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聯合國與國際衝突解決—聯合國在東南亞之衝突解決與

和平建立：一個少有大國參與的模式？（第1年）

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計畫主持人：黃奎博（政大外交系副教授）

共同主持人：

計畫參與人員：譚偉恩（政大外交系博士班）

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中、英文摘要：

本摘要報告說明研究背景與目的，探索東南亞地區以「聯合國政治事務局」(UNDPA)、
「聯合國發展計畫」(UNDP)為主的衝突解決與和平建立模式，指出此種模式在東南亞
的適用性仍未明確，而且美國與中共在其中的角色似乎不是像原計畫申請書中所推測
的那般消極。此外，本報告關於在紐約多所大學與研究機構及聯合國總部面談的情況多
所著墨，發現聯合國目前處理衝突解決的運作體制仍在調整當中，各單位之間的調適亦
尚待努力，或許會影響聯合國在此領域的表現。

This report touches upon the research background and objectives and explores the conflict resolution and peacebuilding model(s) based largely on the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the region of Southeast Asia. It indicates an uncertainty in the application of such models to Southeast Asia, as well as a possible finding that the roles of the United States and the People's Republic of China may not be as passive as the research proposal assumed. Besides, it focuses on the interviews conducted in the universities and research institutes and the United Nations headquarters, with a special attention to the fact that the ongoing adjustment of such models and the coordination among relevant U.N. agencies may influence the performance of the U.N. in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in this region.

前言：

東南亞在歷經柬埔寨問題後，聯合國在該地區衝突預防與解決的努力多半轉移至
「聯合國政治事務局」(United Nations Department of Political Affairs, UNDPA)與
「聯合國發展計畫」(United Nations Development Program, UNDP)之上。這些
單位與當地政府合作，建立民眾基本生活能力並消除貧窮的根源，藉以降低衝突
的可能性。這些揉合衝突解決與和平建立的方式，似已成爲聯合國在東南亞衝突
問題處理上的基本模式。

爲了進一步有效解決東南亞區域內衝突問題，聯合國與東南亞國協自 2001 年 1
月起，舉行了數次的「東南亞衝突預防、解決與和平建立會議」(Conference on
Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia)。2003
年時，東協也與「聯合國發展計畫」共同創立「東協-聯合國發展計畫伙伴建制」
(ASEAN-UNDP Partnership Facility)，集資美金約 1,500 萬元，希望促進東南亞
在人類安全、經濟全球化等議題的戰略對話上的層次。

研究目的：

安理會常任理事國的美國與中共，在東南亞地區競合的情況時有所聞。美國在「九
一一」事件後，將東南亞視爲全球反恐的「第二戰場」，所以重時期對東南亞的
重視，主動改善與東南亞主要國家的關係；當中共對東南亞經貿攻勢（以自由貿

易區為代表) 逐漸成形時, 美國更不願就此失去在東南亞的經貿優勢。中共則因歷史文化及廣土眾民影響, 對於周邊國家採取「捉大放小」的談判策略, 甚至有意無意地希望在東南亞地區成為一個「善霸」。因此, 以目前情況而言, 東南亞區域安全問題似不可能沒有大國的介入, 只是形式的差別或程度的高低罷了。

與此相關的是, 若無大國的積極參與或支持, 聯合國在東南亞的衝突解決與和平建立是否將難竟其功? 在第一年中, 本計畫由前述概念出發, 探討以下問題:

- 一、聯合國在冷戰結束後, 對於東南亞的衝突解決與和平建立有何作為? 其一致性又如何? 與相關的理論架構的分析有何異同?
- 二、以「聯合國政治事務局」、「聯合國發展計畫」為主的衝突解決與和平建立模式, 其本身有何利弊得失? 其又對於東南亞地區的和平與穩定有何正、負面的影響?

文獻探討：

與本研究相關的文獻為聯合國衝突解決或和平建立措施。在國內, 與聯合國衝突解決或和平建立措施相關的文章如鳳毛麟角, 近十年具代表性著作大概僅有楊永明〈聯合國維持和平行動之發展：冷戰後國際安全的轉變〉一文, 其中說明維和行動已經由預防外交擴增至許多國內行動(包括重建等艱鉅任務), 挑戰傳統國家主權原則, 且令國際和平與安全概念解釋空間為寬廣。¹在國外, 討論聯合國衝突解決與和平建立的機制已在所多有, 如Columbia University的Center for International Conflict Resolution、American University的Center for Global Peace、George Mason University的Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution、University of Bradford 的Center for Conflict Resolution、日本左藤康暢(Yasunobu Sato)成立的Peacebuilding Study Group 等。United Nations University 亦設有衝突資料服務(Conflict Data Service), 提供族群衝突及衝突解決的相關事件資料。²

討論聯合國衝突解決與和平建立的機制的專著亦甚多, 例如: Michael Doyle 的”War Making, Peace Making, and the United Nations”專書論文³(Doyle教授後來與Nicholas Sambanis於2006年將前述論點衍伸, 合著了*Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*專書⁴), 認為聯合國應針對不同區域問題制訂不同的維和行動, 而且聯合國對於正在發生的戰事獲爭端較無解

¹ 楊永明, 〈聯合國維持和平行動之發展：冷戰後國際安全的轉變〉, 《問題與研究》, 第36卷11期(1997年11月), 頁23-40。

² 關於「衝突資料服務」的內容, 參見<<http://incore.hq.unu.edu/>>, accessed on June 11, 2008。

³ Michael W. Doyle, “War Making, Peace Making, and the United Nations,” in Chester A. Xrocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 529-560.

⁴ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

決的能力，需要等到戰事或爭端結束幾年後，配合著經濟發展援助才能較為有效地減少衝突因子。

James Dobbins所著的*The UN's Role in Nation-Building*探討美國與聯合國如何在1990年代處理衝突後的和平建立，並提出多項歷史教訓供決策者參考，期使聯合國與相關行動可以更有效率。⁵類似，Anna K. Jarstad與Timothy D. Sisk合編*From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*一書，聚焦在恢復和平與穩定以及促進民主之間的討論，從較為政策分析的角度提出研析建議，警告決策者不要輕忽在衝突過後，因為在該地區推展民主化而帶來的負面效應。⁶Oli Brown等人編輯了*Trade, Aid and Security*一書，釐清貿易與援助政策對於國家及區域安全的影響，其結論仍是認為經濟援助與適當的貿易政策能夠促進區域穩定、恢復政治秩序。⁷

與本研究相關之國外學術著作多係針對聯合國衝突解決與和平建立之通論型文獻，在關係到聯合國在東南亞的相關措施時（亦即本研究第二年的進度），焦點仍多置東帝汶與柬埔寨，而在有關東協於東南亞衝突解決與和平建立之態度與政策、美國與中共又如何看待東南亞的相關議題時（亦即本研究第二、第三年的進度），文獻數量與質量極度不足。詳細內容，將於第二與第三年的進度報告中詳述。

研究方法：

本研究主題之研究方法主要是以鉅觀（macro）的歷史分析範式來處理聯合國在東南亞的衝突解決與和平建立措施，以演繹式的建構說明前述問題所探索的現象及範圍，並找出數個變項間的既存關係（命題敘述），探究是否這些既存關係是否有邏輯上的說服力。

根據前述說明，本研究於第一年期間設立一項經驗性命題：聯合國在冷戰後東南亞衝突解決與和平建立扮演直接且重要的角色。根據此一命題，本研究提出以下假設：聯合國在冷戰後東南亞衝突解決與和平建立為主要介入的第三方。若欲將前述命題轉換成操作化概念，則本研究之依變項為「有聯合國涉入的東南亞衝突解決與和平建立措施」，自變項則為「聯合國之相應作為」。

為充分瞭解相關行為者對於東南亞衝突解決與和平建立的態度與政策，並彌補相

⁵ James Dobbins, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).

⁶ Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁷ Oli Brown, et al., eds., *Trade, Aid and Security: An Agenda for Peace and Development* (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2007).

關資料不足的缺憾，利用訪談（田野調查法）亦可達到蒐集第一手資料的目的。因此，計畫主持人在第一年時已赴紐約聯合國政治事務局、Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies、哥倫比亞大學、紐約大學進行與聯合國官員與學者專家的訪談。訪的主要目的乃在於瞭解聯合國在衝突解決與和平建立方面的機會與困境，順便探知相關官員對於在東南亞地區推動任務時，如何處理與東協及美、中大國的關係。

結果與討論：

本研究計畫並不追求國際關係理論上的突破，而是希望藉著實證及歷史研究目前東南亞地區有聯合國涉入的衝突解決與和平建立進程，瞭解聯合國與東協合作的模式是否可以在少有大國的情況下，達成雙方原先預設的目標。

聯合國、美國、中共涉入東南亞衝突解決與和平建立的學術文獻數量有限，在國內更屬稀少，故若能以演繹與實證分析兼顧的研究方式深入瞭解此一議題，有利於國內學界拓展對於相關議題（聯合國衝突解決與和平建立、其在東南亞的相關作為、美國與中共對前述議題之態度與政策等）的瞭解。當有關聯合國於東南亞衝突解決與和平建立之態度與政策，以及美國與中共如何看待前述相關問題之文獻數量與質量仍非常缺乏時，本三年期研究應可適度地填補此塊空缺。

根據文獻指出，近年來區域和平的維持與經濟發展（尤其是透過國際組織的介入）關係愈來愈密切。由於區域衝突將嚴重影響到區域國家的經濟發展，因此聯合國希望世界銀行（World Bank）等國際性組織能協力共同預防衝突。世界銀行在其報告中指出，武裝衝突往往嚴重減緩國家的發展，在低收入國家尤其如此。不但影響農業生產及社會、經濟和物質方面的基礎設施。衝突地區的局勢不穩定將造成大規模的難民移動。此外，衝突的影響也不限於衝突本身，高昂的社會代價，像是資金外流、死亡率和衛生條件惡化，也是極為需要被解決的問題。⁸相較之下，聯合國與國際貨幣基金組織（International Monetary Fund）在關於衝突預防上的聯繫與合作還處於初步階段，未來有可能朝向確保其貸款政策不會使得受援助的國家經濟情況與社會緊張關係加劇，同時不會造成國內因為貧富過於懸殊而引起衝突爆發。此外，其在評定貸款的審核機制上，可能將更會考慮從預防受援助國家能否避免衝突或抑制衝突的角度切入。⁹

⁸ “Alleviating Poverty in the Midst of Conflict,” at: <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/2ee>, accessed on May 25, 2008.

⁹ “The World Bank and Conflict,” at: <http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-19115>, accessed on May 25, 2008.

聯合國對於衝突解決與和平建立所做的努力毀譽參半，資金的不足也始終是一個很嚴重的問題。在東南亞地區，聯合國配合東協的運作，輔以「聯合國政治事務局」、「聯合國發展計畫」的衝突解決與和平建立模式，在適用性上仍值得探討，因為聯合國在該地區並無與之相關的常駐人力，且東協諸國政府對於聯合國的介入仍抱持些許疑慮，所以配合度不高。

以「聯合國發展計畫」為例，其認為援助與提供國家或衝突地方發展所需時，必須要能同時減少助長暴力衝突的結構性風險。特別是在不公平（處理辦法是消除不同團體之間的差異）、不平等（消除使歧視制度化的政策和做法）、不安全（強化施政透明度和人身安全保障措施），及正義（促進法治和公正的司法）等方面。為了落實這樣的目標，結合發展與援助的維和行動需要建立在暴力衝突發生前加強處理、管理和消除緊張關係的能力，其中包括協助衝突地區的政治環境改善，以應付不穩定的局勢，加強當地的司法與解決衝突的機制、培養消除衝突的技巧方法、建立共識和對話管道、促進重要的民生經濟建設等。¹⁰以目前實際運作的情形來看，其在有可能發生衝突或已經發生衝突的國家中的援助活動占其所有行動方案與活動的一半以上，且年度預算超過12億美元。此外，若干行動方案涉及資助跨界問題方面的區域合作，例如圖們江流域的開發計畫（Tumen River Area Development Program）。¹¹類似的計畫與行動對於預防衝突具有關鍵性的影響，同時對於衝突後的局勢穩定亦有所裨益。

在東南亞地區，自1993年起，「聯合國發展計畫」開始提供越南行政改革之相關援助，並協助越南政府制訂行政程序法、民法，重整經濟事務相關部會的組織。1997年時，越南政府進一步配合國際反貪污的行動，在「聯合國發展計畫」的協助下通過公務員法與貪污防止法。¹²此外，像是「聯合國發展計畫」在柬埔寨的區域發展方案、解除武裝與重返社會方案等等，也算是預防衝突工作的重點項目。¹³

在面談中也發現，聯合國目前處理衝突解決的運作體制仍在調整當中，各單位之間的調適亦尚待努力，或許會影響聯合國在此領域的表現。

¹⁰ “High Risk of Civil War in Southern Thailand,” at:

<http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=8547>, accessed on May 25, 2008.

¹¹ Andrew Marton, Terry McGee, and Donald G. Paterson, “Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation and the Tumen River Area Development Project,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 27.

¹² Martin Painter, “Public Administration Reform in Vietnam: Problems and Prospects,” *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (December 2002), pp. 259-271.

¹³ 結合發展與援助工作的維和行動著重於衝突預防，較常被探討之例多半是在歐洲地區，例如UNDP在羅馬尼亞、保加利亞、馬其頓、烏克蘭等國執行的專案，其目的是加強政府和民間社會內部的衝突管理和解決能力。此外，以聯合國糧農組織（Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO）為主要負責機構的「非洲之角」（Horn of Africa）計畫，在該域落實糧食安全方案作為衝突預防、管理和解決危機能力的重要基礎，請參考”Strategy to End Hunger in the Horn of Africa,” at: <http://www.fao.org/News/2000/001004-e.htm>, accessed on May 25, 2008.

至於美國與中共在東南亞衝突解決與和平建立的角色，在面談結束後，計畫主持人感覺到他們的角色似乎不是像原計畫申請書中所推測的那般消極。但實際情況如何，尚待計畫執行的第二年實地執行面談與田野調查才能做初步判斷。

在探討完聯合國衝突解決與和平建立機制、廿一世紀初葉東南亞區域衝突解決與和平建立模式後，預計將研究心得投稿國內期刊。在此之前，計畫主持人將於民國九十七年七月下旬前往斯洛維尼亞參加第二屆「世界國際研究會議」（World International Studies Conference, WISC）年會，並發表「An Emerging Humanitarian Component in the ASEAN Community: Past, Present and Future」論文一篇，由人道（人權）角度切入，探討東協如何處理其政治安全共同體（ASEAN Political and Security Community）與社會文化共同體（ASEAN Social and Cultural Community）中的人道干預、人權維護等議題，並將其與東南亞衝突解決、和平建立做研究上的連結。

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附錄、赴美國紐約訪談心得報告（民國九十七年四月二日至六日）

一、飛行安排：

04 月 01 日(二) 出發：台灣桃園國際機場(TAIPEI) 1615 經濟艙(H) / 機位：OK /
中華航空(CI-012) 飛行 17 小時 50 分 / 中間停靠 1 站
抵達：甘迺迪(紐約)(JFK) 2205 波音 747-400

04 月 06 日(日) 出發：甘迺迪(紐約)(JFK) 2345 經濟艙(H) / 機位：OK /
中華航空(CI-011) 飛行 18 小時 20 分 / 中間停靠 1 站

04 月 08 日(二) 抵達：台灣桃園國際機場(TAIPEI) 0605 波音 747-400

二、訪談安排：

四月二日下午：Michael W. Doyle, Harold Brown Professor of Columbia University

四月三日上午：Nicole Deller, Director of Programs, Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, Ralph Bunche Institute for International
Studies

四月三日中午：William C. Vocke, Jr., Senior Fellow, Carnegie Council for Ethics in
International Affairs

四月三日下午：Michael Gilligan, Associate Professor of New York University

四月四日上午：Mari Yamashita, Senior Political Affairs Officer & Southeast Asia
Team Leader, U.N. Department of Political Affairs

三、訪談摘要：

Michael W. Doyle:

1. The quality of thinking about UNPKO has improved since the 1990s. Before that, little technical learning could be found. The Brahimi Report recommended sweeping changes in the way that UN peacekeeping and associated post-conflict peacebuilding are conceived: “No access without strategy.”

2. The UN began to hire good young staff for PKO planning in the beginning of the 2000s. Also, better logistics were offered. “Intelligence and access” are two important supporting factors for UNPKO.
3. Member states’ willingness play a key role.
4. In the case of Cambodia in the 1980s, there were some disagreements between the US and the PRC, but a resolution came out at last. Such a resolution rested on an interim (not coalition) government of Cambodia. That was the very first time that the PRC send peacekeepers to Cambodia.
5. In the case of East Timor, the PRC did not force Indonesia to give up the latter’s sovereignty but failed to prevent the US from pressurizing Habibi from compromising with the US.
6. In cases of Macedonia and Guatemala, the US and the PRC did not cooperate well.
7. Southeast Asia is not on the priority list of the US government. The relationship between Myanmar and the PRC seems to be what the US has been concerned about. (KBH: The US and the PRC cooperated before the 1990s, but why not after the 1990s?)
8. UNPKO should be useful and necessary. Whether or not separation is good? From logistics and policy perspectives, separation may not be always right.
9. UNDEF that receives state governments’ donations can work on peacebuilding. It also receives applications from states and NGOs for the peacebuilding missions.
10. Is a major goal of UNPKO to build peace? Not really. To build sustainable peace is a better way to describe it. The UN has valued democracy, but not if promotion would lead to civil war. Sometimes democracy is a means to peace agreements. There is one case significant for pushing democracy, that is, Bosnia with the Bill Clinton administration’s engagement.
11. Most of the pressure came from internal forces, for example, the cases of El Salvador PKO, the Angola PKO, and so on, because these will decide who is going to rule the country.
12. In cases, only few of them are real for democracy. For most others, democracy is better than power-sharing. If no compromise between domestic factions, people in the UN may tend to work on the promotion of democracy.

Nicole Deller:

1. “Responsibility to protect” (R2P) thinks that states should protect their own people and save people in peaceful ways. Military means are the last resort.

R2P should mobilize to prevent people from being killed at the very beginning, not a political campaign or slogan only.

2. UN Special Advisor of the Secretary General for the Prevention of Genocide (Juan E. Méndez) and UN Special Representative on Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities (Francis Deng) have to do with R2P.
3. At the end of August 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon sent a letter to the UN Security Council President, Mr. Pascal Guyama, proposing the creation of the position of Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect. The position, acknowledged by the Security Council, is part-time and on the Assistant Secretary-General level with the main functions of “conceptual development and consensus building” for the responsibility to protect. The Special Advisor on the R2P, Edward Luck, will work closely with the Office of the Special Representative on Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities.
4. In the case of Myanmar, the US contacted the PRC many times and felt that the PRC should deal with it carefully and responsibly. Probably in 2006, a UNSG resolution was vetoed by the PRC.
5. A serious problem faced with R2P is: How actions are being formulated within the UN? Generally speaking, it is now the UNGA takes R2P into effect. In the past, the UN has talked about R2P but never seriously thought about fulfilling R2P. Perhaps R2P can be a set of norms (but this part is not very clear yet).

William Vocke:

1. Maybe the UN needs to implement more public diplomacy to spread its ideas of PKO to the developing countries.
2. With the veto power possessed by the five permanent members of the Security Council, UNPKO has been more or less politicized, and the UN staff can do nothing about it.
3. The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs takes UNPKO into serious account and would like to promote the awareness of such issues via a newly established project “The Carnegie Ethics Center.”

Michael Gilligan:

1. Basically UNPKO is doing all right. The UN and its member states involved sent troops to the cases that needed most. UNPKO can deal with prolonged

conflict (but the failure in Somalia is an opposite case – the UN succeeded in providing food and preventing people from being killed).

2. The UN “Reintegration Program” does not seem to be a good job. For example, Columbia’s assistance program is locally initiated. It is relatively good because it was able to offer job opportunities and teach people how to make their own livings. However, the central government has to agree, so that the program can move on.
3. UNDP’s and UNPKO’s enlargement and division of labor do not seem quite right. Besides, the US may not be going to empower the UN with more intelligence capabilities. With regard to the US attitude toward UNPKO, John McCain could go with it, and the democratic candidate’s attitude is unknown.
4. The ultimate goal of UNPKO is democracy. Lots of decisionmakers from western countries would think so as well. But the record of UNPKO indicates that the UNPKO in this regard may be underachieved, not to mention that local governments may not want real democracy at all. (The cases of Libya and Rwanda look Okay.)

Mari Yamashita:

1. UNPKO has been used to deal with residuals of the Cold War. It needs superpowers’ cooperation and comes up with a resolution at the UNSG. In Nepal, it was a UNDP-led operation. In East Timor, the US and the PRC reached some sort of agreement. In Mindanao, the Philippines, there has not been any resolution inside the UN. Where there are vested interests of superpowers, UN activities can hardly be seen.
2. Now UNPKO is under special representative(s) of the Secretary General. UNPKO now has more policy component, at the request of the UN member states.
3. Secretary General Ban proposed to split of UNDPKO and UNDSS. That was a top-down decision, because he thought some PKOs did not involve any military actions and could be put in two different categories. UNDSS still has to report to UNDPKO.
4. The UNDP-ASEAN annual conference was suspended because of the funding problem. If it can move on, it should be promoted to a concrete level and practices; UNDP can identify possible fields of cooperation.
5. The goal of UNPKO is simply to restore order and peace. When the stage of peacebuilding comes, human rights, development, and many other human security objectives become part of the ultimate goal of the UN.