

CHAPTER 9

Socialization in Taiwan

In this section aimed at analyzing the effects of socialization to foreigners are their political inclinations regarding the cross-strait relationship we analyzed socialization in the following contexts: social relations in Taiwan; Chinese language ability; friends from home; communication method and frequency and effects of English-Media — namely *China Post*, *Taipei Times* and *Taiwan News*. Although socialization is a truly multi-faceted process that involves many personal factors, we will assess the degrees in which the particular variables we have chosen described above would be useful in discerning important socialization processes that are at work in developing one's political inclinations regarding the cross-strait situation.

9.1 Political Inclinations in Terms of Social Relations in Taiwan

Next we wanted to look at the effect, if any, that the composition of foreigners' social relations has had an effect on foreigner's political inclinations. Basically, we wanted to see whether there was a noticeable difference in the way foreigner's outlook on the cross-Strait situation was affected by having foreign or local friends, or a combination of the two. Of the total respondent pool, 268 respondents answered the question, worded as "My good friends in Taiwan are". Of these 15 indicated their friends were "almost all Taiwanese (5.5%); 25 said they were "mostly Taiwanese (9.3%); 117 said they were "almost balanced number of Taiwanese and foreigners (43.6%); 84 said they were "mostly foreigners" (31.3%) and 27 said they were "almost all foreigners" (10.0%).

Table 9-1: Foreigner’s Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Friends in Taiwan

Composition of Friends in Taiwan	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Almost All Taiwanese	15 (100)	2 (13.3)	1 (6.6)	2 (13.3)	3 (20.0)	2 (13.3)	2 (13.3)	1 (6.6)	2 (13.3)
Mostly Taiwanese	25 (100)	1 (4.0)	1 (4.0)	7 (28.0)	5 (20.0)	6 (24.0)	1 (4.0)	4 (16.0)	0 (0)
Taiwanese and Foreigners Balanced	117 (100)	2 (1.7)	18 (15.3)	23 (19.6)	28 (23.9)	22 (18.8)	11 (9.4)	12 (10.2)	1 (0.8)
Mostly Foreigners	84 (100)	2 (2.3)	7 (8.3)	13 (15.4)	24 (28.5)	23 (27.3)	7 (8.3)	7 (8.3)	1 (1.1)
Almost all Foreigners	27 (100)	0 (0)	1 (3.7)	3 (11.1)	10 (37.0)	8 (29.6)	2 (7.4)	2 (7.4)	1 (3.7)

Our main finding is that those with mostly foreigner friends or almost all foreign friends tend to be either more pro-independence later and also more likely to wait to decide. 10 out of 27 of those who had “almost all foreigners” as friends, or 37.0%, were more likely to support independence later, almost twice the proportion of foreigners with either mostly or almost all Taiwanese friends. Pro-independence later also seemed to decline with the proportion of foreigner friends, from 37.0% among those with almost all foreigners to 28.5% of those with mostly foreigner friends to 25.0% of those with mostly balanced Taiwanese foreigners to 20.0% of those with mostly Taiwanese friends and of those with almost all Taiwanese friends.

Our findings also suggest that foreigners tended to be more pro-unification if they had a higher percentage of Taiwanese who they’d consider their “good” friends. The

opposite is also true, as they tended to be more pro-independence if they tended to have “good friends” who are foreigners. For instance over a quarter (26.6%) of those having all Taiwanese friends said they supported answers 1 and 3 — unification now or unification later. While the statistic increases almost 5% for those who say their good friends were “mostly Taiwanese” (32%), it declines substantially to 21.3% for those having a balanced number of Taiwanese and foreigners friends, to 17.7% for those indicating “almost a balanced number of Taiwanese and foreigners, and down to 11.1% for those indicating “almost all foreigners”.

Moreover, 13.3% of those who had almost all Taiwanese as good friends were pro-unification now, which is nearly 6X compared to the figure indicating question 1 of the entire respondent pool (2.3%). The differences in political inclinations can also be seen in those who favored pro-independence at some point in time. Namely 26.6% of those who had almost all Taiwanese friends indicated they were pro-independence at some point in time (questions 2 and 4 together), a figure that reached parity to the respondents who said they were pro-unification at some point in time. The figure then increases to 32.0% with those indicating having mostly Taiwanese good friends, and increases to almost 2 in 5 (39.2%) for those indicating a balanced number of Taiwanese and foreigner friends, mostly holding steady with those indicating a mostly foreigners and jumping to over 2/5 with those indicating a almost all foreigner good friends. Most of the increases are accounted for by respondents indicating they favored independence later, rather than now, with only 20% of those with almost all Taiwanese friends indicating independence later and twice that amount (40.7%) for those who have almost all foreigner good friends.

Those who indicated answer 5 (status quo forever) also seemed to incline the more their good friends are foreigners with 13.3%, 24%, 18.8%, 27.3% and 29.6%, respectively, and those who supported question 6 (status quo forever) seemed to decline as the respondents had good foreign friends with 13.3%, 4%, 9.4%, 8.3% and 7.4%. We did not find any consistent finding for correlation between having good foreign friends and local friends with their propensity to answer the last question as those saying they had mostly Taiwanese did not answer 6.6% of the time; those with almost Taiwanese friends did not answer the last question 16% of the time, and then declining to 10.2% of the time with people having a balanced number of foreign friends and declining further to

8.3% and 7.4% for those people with mostly foreign friends and those with almost all foreign friends, respectively.

Regarding the correlation between friends and political inclinations, it should also be noted that because our study was conducted in Taipei City, it would be highly likely that our respondents' friends in Taiwan also reside in the capital city. Traditionally, northern Taiwan, especially Taipei city, could be seen as a romping ground for those who have supported KMT — a political party that has traditionally supported unification with China more so than the DPP, which has its main base of support in the southern regions, such as Kaohsiung. The 2006 mayoral elections play testament to this with Hau Long-bin, the KMT candidate, winning overwhelmingly in Taipei while Chen Ju, the DPP, candidate won by a razor sharp margin in the southern city of Kaohsiung. Thus, since the political inclinations of locals residing in the south are traditionally more pro-independence, the outcome regarding one's friends in Taiwan and their political inclinations might be significantly different had it been conducted in cities other than Taipei.

9.2 Political Inclinations in Terms of Chinese Language Ability

Next we looked at the impact of language on one's political inclinations by looking at one's ability to read, speak and write Chinese. We asked the respondents to indicate their Chinese ability as "None", "Poor", "Fair", "Good", and "Excellent" in three dimensions of language — reading, speaking and writing. 267 respondents indicated their reading abilities, 275 indicated their speaking abilities and 247 indicated their writing abilities. Of those who indicated their reading abilities, over 1/3 said they did not have any (33.7%), less than 1/3 said they had poor abilities (31.4%), less than 1 in 5 said they had fair abilities (18.7%), 8.9% said they had good reading abilities and only 7.1% said they had excellent reading abilities. This indicates a plausible conclusion that for foreign that the rate of respondents decreases as skill level increases. The same is true for writing abilities with 37.2% saying had no writing abilities, 34.4% saying they had poor writing abilities, dropping by about half to 17.8% for those with fair writing abilities, then to 4.8% for those with good writing abilities, and holding about steady for those with excellent writing abilities at 5.6%.

A look at the ways in which the respondents indicated their speaking abilities, however, reveals discrepancies that call into question one's ability to accurately classify their own language abilities in the context of others. Namely, the declines in rates of respondents as language skill rises cannot be observed. Namely, only 7.6% said they had no speaking abilities, less than 1 in 3 said they had poor speaking abilities (29.4%), 37.0% said they had fair speaking abilities, 16.0% said they had good abilities and 9.8% said they had excellent speaking abilities. we do not want to rule out the possibility of people can have high speaking abilities but low reading or writing abilities but the high discrepancies we believe reduce the credibility of the responses. Moreover, when we observed some of the respondents indicating their abilities, we noticed that some people who in fact had lower abilities in one dimension of language indicated a higher skill level than that of other people who we knew had in fact a higher level.

Table 9-2: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of their Chinese Reading Ability

Chinese Reading Ability	Number of Respondents	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
None No. (%)	90 (100)	1 (1.1)	14 (1.1)	12 (15.3)	21 (23.3)	15 (16.6)	10 (11.1)	16 (17.7)	1 (1.1)
Poor No. (%)	84 (100)	2 (2.3)	8 (9.5)	16 (19.0)	23 (27.3)	20 (23.8)	5 (5.9)	8 (9.5)	2 (2.3)
Fair No. (%)	50 (100)	2 (4.0)	4 (8.0)	10 (20.0)	16 (32.0)	12 (24.0)	3 (6.0)	1 (2.0)	2 (4.0)
Good No. (%)	24 (100)	0 (0)	1 (4.1)	5 (20.8)	5 (20.8)	12 (50)	6 (4.1)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Excellent No. (%)	19 (100)	2 (10.5)	1 (5.2)	5 (26.3)	1 (5.2)	4 (21.0)	3 (15.7)	1 (5.2)	1 (5.5)

Table 9-3: Foreigners' Political Inclinations and Their Chinese Speaking Ability

Chinese Speaking Ability	Number of Respondents	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
None No. (%)	21 (100)	0 (0)	5 (23.8)	5 (23.8)	4 (19.0)	1 (4.7)	1 (4.7)	5 (23.8)	0 (0)
Poor No. (%)	81 (100)	1 (1.2)	4 (4.9)	12 (14.8)	28 (34.5)	19 (22.6)	7 (8.6)	8 (9.8)	2 (2.4)
Fair No. (%)	102 (100)	2 (1.9)	15 (14.7)	18 (17.6)	20 (19.6)	23 (22.5)	9 (8.8)	11 (10.7)	4 (3.9)
Good No. (%)	44 (100)	1 (2.2)	0 (0)	10 (22.7)	14 (31.8)	14 (31.8)	2 (4.5)	3 (6.8)	0 (0)
Excellent No. (%)	27 (100)	2 (7.4)	2 (7.4)	5 (18.5)	3 (11.1)	6 (21.4)	4 (14.8)	3 (11.1)	2 (7.4)

Table 9-4: Foreigners’ Political Inclinations in terms of their Chinese Writing Ability

Chinese Writing Ability	Number of Respondents	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
None No. (%)	92 (100)	1 (1.0)	14 (15.2)	15 (16.3)	28 (30.4)	16 (17.3)	10 (10.8)	16 (17.3)	2 (2.1)
Poor No. (%)	85 (100)	1 (1.1)	7 (8.2)	18 (21.1)	24 (28.2)	23 (27.0)	6 (7.0)	5 (5.8)	1 (1.1)
Fair No. (%)	44 (100)	2 (4.5)	5 (11.3)	8 (18.1)	11 (25.0)	15 (34.0)	1 (2.2)	0 (0)	2 (4.5)
Good No. (%)	12 (100)	0 (0)	1 (8.3)	2 (16.6)	2 (16.6)	6 (50)	1 (8.3)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Excellent No. (%)	14 (100)	2 (14.2)	0 (0)	4 (28.5)	1 (7.1)	3 (21.4)	2 (14.2)	1 (7.1)	1 (7.1)

Since it was so difficult for the respondents to indicate their skill levels accurately, we decided to throw out the respondents who answered “poor”, “fair” and “good”, and opted to look at the two extremes of language — namely, those who said they had no language abilities and those who had excellent abilities. Firstly, we found that people who had excellent language ability in either reading, writing or speaking tended to answer the last question regarding their political inclinations on the cross-Strait situation more frequently.

For instance, whereas 17.7% of those indicating no reading abilities omitted the last question, the corresponding statistic with excellent language abilities was 5.2%. In addition 23.8% of those with no speaking abilities omitted the last question, whereas those with excellent speaking omitted the last question only omitted the last question about half that at 11.1% of the time.

In addition, those with no writing abilities 17.3% of the respondents omitted the last question, whereas only 7.1% of those with excellent writing abilities omitted the last question. Thus we can conclude that understanding the Chinese language abets in one’s

ability to answer the question, but our findings may also coincide with other forces, such as socio-economic status, formal language instruction, and the amount of time the respondents have stayed in Taiwan.

But our main finding in regards to language is that those with no Chinese language abilities — reading, speaking or writing — tend to be more pro-independence and less pro-unification when compared to those respondents with excellent skills in the Chinese language. For instance, whereas only 1.1% of those who could not read Chinese were in support of unification now, over 10% of those with excellent Chinese were in support of it. The same was also true for unification later with only 15.3% of those with no Chinese reading abilities supporting compared to 26.3% of those with excellent Chinese. While a higher percentage of people who could read Chinese excellently chose independence now at a higher frequency compared to those who could not read Chinese at 5.2% and 1.1%, respectively, those who could read Chinese excellently independence later at almost $\frac{1}{4}$ the frequency of those could not read Chinese. Moreover, the effects of language skills on political inclinations are also observable with in terms of speaking and writing. For example, those who speak no Chinese, an equal number of people were in support of independence now at a rate of 23.8% while 19% supported independence later. This is in contrast to those who spoke excellent Chinese who supported independence now at a rate of 7.4% and supported independence later at a rate of 11.1%. However, there were about 5% more people who supported unification later if they spoke no Chinese at a rate of 23.8% compared to those who spoke excellent Chinese at a rate of 18.5%. However, if both unification now and unification later were combined, it would find 23.8% among the first group and 25.9% for the second group.

But the relationship seems even clearer in terms of writing skills in Chinese. Whereas only 1.0% of those writing Chinese supported unification and 16.3% supported unification later, those who wrote excellent Chinese the corresponding figures were 14.2% and 28.5%, respectively. It is also clear that they are less independent as they acquire language abilities with 15.2% and 30.4% of those who supported independence now and independence later, respectively, whereas the corresponding statistic for those who wrote excellent Chinese supported unification 0% and those supporting unification later at 28.5%. Meanwhile, we also found that those who spoke or wrote excellent Chinese tended to be in support of keeping the status quo and deciding later or keeping

the status quo forever. The responses to question 5 and 6 from those who spoke no Chinese were 4.7% and 4.7%, respectively, whereas those who spoke excellent Chinese were 21.4% and 14.8%, respectively. These trends were also apparent for reading Chinese as the support for keeping the status quo and deciding later was 16.6% and for keeping the status quo forever was 11.1% among those who spoke excellent Chinese was 21% and 15.7%, respectively.

Not unlike the respondents who were in support of unification because of their local social attachments through friends, we would propose that understanding the local language allows the foreigners to develop understandings regarding the situation with a broader perspective. Whereas foreigners on the whole, seem to more be more pro-independence before they get here as I've elaborated on earlier, understanding the language gives them broader viewpoints, which may encapsulate other viewpoints, such as unification, deciding later and favoring the status quo forever. Thus an understanding of the language acts as a conduit for socialization with the local. An understanding of the language would also help to better generate a nuanced understanding of the conflict, such as by listening to local TV news, talking to locals or by reading the local newspapers. The localized knowledge could be developed further by those people who have actively sought to learn the Chinese language, and through this learning experience an appreciation of the Chinese culture would be enhanced. How one reckons the concept of Chinese culture, whether Taiwan or China is a better embodiment of the culture and how that ultimately affects their political inclinations regarding cross-Strait conflict is up to debate. However, the point I'm trying to make is that language, as a conduit of knowledge and imbedded embodiment of the Chinese culture, can be seen as the independent variable.

9.3 Friends from Homeland

Next we looked at whether having friends from their homeland affects political inclinations. The motivation behind the question was used mainly to determine one's sense of nationalism, under the assumption that those who are nationalist tend to correspond with people from their own nation most frequently. As we've pointed out earlier, however, the concept of nationalism according to Westwood and Phizacklea is that nationalism is called forth through one's imaginary notions of their own nation, and

this is no doubt influenced by the popular, as well as other symbols, myths and customs. Perhaps this is why, as mentioned earlier by Smith, there are now many more ‘faces of nationalism’, based on the negotiation between the core and the periphery. By this definition one is not necessarily nationalist, just because, they have many friends from their own nation while being abroad.

Thus, it is difficult to determine if nationalism itself forms the basis of these social relations, and not other commonalities like language, customs, and socioeconomic status shared hobbies, or other interests related to everyday life. To that end, we contend that analyzing the effects of nationalism through the disaggregating of respondents into groupings representing their countries of origin like the analysis earlier, while insufficient in itself to measure nationalism, would do a much better job of delineating the effects of nationalism, because one’s country of origin is a better embodiment of the discursive and imaginary concept of imagination. Thus, we felt that the question about whether one had friends from their homeland was erroneous, and so we threw it out.

9.4 Communication Method and Frequency

Next we looked at the method and frequency of how the respondents communicated to friends and family members. The respondents were asked the frequency of their usage of regular mail, phone and Internet to communicate with others who aren’t in Taiwan times per week. Here we wanted to look at the impact of respondents’ social relations outside Taiwan, and whether the facilitation of communication to their social relations via technologies, such as the internet could have any influence on political inclinations regarding the cross-Strait relationship. 196 indicated how often they used regular mail to communicate, while 189 indicated how they used their phone, and 203 indicated how often they used the internet. Several respondents indicated “-“as their response.

For this question, those responses were coded with 0. we then categorized the frequency of use of each medium of communication. For all three categories, we disaggregated the data into less than once per week, 1-3 times per week, and 4-6 times per week. Because many respondents indicated a number higher than 6 in terms of Internet usage, we also included an additional category of 7+ for that category only. Zero times was also included in the category due to the high volume of responded who so

indicated. For communication via regular mail, the survey yielded 127 respondents who contacted friends or family members less than once per week; 14 indicating 1-3 times per week and 17 indicating 4-6 times per week. Meanwhile, in terms of phone usage, 64 said they used the phone to contact the friends and family members, 157 used it 1-3 times and 28 said they used it over times. In addition, In terms of internet usage, about a quarter said they did not use it during the week (25.4%); over 2 in 5 said they used it 1-3 times per week (44.1%); 14.2% said they used it 4-6 times a week and 15.6% used 7 or more times per week. In groupings based on method of communication, only the rate at which people used the phone did not decrease with frequency of use per week.

Table 9-5: Foreigner’s Political Inclinations in terms of their Contact via Regular Mail with Friends and Family

Times per Week	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Less than 1 No. (%)	127 (100)	0 (0)	16 (12.5)	23 (18.1)	36 (23.8)	29 (22.8)	11 (8.6)	10 (7.8)	2 (1.5)
1 – 3 No. (%)	45 (100)	0 (0)	4 (8.8)	14 (31.1)	11 (24.4)	12 (26.6)	3 (6.6)	1 (2.2)	0 (0)
4 – 6 No. (%)	17 (100)	0 (0)	2 (11.7)	4 (23.5)	6 (35.2)	5 (29.4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)

Table 9-6: Foreigners’ Political Inclinations in terms of their Contact via Phone with Friends and Family

Times per Week	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Less than 1 No. (%)	64 (100)	1 (1.5)	7 (10.9)	10 (15.6)	19 (29.6)	18 (28.1)	4 (6.2)	3 (4.6)	2 (3.1)
1 – 3 No. (%)	157 (100)	4 (2.5)	18 (11.4)	30 (19.1)	37 (23.5)	34 (21.6)	14 (8.9)	19 (12.1)	1 (0.06)
4 – 6 No. (%)	28 (100)	1 (3.5)	2 (7.1)	5 (17.8)	7 (25.0)	6 (21.4)	1 (3.5)	3 (10.7)	3 (10.7)

Table 9-7: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in terms of their Contact via E-mail with Friends and Family

Times per Week	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
0 No. (%)	52 (100)	1 (1.9)	2 (3.8)	9 (17.3)	14 (29.6)	12 (23)	4 (7.6)	9 (17.3)	1 (1.9)
1 – 3 No. (%)	90 (100)	1 (1.1)	13 (14.4)	16 (17.7)	24 (26.6)	21 (23.3)	8 (8.8)	4 (4.4)	3 (3.3)
4 – 6 No. (%)	29 (100)	1 (3.4)	4 (13.7)	5 (17.2)	10 (34.4)	8 (27.5)	1 (3.4)	0 (0)	0 (0)
7 + No. (%)	32 (100)	1 (3.1)	1 (3.1)	7 (21.8)	11 (34.3)	10 (31.2)	2 (6.2)	0 (0)	0 (0)

In each of the forms of communication, besides Internet usage, we did not find any strong correlation between the frequency of use of the respective communication methods with their inclinations regarding the situation. In terms of internet communication, we found that those who said used the Internet to communicate were least likely to answer the final question regarding the cross-Strait situation at 17.3%, followed by those who use the phone 1-3 times per week (12.1%). We also found that those who used the Internet to communicate were more likely to be pro-unification pro-independence, and to the status quo now/decide later. On account of keeping the status quo forever, the rate of support seemed to hold mostly steady with frequency of use. In particular those who used the Internet zero times a week supported independence now 3.2% of the time. The rate increasing to 14.4% among those using it 1-3 times a week, declining slightly to 13.7% among those using it 4-6 times a week and declining significantly with usage of 7+ times a week.

This may seem to contradict our contention that inclinations toward independence with frequency of Internet use, but among those who used internet 0 times a week, their support of independence later was 26.9%, mostly holding steady at 26.6% with 1-3 times

per week and then increasing significantly to 34.4% with 4-6 times per week and holding steady once again with 7+ times. Taken together this means that those who use the internet zero times a week support independence 30.7% of the time, those who using it 1-3 times per week at 41% of the time; those using it 4-6 times supported it 48.1% of the time and those using it over 7+ times at a rate of 37.4% of the time. There was also a positive correlation between frequency of Internet communication and unification but the correlations were weak at best. For instance, 19.2% of those who communicated with the Internet 0 times a rated unification now and unification later (questions 1 and 3) at a rate of 19.2%, whereas the corresponding statistic for the 1-3 times a week group held steady at a rate of 18.8% and then increased to 20.6% among the 4-6 times per week group and increased yet again to 24.9%.

In terms of regular mail and phone, we did not find strong correlations with frequency of use of mail and phone and one's political inclinations, except that there is a slight correlation of frequency of communication by post and those supporting status quo now/deciding later. Among those who used the mail 0 times per week, people supported the cross-Strait orientation 22.8% of the time, whereas those 26.6% of those using mail 1-3 times per week and the support rate increased slightly to 29.4% with a frequency of 4-6 times per week. However, in contrast to the findings of the internet, there was rarely a consistent increasing or decreasing correlation seen with increasing frequency. For instance, those that use the mail less than once a week supported unification later 18.1% of the time, and the rate increased substantially to 31.1% and decreased again in 23.5% with those using it 4-6 times per week. Moreover, those who used the phone less than once a week supported independence later at a rate of 29.6% and then decreased to 23.5% and then increased to 25% again among those who used it over 4 times a week. In fact the positive or negative spikes in support among those who used the intermediate level of frequency (1-3 times per week) can also be seen in those use mail for independence now, unification later, and among those in the phone grouping with those supporting independence now, unification later, independence later, and status quo forever.

Our reading of these findings is that the manner and frequency of communication is not a likely predictor of one's political inclinations regarding the cross-Strait situation, except in terms of the Internet. Our guess is that those who use the often to communicate with the internet are also more likely to get a diverse array of information, which may

allow them to become more informed about the political situation, giving them the ability to take a position. That is, says Eric Schmitt, CEO of Google, “The Internet is a phenomena that is as big as the modern transportation system, as big as the creation of radio, and television and newspapers, maybe all combined. The important thing about the internet is it goes fundamentally at the things people care most about, which is information. And that is a good thing — that more information crowds out bad ideas, bad governments, bad behavior.”¹¹¹

Hence it might be unsurprising that those who used the internet over 4 times or over never left the last question blank. Secondly, we believe that having the ability to communicate frequently may allude to the likelihood that they are in a higher socioeconomic status, namely in two dimensions: 1) they are probably more likely to have white-collar jobs or are students; 2) they are able to afford computers. As we’ve pointed out earlier, people with higher socioeconomic statuses are much more likely to answer the last question.

9.5 Effects of English-language Media

Finally, we wanted to look at the impact of media on foreigner’s political inclinations. This question was aimed mostly at those people regularly read the three main English-language publications in Taiwan — namely, the Taipei Times, the China Post and the Taiwan News. A total of 206 people indicated the frequency that they read the China Post per week, whereas 201 indicated how often they read the Taipei Times and 169 indicated how often they read the Taiwan News.

Of those who read the China Post, 120 (58%) said they read it 0 times a week, 49 (23.7%) said they read it 1-3 times per week, 8 said they read it 4-6 times per week (3.8%) and 29 people said they read it 7+ times per week (14.0%). Correspondingly, 96 (47.7%) people said they read the Taipei Times 0 times per week, 41 people (20.3%) said they read it 1-3 times per week, 19 (9.4%) said they read it 4-6 times per week and 45 (22.3%) said they read it 7+ times per week. As for Taiwan News, 118 (69.8%) said they read the newspaper 0 times per week, 18 (10.6%) said they read it 1-3 times per week, 8 (4.6%) said they read it 4-6 times per week and 25 (14.7%) said they read it 7+ times per week. We can conclude by these figures, that while the overwhelming majority said they

¹¹¹ Daniel Franklin, “Podcast of the World in 2007,” (Podcast), *The Economist*, 2007.

read the newspapers 0 times per week, the reading rate did not necessarily decline as frequency of reads increased. For example, in all three cases except for the China Post, more people read the newspaper 7 or more times per week than those who read the paper either 1-3 times a week or those who read the paper 4-6 times per week. Although we found that those who read the respective papers 0 times per week were more unlikely to answer the question regarding the cross-Strait situation, we do not want to imply that there is a causal relationship here, as we do not want to preclude the possibility that the respondents simply read other publications to supplement their knowledge, so that they may be able to answer the final question.

Table 9-8: Foreigners’ Political Inclinations in Terms of How Frequently They Read the *China Post*

Times per Week	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
0 No. (%)	120 (100)	1 (0.8)	15 (12.5)	20 (16.6)	37 (30.8)	27 (22.5)	6 (5.0)	12 (10.0)	2 (1.6)
1 – 3 No. (%)	49 (100)	4 (8.1)	4 (8.1)	11 (22.4)	11 (22.4)	12 (24.4)	4 (8.1)	2 (4.0)	1 (2.0)
4 – 6 No. (%)	8 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (12.5)	4 (50.0)	1 (12.5)	1 (12.5)	1 (12.5)	0 (0)
7 + No. (%)	29 (100)	1 (3.4)	1 (3.4)	9 (31.0)	6 (20.6)	8 (27.5)	3 (10.3)	1 (3.4)	0 (0)
<i>China Post</i> Only No. (%)	8 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4 (50.0)	0 (0)	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	0 (0)	1 (12.5)

Regarding the China Post, we found that those who read the newspaper 7 or more times per week to be more in support of unification and in less support of the independence compared to those who read the China Post 0 times per week. However, we could not find a strong correlation among those who read the China 1-3 times per week

and those read it 4-6 times per week. Regarding question 5 (maintain the status quo and decide later) we found its rate of support tending to hold steady. Namely, we observe that those who supported answer unification now and status quo now/unification later was 17.4% among those who read the China Post 0 times per week; 30.5% those reading 1-3 times per week, 12.5% those reading 4-6 times and 34.4% those reading 7 or more times. We also found 43.3% of those reading 0 times a week in support of independence now or status quo now/independence now, 30.5% for those reading 1-3 times per week, 50% for those reading 4-6 times per week, 24% of those reading 7 or more times. On both accounts we can observe that those reading the China Post 4-6 times a week seemed to be an anomaly in that they tended to support unification less than those reading 1-3 times but more than those reading 7 or more times.

As we have mentioned we cannot preclude the possibility that the mid-range readers, and in fact all the others, get their news from other sources of media, such as the Taipei Times, Taiwan News, or other media outlets both foreign and local. However, when we disaggregate the data further into those who read the China Post but not the Taipei Times — regardless of frequency — we find 8 respondents in our survey; of the 50% who said they were in support of unification all of them were pro-unification later. No respondents said they were pro-independence now or later. Taken together, we think this suggests that a strong correlation exists between those who read the China Post and supporting unification verses independence.

Regarding the Taipei Times, we did not find a correlation between reading the newspaper and unification, but we found a positive correlation for pro-independence, particularly among those who read the paper 4 or more times per week and those who didn't.

In the case of the China Post, which has its readers scattered along the spectrum regarding the cross-strait issue, the readers are probably not reading the newspaper for its political slant. On the other hand, the most frequent readers of the Taipei Times and those who read the Taipei Times exclusively tend to be pro-independence.

Table 9-9: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of How Frequently They Read the *Taipei Times*

Times per Week	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
0 No. (%)	95 (100)	1 (1.0)	9 (9.3)	21 (21.8)	24 (25.0)	21 (21.8)	6 (6.2)	11 (11.4)	3 (3.1)
1 – 3 No. (%)	41 (100)	1 (2.4)	5 (12.1)	7 (17.0)	10 (24.3)	17 (41.4)	1 (14.6)	0 (0)	0 (0)
4 – 6 No. (%)	19 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	2 (10.5)	7 (36.8)	4 (21.0)	4 (21.0)	2 (9.5)	0 (0)
7 + No. (%)	45 (100)	3 (6.6)	3 (6.6)	10 (22.2)	18 (40.0)	9 (20.0)	1 (2.2)	1 (2.2)	0 (0)
<i>Taipei Times</i> Only No. (%)	22 (100)	0 (0)	3 (13.6)	1 (4.5)	11 (50.0)	5 (22.7)	2 (9.0)	0 (0)	0 (0)

Table 9-10: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of How Frequently They Read the *Taiwan News*

Times per Week	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
0 No. (%)	118 (100)	2 (1.6)	13 (11.0)	22 (18.6)	36 (30.5)	31 (26.2)	10 (8.4)	11 (9.3)	3 (2.5)
1 – 3 No. (%)	18 (100)	1 (5.5)	1 (5.5)	4 (22.2)	6 (33.3)	6 (33.3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
4 – 6 No. (%)	8 (100)	1 (12.5)	0 (0)	2 (25.0)	3 (37.5)	1 (12.5)	0 (0)	1 (12.5)	0 (0)
7 + No. (%)	25 (100)	0 (0)	2 (8.0)	8 (32.0)	8 (32.0)	4 (16.0)	2 (8.0)	0 (0)	1 (4.0)
<i>Taiwan News</i> Only No. (%)	3 (100)	1 (33.3)	0 (0)	2 (66.6)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)

That is, those who read the Taipei Times 0 times per week supported unification (questions 1 and 3 together) 22.8% of the time, 1-3 times a week 30.5% of the time, 10.5% for those reading 4-6 times a week, and 28.8% of those reading 7 or more times per week. In contrast there is definitely an increase in support of independence (questions 2 and 4 together) with frequencies of reading the Taipei Times. Namely, 34.3% of those who read 0 times per week, 36.4% of those who read 1-3 times per week, 36.8% of those who read 4-6 times per week and 46.6% of those reading 7 or more times per week. Moreover, we disaggregated the data into people who read only the Taipei Times and not the other two papers, which yielded 22 respondents, irrespective of frequency.

Our findings show that of those almost 22 supported independence at some point in time (63.6%) versus only 4.5% of the time for unification. We also found no consistent findings for keeping the status quo and deciding later, with the rate hovering around 20% for those reading 0 times, 4-6 times and 7 or more times per week, but as much as 41.4% for those reading 1-3 times per week. It is noteworthy that these readers represent the readers who read the Taipei Times, but are perhaps least committed to it, and thus not

really leaning either toward independence or unification. However, due to the constraints of our survey, there is no way to tell. In regards to question 6, we also found no conclusive findings with in that the frequency of people reading the newspaper 0 times per week was 11.4% for question six, whereas it increased slightly to 14.6% for those reading 1-3 times were a week, increasing again to 21% for those reading 4-6 times, yet significantly declining to 2.2 for those reading 7 or more times per week.

For the Taiwan News readers, nearly 7 in 10 (69.8%) did not read the Taiwan News at least once a week. For instance, those who read the Taiwan News 0 times a week were in were in support of unification at some point 20.2% of the time, and the number increased to 18% among those reading 1-3 times and 37.5% among those reading 4-6 times but declined to 32%. It is our guess that those who read it four or more times tend to be more pro-unification than those who don't read it at all. The frequency did not affect those who supported independence however. In fact the statistics reveal that the rate nearly stay the same in respect to the four categories denoting frequency of reads fluctuated at around 40%. Namely, those who read it 0 times independence now or later 41.5% of the time whereas those who read it 1-3 times at 38.8% of the time those reading it 4-6 times at 37.5% of the time and then those reading it 7 or more times at a rate of 40%. We then attempted to isolate those people who read the Taiwan News only, and only 3 respondents had done so. Of those, however, all of them were pro unification with unification now constituting 1/3 and unification 2/3s. Our findings in regards to the Taiwan News seem to contradict what we had expected, namely because the Taiwan News is a pro-independence leaning paper. However, as we have noted, because so few people read the Taiwan News as compared to the other two papers, those that read the Taiwan News were much more likely to also read the other two papers.

9.6 Summary

This section has illuminated what the author believes as noteworthy variables that are involved in the socialization process that could play a role in the development of political dispositions regarding the cross-strait relationship, including: questions on one's social relations; Chinese language ability; friends from homeland, communication to friends and family; and effects of English-language media.

Our main finding is that those with mostly foreigner friends or almost all foreign friends tend to be either more pro-independence later and also more likely to wait to decide. Our findings also suggest that foreigners tended to be more pro-unification if they had a higher percentage of Taiwanese who they'd consider their "good" friends. The opposite is also true, as they tended to be more pro-independence if they tended to have "good friends" who are foreigners.

But our main finding in regards to language is that those with no Chinese language abilities — reading, speaking or writing — tend to be more pro-independence and less pro-unification when compared to those respondents with excellent skills in the Chinese language. Meanwhile, we also found that those who spoke or wrote excellent Chinese tended to be in support of keeping the status quo and deciding later or keeping the status quo forever. Not unlike the respondents who were in support of unification because of their local social attachments through friends, we would propose that understanding the local language allows the foreigners to develop understandings regarding the situation with a broader perspective, hence their preferences to wait and see for a better solution.

In each of the forms of communication, besides Internet usage, we did not find any strong correlation between the frequency use of the respective communication methods with their inclinations regarding the situation; however those who used internet more frequently tended to answer the question regarding their political disposition.

Regarding the China Post, we found that those who read the newspaper 7 or more times per week to be more in support of unification and in less support of the independence compared to those who read the China Post 0 times per week. Regarding the Taipei Times, we did not find a correlation between reading the newspaper and unification, but we found a positive correlation for pro-independence, particularly among those who read the paper 4 or more times per week and those who didn't. In the case of the China Post, which has its readers scattered along the spectrum regarding the cross-strait issue, the readers are probably not reading the newspaper for its political slant. On the other hand, the most frequent readers of the Taipei Times and those who read the Taipei Times exclusively tend to be pro-independence. We received too few people who indicated their preferences for reading the Taiwan News exclusively, and therefore, could not find any significant results relating to the readership of the newspaper and political inclinations regarding the cross-strait situation.