CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter two includes five main sections. In the first section, communicative competence is reviewed to introduce the essential components, including both linguistic and functional competences. In the second section, a review of speech act theory is provided to introduce issues related to indirect speech act, cooperative principle, politeness principles, and the speech act of invitation. The third section concerns socioculture perspective of language use. In this section, first, different culture values between western culture and Chinese culture are reviewed, and then invitation activity in western culture and that in Chinese culture are compared. Next, in section four, a review of linguistic aspect of invitation are given. In this section, the strategies of invitation and the linguistic strategies of invitation by indirectness and politeness are reviewed. Lately, the final section presents teaching speech acts to EFL learners, with pragmatic transfer and pragmatic failure in the first part, and teaching procedures in the second part.

Communicative Competence

Communicative competence, first introduced by Hymes (1966, 1967), refers to people's ability to speak not only grammatically but also appropriately to compensate for the insufficiency of Chomsky's (1965) notion of competence which is limited to rule-governed linguistic creativity only. According to Chomsky, competence is the perfect knowledge of an ideal speaker and hearer in a homogeneous speech community to carry to his perfection in dealing with internal grammar of the language, and then apply the knowledge to the actual performance. Hymes, on the other hand, advocates that all sorts of knowledge, linguistic knowledge as well as knowledge of interactional skills and cultural knowledge behind performance in real contexts, must be taken into consideration to constitute the concept of communicative competence.

Gumperz (1981) agrees with Hymes in that communicative competence should go beyond knowledge of grammar, and he delimitates communicative competence as "the linguistic knowledge and related communicative conventions necessary for speakers in order to initiate and sustain conversational involvement" (pp. 40-41), which undoubtedly is the prerequisite for interpretation. Given that, communicative competence is concerned with interpretation of speech based on the knowledge shared by the interlocutors and contextualization cues rather than merely with sentence content. These contextualizaton cues may help to make conversational inference and, then, avoid communication breakdown. The following example is given for explanation.

A: Are you going to be here for ten minutes?
B: Go ahead and take your break. Take longer if you want.
(Gumperz, 1981, p. 41)

In this case, B interprets A's opening utterance as a request not only by structural knowledge but also by the knowledge of the contextualization cues. In other words, the illocutionary force can be contextually cued by rhythmic organization, the signaling of turn-taking, the choice of discourse strategies that influence their interpretation.

Most regretfully, Hyme's definition of communicative competence is misinterpreted as being different from linguistic competence. That is, linguistic competence, which is a part of communicative competence according to Hymes's definition, is separated from communicative competence. To correct such misconception, Canale and Swain (1980) suggest that grammatical accuracy should be included as an element of communicative competence, and that rules of language use can not be operated if rules of grammar are excluded. Accordingly, they proposed a theoretical framework of communicative competence which include four components: (1) *grammatical competence*, the ability to master the linguistic form including vocabulary, word formation, sentence formation and so on; (2) *discourse competence*, the ability to combine grammatical forms and meanings to achieve a unified spoken or written test in different genres; (3) *strategic competence*, the ability to mastery of how to use communication strategies, which can compensate for breakdown of communication due the performance variables; and (4) s*ociolinguistic competence*, the sociocultural norms and rules controlling the appropriateness of utterances in different social contexts.

As sociolinguistic competence is claimed to take a crucial role in verbal communication, the sociolinguistic aspect starts to be valued. For example, Yu (2005), in his study on sociolinguistic competence in complimenting act between speakers of Chinese and American English, explores sociocultural differences between the two societies, in order to locate universality and specificity of the speech act in different languages. For example, the categories of complimenting strategies may exist universally in languages, but they may carry different semantic meanings to achieve different functions. For example, the word “like” in “I like your dress.” has the meaning of *praise* in American norm. That is, speakers of American English tend to use “like” to serve the function of compliment. On the other hand, Chinese tend to assign the meaning of *want* to the word “like,” and thus the word “like” functions as direct requesting in Chinese culture.

Pragmatic Perspective of Language Use

Communicative competence has been known to include not only accuracy of linguistic forms but also the appropriate use of language. To achieve a successful communication, the pragmatic aspect of language use should also be taken into consideration. In the pragmatic perspective, appropriateness has been proposed to refer to a speaker’s ability to give suitable linguistic expressions to serve communicative needs in a given context. Functional knowledge as such can be analyzed from two aspects: pragmalinguistic perspective and sociopragmatic perspective, with the former concerning more with linguistic and grammatical end of pragmatic aspect, and the latter on the sociocultural influences on linguistic choices (Kasper 1992; Leech, 1983; Thomas, 1983). Briefly speaking, “pragmalinguistic studies are language-specific” while “sociopragmatic studies are culture-specific” (Leech, 1983, pp. 10-11). In accordance, Thomas (1983) categorizes pragmatic failures into pragmalinguistic failure and sociogramatic failure. To be specific, when speakers fail to grasp the intended meaning due to the underlying conventions in an utterance, they suffer from pragmalinguistic failure. On the other hand, sociopragmatic failure refers to the inability to deal with degree of gravity, tabus, cross-cultural difference of power and distance, and value judgment. As language use is beyond a set of linguistic rules, both pragmalinguistic knowledge and sociopragmatic knowledge are necessary to determine the appropriateness of a verbal behavior.

Speech Act Theory

Austin (1962) proposes speech acts by claiming that when people are saying something, they are performing the act at the same time by pronouncing the certain words, and later are designated to the act. For example, when the speaker offers an invitation by saying "I invite you to come to my house," he/she is designated to the act. Also, Austin claims that communication is composed of a series of speech behaviors which are systematically used to achieve communicative purposes Following Austin's definition, a speech act contains three components: locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act (p. 120). A locutionary act refers to the particular sense and reference of an utterance; an illocutionary act refers to the act performed in, or by virtue of, the performance of the illocution; and a perlocutionary act refers to the act performed by means of what is said.

However, an illocutionary act cannot be successfully achieved without conforming to some conditions. Therefore, Austin (1962) proposes a set of *felicity conditions* which are the criteria to account for the prerequisite conditions that must be conformed to successfully achieve the purpose of communication. Searle (1969) offers four conditions developed from Austin's felicity conditions.

(1) Propositional Content Condition: specify the kind of meaning expressed by the propositional part of an utterance;
(2) Preparatory Condition: describe the conditions which are pre-requisite to the performance of the speech act;
(3) Sincerity Condition: outline the conditions which must obtain if the speech act is to be performed sincerely;
(4) Essential Condition: specify what the speech act must conventionally count as.

When an invitation is offered, the four conditions must be conformed to achieving the function of inviting. First of all, the utterance of the invitation concerns Propositional Content Condition. As to Preparatory Condition, the inviter must have the ability to offer the invitation and, similarly, the invitee must have high possibility to receive the invitation. Next, the inviter must intend to invite sincerely according to Sincerity Condition. Finally, when the inviting sentences are uttered by the inviter, the invitation act must to be done in the future in accordance with Essential Condition.

In addition to having the knowledge of the four conditions, interlocutors have to assign functions to a number of infinite sentences for attaining the intended meaning from each other. As no sentence is function-free in the context, interlocutors must recognize the category of the illocutionary act of each sentence to communicate successfully. Sealer (1969, 1979) classifies illocutionary acts into five categories: Assertives (to commit speaker to the truth of the pressed proposition), Directives (to produce some effect through action by the hearer), Commissives (to commit speaker to some future action), Expressives (to express, or make known, the speaker's psychological attitude towards a state of affairs which the illocution presupposes), and Declaratives (illocutions whose successful performance leads to the correspondence between the prepositional content and reality). The target speech act of this study, invitation, is a directive, which demands the hearers' response to the speakers' proposal of doing something; and if a positive response is given, the hearer confine him-/herself to a future act.

Indirect Speech Acts

Speech acts have been divided into direct speech acts and indirect speech acts (Leech, 1983; Searle, 1969, 1979). Searle (1975) argues for distinction of speech acts into direct speech acts and indirect speech acts, and he claims that indirect speech act as cases in which the literal meaning of a speech act is not equal to its intended meaning. Leech (1983) regards indirect speech act as "hinting strategy" to utter "an illocution whose goal is interpreted as a subsidiary goal for the performance of another illocution" (p. 97) and defines direct and indirect speech acts in terms of "means-ends analysis" (p. 36), which explains speaker's problem-solving strategy. In other words, an indirect speech act has at least two acts, that is, primary act and secondary act. The former refers to the illocutionary act which conveys the intended meaning of the utterance, and the latter refers to the literal meaning of the utterance. For example, "Can you pass me the salt?" can be literally meant as a question for asking hearer's ability to pass the salt. However, the utterance is used as a request for the speaker to request the hearer to pass the salt.

From the example mentioned above, it is obvious that, in our daily conversations, interlocutors intentionally use a large number of indirect utterances, instead of direct speech, to achieve the goals of the communication for some reasons, such as politeness consideration or sarcastic purpose. In addition, parts of indirect speech acts are conventionally used to perform certain functions. Searle (1975) lists some linguistic forms conventionally used to perform the function of directives. The conventionally indirect directives are listed as follows.

Group 1 Sentences concerning H's ability to perform A:

Can you reach the salt?

Group 2 Sentences concerning S's wish or want that H will do A:

I would like you to go now.

Group 3 Sentences concerning H's doing A:

Will you quit making that awful racket?

Group 4 Sentences concerning H's desire or willingness to do A:

Do you want to hand me that hammer over there on the table?

Group 5 Sentences concerning reasons for doing A:

Why not stop here?

Group 6 Sentences embedding one of these elements inside another; also, sentences embedding an explicit directive illocutionary verb inside one of these contexts.

Might I ask you to take off your hat? (pp. 268-269)

An example of invitation can be given. "Can you" and "Will you" are syntactic frames which are conventionally used to perform the function of invitation. As to the case of invitation, speakers tend to use "Can you come to my house?" or "Will you come to my house?" to express invitation in order to give the hearer options or lower the imposition on the hearer.

As one sentence may carry more than one meaning and function, conversation inference between speaker and hearer must be well operated for the twol interlocutor to attain each other's intended meaning in conversation. According to Searle (1975), attaining the intended meaning of indirect speech act heavily relies on inference, with some tools necessarily involved to well operate the inference. Devices for inference include theory of speech acts, cooperative principle, mutual background information between interlocutors, and inference ability. Take "Can you come to my house?" as an invitation for example, the inferential procedure by the hearer is described as follows.

STEP 1: The speaker has ask me a question about my ability to come to his house (the fact of the conversation)

STEP 2: I assume that he is cooperating in the conversation and his utterances has some aim (cooperative principle).

STEP 3: In the situation, the utterance does not indicate a theoretical interest in ability to come to his house (background information).

STEP 4: It is probable that the inviter knows the answer of the question is yes (background information).

STEP 5: Therefore, he probably does not intend to ask a question but to give other illocutionary point.

STEP 6: A preparatory condition for a directive illocutionary act is the ability t o perform the act (theory of speech acts).

STEP 7: Therefore, the speaker asks me a question, the affirmative answer of which entails the preparatory condition for inviting me to come to his house.

By correctly inferring the literal meaning to the primary illocutionary act, the hearer can successfully interpret the question into an expression for invitation.

Cooperative Principle

While verbal exchanges go beyond sentential level to involve conversation inference, the interlocutors need a communicative principle consented to both interlocutors to ensure that their verbal exchanges in the conversation comply to cooperation, which is the basic requirement to have a successful communication. Grice (1975) proposes “Cooperative Principle” (p. 45), claiming that the principles control speech acts to achieve verbal exchange. According to Grice, Cooperative Principle (CP, hereafter) includes four maxims, as given bellow, and these maxim and their submaxims can be implemented either by conformation or by violation.

(1) Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
   (a) do not say what you believe to be false;
   (b) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence;

(2) Maxim of Quantity:
   (a) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange;
   (b) do not make your contribution more informative than is required

(3) Maxim of Relation: Do make your contribution relevant;

(4) Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous and specifically:
   (a) Avoid obscurity.

(b) Avoid ambiguity.

(c) Be brief.

(d) Be orderly.

However, in real communication, a sentence can carry more than one speech act and, therefore, offer more than one meaning. In this case, the literal meaning and the intended meaning are not the same. According to Grice, speakers may choose either to conform or to flout the maxims and the submaxims, but it is when the speaker flouts the maxims, does the sentences uttered bring forth the implication, which demands inference.

Politeness Principles

Leech (1983) also points out that CP alone is not enough to interpret indirect speech act. Therefore, politeness principles were proposed to remedy the problem. Three major politeness principles proposed respectively by Lakoff (1975), and Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), Leech (1983) were presented below.

Politeness as Rapport. Lakoff (1975) claims that people use politeness principles (PP) to avoid confrontation in interpersonal interaction. The “Rules of Politeness” or “Rules of Rapport” used to describe the universal selection of linguistic forms include formality (keep aloof), deference (give options), and camaraderie (show sympathy). Lakoff proposes that formality and camaraderie are mutually exclusive whereas deference tends to go with formality for keeping aloof or go with camaraderie for showing sympathy. According to Lakoff, politeness is a universal idea and it varies according to the type of interpersonal relationship, and is conditioned by the culture in which it dwells.

Accordingly, in addressing an invitation, the interlocutors will apply different politeness rules according to their interpersonal relationship. First, formality concerns not being too close to others in order to keep a polite distance. When the inviter is not so close to the invitee, the inviter will try not to impose the invitee by wanting the invitee to do nothing but come. Moreover, deference represents another way of offering invitation to a distant person. In this case, the speaker (e.g. the employee) regards himself/herself as inferior to the invitee (e.g. the boss) and, therefore, gives the invitee a chance to make decision of whether to come or not. On the other hand, camaraderie concerns that the speaker consider the hearer as equals (e.g. relationship of classmates). When offering an invitation, the speaker tries to be friendly in the interaction with direct and open behavior. From the given examples above, it is obvious that conversation is not an easy interacting process merely regarding how people interact. Lakoff devalues what and how people say by putting a spotlight on the reasons why people say in different ways. In other words, CP only, illustrates how interlocutors are cooperating in the conversation, but it is PP that explain why they say something in the way they say it.

Politeness as Face. Goffman (1974) relates politeness to face which is defined as “social value” and “image of self” which people claims for themselves (p. 224). Following Goffman’s concept of politeness, Brown and Levinson (1987) propose that politeness is related to face work, which achieves the goal of social interaction in which the interlocutors try to maintain or enhance the face of each other. According to Brown and Levinson, face maintenance consists of the want of “positive face” (i.e. the want to claim for the public self-image) and the want of “negative face” (i.e. the want to act as freely and umimpededly as possible) (p. 61). Since different speakers put different emphases on the two kinds of faces under different sociocultural needs, misunderstanding may be aroused because the interlocutors do not comprehend each other’s face need. Therefore, before messages and intentions are exchanged, interlocutors need to negotiate, in advance, the relationship between them, which, in turn, would determine the necessity of maintaining each other’s face. In sum, linguistic manifestations are reflections of such expectations (Brown & Levinson, 1978, 1987).

It has been pointed out that social factors influence the speech behavior in the social context, and that the social dynamics always determine the contribution of face among interlocutors (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Scollon & Scollon, 1995; Wolfson, 1989). In order to evaluate the degree of politeness, interlocutors must take social factors into consideration. There are essential three factors involved in the politeness system to manipulate face relationships—power, distance, and the weight of the imposition. First, power, according to Brown and Levinson (1987), concerns asymmetric social status among people. When the two interlocutors are of different social statuses, the more powerful one may unconsciously put imposition on the one of lower status. Usually, the larger the power difference between the interlocutors, the stronger the force of the imposition on the lower status one; and the degree of imposition increase with the distance between the interlocutors. Next, social distance may result from differences in gender, ranking, and intimacy. These three factors, individually as well as in combination, manipulate and develop the politeness and its linguistic manifestations.

Politeness as Comity. Although CP successfully accounts for how the utterances of the interlocutors cooperate in the conversation, CP in itself cannot explains why the interlocutors do not directly convey the intended meaning. As CP fails to take situational factors into consideration, Leech (1983) proposes Politeness Principle (PP) to keep the balance of social necessity and the friendly relations in the situations in which politeness acts as backup. Leech's PP includes six maxims of the PP:

1. Tact Maxim (in impositives and commissives)
   (a) Minimize cost to other
   (b) Maximize benefit to other
2. Generosity Maxim (in impositvies and commissives)
   (a) Minimize benefit to self
   (b) Maximize cost to self
3. Approbation Maxim (in expressive and assertives)
   (a) Minimize dispraise to other
   (b) Maximize praise of other
4. Modesty Maxim (in expressives and assertives)
   (a) Minimize praise to self
   (b) Maximize dispraise of self
5. Agreement Maxim (in assertives)
   (a) Minimize disagreement between self and other
   (b) Maximize agreement between self and other
6. Sympathy Maxim (in assertives)
   (a) Minimize antipathy between self and other
   (b) Maximize sympathy between self and other (Leech, 1983, p. 132)

According to Leech, politeness is emphasized more on other then on self. Also, sub-maxim (a) appears more important than sub-maxim (b), which implies that negative politeness is a more important consideration than positive politeness.

For example, the speech act of compliment can be used to account for Approbation Maxim and Modesty Maxim. When the speaker makes a compliment to his/her friend on the clothes, he/she intends say something good to maximize praise to his/her friend, and avoid the bad part of clothes to minimize dispraise to the friend by following Approbation Maxim. Moreover, in Chinese culture, the speaker is expected to behave in a modesty way to devalue his/her clothes to maximize dispraise of self, and at least not to boast of his/her clothes to minimize praise of self. As to Agreement Maxim, interlocutors will minimize the disagreement and maximize the agreement between them for politeness' sake. Moreover, in order to obey Sympathy Maxim, the interlocutors will maximize sympathy or at least minimize antipathy between self and other. The speech act of invitation, the target act of this study, is related to the first two maxims (namely, Tact Maxim and Generosity Maxim). In the case of invitation, when a speaker intends to invite a friend to dinner, he/she would prepare a dinner to maximize the invitee's benefit, and the invitee does not have to do anything but come to the house to minimize the invitee's benefit by conforming Tact Maxim. On the other hand, the speaker spend time preparing dinner to maximize his/her own cost, and the speaker does not intend to get anything from the invitee to minimize his/her benefit by conforming Generosity Maxim.

The above examples indicate that for the sake of cost-benefit and/or modesty, PP determines how CP is to be implemented. Very often, the need of politeness may collide with Manner Maxims of CP, which demands brevity and clarity. Take the following conversation for example,

A: We'll all miss Bill and Agatha, won't we?
B: Well, we'll all miss Bill. (Leech, 1983, p. 80)

In the above example, in order to follow Maxim of Quantity to give a contribution as informative as possible to respond to A's utterance, B should probably answer, "*Well, we'll all miss Bill, but we won't all miss Agatha.*" However, B, for politeness' sake, retains only the first clause and deletes the second one to implicate that they won't miss Agatha. Another example is given to illustrate the trade-off of Politeness Principle under sociocultural controls. Yu (2003), in his study on compliment, noticed that English speakers tend to conform to the Agreement Maxim by accepting other's compliment. That is to say, English speakers tends maximize praise of self by deemphasizing Modesty Maxim, which Chinese speakers incline to minimize praise to self by upgrading Modesty Maxim. For theses reasons, the speech act of invitation is expected not to follow the CP and the PP completely, and choices of linguistic forms will change with contextual factors, such as the relationship between interlocutors and the social situations. Accordingly, CP will be weakly operating when politeness plays an important role in specific contexts.

The Speech Act of Invitation

According to Searle (1979), inviting is a directive, which shows the speaker's intention to make the hearer do something. When a speaker invites his hearer to participate in a party, the directive focus is substantialized in the hearer's responding action. On the other hand, on issuing an invitation, the speaker commits a course of future action that is beneficial to the hearer. In this sense, inviting is also a commissive, which "commit[s] the speaker to some future course of action" (p. 14). To cover both characteristics, Hancher (1979) names inviting a "commissive directive" (p. 6). Searle (1975) offers four felicity conditions of directive and commissive, as given in Table 1.

Table 1 *Directive and commissive felicity conditions*

	Directive	Commissive
Preparatory condition	H is able to perform A	S is able to perform A. H wants S to perform A
Sincerity condition	S wants H to do A.	S intends to do A
Propositional condition	S predicts a future act A of H.	S predicates a future act A of S.
Essential condition	Counts as an attempt by S to get H to do A.	Counts as the undertaking by S of an obligation to do A.

In order to achieve the purpose of invitation, the four conditions must be conformed. To be specific, when the speaker invites the hearer to come to a party, first, the invitation is predicted by the interlocutors to meet propositional content condition; next, both the inviter and the invitee should have the ability to go to the party to fulfill preparatory condition; also, the inviter must sincerely attempt to and have the responsibility to offer the invitation to conform to Sincerity Condition and Essential Condition.

Wierzbicka (1987) argues that the importance of performative verbs (or, speech act verbs, in Wierzbicak's term) is underestimated. In order to discover the specifically different semantic components of each performative verb and to make distinction among them, she made up a semantic dictionary to give a remedial support for the definition of thirty-seven groups of performative verbs. According to Wierzbicka's semantic dictionary, the semantic components of the act of intivation include:

> I assume that people can't do X if I don't say that I would want them to do it
> I think it would be good for you to be able to do it
> I say: I would want you to do X if you wanted to do it
> I say this because I want to cause you to do it if you want to do it
> I don't know if you will do it
> I assume that you don't have to do it
> I assume that you would want to do it (p. 81-82)

According to Wierzbicka's definition, the act of invitation is more than just a directive which carries the semantic components of S's want for H to do something. However, an inviting act, not a pure directive, carries two additional components: it is H who gets the benefit from doing things, and S wants H to do things only if H really wants. For example, when the speaker invites the hearer to have dinner, the inviter will prepare the dinner for the invitee and the invitee will thus get the benefit from the inviter. Furthermore, the invitee can refuse the invitation if he/she does not want to have dinner with the inviter. Although the invitation benefits the invitee, it may threaten the invitee's face by depriving the invitee's freedom to choose.

Brown and Levinson (1987) consider the speech act of invitation as a kind of face threatening acts (FTAs)—inviter's invitation threats invitee's want of negative face because invitee may lose the freedom and become imposed. Since direct speech acts may directly threaten the invitee's face, indirect speech acts are expected to function as the "fundamental politeness element" (p. 268) to preserve invitee's want of face. Given that politeness is a way to achieve solidarity and rapport, the speech act of invitation, functioning as the combination of a directive and commissive, can be accounted for by Leech's (1983) Tact Maxim and Generosity Maxim in terms of indirectness to mitigate the mutual threats to the interlocutors' faces. When the inviter offer an invitation to come to his/her party, the inviter will prepare food and drinks, and want invitee to bring nothing but come to the party to maximize benefit to the invitee, and, at the same time, minimize cost to the invitee by conforming Tact Maxim. On the other side of the same coin, the inviter minimizes his/her own benefit, and maximizes cost to self by following Generosity Maxim.

Appropriately extending an invitation is not merely concerned with obedience to politeness principals. In order to mitigate threats in an invitation, social factors must be taken into consideration. Thus, according to Brown and Levinson (1987), the degree of mitigation correlates with three factors: (1) social distance, including a composite of psychologically real factors such as age, sex, and intimacy; (2) relative power, usually resulting from social and economical status; and (3) strength of imposition. That is to say, when the inviter utter with the invitee of intimate relationship or equal ranking, the mutual threats will be mitigated.

Cultural Perspective of Language Use

Cultural Differences

As presented above, pragmatic factors do determine language users' choices of linguistic forms, but it is incomplete if cultural controls are excluded. Based on Spencer-Oatey's (1997) study, they find that British and Chinese carry significantly different concepts of power and closeness regarding the relationships between tutor and postgraduation student. The disparity in the two societies accounts for the fact that we can not appropriately communicate without taking cultural factors into consideration.

In general, culture differences are derived from two tendencies: individualism and collectivism, with the former focusing on an individual's goal, while the latter emphasizing the goal of a group of people (Hofstede, 1980; Kim, 1994; Yamaguchi, 1994; Triandis, 1995). In other words, people in individualistic cultures seem to care about themselves and their own family while members in collectivist cultures tend to care about people of in-groups, instead of individuals, for expressing faithfulness (Hofstede & Bond, 1984). Following the same concept, Markus and Kitayama (1991) propose the concepts of independent self and interdependent self by claming that people of Western countries seem to rely more heavily on the concept of independent self, but people from East Asia put stronger emphasis on interdependent self. Similarly, in some other studies, cultural differences are said to be determined by the tendency whether people use internal information (i.e., self view point) or external information (i.e., others view point) (Morris & Peng, 1994; Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999).

Individualism and collectivism are commonly used as criteria to differentiate occidental cultures from oriental cultures. However, these two tendencies do not appear separately; instead, they coexist in all cultures, and it is the matter of predominance that determines which culture a country belongs to. In many researches, Western cultures are empirically proved to be more individualistic than East Asian cultures (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995; Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeir, 2002). Correspondingly, American culture gives a priority to individualism, which is self-oriented, by emphasizing on individual goals, independent self, and internal attribution. On the other hand, Chinese culture is characterized as a culture focusing more on collectivism, which is others-oriented, and stress in-group goals, interdependent self, and external attribution.

Invitational Activity in Western and Chinese Cultures

As Westerners and Chinese adopt different culture value systems, their behaviors would differ. The two cultural value systems are different in the aspect of politeness as face. For Americans, invitation is regarded as an act that may threaten the invitee's negative face as the extent of imposition increases (Brown & Levinson, 1978, 1987). In other words, in American culture, when the inviter extends an invitation, the inviteeis force to choose in between accepting the invitation or rejects it. However, Chinese invitation is not necessarily threatening to invitee's negative face (Gu, 1990; Mao, 1992; Yu, 2003), in order to save face in Chinese culture.

Hu (1944) proposes that there are two faces in Chinese culture, *lian* "臉"and *mianzi* "面子". Hu defines *lian* as "the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation" (p. 45); on the other hand, *mianzi* refers to the reputation or prestige which gain from getting on in life or attributed by the members in the community. Mao (1992) compares Chinese *lian* and *minzi* with Brown and Levinson's concept of face. He claims that *lian* and *minzi* stand for a public image as it comes from the evaluation of others in the community. In addition, *mianzi* seems to be in accord with the notion of Confucianism, which contends the importance of group and community to which individuals are subordinated (Tu, 1985). The purpose of this tradition is to be “refined or cultivated in speech” (Wang, 1967, p. 4), which is one of meanings of *li* “禮” (Chinese politeness). On the contrary, Brown and Levinon’s face emphasizes self-image which intrinsically belongs to individuals. When it come to the speech act of invitation, in Chinese culture, *mianzi* is more important than Brown and Levinson’s negative politeness.

According to Mao (1992), Chinese invitation should be taken as a speech act of multiple-layer, ranging from multiple turns of refusal to an expected acceptance, which is quite different from Wolfson’s one-layer speech behavior of invitation. Mao points out that the ritual refusal of invitation in Chinese culture calls on the invitee to protect the inviter’s negative face first, and then, after the refusal, the inviter offers the invitation again to attend the invitee’s positive face, and, at the same time, threat invitee’s the negative face. The turns may possibly repeat one to three times to achieve the acceptance. In this sense, it is obvious that both the behavior of immediately accepting the invitation and that of not giving “continuous invitation” deviate from Chinese norm of interactional and disconform to Brown and Levinson’s politeness framework. Moreover, Gu (1990) points out that the inviter is considered “intrinsically polite” (p. 242) based on the concept of genuine desire for invitation, and the invitee’s acceptance can be seen as a strong evidence of the inviter’s sincerity. In Chinese invitation, damaging negative face turns out to be a ritualized way to show politeness, not necessarily necessary threatening each other’s face.

In the perspective of Leech’s (1983) politeness principle, the speech act of invitation (as a directive and commissive) is directly associated to Tact Maxim. Accordingly, since American culture emphasizes more on individuals, the inviter offers an activity beneficial for the invitee to maxim the invitee’s benefit. When the invitee rejects the invitation, the inviter would minimize the cost of the invitee by avoiding impeding the individual freedom of invitee. This conforms to the concept that negative politeness is more important than positive face (Leech, 1983). However, Chinese culture seems to flout the rule. Although the inviter in Chinese culture would follow Tact Maxim to maximize benefit to the invitee by offering an invitation, Chinese people tend to invite again and again, even when they are rejected. The reason is that the rejection is seen as a ritualized formulation of invitation in Chinese culture, and the seeming rejection is interpreted as a way of expressing politeness, as "pragmatic paradox" (p. 111) proposed by Leech. In this sense, as consistent with O'Driscoll's (1996) contention, Americans seem to emphasize negative face over positive face to show the desire for "disassociation/independence/individuation" (p. 10); Chinese tend to have desire for "association/belonging/merging" by prioritizing maintenance of positive face, and sacrificing negative face as the two faces conflict (O'Driiscoll, 1996).

From the different conceptions of invitation mentioned above, English language teachers should help EFL learners within Chinese context become aware of the differences between the conversational structures of the two cultures.

Linguistic Aspect of Invitation

The Strategies of Invitation

The speech act of invitation is divided into direct invitation and indirect invitation. Based on Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper's (1989) categorization of request, invitation is classified into four categories of strategies, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 *English invitation strategies* (derived from Blum-Kulka et al., 1989)

	Strategy	Example
I	**Direct Invitation**	
	1. Elliptical phrase	Party?
	2. Imperatives	Come to my party.
	3. Unhedged performatives	I invite you to come to my party.
	4. Hedged performatives	I would like to invite you to come to my party
	5. Obligation	You must/have to come to my party.
II	**Conventionally Indirect (Speaker-based conditions)**	
	6. Desire/Needs	I want/need you to come to my party.
	7. Wishes	I would like you to come to my party.
III	**Conventionally Indirect (Hearer-based conditions)**	
	8. Suggestory formulae	How about coming to my party?
	9. Permission	May I invite you to come to my party?
	10. Willingness	Would you come to my party?
	11. Ability	Could you come to my party?
VI	**Indirect Invitation**	
	12. Hint (strong)	I am having a party.
	13. Hint (mild)	Do you know I am having a party?

Note. The examples refer to the situation where the speaker invites the hearer to a party.

According to Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), five skills are included in the category of Direct Invitation. However, it obviously conflicts with the concept of direct speech act in the field of linguistics, according to which, the illocution of direct speech act is performed by its perfermative verb. On the other hand, the rest of linguistic forms without performative verb are categorized into indirect speech act with various strength of indirectness. In this study, it is impossible to examine all of thirteen skills for some reasons. First, because the study is focus on investigating the four strategies rather than those minute skills of the strategies, all of four strategies are tested to build up a hierarchical ordering. Next, due to time limitation and Chinese high school students' English proficiency, only two of the skills of each strategy are chosen in this study. Therefore, sentences with performative verb and imperative sentences are chosen. Moreover, "desire" and "wish" in Conventionally Indirect Invitation (Speaker based conditions), and "willingness and ability in Conventionally Indirect Invitation (Hearer based conditions) are merged as Indirect Invitation by Modality.

In addition to Blum-Kulka et al.'s categorization, different ways to classify the strategies are offered by other scholars. For example, Wolfson, D'Amico-eisner, and Huber (1983) observe that middle-class Americans provide some patterns for the speech act of invitation. In specific, they classify invitations into unambiguous and ambiguous invitations based on the data. The unambiguous invitations require (1) reference to time and/or mention of place or activity and (2) a request for a response (kernel). The following example illustrates the realization of an unambiguous invitation:

Do you want *(request for response)* to have lunch *(activity)* tomorrow *(time)*?
(Wolfson, 1989, p. 119)

However, not all invitation forms conform to the structures given above. Some of the information can be conveyed to the invitee only with the help of context. For example, when one of your friends knocks on the door at noon some day and said, "Lunch?" (Wolfson, D'Amico-eisner & Huber, 1983, p. 119), it is no doubt that the addressee would think that an invitation has been offered. According to Wolfson, this kind of unambiguous invitation can be achieved by one-word utterance, in which the activity is accounted for by the semantic content, the intonation that indicates the requirement of the response, and the time that can also be implicitly inferred from the context.

In Wolfson's (1989) study, a vast majority of invitations are achieved by a process of negotiation which the interlocutors take turn and cooperate with each other to complete the speech act. Since the need of negotiation for invitation result from interlocutors' ambiguous utterances, Wolfson proposes the term *lead* to refer to the statement or question opening a negotiation which may lead to invitations. According to Wolfson, et al., *leads* can be classified into four categories based on the function: (1) *Expressive leads*, used to convey the feelings of the speaker without any specific commitment; (2) *Availability leads*, used to establish the availability of the addressee; (3) *Pseudo-kernel leads*, used to give rise to ambiguous invitation with features of indefinite time, a required response and a modal auxiliary like "must," "should," or "have to" is almost always used; and (4) *Past tie*, used to mention shared knowledge of a past attempt to invite. In Leech's (1983) and Brown and Levinson's (1987) concepts of politeness, a speaker may express politeness by using leads to negotiate for completing a speech act. However, politeness can always be shown in different ways, especially when the speaker takes social controls into consideration. Wolfson, et al. (1983) indicate that impoliteness may result from using inappropriate leads for negotiation to invite someone who is intimate or is of equal social status with the inviter. In that case, the speaker's "fear of rejection is minimized . . . [so] negotiation is often unnecessary" (p. 126).

In this study, ambiguous invitations are excluded for following reasons. First, ostensible invitation, functioning as greeting or maintaining the relationship, is not a real invitation in question. Second, ambiguous invitation constructed by leads may result in many different interpretations of the utterances. In order to avoid distraction to the informants, the researcher will put the emphasis on unambiguous invitations. In the thesis, unambiguous are divided into three categories, including (1) Direct Invitation, (2) Indirect Invitation by Modality, and (3) Indirect Invitation by Hint.

Linguistic Choice by Indirectness and Politeness

It has been claimed by some scholars (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Lecch, 1983) that the notion of politeness is related to the degree of indirectness. For example, Brown and Levinson (1987) maintain that politeness is highly based on the strategy for doing face-threatening act. When the speaker goes on record and baldly does the act without redress, the degree of politeness which the speaker conveys is very low. Next, politeness increases as the speaker tries to employ redressive action. Also, the "off-record" behavior yields a high degree of politeness. Leech (1983) advocates the same concept by claiming that when the degree of optionaity or indirectness of illocution increases, that indirect act is more polite. However, the concept is questioned. That is to say, a higher degree of indirectness does not necessarily imply a higher strength of politeness.

Blum-kulka and Olshtain (1984) divided request strategies into three categories. First, direct strategy of request is the least indirect one compared to the other strategies; next, conventional indirect strategy (such as willingness, desire, and ability) is more indirect than direct strategy; then, non-conventional indirect strategy (such as hints) is considered the most indirect (Blum-Kulka and Olshtain, 1984). However, it is pointed out that politeness does not correlate with indirectness for the three strategies (i.e., direct strategy, conventional indirect strategy and non-conventional indirect strategy). Rinner and Kobayashi (1999) claim that selections of certain strategies for the sake of politeness are different in different cultures. In their investigation on Japanese culture, requestive hints of high indirectness may be polite and impolite in different situations. As noted by Blum-Kula (1987), use of hints for request is not necessarily polite because back of "the pragmatic clarity" (p. 13) is essential to get the intended meaning of the speech. A similar phenomenon appears in imperatives. In Kallia's (2005) study on speech act of request and suggestion, imperative is found to be both polite and impolite in Greek. Moreover, some scholars consider hinting sentences and imperative sentences are not polite. (e.g. Rinnert & Kobayashi's, 1999; Tusuki, Takahashi, Patschke & Zhang, 2001). The results of these studies reveal that the linguistic choice for the sake of politeness is different from culture to culture.

Conventional indirect strategy is most frequently used by American English speakers (Blum-Kulka & House, 1989; House & Kasper, 1981; Rinner & Kobayashi, 1999). Carrel and Konneker (1981) claim that syntactic pattern is the primary indicator to differentiate the degree of politeness. That is, interrogative is the most polite, declarative is the next most polite, and imperative is the least polite. Therefore, in general, conventionally indirect strategy can be divided into two groups—the interrogative one and the affirmative one in linguistic structure level, with the former being more polite than the latter.

Teaching Speech Acts to EFL Learners

Based on the two levels of pragmatics, pragmatic transfer is probed into to discuss the development of L2 learners' knowledge of the target language at pragmatic level.

Pragmatic Transfer

Pragmatic transfer, by definition, refers to "the influence exerted by learners' pragmatic knowledge of language and cultures other than L2 on their comprehension, production and learning of L2 pragmatic information" (Kasper, 1992, p. 207). Kasper (1992) follows Leech's (1983) division of pragmatics to propose pragmalinguistic transfer and sociopragmatic transfer. The former concerns the transfer of learner's choice of language recourses which are given to convey certain illocutions; on the other hand, the latter deals with a language user's interpretation and performance of the linguistic behavior which is influenced by the gap between L1 and L2 contexts, subjectively assessed by the language user.

Pragmatic transfer is divided into positive and negative transfer (Kasper, 1992). When L1 and L2 share the same language- or culture-specific conventions of usage and use, positive pragmatic transfer occurs. However, negative pragmatic transfer occurs ‘‘when a pragmatic feature in the interlanguage is (structurally, functionally, distributionally) the same as in L1 but different from L2’’ (Kasper, 1998, p. 194), which results in pragmatic failure proposed by Thomas (1983).

Pragmatic Failure

Pragmatic failure is described as "the inability to understand what is meant by what is said" (Thomas, 1983, p. 91). It occurs whenever the speaker's utterance is perceived by the hearer as other which the speaker does not intend. Therefore, pragmatic transfer is an important source resulting in communication breakdowns. Following Leech's (1983) classification of pragmatics, Thomas (1983) divides distinction of pragmatic failures into pragmalinguistic failure and sociogramatic failure. To be specific, when speakers fail to grasp the intended meaning due to the underlying conventions in an utterance, they suffer from pragmalinguistic failure. For example, at pragmalinguistic level, “Would you like to read?” is conventionalized as a polite request or directive in American culture; however, Russians tend to respond “No, I wouldn’t” by regarding it as a real question (Thomas, 1983). Thomas (1983) also identifies two sources of pragmalinguistic failure. The first one is “teaching-induced errors” (p. 101), which refers to the errors resulting from teacher’s explicit statement of wrong input or the teacher’s unconsciously omitting particular input, and the other source is “pragmalinguistic transfer” (p. 101), which refers to those learners inappropriately transfer speech act strategies from L1 to L2. In terms of teaching-induced errors, Kasper (1982) proposes that foreign language teaching itself may cause failures by directly providing the inputs deviating from the target language norms from, namely, “primary teaching induction” (p. 102), or by indirectly involve students in psycholinguistic process to yield specific interlanguage rules resulting from the way they practice or the input in the materials in the classrooms, namely, “secondary teaching induction” (p. 102). Also Kasper (1996) think it is the incomplete input of the target language given by the teacher that results in students’ inability to native-like in pragmatic behavior. These two sources possibly lead to pragmatic overgeneralization. For example, Russian speakers appear to use “to be to” on any occasions to express obligation in English; however, “to be to” is pragmatically restricted to be used by people of higher status.

As for sociopragmatic failure, it refers to the inability to deal with degree of gravity, tabus, cross-cultural difference of power and distance, and value judgment (Thomas, 1983). In Beebe, Takahashi and Uliss-Weltz’s (1990) study on refusal, Japanese learners of English choose different excuses to refuse the interlocutors of higher ranking status or lower ranking status. However, for American native speakers, the standard of excuse selection is based on status, i.e., the interlocutors’ being equal or unequal. That is, the excuses made by Japanese learners of English at sociopragmatic level are negatively transferred from Japanese culture to American contexts. To repeat, communication needs far more than just a set of linguistic rules, and both pragmalinguistic knowledge and sociopragmatic knowledge are necessary to determine the appropriateness of a verbal behavior

In addition, pragmatic failure may possibly result from other factors. Language proficiency has been considered as an influential factor to achieve pragmatic transfer. Learners of a higher language proficiency show a greater pragmatic transfer than low-level learners, because lower-level learners are subject to the interference of their native language (Maeshiba, Yoshinaga, Kasper & Rose, 1996; Takahashi, 1996; Wannaruk, 2009). Bardovi-Harlig and Dörnyei (1998) propose that when ESL learners achieve a high level of English proficiency, they are able to be aware of pragmatic aspect of language. Also, Cook and Liddicoat (2002) propose that learners at high-proficiency level are able to automatically process the language. It is this processing automaticity which effectively process pragmatic and linguistic knowledge, which are essential to obtain the intended meaning of the speech. Another possible cause of pragmatic failure is "oversensitivey" (p. 27) of English learners, which proposed by Carrell and Konneker (1981). They note that as English learners tend to consider that each linguistic form is given to meet certain communicative intention, it is likely for them to over-sense differentiation of syntactic or semantic forms. In addition, in

It is found that language learners, even with satisfactory proficiency in vocabulary and grammar, fail to communicate appropriately with other people simply because they are not equipped with the competence to detect appreciate cross-cultural differences between L1 and L2, without which their communicative competence of L2 is not will not be complete (Ellis, 1992; Cohen, Olshtain & Rosenstein, 1986; Gumperz, 1982; Wolfson 1989). However, Ellis (1992) indicates that it is not easy for target language learners to develop the sociolinguistic competence in the classroom. In the study on language learning of college students, Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford (1993) point out that the learners' failure to employ appropriate forms of a speech act within contexts lies in little feedback from the teacher on the appropriateness of the sociolinguitistic forms. Some researchers have been shown that L2 learners tend to apply their L1 conventions in the L2 sociolinguistic behavior (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper., 1989; Yu, 1999). Miscommunication may most likely occur when L1 and L2 display cross-cultural differences and lead to negative sociolinguistic transfer. In Yu's (2008) recent study on teaching and learning sociolinguistic skills in Taiwan, he claims that Chinese learners of American English in Taiwan fail on the sociolinguistic test, even though the instructors claim that their teaching benefit the development of communicative competence. However, the absence of sufficient and appropriate opportunities, for learners to raise their awareness of the standards for sociolinguistic competence, prevent language teaching from the orientation of developing the communicative skills. Moreover, Cohen, Olshtain & Rosenstein (1986) also find that nonnative speakers do not have efficient sensitivity to sociolinguistic awareness as native speakers do. Therefore, since the importance of sociolinguistic awareness is singled out in these studies on teaching speech acts, teachers can first develop learner's awareness of those concepts of language functions on sociopragmatic level and cross-cultural differences.

Procedures

Olshtain and Cohen (1991) suggest five steps for presenting and practicing speech acts: (1) Diagnostic assessment, (2) Model dialog, (3) Evaluation of the situation, (4) Role-play activities; and (5) Feedback and discussion (p. 161-62). However, according to Cross (1999), the five steps can be simplified to the three stages: presentation, practice and performance (or, PPP model) as the selection of a lesson plan. The learners, before they are ready to perform what they have learned, must be given enough comprehensible input (Krashen, 1985). Swain (1985) puts emphasis on learners' output, claiming that production plays a vital role in learner's full language development. If learners have few chances for productive use of language, they will not know how much they have learned. At the same time, it will be hard for teachers to check learners' comprehension and to locate the gap between comprehension and production.

PPP model is not necessarily the only model for planning a lesson. For example, Task-Based Instruction (TBI) is an approach which employs tasks to be the central unit of lesson planning, and material designing for language teaching (Richards & Rodgers, 2001). In TBI, the task completion, as the final purpose, is concerned with more than just a procedure of PPP; task explaining, planning, and reporting are the focus of task cycle to prompt learners to use language to learn.

However, in this study, it is hardly possible to adopt the approach at the very beginning stage of language learning in secondary education. First, since task-based teaching is time-consuming, it is unlikely for the teacher to complete a task in only three periods. Second, learners' low communicative competence makes it difficult to put such task-based execution at the initial stage of language teaching/learning. The PPP model is more suitable for those who are in the stage of learning language functions. Finally, in order to arouse learners' awareness of the concept of langauge function, clear presentation, sufficient practice and performance are necessary. The four-period teaching program proposed in the study can serve as an initiation of teaching language function in EFL class.

Top-down and bottom-up processings are claimed by scholars to be beneficial to enhance comprehension process. Carrell and Eisterhold (1983) define the different operations of top-down and bottom-up processing. To be specific, top-down processing, described as concept-driven, moves from the whole to the parts; while bottom-up processing is considered to be data-driven, moving from parts to the whole. The former approach easily explains the benefit of background knowledge, which may provide a general picture to help the learners to make predictions in learning whatever they are taught. Teacher/learners should also activate bottom-up processing to deal with the details of the whole concept by giving examples. Therefore, using only one of two ways of processing may lower the effectiveness of language teaching/learning.

Research Questions

Based on what mentioned above, three research questions are to be answered in this study:

1. How does indirectness determine appropriate choice of syntactic patterns for invitation?
2. How does politeness determine appropriate choice of syntactic patterns for invitation?
3. How effective will it be to teach functional aspects of invitation in EFL classrooms in senior high school education?
4. Will the effectiveness of teaching language functions be influenced by the teaching methods (namely, function-based method and structure-based method)?
5. Will the effectiveness of teaching language functions be influenced by the ranking of school (based on The Basic Competence Test for Junior High School Students scores)?
6. After receiving the teaching program, do EFL students and teachers consider the program of teaching functions as feasible, necessary, and effective?

Hypotheses

Two main hypotheses are to be tested in the study.

Hypothesis 1: Indirectness and politeness, individually as well as in combination are influential factors to determine appropriate choices of syntactic patterns for invitation

Hypothesis 2: Teaching functional aspects of invitation in EFL classrooms in secondary education would be effective.

(1) After receiving the instruction of functional controls on linguistic choice, high school students in Taiwan would yield better accuracy in choosing appropriate English forms for invitation.

(2) Function-based method will be more effective than structure-based method in teaching language functions.

(3) School of higher BCT score will show better teaching effectiveness than schools of low BCT score.

(4) After receiving the program of teaching language functions, EFL students and teachers will consider the program as feasible, necessary, and effective.