hurried on” (AIW 12), Alice startles at the sight and follows the White Rabbit immediately with curiosity. Without a second thought after seeing the White Rabbit popping down a large rabbit-hole, down goes Alice into this “space of imaginary transformation” (Feldstein 150), through which Alice
gets a chance to visit Wonderland, a world full of bright images and nonsensical conversations she desires eagerly. At this very beginning, the topics of time and space are brought out, for the issues of “no time” and “the transformation of places” penetrate *Alice in Wonderland*.

Wonderland is often regarded as an other land, being different from the Victorian world where Alice departs from. After Alice’s darting down through the rabbit-hole, the world opening before her eyes is a strangely familiar but somehow different one. Its space is constituted with numerous centers or *no center*, for every place will miraculously lead to another or back to the original point, since they are all reticulately connected. While we say that the above Victorian land resembles the world of the State apparatus with power and center, the underground Wonderland represents the world of the war machine in which powerlessness and centerlessness constitute this anarchy. Along with Alice’s penetration through the rabbit-hole into an incredible land, “time” has also been distorted with an uncommon attribute—not an “it” but a personified “he”—and it is suspended right at the minute Alice arrives in the subterrestrial world. The spatiotemporality of Wonderland has another nature dissimilar to the surface world and has significant influence on the role of Alice as a traveler. The multiple spatiotemporality characterizes *becoming*: Deleuze and Guattari state that, in becoming, “[s]patiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities” (263). Since, according to Islam, a real traveler would undergo the process of becoming-other, of which multiple spatiotemporality is a significant factor, this chapter concentrates on the time and space of Wonderland. These discussions will help to examine how Alice’s role as a

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1 The analogies between the Victorian world and the State Apparatus, in addition to the analogies between Wonderland and the war machine will be discussed later in this chapter.
traveler is influenced by the unique environment of Wonderland. Whether Alice travels light without limits of time and space or not has great influence on defining her role as a nomadic or a sedentary traveler.

I. The Departure of Travel: Alice Driven by Curiosity

We have discussed that according to Van Den Abbeele’s definition of travel and de Certeau’s travel account, travel comprises an other place, the foreign other and the return; in addition, travel begins with the crossing of boundary. The first thing under scrutinization is the initiation of travel, because “the departure charters the journey, establishing its motives and first meanings” (Leed 25). Surveying the history of travel, one notices many kinds of initiation, such as the one for the heroic, the forced, the freedom, the selfhood, the exilic, etc. However, no matter how diverse the initiation is, the essence of the departure has never changed: it always “separates the individual from a defining social and cultural matrix” (Leed 26). Take the initiation of the heroic and the nonheroic journeys as examples, the heroic journey is one designated “to extend an identity across through space and through time, to display power and status” (Leed 26) in order to gain recognition. It is undertaken voluntarily without outside forces. On the contrary, the nonheroic journey is an involuntary one, propelled by “necessity, chance, disaster, crime, or the violation of some norm” and leading to an endless suffering journey (Leed 28).

Alice’s departure derives from neither a wish for fame nor an escape by force. Her motive is rather simple as she voluntarily follows the White Rabbit to Wonderland out of curiosity. Leed suggests that the departure establishes not only the motives of the journey but also “the initial identity of the traveler” (25). From the very
beginning of *Alice in Wonderland*, we know that Alice comes from the above world of doctrine where she is educated as a lady sat reading on the bank, a place which is later opposed to by the illogical Wonderland. Given the attributes of a Victorian child, Alice in her journey never forgets the lessons she learns from school and always tries to behave as a courteous child with etiquette. She even attempts to “curtsey as she spoke” while falling down the rabbit-hole (*AIW* 14). Alice’s insatiable curiosity initiates her journey as a heroic one because of its “unforced” characteristic. Even though the entire journey is not initiated by her eagerness for fame as a heroic journey would be, it is heroic in the sense that Alice in the whole journey tries to gain recognition and to extend her identity as a heroic traveler does. Nevertheless, in the nonsensical subterranean world, Alice’s attempt to assert herself always fails. Instead of extending her identity across through time and space, Alice’s identity is constantly questioned: “Who are you?” said the Caterpillar” (*AIW* 47); “Well! What are you?” said the Pigeon” (*AIW* 57). Even Alice queries who she herself is: “Who in the world am I?” Ah, *that’s* the great puzzle!” (*AIW* 23). Many travelers on the way of travel “feel the dividedness of self, the process of estrangement, and the ambiguity of identity as injury and suffering . . .” (Leed 46). After Alice leaves the Victorian socio-cultural context which provides her with a constructed identity, her localized identity is consequently disturbed, estranged and becoming ambiguous while she adventures in the illogical Wonderland.

What initiates Alice’s departure from home is an unexpected one driven by her

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2 Carroll has once described Alice’s personality traits in “Alice on the Stage,” describing that Alice is “[l]oving, first, loving and gentle: loving as a dog . . . , and gentle as a fawn: then courteous—courteous to *all*, high or low, grand or grotesque, King or Caterpillar, . . . : then trustful, ready to accept the widest impossibilities with all that utter trust that only dreamers know; and lastly, curious—widely curious, and with the eager enjoyment of Life that comes only in the happy hours of childhood . . .” (qtd. in *Alice in Wonderland* 12n1). Loving, gentle, courteous, trustful and curious as she is, Alice is a typified Victorian well-mannered educated child.
daring curiosity without the characteristics Leed regards as marking all partings: “protest, grief, despair, mourning” (29). As Alice leaves the defining socio-cultural matrix of Victorian society, she shows no “separation anxiety,” which “occurs with an infant’s loss of attachment to significant others”: the infants protest and try their best to recover their mother; then, they feel despairing of recovering her, and soon lose interests and become detached from her (30). Most departures follow this typical procedure. However, strangely, the commencement of Alice’s journey displays no sign of dissent or desolation. It is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, an “anti-memory” one (294), which is one of the important factors to initiate the process of becoming-other.3 Alice breaks away from the limit of Victorian memories for a moment: “In another moment down went Alice after it [the White Rabbit], never once considering how in the world she was to get out [the rabbit-hole] again” (AIW 12).

Alice forgets persistent memories she acquired from the Victorian society: she should be mild and placid as a lady, but she follows the Rabbit totally out of curiosity. Therefore, she can be led to the borderline between Victorian world and Wonderland, and leaps down into the secret rabbit-hole. Her chasing of the White Rabbit yields a very good beginning for the innocent Alice to become a real traveler on her journey. Her journey approximates what Leed concerns as the journey of rejuvenating, which “assumes a periphery beyond which one may find the ‘furthest reaches of abroad,’ a strange and unfamiliar world” (50)—a world, in Alice’s case, of the peculiar and the unusual Wonderland. Instead of attaching to the normative, Alice hankers exciting adventures and courts for novelties fearlessly. Her separation from the place of origin

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3 A more detailed elaboration on anti-memory will be in Chapter Four. In short, anti-memory means that the subject will forget the past, leading the subject freely to encounter the other, which is one of the important factors that leads to the process of becoming-other.
is a positive one because of its autonomous and stimulating quality as well as its anti-memory characteristic.

Jumping down the rabbit-hole brings Alice to the space of transformation, engendering the act of crossing boundary, which occupies a significant place in the definition of travel. It is to traverse the line into an other land that travel comes into being. The boundary functions like the threshold that separates and connects two places. It is at the same time a barrier of and a medium between places. Islam states that, inspired by Georg Trakl’s verse “A Winter Evening,” Martin Heidegger views the threshold as the joint of places while at the same time separating them: “It [the threshold] sustains the middle in which the two, the outside and inside, penetrate each other. The threshold bears the between. What goes out and goes in, in the between, is joined in the between’s dependability” (qtd. in Islam 20). Islam, following Heidegger, sees the boundary not merely as the demarcation of places but also as the place of connection. He instances the fissures of a wall: no matter how thick a wall is, it “can never fully succeed in filling the fissures in its own very structure” (38). Therefore, the fissures not only represent breaches but also function as bridges, which make the intrusion from one place to the other possible.

The hole which penetrates through the earth is one of the earth’s fissures that functions as a bridge between the aboveground and the underground. According to Eileen Z. Cohen, the hole in the earth is “a popular means of entrance into fantastical worlds in children’s stories: as, for example, in the Oz books” (162). In Alice in Wonderland, the rabbit-hole represents Cohen’s entrance, or the threshold, that connects the surface world with the fantastic underground while simultaneously separating the above from the below. It works not only as the demarcation of places in
the usual sense, but also as the passage that connects the real world to Wonderland. The hole becomes the “pure surface,” in Deleuze’s words, “a continuity of the outside and the inside, of the above and below, of reverse and right sides” (*Logic of Sense* 236). Like every wall, the Victorian land is also interstitial, and the rabbit-hole represents one of its fissures that enable insiders to venture to the outside, leading to a passage of the border zone for Alice to intrude into the alien land.

Following the amazing White Rabbit, Alice is brought to the boundary and darts down the entrance of the mythical other land. On the issue of boundary, Islam points out that geographical lines are assigned to space on the basis of complex discourse of difference. For instance, the simple evaluation of familiarity/unfamiliarity might serve as the practical logic of difference, in this case, the borderline will be inscribed at the limit of one’s own horizon of familiarity. (62)

What appears inside the hole questions Alice’s common understanding of a normal rabbit-hole: “[S]he looked at the sides of the well, and noticed that they were filled with cupboards and book-shelves: here and there she saw maps and pictures hung upon pegs” (*AIW* 13). Alice begins guessing where the seemingly endless fall within the strange well would bring her to: “I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the earth”; “How funny it’ll seem to come out among the people that walk with their heads downwards!” (*AIW* 13). She starts sensing the difference between the familiar world she used to inhabit and the rabbit-hole now she falls in. The rabbit-hole as the transformational space represents the geographical borderline which Islam refers to as the inscription between the familiarity and the unfamiliarity, for it separates and
connects the aboveground to the underground—it is the threshold between the known and the unknown.

Islam provides Dante’s crossing of the forest to the Inferno in *The Divine Comedy* as an example of the real travel. Dante cannot tell how exactly he gets in the forest. His crossing of boundary is a smooth one; merely “the experience of disorientation remains as the trace of the intensive force of duration that the ‘moving body’ endures in the course of the passage” (Islam 67). Such an unconscious crossing signals the existence of the supple line and suggests the real event of travel (Islam 67).

Nevertheless, with the long fall in the rabbit-hole, Alice’s crossing of boundary is very much a conscious one, for she continuously expects and wonders about another world: “Either the well was very deep, or she fell very slowly, for she had plenty of time as she went down to look about her, and to wonder what was going to happen next” *(AIW* 13). While falling down, Alice first surveys the surroundings, observing that the well is full of cupboards and book-shelves with hanged maps and pictures. She starts fancying that she might get near the center of the earth while showing off knowledge she learns from school: “[T]hat [the center of the earth] would be four thousand miles down . . . but I wonder what Latitude or Longitude I’ve got to?” *(AIW* 13). Her

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4 Islam quotes Dante’s crossing of the threshold to the Inferno in *The Divine Comedy* as an example here:

> Half Way along the road we have to go,
> I found myself obscured in a great forest,
> Bewildered, and I knew I had lost the way.

> It is hard to say just what the forest was like,
> How wild and rough it was, how overpowering;
> Even to remember it makes me afraid.

> I cannot tell exactly how I got there,
> I was so full of sleep at that point of my journey
> When, somehow, I left the proper way. (qtd. in Islam 67)

Dante’s crossing of boundary is an event that cannot itself be represented, and all he could remember is “his overpowering experience of disorientation,” which Islam regards as “the sign of the supple line that expresses the real event of the travel” (67).
self-consciousness of heading for an unfamiliar other land is worth attention. This conscious fall does not demonstrate the attribute of the supple line and a real traveler’s unconscious crossing. Alice’s role as a real traveler is challenged in the very beginning of her conscious crossing of boundaries.

In Deleuzian nomadology, the State apparatus is separated from the war machine by the fortress it builds. However, the demarcation between them is never distinct, for it would be muddled by fissures and breaches on the very structure of walls. Therefore, the fortress built by the State apparatus implicitly functions as the threshold whenever the outsiders discover the way and intrude into. Yet, generally, this threshold encloses people inside by the power of the State apparatus. Exterior of the State apparatus is its pair in coexistence—the war machine. As designated in the previous chapter, the State apparatus has rigid boundaries, inside which the power of the Law dominates. It conceptualizes people with homogeneous identity by its powerful sovereignty. In contrast to the domain of the State apparatus, the country of the war machine is constituted without center, being characterized as a free and open wilderness.

The Victorian court represents what Deleuze and Guattari call the State apparatus, where sovereign power controls and endows people with a fixed identity. During her travel, Alice constantly recollects the knowledge she has learned from school. She is educated as a typical Victorian child, recalling things by lessons she has been taught. However, the fissure in the normal world—the hidden passage in the rabbit-hole—brings Alice to a chaotic world full of nonsense and illogicality or, in her words, a world of “fairy-tales” (AIW 39), where impossible things plausibly happen. Wonderland, as the epitome of the free centerless space for the war machine, enables
Alice to jump out of the rigid limit of the Victorian society and gains chance to relieve herself in an unrestrained world where she could ramble everywhere as long as she could get in and eat everything that she deems eatable. The war machine is in itself “irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from elsewhere” (Deleuze and Guattari 352). Wonderland is the dwelling space exclusively for the war machine, which is outside the Victorian reign and regardless of its laws. It is a land that really “comes from elsewhere.”

II. The Temporality of Travel: Wonderland’s Time as Aion

After Alice’s tumbling down into the other land, the natural progression of time is suspended. The most famous scene of the discussion on time is at the mad tea-party, in which the function of the watch is probed—a watch which does not tell the hour but the day of the month (AIW 71-72). For Alice, it is the year that “stays the same . . . for such a long time” (AIW 72), thus being useless to be indicated on watches. However, for the inhabitants in Wonderland, especially for the Hatter, it is the hour that stays the same and consequently becomes needless to be indicated on watches. The Hatter’s watch expresses the distorted attribute of timelessness in Wonderland, for the hour cannot be counted. What also comes into question is the nature of time. For Wonderland’s creatures, time is personified as he. When Alice talks about wasting it (time), the Hatter retorts: “If you knew Time as well as I do . . . you wouldn’t talk about wasting it. It’s him”” (AIW 72). The personified Time thus can be and has been “murdered” by the Hatter: when the Hatter recites a verse and mangles its meter, the Queen accuses him of “murdering the time! Off with his head!” (AIW 74). The pun here interrupts Time’s natural flow at six o’clock, becoming “always tea-time” (AIW 74).
74). This indefinite suspension and the murder of personified Time in Wonderland exemplify Wonderland’s temporality as *aeon*.

The Latin word *aeon*, which means “age,” “forever,” or “for eternity,” derives from the Greek word *aion*, signifying “age,” “a period of existence” or “life” (“Aeon,” Wikipedia). It refers to an immeasurably eternal time (Age) which is dominated by God, being contrary to the chronos—the limited and created time—in which human beings live. In the usual sense, aeon is geologically “a unit of time equal to one billion years”; however, it is most often used as “any long, indefinite, period of time” (“Aeon,” Wikipedia). Deleuze borrows the concept of aeon as a “long indefinite period of time” in his writings. While he uses the capitalized “Aion” in *The Logic of Sense* which contains most of his discussions on Aion, he uses the capitalized “Aeon” in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Although we should not confuse Aion with Aeon, for Deleuze, both of these two terms indicate “the indefinite time of the event” (Deleuze and Guattari 262),⁵ which originates from “Bergson’s concept of duration . . . and to Nietzsche’s eternal return” (Islam 65).

Deleuze emphasizes the *becoming* characteristic of the unlimited Aion. As indicated in Chapter Two, becoming is neither in the beginning nor in the end, but always in the middle of the process. It always eludes the present, moving toward the past as well as indicating for the future. Becoming also needs speed of intensity, leading the subject to deterritorialize on the line of flight, being never fixed at one point and having the characteristic of in-betweenness. For Deleuze, the unlimited Aion is in the process of becoming as well; it is

the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that

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⁵ This thesis unifies the usage for the capitalized Greek root *Aion* thereafter.
which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time
not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is
both going to happen and has just happened. (Deleuze and Guattari 262)\(^6\)

Aion thus signifies the “past-future, which in an infinite subdivision of the abstract
moment endlessly decomposes itself in both direction at once and forever sidesteps
the present” (Deleuze, *Logic of Sense* 77). It is always in the process of becoming,
decomposing each abyssal present into instantaneous subdivisions; hence, “only the
past and future subsist . . . however small it [subdivision] may be, stretching it out
over their empty line” (*Logic of Sense* 62).

Aion is symbolized as a pure line—a line of flight—that flees simultaneously in
both directions toward the past and the future, endlessly distancing the space between
them. It is “the time of events-effects” (Deleuze, *Logic of Sense* 62) and “the time of
the pure event or of becoming, which articulates relative speeds and slowness”
(Deleuze and Guattari 263). Such an event exists incorporeally at the surface on the
line of Aion, always being something that has just happened and is about to happen,
but “never something which is happening” (Deleuze, *Logic of Sense* 63). However,
these incorporeal events can never fill up the unlimited Aion. Each event represents
both the smallest and the longest time, for it is at the same time divided into the past
and the future as well as infinitely subdivided by Aion into unlimitedness in the
dynamic process. No present can be fixed, only “the Event subsists” (*Logic of Sense*
176), because becoming always eschews the determinably discrete present.

In contrast to the unlimited Aion is the time of measure, Chronos, which

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\(^6\) A most pertinent example for this past-future is in Carroll’s another story, *Through the Looking-Glass*,
in which the White Queen informs Alice the rule of “jam to-morrow and jam yesterday—but never jam
to-day” (*TLG* 196).
“situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject” (Deleuze and Guattari 262). The present of Chronos is corporeal, fixed and definite, being regularized in “an individual system” that takes in each singular point (Deleuze, Logic of Sense 77) and being “filled up with states of affairs and the movements of the objects that it measures” (Logic of Sense 64). While the infinitive Aion does not have any present because the instantaneous present is always eluding and fractured into the past and the future, the definite time of Chronos has only the living present as real being, for it absorbs the past and the future as its orientation and as two relative presents. In accordance with Chronos, these three (the past, the present and the future) are not three dimensions of time as that of Aion. They belong to “a more vast present which has a greater extension or duration” (Logic of Sense 162). Inside Chronos, the profound and the perpetual present always begins anew in a cyclical return, for Chronos is composed of linked presents. Its circularity is in contrast to the straight stretching line of Aion. Deleuze provides detailed comparisons between Aion and Chronos which make distinctions between them clearer:

Whereas Chronos expressed the action of bodies and the creation of corporeal qualities, Aion is the locus of incorporeal events, and of attributes which are distinct from qualities. Whereas Chronos was inseparable from the bodies which filled it out entirely as causes and matter, Aion is populated by effects which haunt it without ever filling it up. Whereas Chronos was limited and infinite, Aion is unlimited, the way that future and past are unlimited, and finite like the instant. Whereas Chronos was inseparable from circularity and its accidents—such as blockages or precipitations, explosions, disconnections, and
indurations—Aion stretches out in a straight line, limitless in either
direction. (*Logic of Sense* 165)

The oppositional relationship between Aion and Chronos analogizes the relationship between the war machine and the State apparatus. On the one hand, the immeasurable incorporeal Aion is an elongated line which always moves toward the past as well as heads for the future, dividing the past and the future into infinitive instants and being never fixed at any points on the line of flight. It has nomadic attributes that Deleuze appreciates. Like the stretched line of Aion, the space for the war machine is also boundless and does not have a center, being constituted of supple lines. The nomads on such centerless space move with speed of intensity and are never fixed at one point. They are always on progression. While encountering the other, they would also undergo the process of becoming-other. On the other hand, Chronos is corporeal and limited, seeing the past and the future as the oriented dimensions of the present and renewing every present to form the circularity. Similarly, the space of the State apparatus is definite and centered around an authorial power. Inside the State apparatus are people with fixed identity, moving along the route of power without intensive speed.

These analogies between Chronos and the State apparatus reveal the fact that the time of the Victorian world, or any other historical era, is the time of Chronos, which is absolute and linear. Within Victorian time, the past and the future are its two oriented dimensions, for it always moves successively from the past to the future. It is time that is created by human beings and could be measured, recorded and tabled chronologically. Chronos’ limited present measures “the action of bodies as causes and the state of their mixtures in depth” (*Deleuze, Logic of Sense* 61). The historicized
Victorian period also comes from the great mixture of the corporeal matter and the deeds of bodies in this period, in which everything is fixed and simultaneous. Its time is inseparable from the events and activities that fill it out and make it distinguishable and identifiable as “Victorian”—the state of the mixtures of numerous action of bodies: the First Reform Bill (1832), the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), the Great Exhibition in London (1851), etc. The so-called Victorian period thus has the progressive time of Chronos, “the time of actualization” (*Logic of Sense* 168), defined by “the present which alone exists” (*Logic of Sense* 77). Hence, the question being asked here is “what is now happening?” Since the time of Chronos encompasses every present and is remarked by its eternal circular return which continuously begins anew the same absolute present, it measures off “a new cosmic period after the preceding one” (*Logic of Sense* 163); thus comes the Modern period.

What should be further emphasized here are the analogies between Aion and the war machine, which provide evidences for the time of Wonderland as Aion discussed above. In Wonderland, the murder of time signifies that there is no present, only that has already passed and eternally yet to come. The indefinite time is unlimited as a pure straight line; it is the “empty form of time, independent of all matter” (Deleuze, *Logic of Sense* 62). Inside Aion, the question being asked is about the abyss of a past-future, “What is going to happen? What has just happened?” (*Logic of Sense* 63). For Alice, these questions are precisely what haunt her mind: because some illogical things have happened, what arouses Alice’s interest is exactly those past things and those which she looks forward to happening. In Wonderland, there are many incorporeal events as effects, such as Alice’s shrinking, growing up, and her instable identity. However, these events can never fill up time in Wonderland. Deleuze gives
an illustration to the scene of the mad tea-party: since the Hatter and the March Hare kill the present,

the present no longer subsists except in the abstract moment, at tea time,
being indefinitely subdivisible into past and future. The result is that they now change places endlessly, they are always late and early, in both directions at once, but never on time. (*Logic of Sense* 79)

Wonderland’s time as Aion becomes more prominent here—it is in nature unlimited and always moving in two directions.

Critics often use “timeless” (Cohen 162) and “timelessness” (Rackin, “What You Always Wanted” 4) to describe the temporality of Wonderland, but none of them emphasizes the fact that Wonderland’s time is the time of Aion which is characterized by *becoming*. Wonderland is in itself in the process of becoming, making every person and event in it unstable and going in both directions. Deleuze’s idea of “the reversal” in Wonderland verifies Wonderland’s stretching toward both extremities:

*[T]he reversal of becoming larger and becoming smaller—“which way, which way?” asks Alice, sensing that it is always in both directions at the same time, so that for once she stays the same, through an optical illusion . . . the reversal of more and less: five nights are five times hotter than a single one, “but they must be five times as cold for the same reason”; the reversal of active and passive: “do cats eat bats?” is as good as “do bats eat cats?”; the reversal of cause and effect: to be punished before having committed a fault, to cry before having pricked oneself, to serve before having divided up the servings. (*Logic of Sense* 3)*

These reversals are exactly those pure events which move toward two directions on
the line of Aion but never filling it up. In the case of Aion, Deleuze states that “the becoming-mad of the depths was climbing to the surface, the simulacra in turn were becoming phantasm” (*Logic of Sense* 165). That is why the most concealed of these nonsensical reversals (all the becoming-mad of the depths, the simulacra) come out to the surface and become the most manifest of phantasms on the line of Aion in Wonderland. The original simulacra, i.e., Alice’s repressed fears of growing up and shrinking, become lively in Alice’s dream as phantasm. In seeing Wonderland as a world of fantasy, a fact emerges: within fantasy, time goes both directions; it always eludes the present and indicates the past-future. The time within fantasy is not the historicized Chronos being filled up with states of affairs which can be counted and recorded. While a subject is fantasizing (or dreaming), time escapes the limited present and heads for the past-future. That is why Deleuze deems the unconscious not as a conceptual scheme, but “as a productive, forward-propelling force of flows or intensities” (Braidotti 161). Its time is the time of the unlimited Aion, being occupied by myriads of pure events and reversals, which are constantly on the way of filling up the unlimited Aion without any success of filling it out.

Deleuze mentions that Chronos is “composed only of interlocking presents; the other[Aion] is constantly decomposed into elongated pasts and futures” (*Logic of Sense* 62). Interestingly enough, in Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland*, we see both of these. On the one hand, the opening and the ending of *Alice in Wonderland*, being short as they are, are situated in the Victorian society with the time of Chronos. On the other hand, Alice’s adventure in Wonderland, which occupies most of the book, happens inside the time of Aion. These comparisons provide good examples for the differences between Chronos and Aion. More importantly, it comes out that, without
Chronos, Aion cannot be identified, and vice versa. Like the State apparatus and the war machine, Chronos and Aion coexist as a pair. Without one, the other could no longer be highlighted. Wonderland’s time as Aion would easily lead the traveler to undergo the process of becoming-other as a nomadic traveler. Aion is the temporal plane on which a traveler undertakes becoming-other, because becoming needs a subject to elude the present on the line of flight. Alice’s travel happens on the line of Aion in Wonderland, which would make it easy for her to elude the present and to enact becoming-other as a real traveler. However, whether Alice really becomes a nomadic traveler or not is still doubtful, for a subject also needs to have other features that will lead her/him to the process of becoming-other.7

III. The Space of Travel: the Rhizomatic Nature of Wonderland

The Victorian world not only resembles the State apparatus for its time as Chronos and its power to homogenize people inside it, and Wonderland not only parallels the war machine because of its time as Aion and its place for liberation. The relationships on the nature of space between the Victorian land and the State apparatus as well as between Wonderland and the war machine have similarities as well. These relationships would likewise influence the quality of travel leading on each specific space.8 Chapter Two has brought out the basic differences between the

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7 We have discussed that Alice’s initiation of travel with antimemory and Wonderland’s time as Aion make it easy for Alice to undergo the process of becoming-other. However, Alice’s conscious crossing of boundary undermines her possibility of becoming-other. Whether Alice becomes a real traveler in her adventure or not is still doubtful, for there are still other features that would affect her role as a real traveler. Other features, such as the traveling smooth space, the encounter with the other, the traveling speed of intensity, etc., will be discussed partly in the following parts and still others in the next chapter.

8 Space would influence the quality of travel for the reason that a real nomadic traveler adventures on the smooth supple lines of the nomad space, whereas a sedentary traveler only travels from points to points on the striated gridded lines of the sedentary space. This part focuses on the nature of space in
sedentary space and the nomad space, on which occupies the State and develops the war machine respectively. While the sedentary space is constituted of points, the nomad space is composed of intersecting lines. While the sedentary space is circumscribed within territories, the nomad space opens and deterritorializes every territory. While the sedentary space is centered, homogeneous, and determinate, the nomad space is acentered, heterogeneous, and indeterminate. While the sedentary space is structured as the genealogical arborescent root-tree, the nomad space constructs itself as the interconnected rhizome. While the sedentary space appears like the game of Chess with fixed points and identified pieces, the nomad space accords with the game of Go, which is smooth and without rigid regulations. Deleuze and Guattari thus state that lines and trajectories are subordinated to points in the sedentary space, so one goes from one point to the other. However, the points are submitted to lines and trajectories in the nomad space; hence, one could spring up at any points irregularly (478). Massumi further indicates that the sedentary space has the *logos* as its mode of distribution, “entrenching oneself in a closed space,” which is in opposition to the nomad space’s *nomos* of “arraying oneself in an open space” (6). Therefore, the differences between a gridded sedentary space and a smooth nomad space are that the former is metric and finite, which can be “counted in order to be occupied,” while the latter is vectorial, projective, or topological, of which space is open-ended and “occupied without being counted” (Deleuze and Guattari 361-62).

With a powerful authority dominating the public, every state creates laws to normalize people. It builds fortress to regulate people’s movement on the one side and to protect itself from the outside forces on the other side, territorializing itself as a Wonderland; next chapter will have further discussions on nomadic and sedentary travelers.
country and homogenizing people as its identified nationals. Its space is occupied by fixed points, or “the punctual system” (Deleuze and Guattari 194), making people move from one point to the other and to travel on settled routes within prescribed boundaries. The space of the State apparatus is a homogeneous one, which resembles the form of the striated and the “space of pillars . . . formalizing all the other dimensions . . . [and] striating all of space in all of its directions” (Deleuze and Guattari 370). This sedentary space centers on the powerful court or government, branching toward numerous stratified offshoots—it “makes the distinction between governors and governed possible” (Deleuze and Guattari 359). People inside the rational order of the State apparatus are endowed with identical identities and homebound characteristic, following principles and directions regulated by the organs of power. These features form an interiorized self-sufficient society, country, or nation—“a fully social reality instead of a pure concept” (Deleuze and Guattari 359).

In this sense, the space of the State apparatus is sedentary and striated with rigid lines. Together with its time as Chronos, every state rises and declines on the historicization and delimitation of its self-build rigid spatiotemporality.

So is the above-ground Victorian world in *Alice in Wonderland*. The Victorian space is occupied with fixed points, reterritorializing within circumscribed boundaries. People enclosed within its compositive territory always move from point to point. For example, while leaving the bank and runs directly toward home at the end of the story, Alice makes a point-to-point move with the destination of home-bounding in her mind—a homebound that she never thinks of while she is in Wonderland. Furthermore, the Victorian authority establishes order, which restricts people by regulated laws and homogenizes them with doctrines and lessons. Alice is so
influenced by Victorian morals that she interprets things or even identifies herself by using Victorian codes she learns from school: if a creature does not look at her while addressing her, this creature is rudely *uncivil*; if a creature says things that are contradictory to the viewpoint of the above, this creature is definitely *stupid*.

The Victorian is monarchized as a nation with the sovereign court as its authority, pyramiding lineally the Queen on the top, the aristocracy secondarily, the bourgeoisie in the middle, and the working class and the poor at the bottom. This ranking fixes people on their own positions, and designates their spheres of activities. Even though tough transitions among strata might be possible, people are all endowed with prescribed identities and belongings. The authority educates the aristocracy an aristocracy, the bourgeoisie a bourgeoisie, the working class a working class and the poor a poor. The Victorians of each stratum are bestowed with the resemblance of identity. They behave according to what they are expected to and go to places that fit their status. So is Alice who, as a child of the bourgeois, is educated to be a courteous lady at home.⁹ All these make the land of Victorian an embodiment of the sedentary space, for it represents a provincial country with striated space within enclosed boundaries, where paths are subordinated to points. Although there are seemingly rankings in Wonderland—for instance, the Queen of Hearts as the highest authority, the King of Hearts and other kings as the aristocracy, the Diamonds as the bourgeoisie,

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⁹ From some aspects in *Alice in Wonderland*, we could conjecture that Alice comes from a bourgeois family: besides that Alice tries to be as courteous and lady-like as she can, while she doubts who herself really is, she has once said that “I must be Mabel after all, and I shall have to go and live in that poky little house, and have next to no toys to play with . . . .” (*AIW* 23). From her grumbles, we get the idea that Alice lives in a wide large house and has several toys to play with. She also has the habit of having afternoon-tea and joining tea-party which mostly occurs above the strata of bourgeoisie, no wonder she complains that the mad tea-party of the Hatter and the March Hare is “the stupidest tea-party I ever was at in all my life” (*AIW* 78); in the end of the story, Alice’s running for her usual afternoon tea exemplifies her bourgeois background. In addition, Rackin directly mentions that Alice is “in many ways an ordinary bourgeois child of her own era” (*Nonsense, Sense, and Meaning* 14) and Auerbach also explicitly indicates that Alice “stands as one image of the Victorian middle-class child” (“Alice and Wonderland” 31).
and the Spades as the working class—things and events are distorted with nonsensical nature, because the brutal Queen never really executes anybody. The Queen is mocked and twisted, never once being the center of Wonderland, in contrast to the monarchial Queen of the Victorian, who grasps strong power and spreads her power all over the Victorian land.

In opposition to the sedentary space of the powerful State apparatus is the smooth open space of the war machine with intensive force, which is outside the imperial State.10 People become the nomads only when they hold the smooth open space: “[T]he primary determination of nomads is to occupy and hold a smooth space: it is this aspect that determines them as nomad (essence)” (Deleuze and Guattari 410). The nomads invent the war machine, rambling and holding the open-ended space of, for instance, the desert and the steppe, and roving without any destinations. The desert and the steppe, like the sea and the ice, are horizonless space without fixed points. They are smooth autonomous space with intensities, forces and haecceities, posing “the problem of the fleet in being,” i.e. “the task of occupying an open space with a vertical movement that can rise up at any point” (Deleuze and Guattari 363) and holding space “with a vector of deterritorialization in perpetual motion” (387). This kind of space is centerless or, in other words, with numerous centers: everywhere is the center, the nude, the intersection of what Deleuze and Guattari call the “multilinear systems” (295). Its space is interconnected with multiplicities; it is rhizomatic in nature. However, it does not mean that there are no points or stops on the nomad space, but that points are submitted to vectorial and directional lines.

10 The intensive force that occupies the nomad space should not be confused with power in the sedentary space. While power delimits and releases boundless potential, force culminates them. Massumi hence emphasizes that “[p]ower is the domestication of force. Force in its wild state arrives from outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls” (6).
Tending to develop in all directions, the nomad space has no borders or enclosures, only when it approaches the State apparatus which spheres the war machine, for the war machine is “trapped between the two poles of political sovereignty” (355). The nomads never have the political authority, the linear aristocracy or any hierarchical stratification. They are anarchical and have “no history . . . only have a geography” (393), verifying again that the time of the war machine is the time of Aion in which no chronological history exists, and that the space of the war machine is the rhizomatic space, on which the nomads ramble smoothly without established destinations.

After the fall in the rabbit-hole comes to an end, Alice is totally placing herself in the space of a mysterious world, a place which cannot be judged by common sense. It incarnates an abstract land filled with illogicality and illegitimacy. Like the cave in Forster’s *A Passage to India* which “exceeds the representational order of good sense” and represents “the groundless grounds of spatium and the timeless time of the aeon” (Islam 52), Wonderland also transcends the normality of the Victorian good sense, having its time as the timelessness of the unlimited Aion (which we have discussed in the previous part) and its space as the groundlessness of the smooth nomad space (which is the main concern hereafter). Although Alice never goes anywhere except being trapped in the subterranean world, this world does not have any perceived boundaries. If there really exists a boundary, all we can designate is the boundary of

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11 However, this statement does not mean that there is no nomad space in the State apparatus; there are possibilities that nomads find their own places within the State and regardless of its laws. For example, the flâneur in the urban city rambles to places without any fixed routes and destinations; he/she breaks the limits of the State and embodies the very nature of the nomad who holds the smooth nomad space. Autonomous zones of the nomad space may be an “underdeveloped” area in the capitalist economy, or a “Third World,” which may in fact occur within the borders of the “First World” (the “ghetto”). Or they may be widely scattered through the social field, physically separated from one another so that even though they are geographically implanted they do not define a continuous territory. (Massumi 104)

Therefore, the nomads, outside the power of the State apparatus, might find their free autonomous zones within the State.
the long passage of the rabbit-hole which connects and separates the underground to the surface—Wonderland represents the space of the war machine which is outside the power of the Victorian State apparatus.

The underground space expands before Alice’s eyes after her falling down through the rabbit-hole. Alice’s travel in Wonderland is composed of movement among places, always leaving one place behind and bounding for another. The constant shift of places brings Alice forward to her journey.\textsuperscript{12} One place may surprisingly lead to another, and Alice always comes \textit{suddenly} upon somewhere.\textsuperscript{13}

After the Caucus-race, seeing the White Rabbit appears again, looking for his fan and gloves, Alice suddenly realizes that “everything seemed to have changed since her swim in the pool; and the great hall, with the glass table and the little door, had vanished completely” (\textit{AIW} 37). She does not even know how she gets to the place of the Caucus-race after leaving the long hall. Both Alice’s crossing of boundaries and her shift in places here are unconscious. She travels on the smooth open space of the subterranean world without any pre-set routes or destinations in mind. In Wonderland, even doors will suddenly appear in anywhere for travelers to enter: after Alice leaves

\textsuperscript{12} Unable to get through the small door in the long hall, after the Caucus-race, Alice suddenly comes to the White Rabbit’s house. Afterwards, she flees into the thick woods, seeing the Caterpillar and then the Pigeon there. Leaving Pigeon behind, she comes upon a house with the cook and the Duchess with a baby inside. After taking over the Duchess’s baby into the open air and then dropping him, Alice runs into the Cheshire-Cat, who tells her the direction to the houses of the Hatter and the March Hare who are now holding a mad tea-party with the Dormouse. While leaving the mad tea-party, Alice sees a door suddenly appears before her on the tree. It is a door surprisingly leads Alice back to the long hall. This time she is able to get into the garden because of the mushroom and then she plays croquet game with the Queen there. The Queen then asks Gryphon to bring Alice to the Mock Turtle besides the sea. Finally, hearing that “[t]he Trial’s beginning” (\textit{AIW} 108), Alice goes to the court, waking up and ending her journey after her evidence.

\textsuperscript{13} The word \textit{suddenly} appears often in \textit{Alice in Wonderland}, and it is used for many times with regard to Alice’s sudden arrival of some places: “[t]he well] dipped \textit{suddenly} down, so \textit{suddenly} that Alice had not a moment to think about stopping herself before she found herself falling down what seemed to be a very deep well” (\textit{AIW} 12, italics mine); “\textit{suddenly}, thump! thump! thump! down she came upon a heap of sticks and dry leaves, and the fall was over” (\textit{AIW} 14, italics mine); “\textit{Suddenly} she came upon a little three-legged table, all made of solid glass” (\textit{AIW} 15, italics mine); “she came \textit{suddenly} upon an open place, with a little house in it about four feet high” (\textit{AIW} 56, italics mine).
the mad tea-party for the woods, “she noticed that one of the trees had a door leading right into it. ‘That’s very curious!’ she thought. ‘But everything’s curious today. I think I may as well go in at once.’ And in she went” (AIW 78). It is a transformational door which leads Alice back to the long hall where she first arrives in the underground world. As a result, places here are not impenetrably encircled within the panopticon. They are all interconnected. No rigid contour or map can be drawn for Wonderland because of its transitory boundaries and interconnected space. That is why it is groundless in nature, or, in other words, it is “spaceless” (Cohen 162) and the “placelessness” (Rackin, “What You Always Wanted” 4).

The emergence and the vanishment of the Cheshire-Cat also elucidate the interconnected nature of Wonderland. For Alice, it is no big deal for seeing the Cheshire-Cat grinning good-naturedly on a bough of tree, because she has been startled by and getting used to several illogical happenings in Wonderland. Even when the Cat suddenly disappears after saying “You’ll see me there [the croquet game]” (AIW 66), it does not astonish Alice much. While Alice is still looking at the place where the Cat vanishes, the Cat suddenly appears again and asks about the baby, and then he disappears once more. Alice continues walking on, seeing the Cat once again on a branch of a tree. The Cat can manifest and vanish at any time and place as he wishes. He travels from one place to another along the supple line on the smooth nomad space. His emergence at one place and vanishment to another place is not a fixed point-to-point one, but one that could transfer to any flexible points, because space here is all rhizomatically interconnected. Alice feels quite dizzy and complains about the Cat’s abrupt appearance and disappearance. The Cat then fades away really slowly: he begins vanishing with “the end of the tail” and ends with “the grin” (AIW
and later in the Queen’s garden, he emerges gradually in the air by first showing up with a grin, followed by his eyes and finally with his whole head appeared (AIW 86). The Cat could simultaneously exist in two places, with his tail in one place and his grin in another, for the space in Wonderland is multidimensional and interchangeable. That is also why after the Caterpillar, who is commonly recognized as a slow-motion creature, answers Alice’s questions at the end of their conversation, it soon in another moment goes out of sight (AIW 53).

Wonderland thus demolishes the order of the topological space and represents a decentered space where places are all interconnected. The space with displaced frontiers resembles Michel Foucault’s *Heterotopia* which is “of supple boundary, and offers perilous voyages beyond threshold” (qtd. in Islam 30). Wonderland’s reticulate nature further exemplifies the concept of *rhizome*, which is an “antigenealogy,” without a center but with “multiple entryways” (Deleuze and Guattari 11-12). Points of a rhizome can be and must be connected to the others. Therefore, there are in fact no points in a rhizome but only lines, for points are subordinated to lines—“the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature”; the acentered rhizome hence embodies “all manner of ‘becomings’” (Deleuze and Guattari 21).

Susan Sherer describes the complex spatial dynamics of Wonderland as a space with the fantastic elasticity: “Space is created as she [Alice] moves through it and closes up behind her as she exits. It is as if space does not exist unless she inhabits it; the hole deepens as she falls through it; doors, keys, and corridors materialize as she needs them” (4). Sherer analogizes Wonderland’s space to the *ad-hoc spatiality*, which “differs radically from the *spatial imperatives* that we find in, say Hardy, who
continually reminds us that physical structures outlive their human makers” (5, italics mine). The point which should be emphasized here is that those Sherer refers to, the ad-hoc spatiality of elasticity and the spatiality of the imperatives, indeed resemble the rhizomatic space of the war machine and the striated space of the State apparatus respectively. On the one hand, the spatial imperatives are stratified with emphasis on physical structures, i.e. points. On the other hand, the spatiality of ad-hoc network is interconnected in nature, for it, like the smooth space, is constructed with dense points which constitute elastic supple lines. Points here are all multiply linked and are submitted to the paths. Sherer’s critique helps assert the intricate labyrinthine nature of the nomad space of Wonderland—one with ad-hoc spatiality.

The rhizomatic nomad space of Wonderland enables Alice to travel along the smooth space as a nomadic traveler. Alice, who is not bounded by any pre-set goals, advances along the supple line. Not along the route of power, her travel is not a point-to-point one, but one that happens to go to places as long as there are doors, roads and creatures. In the smooth space of Wonderland as a world of fantasy, any of Alice’s intentional decisions would be, in Žižek’s words, an “empty gesture” (27). It seems that there are free choices for Alice, but, in fact, there are not. What she decides is often being rejected: “[W]hat the empty gesture offers is the opportunity to choose the impossible, that which inevitably will not happen” (Žižek 27). Thus, although Alice desires to enter the garden of flowers and cool fountain, she cannot decide the route or choose the ways. In most cases, the creatures and the situation lead her naturally to the next destination.

For Islam, travelers progress either in the striated or in the smooth space, and proceeds respectively along the rigid and the supple line (55-57). A real traveler, a
nomadic one, travels along the supple line in the smooth space. However, one who progresses with the allure of goal is a sedentary traveler who journeys on the rigid line in the gridded space. The labyrinthine space of Wonderland is totally an abstract one, “where boundaries are always in the process of dissolution” (Wolfreys 55). No one can tell how big it is or how its contour looks like. The map has already been left behind at the very beginning while Alice pops down the well, through which she passes “maps and pictures hung upon pegs” (AIW 13)—maps that are unobtainable and useless in Wonderland thereafter. Baum declares that a blank map is ideal for “the Wonderland of dreams and fairy tales . . . since it permits the traveller to take any route to his destination, or it allows him not to move at all, since he would be already where he wanted to go” (77). But Baum’s blank map is not totally suitable for the enigmatic Wonderland in Alice in Wonderland, because its consistent dissolving boundaries and its interconnected space’s becoming characteristic make itself a world unmappable.

Concerning Wonderland’s spatiotemporality, it does not have the limited time and space as the above world; time and space are both, on the contrary, supple, flexible and indefinite in Wonderland. We now come to the conclusion that Wonderland’s time is the unlimited Aion which always eludes the present and indicates the past-future—the time consists itself in the process of becoming. Furthermore, Wonderland’s space represents the smooth nomad space which is rhizomatically interconnected in nature. It is a malleable space of multiplicities which has “all manner of becomings” (Deleuze and Guattari 21). This multiple spatiotemporality makes the whole Wonderland in the process of becoming unlimited; it expresses the “pure becoming without measure” (Deleuze, Logic of Sense 1) either
in time or in space. Hence, the interconnected nature of the subterranean world, together with its time as the unlimited Aion, provide Alice with the smooth multidimensional space and the timeless surroundings, both of which enable her to move forward along the supple line while eluding the present, leading her on the road to becoming-other as a nomadic traveler. These spatiotemporal characteristics depict the extrinsic qualities of which becoming needs, providing a good beginning and framework for Alice to become a nomadic traveler. However, to becoming-other as a nomadic traveler is not as simple as it seems to be. The next chapter will try to analyze the intrinsic aspects of a traveler’s becoming, focusing on the features of Alice as a traveler while examining her attitudes toward travels.