

守勢現實主義與冷戰後中共的安全政策

摘要

本論文的中心命題是：冷戰後的中國是尋求向外擴張、還是自我防禦的國家？爲了檢視此一命題，本論文從守勢現實主義（defensive realism）的理論中推論出維持現狀、嚇阻戰略與昂貴信號，以作爲檢視冷戰後中共安全行爲的指標。本論文分別檢視中共領導人的政策宣示、1995-96 年台海危機以及冷戰後中共與南海爭議的個案，證明：第一、中共對國際環境的認知會符合守勢現實主義關於良性的國際結構與安全充足的觀點；第二、中共的外交政策旨在維持既有的國際秩序，所以其對外的行爲以維持現狀爲主，避免改變現狀的情形發生；第三、中共的國防政策屬於防禦性的，因此其戰略以嚇阻爲主，避免使用武力直接與敵人衝突；第四、爲了表示防禦性、維持現狀或者是合作的意圖，中共採取昂貴信號的作法，以避免被其他國家所誤解。所以，本論文論證出冷戰後的中國是一個追求自我防禦的國家，其安全政策是屬於防禦性的。

關鍵字：中共、守勢現實主義、安全政策、冷戰後

Defensive Realism and Post-Cold War PRC Security Policy

Abstract

The central question of this thesis is: *Is China an expansionist or a self-preserving state in the Post-Cold War era?* From defensive realism theory, I infer status quo policy, deterrence strategy, and costly signal to estimate Post-Cold War PRC security behavior. Empirically, I examine Chinese leaders' statements, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96, and South China Sea disputes in the Post-Cold War era. I reach the conclusion that: First, PRC's perception of international environment is consistent with defensive realism's argument that international structure is benign and security is plentiful. Second, China engages status quo foreign policy to maintain the international order. Third, China's defense policy emphasizes on deterrence strategy to avoid direct conflict with the enemy. Fourth, China adopted costly signals to unfold its defensive, status quo, or cooperative intention to prevent other countries' misunderstanding. I argue that, therefore, Post-Cold War China is a self-protecting state with the defensive security policy.

Keywords: defensive realism, Post-Cold War, PRC, security policy