

CHAPTER 4

Foreigners' Contending Political Voices in Taiwan

In this chapter we will look at the contending forces that are at play, especially for foreigners, in the construction of their identity and what role it plays in the engendering of their unique political opinion on the cross-strait issue. Thus, we are trying to show that the effect on identity of foreigners that factors such as: the emergence of globalizing institutions, nationalism, civic duty, mobility and plays a key role in engendering a contending voice, which helps to consolidate and diversify a new political voice to the locally debated issues regarding the cross-strait situation. We will attempt to provide the scope for these new contending global voices and perceptions on the cross-strait relationship.

4.1 The Local, National, Global and 'Glocal' Dialectic, and Self

But if it were the case that a predominant number of foreigners from English-speaking countries here are English teachers, *A World of Teaching*, while it does not talk about English teachers in Taiwan specifically, it recounts the stories of those who developing areas like Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The common themes in their stories of their transnational experiences should prove useful for my project.

The perils of reading only one perspective about a given part of the world are a serious relying on only network news to formulate an opinion about a conflict, let alone

an entire country of or culture, given the political and social climate since September eleventh, when teachers may have given more careful consideration as to where they will feel safe.⁵²

In contrast, the scope of my study and when we use the term “foreigner”, we intend to reflect the attitudes from peoples not only from countries emphasized by Huang’s master’s thesis but also from all over the world. Because of the deficiency we have encountered on not only in finding studies focusing on foreigners in this comprehensive sense of the term, but also on the lack of scholarship assessing those foreigners not engaged in low-skilled work in Taiwan, we believe that this is one way my research would provide a meaningful contribution to Taiwan studies.

Since my intention is to aggregate the two seemingly divergent groups of foreigners together to see if foreigners on a whole have anything in common with each other regarding their political inclinations in Taiwan, and then disaggregating them by country to see if migrants from different countries have any specific traits, this would also require analysis on such broad questions like — what does it mean to be a foreigner and a foreigner in Asia in particular? How are one’s worldviews shaped by their experiences in their homeland, and how do their perceptions change as a migrant being socialized in their host country — or they do they change at all? How relevant and to what extent are notions of nationalism, patriotism and cosmopolitanism important in understanding foreigners’ political attitudes become salient in an era of globalization? For Charles Taylor, our identities bespeak how we view the world in general as self-interpreting animals.⁵³ Ross Poole notes that:

“Because we have a certain identity, we understand (or misunderstand) the world in certain ways. It provides a perspective on the world: a point from which and a framework within which we know the world. Second, an identity is also mode of agency. It provides us, not only with a conception of how we should act in certain circumstances, but also with a motivation to do so. It both tells us what to do and prompts us to do it ... It is because we have a certain conception of myself – in a sense, I am that conception – that the world is relevant to me in certain ways (as a ‘self-interpreting animal in Taylor’s language.’⁵⁴

⁵² John A. Hansen and Evan M. Smith, *A World of Teaching: Personal Journeys Through the World’s English-Speaking Classrooms* (Westport, Connecticut: Bergin & Garvey), xiii.

⁵³ Charles Taylor, *Human agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 1.

⁵⁴ Poole, 61.

Broadly speaking, answering questions such as these hinge on illuminating the effects of migrants' identity in flux and to see whether the values they've inherited from their homeland translates into any particular political inclinations on the cross-strait relationship. For example, scholars who have touched upon cultural differences and their effects on political behavior, such as Almond, Verba, Huntington, and Benedict Anderson and their work will be quoted. There is a vast literature on that touches upon these types of questions. For instance Shiela L. Croucher sheds light on the dynamics of the identity in an era of globalization by recognizing that,

[T]he growing number and sophistication of various transnational movements and organizations ... as part of an emergence of a global civil society, attests to the desire and the capacity of individuals and groups to negotiate new forms of belonging – many connected from more familiar attachments to territory, geography, or polity ... various debates characterize this literature – the most prominent of which revolves around whether identity is best conceptualized as static, essential, and unidimensional, or fluid, constructed, and multidimensional.⁵⁵

A nation's political elite has certainly attempted appeal to the various notions of patriotism in order to consolidate its power, and according to Maurizio Viroli, these appeals are nothing other than appeals to its citizens' passion, especially among society members who view that liberty as a fundamental goal. Political efficacy is then required by citizenship. As the author notes,

A purely political republic would be able to command the philosopher's consent, but would generate no attachment, no love, no commitment. To generate and sustain these sorts of passions one needs to appeal to the common culture, to shared memories. But if the appeal has liberty as a goal, one must resort to the culture that grows out of the practice of citizenship and is sustained by shared memories of commitment to liberty, social criticism, and resistance against oppression and corruption.⁵⁶

This means that there lies a priority of interests, according to the author because of the influence and inescapability of the nation to types of appeals to passion may be called upon, namely patriotism and nationalism and hence alter one's political outlook. This, according to the author, is rooted in the following:

“national identity in its distinctive modern sense is, therefore, an identity which derives from membership in a ‘people’, the fundamental characteristic of which is that it is defined as a ‘nation’. Every member of the ‘people’ thus interpreted partakes in its superior, elite quality, and it is in consequence that a stratified national population is perceived as essentially homogeneous, and the

⁵⁵ Croucher, 35-6.

⁵⁶ Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay On Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford. UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), 13.

lines of status and class as superficial. This principle lies at the basis of all nationalisms and justifies viewing them as expressions of the same general phenomenon.”⁵⁷

Inspired by passions pertaining to the nation, both patriotism and nationalism passions, could arise, which we argue could influence their inclinations on the cross-strait situation, especially in how it might relate to their own nation, however significant or detached they may be. Maurizio Viroli makes note of the differences between patriotism and nationalism:

“The crucial distinction lies in the priority or the emphasis: for the patriots, the primary value is the republic and the free way of life that the republic permits; for the nationalists, the primary values are the spiritual and cultural unity of the people ... one can identify a language of patriotism that has been a language of common liberty, which is substantially different from the nationalist language of oneness, uniqueness, and homogeneity.”⁵⁸

And accordingly, in his defense of patriotism over nationalism, passion based on the nation Viroli reckons that. There is no need to strengthen moral or religious unity, ethnic homogeneity, or linguistic purity.”⁵⁹ Namely, the author suggests that:

“If to love one’s country means to love common ethnic and linguistic characteristics, a shared conception of the good life, or the vision of a common national destiny, such a love no doubt sustains commitments to the common good. It also encourages, however, contempt and intolerance for cultural, racial, and political diversity both at home and abroad. Examples abound of civic-minded citizens who are prepared to give their blood for their country but who are also prepared to deny religious liberty, minority rights, and cultural pluralism; and the narrowness of their patriotism reflects the exclusive character of their love of country.”⁶⁰

The point we are trying to make is that the concept of the nation can reverberate on several dimensions, and while there are several ways that one can perceive the nation as a reference point for forming worldviews, one must never neglect the significance of the nation, and its multidimensional roles in identifying of political inclinations to its peoples.

The relevance of the nation is supported by the fact that the prevalence of the nation as a point of reference is inescapable. For Ross Poole, “a major source of the strength of national identity has been in its inescapability.”⁶¹ This inescapability permeates in the modern world, according to the author, because the nation has appropriated to itself the means to articulate the cultural and linguistic means for the

⁵⁷ Viroli, 7.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 13.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 12.

⁶¹ Poole, 69.

realization of the self of the members. The nation thus defines the fusion of culture, language and polity, and has become an integral aspect of ourselves, and it becomes difficult to define ourselves irrespective of our nation, and thus it is easier to define ourselves by our nation, and others define us by our nation. The author cautions against conceptualizing these attachments as primordial, but says that “language and cultural symbols through which we now understand ... have come to provide an inescapable structure of experience. The author contends that in fact, the national identity can strengthen itself by drawing upon a wealth of cultural resources which are used in forming one’s conception of national identity and common ground for understanding among its members:

This identity provides us with a land in which we are at home, a history which is ours, and a privileged access to a vast heritage of culture and creativity. It not only provides us with the means to understand this heritage; it also assures us that it is *ours*. If on occasion the nation may require that we endure losses and hardships on its behalf, it also makes available a fund of meanings, pleasures and rewards beyond anything that we are likely to find in our individual lives.⁶²

Seeking to describe the discursive battle regarding identity construction, and its implications on belonging in what the authors sees as a occurring in a postmodern era, Shiela L. Croucher provides several theories from prominent scholars in making sense of the milieu between primordial verses fluid conceptualizations of nation and the different forms of nationalism. For instance the author notes of nationalism’s related permutation — ethnic nationalism:

The most common distinction that has surfaced in the literature on nationalism is that between civic nations and ethnic nations. Civic is the term used to refer to national communities that are purportedly rooted or based upon a shared commitment to a set of political principles and institutions. Ethnic nations are those said to be based upon shared ancestry and cultural community. The United States, France, and Canada are frequently cited examples of the former, and Germany, Japan, and countries throughout Eastern Europe the later.⁶³

Our discussion above regarding the many permutations of nationalisms should allude to the malleability of the concepts. We argue that in the face of globalization and as the importance of the nation arguably becomes eroded, so as to create a transnational identity, which is based on one’s nation and attachments to other spaces. More recently, world migration and the creation of diasporic communities among other factors has

⁶² Ibid., 69.

⁶³ Croucher, 87.

opened up new challenges, challenges that often use ethnic identity as the language to provide solidarity, and in the author's words, the content of ethnic identity and the common concerns of an ethnic group that help to unite them are the result of "not simply the prolongation of pre-migration customs and patterns, but are the result of an interaction between these and the values and requirements of the receiving society."⁶⁴ In many ways, the centrality of ethnic groups continue to resonate and they intra community linkages are clear and they are not destined to acculturation because of the renewed importance of diasporas as integral aspect of trans-state relations. According to one account, they take the form of "expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities tout court — in much the same way that 'ghetto' has come to designate all kinds of crowded, constricted, and disprivileged urban environments, and 'holocaust' has come to be applied to all kinds of mass murder."⁶⁵

Thus it should not be too surprising that the negotiation of identities is a complicated one, but is complicated further, detracted further or enhanced by globalization. Mike Savage, Gaynor Bagnall and Brian Longhurst have elaborated immensely on these interactions and explain how that it is through these interactions that identities are formed with the negotiation with one self, the local and global:

"Benjamin's point is that in such accounts the present is defined with respect to a past constructed in its shadow. This 'present' becomes a product which the powerful use as a means of denying truths they would rather not face. It thus becomes a moral project in which globalization constructs its own truths, rendering the local as a repository of the defensive past. Using Benjamin's insights, we can recognize that globalization is a means for particular people, with specific interests and identities, to proclaim universal rights and powers. Faced with the implications of Benjamin's insights, we see it as morally essential to champion the local."⁶⁶

The authors caution against using a generalized conceptualization of the global and the local precisely because the interaction works in an infinite number of layers that are conducive to the negotiation of identities. The authors point out:

⁶⁴ Croucher, 136.

⁶⁵ Zlatko Skrbis, *Long-distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities* (Brookfield, Vermont: 1999), 5.

⁶⁶ Savage et al., 6.

“Network approaches vary immensely, but both in the form of social network analysis, as well as in actor network theory they insist that global processes do not work at a general level, but operate through specific proximate ties and connections. The global thus does not stand above the local, but are a particular set of network ties, with the result that there is no ‘one’ global, but an infinite multiplicity of global relationships, all constituted in various forms through particular local configurations.”⁶⁷

For the authors, as individuals go about their lives they encounter a multitude of people, images, and technologies that are outside the scope of the provincial self, what they called the ‘neighborhood’ for one’s self, ‘the potential for neighborhood itself to be redefined.’ It is at the juncture where the construction of boundaries take place that “global flows thereby allows the proliferation of rich imaginary and symbolic resources to all people to construct their ‘local’ in a range of ways.”⁶⁸ For Ulrich Beck “Globalisation is a non-linear, dialectic process in which the global and the local do not exist as cultural polarities but as combined and mutually implicating principles.”⁶⁹

One primary principle according to Bourdieu is the concept of habitus, but other mechanism abound. According to P. Bourdieu’s interpretation of the negotiation involves the ‘practical sense of a habitus’, in which “the agent engage in practice knows the world but with knowledge which is not set up in the relation of externality of a knowing consciousness. He [sic] knows it, in a sense, too well ... takes it for granted, precisely because he is caught up in it, bound up with it; he inhabits it like a garment or a familiar habitat.”⁷⁰ For Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, they see Bourdieu’s sociology lacking because in seeing “that self-interest as the main mechanism for action, Bourdieu’s embodied sociology leads him to focus more on feelings of ‘comfort’ in place.” In some cases there seems “no break between the actor and the world around.”⁷¹ This aspect of comfort in place undoubtedly helps further defines one’s worldview, one’s judgment of his or surroundings and one’s sense of the other, where conflicting viewpoints and interests clash, as Bordieu highlights,

[S]pace is not just an arena for conflict but forms part of the stakes over which conflict takes place. Fields define hierarchical spaces of social and spatial positions, specifying the stakes the

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁰ Bourdieu, P., *Pascalian Meditations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 142-3.

⁷¹ Ibid., 8-9.

stakes involved in such positions ... Just as physical space ... is defined by the reciprocal externality of positions ... the social space is defined by the mutual exclusion, or distinction, of the positions which constitute it.⁷²

For Bourdieu, the pursuit of comfort is driven by the interaction of the competing influence of ‘fields’, places of leisure, work, residence, etc. and also of habitus, and how the processes manifests itself in mobility, which are seen as specific actions taken to relieve discomfort:

“People are comfortable when there is a correspondence between habitus and field, but otherwise people feel ill at ease and seek to move — socially and spatially — so that their discomfort is relieved. For Bourdieu this is a crucial to the ‘dialectic of positions and dispositions’. Mobility is driven by people, with their relatively fixed habitus, both move between fields ... and move to places within fields where they feel more comfortable. Mobility and stability are hence reciprocally interrelated through the linkage between fields and habitus.”⁷³

For the authors, the main focus for them were the new forms of mobility and connection, and their ability to rework and to further define social relationships and re-define localism. For instance it has been noted that the process has been both static and dynamic,

“There is increasing differentiation between those fields — often organized through mass communication — that are relatively spatially indifferent, and those that remain very largely rooted in place. The friction, or disjuncture, between these fields is of crucial importance. Those cultural fields that are still dependent on fixed spaces are likely to remain as significant as ever in generating cultural distinction.”⁷⁴

However, perhaps one of the writer’s main points was that the local should not be seen as transcended by globalization; rather it is but an aspect of global relationships. Globalization, therefore, creates novel forms of localization, what has been popularized as “glocalization” by Robertson where “globalization has involved the reconstruction of ‘home’, ‘community’ and ‘locality’”⁷⁵. And with the multiplication of fields, says Savage et al, “Ordinariness’ becomes a key arena around which people seek to establish the commonality of their shared position with various others. People claim ordinariness in

⁷² Ibid., 9.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Savage et al., 11.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 3.

order to ‘opt into’ a range of shared practices and activities in a situation where the multiplicity of fields may pull them into separate practices. The ordinariness codes new kinds of distinctions and hierarchies, though these may be implicit rather than stated overtly.⁷⁶

As discussed, the dialectic created by the pull of the local, national, global and ‘glocal’ is a significant one, which not only lead to a re-interpretation of identities, but has a lot to do with the creation of new ones — and a particular force need not cause other forces to acculturate. Imbedded in all these fields ultimately relies on self-interpretation, however, which is ultimately the agency of interpretations. Ross Poole notes,

“Our selves – the selves that we are – are interpretations. It is through self-interpretation that we become conscious of ourselves as subjects of experience and action. We come to understand ourselves in certain ways, and these modes of self-understanding constitute the identities in terms of which we confront and act on the world. Of course, the forms in which we interpret ourselves are not created by ourselves de novo. They are, at least in the first instance, provided by the forms of social life into which we are inducted. The prevailing language and culture not only provide the conceptual resources through which we become aware of the world and of others in the world, but the resources through which we become aware of ourselves as part of that world.”⁷⁷

Because of the complex negotiation of identities and how they are crucial in our abilities to ‘become aware of the world’, this study will fundamentally be concerned with looking at issues like social life, language, culture, and also economic life, since they are an integral ‘conceptual resources’ in decision making.

4.2 Globalization and Cultural Changes

Thus in looking at the tensions that arise in identification as a result of globalizing forces, a critical assessment of globalization as a concept is also at hand. Namely, in addition to analyzing how one’s identification can change as the authors mentioned above explicate, we will also elaborate on how precisely globalization creates the breeding ground for these processes to occur. “[T]he suggestion that all is transitory is re-examined in relation to the growth of Latino/a cultures in the US. North and South America are a

⁷⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 60.

mirror dance in which the impact of the North has been keenly felt in the South but in which latterly the South has moved North to join the diasporic cities of the US.”⁷⁸

For Taiwan especially, a country that ushered in a new era of migratory openness relatively late when the Executive Yuan laborer committee announced its decision to commence the utilization of foreign workers in October 1989, the impacts of globalization on the movement of peoples to Taiwan is not only relatively new phenomenon but also becoming an inextricable aspect of its development strategy.⁷⁹ If Croucher, Charsley and others are right that one’s identification can shift markedly because of the socialization process involved in the receiving society, the fact that Taiwan’s migratory policies opened up to the world relatively late should also significantly affect the respective identifications of migrants to Taiwan. That is, the foreigners who have moved here would have had little opportunity to really let their roots sink in but it is unclear how this would affect their political inclinations.

However, scholars like Janine Brodie have contended that contemporary globalization has given rise to such forces as globality and globalism. For, “Globality refers to the amalgam of forces, many technological and irreversible, that are attributed with progressively breaking down barriers of time, space, and nation and fashioning the planet into a coherent global community.”⁸⁰

In Brodie’s analysis, the author attributes the institutional retooling that takes place for the new forces, and how Francis Fukiyama was right in pointing out the process of state deregulation and economic restructuring, the proliferation of new technologies that facilitate mobility of people, capital, goods and symbols, led to a new sense of connectivity, which is global.⁸¹ For Keohane and Nye, “Globalism is a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances. The linkages occur through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, and people and forces, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens). Globalization and deglobalization refer to the increase or decline of

⁷⁸ Westwood et al., 96.

⁷⁹ Kung and Wang.

⁸⁰ Janine Brodie, “Introduction: Globalization and Citizenship Beyond the National State,” *Citizenship Studies* 8, no. 4 (December 2004): 324.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

globalism.”⁸² For Fukiyama, this created a new kind of ‘consumerist post-modern aesthetic’, and a new intensified sense of individualized identity, which were indicative the development of new social relations generated by global flows.⁸³

For Luke Desforges, Rhys Jones & Mike Woods quoting A. Amin it is precisely these forces that are helping to bring about a whole new relational imagination” that helps foster a new geography of citizenship that transcends one’s own nationality and brings out novel forms of global attachments. Namely, “a ‘relational imagination’ would also help to engender new geographies of social and political responsibilities beyond bounded spaces — a “new politics of connectivity ... it is the connections to strangers without — living, working and dying — in other *places* that form some of the most important, and potentially liberating, new geographies of citizenship in the contemporary world.”⁸⁴

For Mike Savage, “the global becomes its own context (there are no boundaries other than its own). Instead of seeing agency as linked to the contexts of everyday life routines, “emergent global networks offer the chosen — or rather, choice itself — as the origin of the imagined community of global citizenship”:

“The Condition of Postmodernity (1987) emphasized how global flows were related to cultural change, was himself influenced by Ranymond Williams’s concern about the instability and fragmentation of the face-to-face community in contemporary life Harvey, (1993). Harvey’s own work engaged with the humanist argument that social life is most secure in face-to-face, communal situations, and his criticisms of post-modern culture was in large part related to his fears about its evisceration of communities, especially industrial, working class communities ... Other work in this vein pointed to the transient spaces of shopping malls, fast food joints, and airport terminals emphasise the rise of new kinds of ‘non-places’ (auge 1995). The culmination of this early work came with Robertson (1992), who developed the first major account of globalization as the rise of a ‘global awareness’, and Albrows’s (1996) account of the Global Age as marking the end of modernity.”⁸⁵

For S.R. Charsley, the content of these migrant groups, although having been stratified into distinctiveness as ethnic groups because of the systems of legal and

⁸² Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?)” *Foreign Policy* 118 (2000): 105.

⁸³ Savage et al.

⁸⁴ Luke Desforges, Rhys Jones and Mike Woods, “New Geographies of Citizenship,” *Citizenship Studies* 9, no. 5 (November 2005): 444.

⁸⁵ Savage et al., 4.

economic systems of power embedded in the international migration system, are “not simply the prolongation of pre-migration customs and patterns, but are the result of an interaction between these and the values and requirements of the receiving society.”⁸⁶ Within these frameworks, fostered by the affects of contemporary globalization, which have been shown to shape foreigners’ political inclinations here in Taiwan. Thus, as Croucher points out, the concept of liberal pluralism “... which has been theorized largely within and within and with reference to the West and the United States, predicted that traditional, or parochial, attachments such as those rooted in kinship, clan, or ethnicity would dissipate in the face of modernization. Particularism would give way to universalism, ethnic groups and immigrants would assimilate, and the identities that remained would be functionally specific to the demands of a modern society and economy.”⁸⁷

“contemporary capitalist societies are increasingly characterized by the interaction between simple (e.g. theatre), mass (e.g. television) and diffused audiences (of everyday life). Extant paradigms for conceptual demands of the understanding of these relations... There is thus no one space where we feel at home all the time ... Discursive consciousness, and reflexivity in general, is amplified through the multiplication of fields.”⁸⁸

One need look no further than the role being played by multinational corporations and NGO’s that are striving to become significant forces in shaping public policy in all realms of life. And many of the non-state actors are trying to work together to bridge relationships that are mutually beneficial and sustainable with society and above all profitable. The relationships are at a nascent stage, but are being played out, such as the World Economic Forum at Davos Switzerland, where the likes of Bill Gates, Bill Clinton, Tony Blair have gathered to discuss about global strategies in our times of dynamic change. For instance, it’s Global Governance Initiative “monitors the efforts of governments, the private sector, international organizations and civil society towards achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. These objectives relate to poverty, conflict, health, education, the environment, human rights and hunger.”

⁸⁶ S.R. Charsley, “The Formation of Ethnic Groups in Urban Ethnicity” in *Questions of Consciousness*, ed. Abner Cohen (London: Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth 1974), 337-68.

⁸⁷ Croucher, 116.

⁸⁸ Savage, 10.

The point I'm trying to make is that the global forces are fundamentally changing the character of the actors involved in transnational decision making. Already, states have become permeable to the influence of multinational companies and NGO's. The influence of foreigners, including their organizational capacity in light of new global linkages, is also starting to take hold. The evolution of globalization and national policies would form the basis for their political participation. While some may argue that we are far off away from any day that Taiwan's unique political situation becomes inclusive of foreigners' political inclinations, the pace of political change on the island is so dynamic that the influence of foreigner's political inclinations should not be neglected, in light of the need to find novel approaches to solve the current cross-Strait impasse.

4.3 Impact of Cosmpolitanism and the Flexible Eye on Taiwan

In light of the previous discussion about identity formation in the context of globalization, our study probes the possibility that a major aspect of foreigners' political inclinations is that they their experiences may have bequeathed to them a 'flexible eye' in interpreting the cross-Strait situation. For Jennie Germann Molz "the 'flexible eye' describes a particularly cospolitan perspectives derived through mobility, detachment and multiplicity as opposed to rooted-ness or national affiliation ... the 'flexible eye' serves as an apt metaphor for the spatial and civic affiliations enacted by round-the-world travelers."⁸⁹

For these people, according to U. Hannerz these people who begin to develop a cosmopolitan framework in formulating a worldview as a result of their world experiences the beholders demonstrates an 'orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other ... There is the aspect of state of readiness, a personal aility to make one's way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting."⁹⁰

This follows a Kantian vision. "Kant believed that the spread of commerce and the principles of republicanism could help foster cosmopolitan sentiments. As world citizens individuals would act to cancel the egoistic ambitions of individual states. Kant's

⁸⁹ Jennie Germann Molz, "Getting a 'Flexible Eye': Round the World Travel and Scales of Cosmopolitan Citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 9, No. 5 (2003): 517.

⁹⁰Ibid., 519.

vision of a peaceful cosmopolitan order based upon the obligation by states to settle their differences through the court of law has gained a new legitimacy in the post-Cold War era.”⁹¹

Thus at its core, cosmopolitanism can be seen as a strident call for the democratization of power on a global level and seeks to promote a universal *human* security that puts the concerns of international relations within a broader context of intrastate relations, the individual and individuals in a group or community.⁹² For Paul M. Evans cosmopolitanism’s concerns for human security has gained currency because of “post-Cold War security environment; the increasing significance of intrastate as compared to interstate conflict; the emergence of a new form of diplomacy that connects states, international institutions, and civil society actors; and, more fundamentally, the deepening of globalization that brings with it new information networks and media capacity, which have exacerbated the problems faced by failed and failing states, and which have produced new forces for democratization.”⁹³ The author contends there are three main approaches “those growing out of human rights and the rule of law traditions, those featuring safety of people, and those focusing on sustainable human development.”⁹⁴

Hence the mobility of foreigners, may in Stevenson’s view, may promote an inclinations among foreigners that are “able to offer substantial ethical arguments that move discussion beyond narrower concerns of ... neoliberalism and the certitudes of dogmatists ... Cosmopolitanism then resembles an interconnected mosaic of arguments and discourses rather than predetermined blueprints.” In this light, Stevenson argues that modern discourse had been shaped by the unfolding of the Cold War in a way that “issues such ecological awareness, the impact of global poverty, feminism and the participation racial and ethnic minorities cannot readily be integrated into a concern for territorial states.”⁹⁵

⁹¹ Stevenson, 251.

⁹² Paul M. Evans, “Human Security and East Asia: In the Beginning,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4 (2004): 265.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 266.

⁹⁵ Stevenson, 251-253.

In addition to analyzing how self-identifications are reconstructed in the face of globalization and to pinpoint the precise mechanisms involved in this process, the paper will also use in its assessment of foreigners' political inclinations literature that illuminate some of the ideologies that are inherited from the foreigners' homeland's history and institutions. Namely, we would also like to briefly assess the source of these values rather than merely accepting them *ipso facto*. By understanding the source and lineage of these ideas, a better understanding of how their political inclinations have changed since moving to Taiwan could be understood. In assessing these facets of foreigners' ideology, the work of Seymour Martin Lipsett will be drawn upon to analyze the ideological and cultural differences between American and Canadians. The author notes, for instance, that the two countries differ in their basic organizing principles:

Canada has been and is a more class-aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectivity-oriented and particularistic (group-oriented) society than the United States. These fundamental distinctions stem in large part from the American Revolution and the diverse social and environmental ecologies flowing from the division of British North America. The social effects of this separation were then reinforced by variations in literature, religious traditions, political and legal institutions and socioeconomic structures.⁹⁶

If in effect the cultural differences between these peoples' cultures can be traced to these distinctions, then if differences between Americans and Canadians, for example, might be traced to these factors. Specifically, the author notes that differences among the two nationalities can be seen, such as:

In Canada similar federal arrangements, but without the concomitant unifying myths of origin and foundation have ensured that within an overarching national legal and political framework, the ethnic communities enjoy wide powers in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Recently, after Quebec's silent revolution, there has been a growing commitment to multiculturalism and the ideal of a plural, polyethnic nation, so much so that, together with the effects of Quebecois secessionist tendencies, the very fabric of any historic identity sustaining the Canadian federation, has many would claim, been jeopardized.⁹⁷

Although Lipset's work covers only the cultural differences between Americans and Canadians, one might be able to extend his logic even further by analyzing whether those distinctions he cites to other nationalities. For instance, works that analyze these inclinations on specific national and cultural works include Michael Leifer's chapter, "The Changing Temper of Indonesian Nationalism" and "James Putzel's article "Social

⁹⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Continental Divide* (London: Routledge, 1991), 8.

⁹⁷ Smith, 109.

Capital and the Imagined Community: Democracy and Nationalism in the Philippines”,⁹⁸ both contained in *Asian Nationalism* as well as Robyn M. Rodriguez’s article “Migrant Heroes: Nationalism, Citizenship and the Politics of Filipino Migrant Labor”.

Indeed, the experience of Taiwan, as noted by A-chin Hsiao earlier, is unique though precisely because in words Taiwanese political nationalism never sprung from ‘diverse social and environmental ecologies’ as it did in other place. Here the author explores the contention fully:

“Unlike the nationalism of the Jews within the Russian Empire, the Slovaks within the Habsburg Empire, the Greeks within Ottoman Empire, and the Irish within the British Empire, the cultural work of Taiwanese dissident humanist intellectuals does not play the role of midwife to political nationalism. In a time when the nation-state became the dominant political framework of government, and the nation became the prevailing form of collective identity justifying action to gain or exercise power, the cultural elites of ethnic minorities within the old empires forged a sense of national identity by crating collective symbols, recovering and rewriting history, and reviving language and folklore, that is, by fostering a historical sense of national distinctiveness. The cultural elite’s articulation of a sense of national identity laid the foundations for national political mobilization.”⁹⁹

What we are proposing with the above examples, and with the analysis earlier about the ‘narrative of unfolding’ is that a multitude of resources can be drawn upon in identity construction, but the available fields of for the re-interpretation of identities depends highly on personal circumstances, as well as global circumstances that are beyond control of the individual unless they choose to migrate. Because of these unique experiences, both at the personal level, at the level of civil society and within the framework of the negotiation between globalizing forces and the state, and due to the fact that they have not opted to leave, leaves a diversity of viewpoints regarding the cross-Strait are likely to rise because of these competing fields, and yet they represent a very specialized view because they are not just any foreigners but foreigners in Taiwan. But as contended earlier, in this day of globalization, real changes are happening as a result of globalization, and foreigners can be seen as the products of it. Namely, notes T.G. McGee and Gisele Yasman,

“at a global level, the processes of labour formation in urban areas have been influenced by processes of economic restructuring, international investment, the collapse of socialist societies,

⁹⁸ Michael Leifer (ed.), *Asian Nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 2000).

⁹⁹ Hsiao, 180.

and technological advances in transportation and communication which have differential impacts on various components of the urban system of developing countries.”¹⁰⁰

Yet one should not over-emphasize the influence of global forces on our identities, and think that global concerns will become the most preminent field either, as in perhaps, the solidification of a global citizenry, a global government or a global civil society; indeed, based on present circumstances and the fundamentality of the nation, we may be far from it, as observed by Max Weber:

“There might exist global civil society in its relative infancy. And there might be a global market. There may even be some measures of global governance. But there is no institution that approaches the role of the Weberian state at the global level. There is no global sovereign who exercises a ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.’”¹⁰¹

Yet one cannot simply deny the fact that globalization as it relates to identity and its expression on political life is slowly emerging onto the fore, arguably with increasing momentum propelled by the very forces of globalization. Yet it would also be inaccurate to consider foreigners in Taiwan having significant political clout on the resolution of the cross-Strait conflict over locals — the implication of non-citizenship is of course many and varied.

But what I’m trying to suggest is that their experiences create discernable distinction on the cross-Strait issue, and the difference are quite unlike that of locals. In regards to globalization and their will or ability to translate into political change, however, the matter is still up for debate. Raffaele Marchetti illuminates some of the challenges that would continue to predominate at the global level:

“These intense processes of global transformation functionally require increased transnational cooperation, and yet pose a continuous challenge to the effectiveness and legitimacy of traditional political life. Participation remains a key element for reforming such an outdated political structure, thus enabling the proper tackling of global issues. The lack, at every level of activity, of legitimate political structures within which political agents – first and foremost individuals – can effectively influence social outcomes through expressing their free consent and exercising their capacity of autonomy, highlights the need for an adequate expansion of the democratic political system at the global level. A fundamental principle of justice thus demands the strengthening the transnational

¹⁰⁰ T.G. McGee and Gisele Yasman, “Work, Space, and Place in the Cities of the East Asian Pacific Rim” in *Culture and the City in East Asia*, ed. Won Bae Kim, Mike Douglass and Sang Chuel Choe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 71.

¹⁰¹ Max Weber, “Essays in Sociology,” in Bowden, 57.

institutions of democracy, with the intention of creating more inclusive mechanisms of democratic self-legislation in order to avoid the current high degree of international exclusion.¹⁰²

However, in the context of the present changes and challenges, one must not ignore the latency and potential of their the foreigner's political situation, a situation where both sides of the Strait are seeking inventive strategies that to resolve the political impasse based on both local interests and global realities.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter we have shown the underlying importance the emergence of globalizing institutions, nationalism, civic duty, mobility and persistence of cultural traditions plays a key role in engendering a contending voice, which helps to consolidate and diversify a new political voice to the locally debated issues regarding the cross-strait situation. We have also analyzed the ways in which one's conceptualization of self becomes reinterpreted by using a framework through the lens of one's space, comprising of habitus and field. We have shown how the space that foreigners would be able to operate and make decisions is being fundamentally altered by globalization.

The influence of foreigners, including their organizational capacity in light of the structural development to the economy and society, is also starting to take hold. However, the evolution of globalization, and national policies would continue to regulate the extent to which they can participate politically. For foreigners, though, globalization is not undermining the importance of their cultural or national heritage in terms of self-conceptualization. The underlying logic in cosmopolitanism is that globalization has helped to bring about new global concerns, which cannot be mitigated through the efforts of state action alone. As a emergent contending voice in Taiwan, which is but a product of globalization, understanding political inclinations of foreigners has become crucial.

¹⁰² Raffaele Marchetti, "Global Governance or World Federalism? A Cosmopolitan Dispute on Institutional Models," *Global Society* 20, no. 3. (July, 2006): 287-8.