

# CHAPTER 8

## Taiwan, China and other Global Connections

This chapter will analyze the effect, if any, of respondents' connections to Taiwan, China and other global connections, in terms of the length of time they have stayed in Taiwan; frequency of travels to mainland China; length of stay in mainland China; family and business connections to China; length of time planning to stay in Taiwan and intended destination after leaving Taiwan. In our inquiry we want to look at not only the nature of the interactions that the respondents have, but also the frequency they have these interactions. Probing such variables, we believe, would help us illuminate the affective ability of cross-national socialization processes to influence the political inclinations of foreigners regarding the cross-strait situation.

### 8.1 Political Inclinations in Terms of One's Length of Stay in Taiwan

Next we looked at the effects of the amount of time that the respondents have stayed here on their political inclinations regarding the cross-Strait situation. The total respondent pool who revealed how long they have stayed was 296. Of those 132 said they've been here from 0-12 months, 79 said they've been here for 13-24, while the corresponding number for those who have stayed 25-36 months, 37-48 months and 49 or more months was 21, 15, and 49 respectively. This means that over 7 out of 10 have lived in Taiwan for 2 years or less (71.2%). Because it is our presumption that most foreigners who are living in Taiwan have not been here for a very long time — as our respondent

pool suggests — we thought that the amount of time they have stay here might be an useful independent variable to analyze the political inclinations of foreigners regarding the cross-Strait situation. We should also note, however, that our sample is heavily laden with students, and most tend not to stay here for over four years to pursue an undergraduate degree or two years to complete a master’s degree or for language instruction.

**Table 8-1:** Foreigners’ Political Inclinations in Terms of Time They’ve Stayed in Taiwan

Months	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
12 or less No. (%)	132 (100)	1 (0.7)	14 (10.6)	28 (21.2)	34 (25.7)	29 (21.9)	5 (3.7)	16 (12.1)	5 (3.7)
13 – 24 No. (%)	79 (100)	3 (3.7)	8 (10.1)	10 (12.6)	17 (21.5)	17 (21.5)	10 (12.6)	12 (15.1)	2 (2.5)
25 – 36 No. (%)	21 (100)	2 (9.5)	2 (9.5)	3 (14.2)	9 (42.8)	2 (9.5)	2 (9.5)	1 (4.7)	0 (0)
37 – 48 No. (%)	15 (100)	1 (6.6)	2 (13.3)	1 (6.6)	2 (13.3)	1 (6.6)	2 (13.3)	5 (33.3)	0 (0)
49 or over No. (%)	49 (100)	0 (0)	4 (8.1)	8 (16.3)	10 (20.4)	15 (30.6)	6 (12.2)	5 (10.2)	1 (2.0)

We found that the group most likely to leave the last question blank comprised of those who’ve stayed here for 37-48 months with 33%, followed by those who’ve stayed 13-24 months (15.1%, followed by 0-12 months (12.1%) and by those who’ve lived here for over 49 months (10.2%). The results show that those who’ve stayed here for 25-36 months are most likely to answer the last question with a figure of 4.7%. The 25-36 age, in fact, seems like the major anomaly among the groups. In particular, they ranked highest in supporting independence later with 42.8%, compared to groups 0-12, 13-24, 37-48 and 49 or over, with 25.7%, 21.5%, 13.3%, and 20.4% respectively. On other answers, though, the group gave support in a narrow band between 9.5% for answers 1, 2,

5 and 6 and 14.2% for answer 3. In contrast, the band for the corresponding answers for the 0-12, 13-24, 37-48 and 49 or over groups were 0.7%-21.9%, 3.7%-21.5%, 6.6%-13.3%, 0%-30.6%, respectively. Noteworthy also is that the 37-48 month group has any significant peaks in support for the respective choices on the unification/independence question.

This suggests that the 25-36 age group is less prone to have their inclinations scattered along the political spectrum and concentrated in the status quo now/independence later category. Moreover, while the 49+ month group, while over ¼ supporting independence at some point in time (28.5%), the data shows that the majority supporting the wait and see attitude — status quo now, decide independence or unification later — with 30.6%, whereas correspondingly the figure for the other groups in ascending order according to the time they've stayed here is 21.9%, 21.5%, 9.5%, and 6.6%.

This suggests that for those who have been here 24 months or less, they might be more inclined to pick a position regarding the cross-Strait relationship, for those who've been here between 2-3 years tend to support independence more and those who've stayed here for over four years tend to either support independence or to decide the question at a later point. If we were to sum the percentages of respondents who are both non-aligned toward independence or unification now but support the status quo for now — that is, the sum of questions 5 and 6, we find that those 49 or older are in highest support (42.8%), followed by the groups 13-24, 0-12, 37-48 and 35-36 with 34.1%, 25.6%, 19.9% and 19.0%, respectively.

## **8.2 Political Inclinations in Terms of the Number of Countries**

### **One Has Traveled**

Next we looked at the number of countries the respondents have traveled. A total of 271 surveys were collected from respondents who answered the question. Of these, 109 said they traveled 1-3 countries (40.2%), 40 said they traveled 4-6 countries (14.7%), 26 said they've traveled 10-12 countries (9.5%) and 62 said they've traveled 13+ (22.8%). As for the few respondents who answered 0, their response was automatically coded as "1", since they've traveled to Taiwan at least. This adjustment, should not significantly affect the results as categorized here, since no "0 countries" categories was provided. We

found that those in the categories with the fewest countries travels tended to leave the last question blank with over a quarter doing so (25.6%), followed by the 10-12 group (5.8%), followed by the 7-9 group (3.8%), followed by the 4-6 group (2.5%) and lastly followed by the 13+ group (1.6%).

Our main finding is that there is a significant rift between respondents who have traveled 1-3 countries and all the others who have traveled to more than 3 countries. Those who have traveled to 4-6 countries rate independence later very highly at 42.5%; for those visiting 7-9 countries, 10-12 countries and 13 countries or more, the rating for independence later was 26.9%, 32.3%, and 32.2%, respectively. In contrast, only 10% of those who visited 1-3 countries chose independence later. Since a relatively low percentage of respondents in the 1-3 category answered the question, it is perhaps unsurprising to find also that the percentage in which they supported independence now or later taken together is also relatively low at 19.1%. This is in contrast to the groups who have traveled 4-6, 7-9, 10-12 and 13+ countries with those supporting either independence now or independence later at rates of 52.5%, 38.4%, 47% and 40.2%, respectively. Thus we can say that people who have traveled to more than 1-3 countries tend to support independence at some point in time. Yet to completely characterize the group who have traveled 1-3 countries are mostly either blasé about the issue or are unwilling to provide an answer would be incorrect.

The fact that as the number of countries traveled declines while the proportion of those leaving the question on political inclinations blank alludes to the ability of worldly experiences to help develop one's political psychology, which leans either toward pro unification or pro independence. In fact, the 1-3 countries traveled group are ranked second in the 5 respective categories on answer choice 1 and answer choice 3 taken together, with over 1/5 of those respondents (22.8), which fell short of the top rated group in that category by only 0.2% , namely, the 7-9 countries group who supported unification now at 0% and unification later at 23%. Moreover, the 1-3 countries traveled group could also be exceptional in the sense that they tend to support independence now or independence later at quite low levels, less than twice as much compared to the other groups. However, roughly speaking, we can say that the number of countries traveled has little effect on unification in the future.

**Table 8-2:** Foreigners' Political Inclinations in terms of Number of Countries They've Traveled

Countries traveled	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
1 – 3 No. (%)	109 (100)	3 (2.7)	10 (9.1)	22 (20.1)	11 (10.0)	23 (21.1)	9 (8.2)	28 (25.6)	3 (2.7)
4 – 6 No. (%)	40 (100)	0 (0)	4 (10.0)	7 (17.5)	17 (42.5)	3 (7.5)	7 (17.5)	1 (2.5)	1 (2.5)
7 – 9 No. (%)	26 (100)	0 (0)	3 (11.5)	6 (23.0)	7 (26.9)	8 (30.7)	1 (3.8)	1 (3.8)	0 (0)
10 – 12 No. (%)	34 (100)	0 (0)	5 (14.7)	4 (11.7)	11 (32.3)	10 (29.4)	1 (2.9)	2 (5.8)	1 (2.9)
13 or over No. (%)	62 (100)	3 (4.8)	5 (8.0)	9 (14.5)	20 (32.2)	18 (29)	3 (4.8)	1 (1.6)	3 (4.8)

Among the group that has traveled to 4-6 countries we also found that compared to the other groups, they tended not to support keeping the status quo now and move either towards unification or independence later. Namely, the group only 1 in 4 responded to either answer choice 5 or 6, whereas for those who've traveled 1-3, 7-9, 10-12, +13 their corresponding support rate was much higher at 29.3%, 34.5%, 32.3%, and 33.8%, respectively. However, the 4-6 group also supported option 6 most — keeping the status quo forever — compared to the other groups at 17.5% while also correspondingly for the other groups were 8.2%, 3.8%, 2.9%, and 4.8%, respectively. The fact that the group that is least likely to move to either unification or independence at some point in time but most like likely to want to keep the status quo forever is a thought provoking characteristic about the 4-6 countries group.

### **8.3 Political Inclinations in Terms of One's Frequency of Travels to Mainland China**

Next we looked at the number of times the respondents have traveled to mainland China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao). Only 190 respondents responded to the question. Of these, 118 (62.1%) had never visited mainland China, 47 (24.7%) had visited once, 10.1% had visited twice, 6.3% had visited had three times, and 6.8% had visited four times or more.

Our findings suggest that 23.0% of those who have traveled to China 4 times or more are pro-unification — a rate that is much higher than the aggregate average of some 2.3% point in time if they had never visited mainland China compared to people who have visited mainland once. However, among those who have visited China three times or two times the corresponding rate is 0% and 0%. Those visiting China once and twice are at rates slightly higher at 1.6% and 4.3%, respectively. The people who have traveled to China 4 times or more are inclusive of those who have traveled to China many times. Therefore, our findings suggest that those who have visited China many times tend to be more pro-unification now than the other peer groups.

**Table 8-3: Foreigner's Political Inclinations in Terms of Times They've Visited****Mainland China**

Number of China Visits	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
0 No. (%)	118 (100)	2 (1.6)	8 (6.7)	22 (18.6)	40 (33.8)	28 (23.7)	10 (8.4)	4 (3.3)	4 (3.3)
1 No. (%)	47 (100)	2 (4.2)	10 (21.2)	4 (8.5)	9 (19.1)	13 (27.6)	6 (12.7)	3 (6.3)	0 (0)
2 No. (%)	23 (100)	0 (0)	2 (8.6)	5 (21.7)	5 (21.7)	4 (17.3)	6 (26.0)	1 (4.3)	0 (0)
3 No. (%)	12 (100)	0 (0)	1 (8.3)	3 (25)	2 (16.6)	3 (25.0)	1 (8.3)	0 (0)	0 (0)
4+ No. (%)	13 (100)	3 (23.0)	1 (7.6)	1 (7.6)	2 (15.3)	5 (38.4)	1 (7.6)	0 (0)	0 (0)

In terms of supporting independence, the results seem clearer. Namely, one is less likely to support Taiwan independence as the frequency of visits to mainland China rises. Taken together this means that one becomes more in support of the status quo without any inclinations towards either independence as frequency of visits to China rises. This is evinced by the fact that 40.5% of respondents who have never traveled to China either chose independence now or later, whereas correspondingly, the statistic was 40.3%, 30.3%, 24.9%, 22.9% for those who have traveled to China once, twice, three times and 4 or more times, respectively.

Those who have never traveled to China supported independence later 33.8%, the highest of all the groups but many were hesitant to support independence later with only 6.7% support. Moreover, while also shown to be heavily of support of independence, those who have traveled once to China, the respondents who supported independence seemed to be more or less evenly spread between those supporting independence now and status quo now/independence later with 21.2% and 19.1%, respectively. The parity,

however, was not apparent with those traveling to China twice with a corresponding ratio of 8.6:21.7, whereas the ratio was 2:1 with respective support rates of 8.3% and 16.6% for those traveling 3 times, and for those traveling four times the ratio was nearly 2:1 with rates of 7.6% and 15.3%. As pointed out earlier, as someone visits China more, especially 4 or more countries, they are also more likely be either in supporting to decide later or to keep the status quo forever.

## **8.4 Political Inclinations in Terms of Ones Length of Stay in Mainland China**

We wanted to further explore the “China Factor” more in depth, which is why we also included a question asking the respondents to indicate how long they’ve been in China and whether they had financial or familial connections there. We looked at the amount of time one has stayed in Taiwan by categorizing the respondents into the following lengths of time: less than 1 month, over 1 month but less than 12 months and 12 months or more. The question yielded 202 surveys with a response to this question; 136 of those (67.3%) were in China less than a month, 50 (24.7%) more than 1 month but less than 12 months, 15 (7.4%) 12 months or more. We believe the results from the question are much more conclusive than that of what was asked previously about their frequency of visits to China, particularly because so few surveys were collected from those who have traveled there many times. In contrast, asking them about how long they’ve been there allows us to analyze their exposure to China more accurately because of its ability to depict the temporal dimensions of socialization processes involved into socialization into Chinese society, within the context of being a foreigner in Taiwan.

**Table 8-4:** Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of Time they've stayed in China over a Month

Time Stayed in China Over a Month	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Less than 1 Month No. (%)	136 (100)	2 (1.4)	9 (6.6)	25 (18.3)	46 (33.8)	33 (24.2)	11 (8.0)	0 (4.4)	4 (2.9)
Over 1 Months, 2 or Less Months No. (%)	28 (100)	2 (7.1)	7 (25.0)	2 (7.1)	6 (21.4)	10 (35.7)	1 (3.5)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Over 2 Months, 3 or Less Months No. (%)	5 (100)	0 (0)	1 (20.0)	0 (0)	2 (40.0)	1 (20.0)	1 (20.0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Over 3 Months, 4 or Less Months No. (%)	5 (100)	1 (0)	5 (20.0)	10 (20.0)	21 (40.0)	14 (0.0)	4 (0.0)	1 (20)	0 (0)
Over 4 Months, 5 or Less Months No. (%)	13 (100)	2 (15.3)	4 (30.7)	3 (23.0)	0 (0)	3 (23.0)	1 (7.6)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Over 5 Months No. (%)	15 (100)	1 (6.6)	2 (13.3)	3 (20.0)	0 (0)	2 (13.3)	2 (13.3)	2 (13.3)	1 (6.6)

Our data suggests that unlike several of the preceding categories that have been analyzed, an overwhelming percentage of the respondents who have indicated their stay in China had also answered the last question regarding unification or independence of China. Namely, for those who have been there more than one month but less than a year indicated, less than 1 than in 50 left the question blank (1.9%), and for those who have stayed there less than a month the figure was only 4.4%, topping out at 13.3% for those who have been there for over a year. This compares to the participation rates of other categories that were pushing 40%, such as those with less than middle school at 38.7%. It is difficult to speculate on why people who have revealed their time stayed in China are also more willing to answer the last question, but one interpretation is that some

respondent who did not reveal their time stayed in China felt burden to answer questions about China in general, maybe it lacked immediacy and relevance to the respondents lives, unlike socioeconomic issues, issues about one's country, gender and transnationalism.

One of our major findings is that the longer they have stayed in China, the more likely they would be pro-unification, although those who have stayed there a month or less are only slightly less likely to support unification later (18.3%) than those who have lived there a year or more (20%). But combined rate of support for those who either favor unification now or status quo now and unification later is less than 1 in 5 (19.7), holding stable at 19.5% for those who have been there over a month but less than a year and jumps significantly to well over 1 in 4 (26.6%), with increases apparent in support for unification now (6.6%) and status quo now/unification later (20%), compared to the corresponding figures for those who have lived there for more than one month but less than a year at 7.8% and 11.7%, respectively.

We've also found that all three groups pertaining to time stayed in China indicated support for leaving the status quo without going towards unification or independence in the future at near consistent rates with combined support for status quo now decide later and status quo forever hovering at a band of 32.2% for those staying there for one month or less, 28.8% for those staying for more than one month but less than a year and declining further to 26.6% for those who have stayed there a year or more. However, whereas 2 groups representing those who have stay in China the least supported keeping the status quo for now at 24.2% and 27.4%, respectively, with correspondingly low statistics for keeping the status quo forever, questions 5 and 6 were supported by those who have stayed a year with the same parity at 13.3% each. This may allude to the fact that about a quarter who have stayed in China for a year or less have not made up their mind up about independence, and when they do visit China for over a year, they are likely to become more pro-unification.

## **8.5 Political Inclinations in Terms of One's Family and Business Connections to China**

Next we looked at respondents' connections to China. 258 people responded to the question with 171 saying they had no family or business connections to China, 18

saying they had some family but no business connections, 4 indicating they had both business and family connections to China, 36 saying they had family connections but no business connections. This means that nearly 2 in 3 (66.2%) did not have either business or family connections to China. Unfortunately, due to the ambiguity that resulted after the tabulating the responses, we do not feel confident that it would help in identifying any useful correlations; here's why:

Firstly, the low number of respondents indicating they had both family and business connections meant that each respondent accounted for  $\frac{1}{4}$  the result. As we have seen previously, most of the percentages have looked at look at ranges between 5% and 30%; we do not think 4 respondents is statically significant; moreover, if we would have resulted in 25%, 25%, 25%, 25%, 0%, 0% for the corresponding answer choices 1-6 in the last question dealing with cross-Strait relations.

Secondly, while 36 is a statistically significant number, which have accounted for those who had no family connections but some business connections, five of them "weird" answers accounting 13.8% of the total, which could dramatically altered the results of the question. But one aspect that we can perhaps glean is that, of the 171 who indicated they did not have business or family connections nearly twice as many of the respondents supported independence now or status quo now/independence later (40.2%) versus unification later (20.4%).

**Table 8-5: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Connections to China**

Nature of Connections to China	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
No family & no Business Connections No. (%)	171 (100)	3 (1.7)	20 (11.6)	32 (18.7)	49 (28.6)	47 (27.4)	17 (9.9)	18 (10.5)	3 (1.7)
Some Family But no Business Connections No. (%)	18 (100)	1 (5.5)	0 (0)	4 (22.2)	5 (27.7)	5 (27.7)	3 (16.6)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Some Family and Some Business Connections No. (%)	4 (100)	1 (25.0)	1 (25.0)	1 (25.5)	1 (25.0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
No Family but Some Business Connections No. (%)	36 (100)	1 (2.7)	5 (13.8)	8 (22.2)	7 (19.4)	5 (13.8)	0 (0)	5 (13.8)	5 (13.8)
No answer No. (%)	33 (100)	1 (3.0)	4 (12.1)	5 (15.1)	10 (30.3)	8 (24.2)	5 (15.1)	20 (60.6)	0 (0)

## 8.6 Political Inclinations in Terms of Length of Time Planning to Stay in Taiwan

Next we looked at how long the foreigners were planning to stay in Taiwan. Our survey has yielded 249 valid responses for the question asking how long they've stayed, including 20 who wrote "?". Of the 249, almost 1/5 indicated they plan to stay half a year or less (20.1%), a little more than a quarter said they plan to stay over half a year and up to 1 year (27%), 58 planned to stay over a year and up to 2 years (23%) and 43 said they planned on staying for over 2 years (17.3%). We found that the longer

foreigners plan to stay in Taiwan, the less likely they are to be pro-independence and the more likely to support pro-unification. Namely, the results show that those who plan to stay here less than six months are in most support of taking action now to decide whether to go towards unification or independence with the corresponding statistics represented by 4% and 12%, respectively. The difference in the percentage of those who support independence now, however is only marginally higher than that of those planning to stay 7-12 months, though only marginally at 11.9%. But these rates are nearly three times that of respondents who plan on staying for more than 2 years at 4.6%. In terms of unification later, though, more than 1 in 4 were in accordance (25.5%), verses only 14% of those planning on staying here 6 months or less, 23.8% of those staying 7-12 years and only 12% of those planning on staying for 1-2 years.

We also found that those who plan on staying here for over two more years, the more likely they are to support either status quo now and decide later (25.5%) and status quo forever, (6.9%), which added together is 32.4%, though not necessarily the most likely to support status quo forever, which is represented by those who have plan to stay for 1-2 years (3.4%). In contrast, only those who have stayed here for 6 months or less supported either status quo now and decide later or status quo forever 28%, 29.7%, 24%, respectively. In fact support for either question 5 or 6 seems to decline as one plans to stay for 2 years, but seems to increase significantly if they plan on staying here for over 2 years.

Our guess is that those who have stayed here the longest, because of their attachment to Taiwan in several dimensions including economic, psychological and political, have led them to believe that leaning on one side of the independence/unification debate does not present a workable solution in the context of their vest stakes in Taiwan. In contrast, for those who plan on leaving sooner, their transnational mobility and personal circumstances might significantly affect what they deem as an acceptable solution (either independence or unification at some point) in their own based on their connections to Taiwan, so they might be less wary in making a decision, because on a temporal bases, they would be affected less by a change in the status quo. As for those respondents who said they were “?” as a response to how long they plan to stay, we an also see that while they supported status quo now and independence in the future, 1 in 2 supported either deciding status quo in the future or to

keep the status quo forever. We can thus say that respondents who don't know how long they would stay would also likely favor a cross-Strait policy that does not change for now, and time would be needed for them to make up their minds regarding the issue, because the future for them is so uncertain for them at present.

## **8.7 Political Inclinations in Terms of Intended Destination after Leaving Taiwan**

We did not analyze question 16 as rigorously as possible, because it was our intention to merely solicit several respondents who planned to move to China, and therefore analyze the “China factor” more in depth by comparing the pull of the of the country with others and its correlative effects on political inclinations regarding the cross-Strait issue. However, we did manage to indicate the respondents into three discernable categories of those who don't know where they're going next (44), those going somewhere else other than China (183) and those going to China (22). This yielded 249 respondents, and the corresponding percentages that each of the sub-groupings represented was 17.6%, 73.4% and 8.8%, respectively.

Despite the shortcomings of obtaining results from only 22 people who planned to move to China next, we found that those moving to China tend to be most in support Taiwan independence at some point in time, with over 2 in 5 (40.8%) support of either question 2 or question 4, whereas the corresponding statistic for those who don't know was 34% and those planning on moving somewhere next was 37%. Thus the disparities of support independence was not incredibly high. However, those moving to China also seemed the least willing to see the cross-Strait to see the impasse prolonged forever, as only 4.5% saying they supporting status quo forever, about  $\frac{3}{4}$  the ratio of those who plan on moving somewhere else (6.0%) and about  $\frac{1}{3}$  as much as those who don't know (18.1%). Most respondents who planned on moving to China next also were also in favor of keeping the status quo now and deciding later with 36.3 — the highest ratio seen among all answer choices among the three groups. Since they tend not wanting to see the impasse going on forever, it should unsurprising then that they'd idealize it to be solved in the future. As we've noted earlier, however, many of them would carry with them their support for independence despite their move to China.

Here lies one of our most critical points about the “China Factor”: As we have already discussed, although they are predominately pro independence, those people who have never been to China before tend to be in higher support of unification than are the people who have been there several times, and have become more in support of the status quo. We’ve also noted that the longer one has lived there, support for unification tends to increase. As our study shows, those who plan to move to China are in fact more pro-independence, and that they have the propensity to become more pro-unification because of the time they’ve stayed and not necessarily because of the number of times they’ve traveled to China. The implication is that that the “China Factor” is real, but it has a higher likelihood of altering one’s political inclinations toward unification — even to people who are pro-independence to begin with — only if they’ve experienced China for longer periods of time, not merely by visiting there very often.

We should also make note that in terms of the people who didn’t know what they were going to do next, that they tended to support keeping the status quo and deciding unification or independence later and keeping the status quo forever equally at rates of 18.1% and 18.1% respectively. Yet much like their counterparts in the other grouping regarding one’s next country of destination, those who didn’t know were also high in pro independence at some point in time at a rate of 34.1%. They were also least in support of unification later with only 11.3% as compared to those moving somewhere else (21.3%) and those moving to China (13.6%). Out of the groups, those who didn’t know also supported unification now at 0%, verses 2.7% and 4.5%, respectively for the other two groups. One must not forget that since they don’t know where they’re going next, Taiwan would still remain as a possible place for them to stay in the foreseeable future. This could be a possible rationale why they would be in lowest support of unification, in that they would be wary of the political change that may come as a result of unification. Hence it shouldn’t be to surprising, that those who don’t know can be seen as a group who would be resistant to a change in the status quo for now, as also evidence by their low support of independence later at 6.8%, with the corresponding statistics of 11.4% and 4.5% for the other two groups, respectively. And not coincidentally, those who didn’t know about their next decision also were the group to skip the last question regarding the cross-Strait situation.

## 8.8 Summary

We found that the group most likely to leave the last question blank comprised of those who've stayed here for 37-48 months with 33%, followed by those who've stayed 13-24 months. The results show that those who've stayed here for 25-36 months are most likely to answer the last question with a figure of 4.7%. The 25-36 age, in fact, seems like the major anomaly among the groups. In particular, they ranked highest in supporting independence later with 42.8%, compared to the other groups. This suggests that the political inclinations regarding the cross-strait situation of the 25-36 age tends is less to prone to be scattered along the political spectrum and more concentrated in the status quo now/independence later categories.

Our main finding is that there is a significant rift between respondents who have traveled 1-3 countries and all the others who have traveled to more than 3 countries. Those who have traveled to 4-6 countries rate independence later very highly at 42.5%; for those visiting 7-9 countries, 10-12 countries and 13 countries or more, the rating for independence later was 26.9%, 32.3%, and 32.2%, respectively. In contrast, only 10% of those who visited 1-3 countries chose independence later. Another one of our key findings is that the respondents' number of countries traveled declines while the proportion of those leaving the question on political inclinations blank increases. We speculate that this can be explained by the possibility that worldly experiences gained through travels to countries help develop one's political psychology, a psychology that aides the foreigners in determining for themselves their political inclinations regarding the cross-strait situation.. In there seems to be a propensity for people who have traveled many countries to support independence later.

Our findings also suggest that 23.0% of those who have traveled to China 4 times or more are pro-unification — a rate that is much higher than the aggregate average of some 2.3% point in time if they had never visited mainland China compared to people who have visited mainland once. However, among those who have visited China three times or two times the corresponding rate is 0% and 0%. In terms of length of stay in China, we found that the longer they have stayed in China, the more likely they would be pro-unification, although those who have stayed there a month or less are only slightly less likely to support unification later than those who have lived there a year or more.

Another key finding is that those who plan to stay in Taiwan less than six months are in most support of taking action now to decide whether to go towards unification or independence. we also found that those who plan on staying here for over two more years, the more likely they are to support either status quo now and decide later (25.5%) and status quo forever. One explanation for the results is that among foreigners who have stayed here longest, their attachments to Taiwan in several dimensions including economic, psychological and political, have led them to believe that leaning on one side of the independence/unification debate does not present a workable solution in the context of their vest stakes in Taiwan.