Diaspora Diplomacy and Capacity Building between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Taiwan加勒比海共同體（CARICOM）與台灣之間的僑民外交及能力養成

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July 2015
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July 2015

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Abstract

Through the availability of educational scholarships and cooperation exchanges offered by Japan, China and Taiwan to CARICOM nationals, a resource of human capital is present in the Asia-Pacific that has not been utilized. This diaspora is of mutual benefit to both regions in several ways, and is in need of specific mechanisms and structures to ensure effective diaspora mobilization. The thesis aims to re-introduce the topic of diaspora diplomacy and present its potential towards the creation of a collective CARICOM-specific initiative in Taiwan. These recommendations take into consideration the limitations and specificity of this case. Through the inclusion of document analyses, relevant supplementary studies, interviews and surveys, recommendations for a collective diaspora engagement strategy have been proposed. Thus, the research findings reiterated the potential of the diaspora in Taiwan, their willingness to be involved and emphasized the need for further engagement and diaspora mobilization to take place. This thesis, in its novelty serves as an impetus for additional research and much needed discussion with regards to diaspora engagement.

Keywords: CARICOM, Diaspora diplomacy, Capacity building, Students
摘要

多年來，日本、中國大陸與台灣為加勒比海共同體，透過提供獎學金與合作交流等策略，來加強人力資本的開發。儘管如此，這些雙方的國際合作，並未在亞太地區獲得足夠的重視。尤其對於各方有利的僑民外交，更需要建構足夠的機制與制度，來建構彼此的僑民交流成效。有鑑於此，本研究擬重新檢視並探討僑民外交中，台、加雙方如何建立一個以加勒比海共同體為主的合作交流機制，及其對於雙方之可能影響。研究方法採用文件分析、訪談與問卷等方式，進行資料蒐集。研究結果發現，如何妥善運用在台的加勒比海共同體的僑民，尤其是來台的留學生等人力資源，以加強上述地區民眾的僑民外交能力養成，將有助於雙方未來進一步的交流與合作。論文最後並提出若干加強台、加兩地僑民外交的具體建議，也進一步呼籲未來學界投入相關研究之必要性。

關鍵字：勒比海共同體，僑民外交，能力養成，留學生
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## Acronyms

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<thead>
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<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOSIS</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA-TS</td>
<td>African students Association in Telangana State (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUN</td>
<td>ASEAN University Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGYPN</td>
<td>CARICOM Global Youth and Professionals Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFCOR</td>
<td>Council of Foreign and Community Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICHET</td>
<td>Foundation of International Cooperation and Higher Education in Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICDF</td>
<td>International Cultural and Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFI</td>
<td>International Congress for Fiji Indians Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information, Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>International Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JET</td>
<td>Japan Exchange and Teaching Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPI</td>
<td>Migration Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASJ</td>
<td>Network of African Students in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Island Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVC</td>
<td>Pacific Youth Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCEF</td>
<td>Quanta Culture and Education Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island Developing States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>The United Nation’s Conference on Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USLOA</td>
<td>Union of Saint Lucian Overseas Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWI</td>
<td>University of the West Indies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Research Background

Migration has produced positive and negative effects on nations and regions. In 2011, The Economist (2011) stated that diaspora communities (particularly first-generation migrants) accounted for 3% of the world’s total population. The mass movement of peoples to more and less developed countries alike has led to a depletion of much needed talent and human capital in countries of origin. Small-island developing states (SIDS) in the Caribbean are not exempt from this extra-regional migratory trend. However, with increased diaspora communities abroad, their home countries have also benefited in several ways.

Diaspora communities aid in the social and economic development of their home countries through remittances and additional capital flows of foreign exchange. Additionally, the diaspora has allowed local Caribbean businesses to enter into extra-regional markets. Most importantly, diaspora communities serve the purpose of enhancing global awareness and cultural sensitivity of their host countries. Their presence and innate need for cultural expression has fostered people-to-people interactions, spurred activism and engagement. This draws attention to diaspora diplomacy and its importance in national and regional foreign relations approaches.

Diaspora Diplomacy is noted as having three lucrative characteristics: (i) it promotes trust, (ii) spurs creativity and collaboration and (iii) allows for the ease and speed of communication links (Economist, 2011). Through mass emigration of Caribbean nationals to the United States, Europe, Canada and Latin America, the region’s rich culture has further diversified the socio-cultural fabric of these host countries. The Asia-Pacific region, in recent years, has also become a destination of a small portion of these migration flows.
Through the availability of scholarships and training programs offered by Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea to nationals of Caribbean countries, an untapped resource of human capital exists in Asia-Pacific. This resource has the potential to augment in a real and beneficial way the formal foreign relation efforts between regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Asia-Pacific. This can be especially enhanced through fostered cultural interactions between the two regions.

CARICOM was formed in 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in Trinidad and Tobago. However, The Community’s origins trace back to the West Indies Federation of 1958. Birthed from the Caribbean Federation Act two years prior, the West Indies Federation was the region’s first attempt at integration which at the time comprised the British-Caribbean colonies. Presently, CARICOM officially consists of 15 island nations and land-locked territories namely, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

The Caribbean Community’s foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific does not exist as a jointly constructed policy. Rather, the Caribbean region’s approach to the Asia-Pacific region exist as separate approaches of individual countries and are based on a variety of factors including, national, economic and development goals and the respective foreign policy positions on certain issues, such as the ‘One China’ policy. Yet, it is the Caribbean region’s vibrant and eclectic culture that has transcended political and economic barriers, allowing for widespread opportunities for building and strengthening relations among countries.

As of April 2nd 2015, the National Immigration Agency of Taiwan totaled the number of foreign residents in Taiwan at over 636,000. This figure accounts for nearly 3% of Taiwan’s total population of 23.4 million people. Of this statistic, 386 foreign nationals come from 11 CARICOM member states which in turn represent 0.06% of Taiwan’s total international community (National Immigration Agency, Table 1).
### Table 1. Population of CARICOM Nationals in Taiwan (April 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>386</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of the 11 CARICOM countries listed above, Taiwan has established formal diplomatic relations with Haiti (1956), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1981), Saint Kitts and Nevis (1983), Belize (1989) and Saint Lucia (1984-1997, 2007). Though a small percentage of the foreign population in Taiwan, the CARICOM diaspora can serve as a vital and viable link that can produce avenues for enhanced cooperation and long-lasting friendship.

In presenting the potential of CARICOM nationals in Taiwan, the study aims to incite thorough discussion on the topic of collective CARICOM diaspora engagement in Asia-Pacific; influencing a critical review of the foreign policy frameworks and promote targeted investments in cultural policy and diaspora engagement between CARICOM and Asia-Pacific states.

### 1.2 Research Motivation and Rationale

People-to-people interactions carry a strong, enduring impact on the way in which people view the world, the people in it and themselves. Globalization and migration, though with
its negative aspects has created global villages; hubs for cross-cultural exchanges. As countries try to compete economically and developmentally, what tends to be overlooked is how aware people are of those of different creeds and cultures in their respective homelands.

In the rather homogenous societies of Asia-Pacific, the presence of multicultural communities is important to breaking down barriers, while promoting a spirit of social cohesion. In this way, hospitable social and economic environments can be created that effectively utilize the knowledge gained from sustained interactions between local and foreign communities. The connection between the Caribbean region and Asia-Pacific is not as distant as would be presumed. As will be explained further, relations between the Caribbean region and Asia-Pacific go beyond political recognition and dollar diplomacy. Yet, it is not sufficient to solely focus on this link as through the presence of the Caribbean diaspora a multidimensional learning experience laden with opportunities for even further connection and investment exists.

The Caribbean diaspora serves as the region’s collective voice around the world. Strengthening this voice via equipping and utilizing these communities ensures that it is heard. As small-island developing states, this voice is imperative to ensuring the well-being of countries and their citizens amidst their respective challenges. Cultural expression serves as the outward preservation and affirmation of Caribbean identity. To aid in the enablement and engagement of the Caribbean diaspora only enforces Taiwan’s view on identity as an important component of national sovereignty. For CARICOM to aid in this process by supporting its nationals in Taiwan, the link between the diaspora and the home region is bolstered. Additionally, there is a transfer of cultural knowledge that can further prepare the region for Asia-Pacific investment in innovative and sustainable sectors.

In writing this thesis, there is a realization that the role of the diaspora in Taiwan is not only restricted to a certain demographic. The research provides an outlet; serving as a means for the community in Taiwan to expand their capacities and for the Caribbean
Community to understand that the presence of the diaspora in Taiwan is an opportunity abundant with potential. This research gives purpose and validation to a community limited by size and other disadvantages. It also aids in reducing the time taken to consider what would need to be done by actualizing it through specific practical recommendations. In so doing, the community, though small and distant is not rendered incapable.

1.3 Research Goals and Questions

The thesis presents diaspora diplomacy as an important option worthy of consideration by the CARICOM member states, where the cross-cultural exchange is maximized for the continued strengthening of relations between the two regions and the furtherance of their development goals. More specifically, this thesis seeks to achieve the following goals:

1. To present relevant national and regional diaspora-based strategies that may be employed collectively by CARICOM countries to strengthen relations between CARICOM and Taiwan.

2. To propose a strategy for active citizen mobilization of CARICOM nationals in Taiwan, by identifying and presenting potential opportunities for maximum engagement.

The thesis will also seek to answer the following questions:

1. What tangible, mutual socio-economic benefits have such strategies produced in both the countries of origin and the host countries?
2. What specific aspects of regional diaspora-based diplomacy strategies can be applied to the CARICOM-Taiwan context?
3. In what ways can the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan enhance the environment and opportunities presented to them by their host country?
4. What obstacles must be addressed if the projected benefits are to be achieved?
5. Could such strategies progress to noted significance that could warrant concern amidst tension brought on by the ‘One China’ Policy?
1.4 Methodology

In aiming to answer the questions and address the above-stated goals, this thesis comprises of a literature review combined with analysis of selected national and regional diaspora-based policies and strategies. The thesis is also informed by in-depth face-to-face and email interviews with relevant parties. The paper presents diaspora diplomacy as an important option worthy of consideration by the CARICOM member states. It concludes with several policy recommendations and limitations as they pertain to the aforementioned goals of this research. The paper presents diaspora diplomacy as an important option worthy of consideration by the CARICOM member states, whereby cross-cultural exchanges in the host countries are maximized for the continued strengthening of relations between the two regions and the furtherance of their development goals.

Document Analysis

The research review and analysis section provides concise introduction to CARICOM, and CARICOM-Asia-Pacific relations. By addressing, Japan, China and Taiwan’s relations with CARICOM and its member states, the reader is presented with a general overview of how Asia-Pacific states have become important to CARICOM and vice versa. The thesis addresses what connects the two regions politically, economically, historically and socially. In addition, the thesis highlights the importance of the diaspora culture, capacity building and civic engagement in the development of their home territories and host countries.

In-depth Interviews

As the thesis sought to present diaspora engagement in Taiwan as an undertaking of the Caribbean Community, three (3) in-depth interviews were conducted with the
Ambassadors of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Belize and the Director-General of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). These three interviews were conducted in order to determine the probability of a collective CARICOM diaspora policy in Asia-Pacific, what this policy would entail, and how can the diaspora be mobilized effectively in this regard. Additionally, two representatives from the Foundation for International Cooperation in Higher Education (FICHET) and the Quanta Culture and Education Foundation (QCEF) were also interviewed. These non-profit organizations were targeted for the sole purpose of understanding how the international community is incorporated into their missions.

**Analysis of diaspora-based policies**

Two pertinent examples from the Caribbean were included in this research. In so doing, the analysis of these supplementary case studies highlighted areas of much needed development if a diaspora initiative in Taiwan were to come to fruition. Recommendations were subsequently made for the purpose of creating a CARICOM Diaspora policy specific to the peculiarities of Taiwan.
**Definition of Terms:**

**Diaspora diplomacy**
Diaspora diplomacy is a style of diplomacy whereby the role of diaspora communities extends into diplomatic and foreign policy-making processes (Mwagiru, 2012, p.76). The Economist (2011) notes diaspora diplomacy as having three lucrative characteristics: trust, creativity and collaboration, and communication.

**Capacity Building**
At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environmental Development (UNCED), capacity building was defined as a country’s human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional and resource capabilities “.....enhanc[ing] the ability to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development options, based on an understanding of environment potentials and limits and of needs......" perceived by the people of the country concerned”. It describes a long term process that, according to the Urban Capacity Building Network’s definition, includes providing people with the necessary resources and creating an enabling environment to allow them to be effective in their actions. (Global Development Research Center).

**Cultural Diplomacy**
Cultural Diplomacy is defined by the U.S. State Department as the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects among nations and their peoples in order to form mutual understanding\(^1\).

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\(^1\) Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy, U.S. Department of State, September 2005
1.5 Research Limitations

This thesis is by no means exhaustive. Surveys were designed to gather qualitative and quantitative data on the CARICOM diaspora’s perceptions of their presence in Taiwan and their interest and willingness to be involved in engagement strategies. Though these surveys provided a quantitative and qualitative input to this research, a more in-depth follow up study would be suggested for future research on this topic.

Literature on the role of the Diaspora in CARICOM policy is not as abundant as would have been expected, especially in relation to Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific. In designing a policy geared towards a non-Western country and region, a lot of factors need to be taken into consideration. For a CARICOM-Asia-Pacific culture-based diaspora policy to be considered plausible, various factors that may have gone unnoticed in this study would need to be further researched and addressed.

Restricted to Taiwan, the study does not incorporate contributions from the CARICOM diaspora in Japan, South Korea and China. Inclusion of data from these countries would provide a more all-encompassing image as to the plausibility and effectiveness of the proposal being put forward.

It would also have proven interesting to compare the culture-based and diaspora policies of the member states of the Caribbean Community and other SIDS regional blocs such as the Pacific Island Forum. In so doing, additional evidence to support the argument that SIDS regional blocs can benefit from collective culture-based and diaspora-based approaches could be further reinforced.

It is hoped that future research will be able to explore the communities in these countries and ultimately combine the studies into a formal document.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Strength in Many: SIDS and Regional Blocs

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 recognized Small Island Developing States (SIDS) as a distinct group of nations with peculiar characteristics that warrants special consideration and assistance (Bass: Clayton, 1995). Though not unanimously accepted, the definition of SIDS includes the following characteristics: size, remoteness, vulnerability to external shocks, narrow resource base, and exposure to global environmental challenges².

*The Barbados Programme of Action* (1992) and the *Mauritius Strategy of Implementation* (2008) echoed the complexity of the situation faced by 38 UN-recognized island states across the Caribbean, Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Asia-Pacific region³. These challenges include, but are not limited to problems and disparities caused by increased globalization, trade liberalization benefits, and depletion of natural resources. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) serves as the main all-encompassing negotiating body that also includes non-UN recognized territories. Other international bodies of which SIDS are members includes the Commonwealth of Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the African Caribbean Pacific Group of States (ACP).

In addition to CARICOM (Caribbean Community), other regional blocs such as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) serve as specific hubs for cooperation and integration among SIDS, based on their geographic location.

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is a sub-regional bloc consisting of nine member states in the English speaking Eastern Caribbean. The Organization was

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²Definition of SIDS is derived from the Developing States Network, About Us. http://www.sidsnet.org/
established to promote cooperation on defense issues, international diplomacy and economic policies. Six of the OECS member states namely, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Grenada and Antigua and Barbuda are also members of CARICOM.

The Pacific Island Forum is an inter-governmental organization that acts as the collective body of 16 independent nation states. Founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum, the PIF seeks to effectively implement executive decisions that are in the best interest of the people in the Pacific. The organization’s goals include strengthening regional cooperation and integration, policy formation and enhancing the political governance and security for the region⁴.

Due to their unique situations, SIDS and their respective regional groupings have focused on (and continue to focus on) developing policies and strategies aimed at addressing their individual and collective challenges and needs.

With the current global shift towards the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan, China, Japan and South Korea (for example) have been increasingly reaching out to lesser developed nations in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Japan conducts negotiations with CARICOM as a bloc as well as bilaterally. These efforts include tailored strategies based on the needs and circumstances of target nation states, and/or collective approaches based on the goals of regional organizations. Most of these efforts have been made in the area of climate change and sustainable development, information technology, infrastructure, agriculture, fisheries and marine resources.

In light of the aforementioned challenges affecting small-island developing states, their foreign policies have been designed and implemented to compensate for such limitations by relying on cooperation with intra-regional actors with like challenges, and by seeking assistance from more developed extra-regional nations.

Discourse on the most effective approaches to small-island state foreign policy includes multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism. Keohane (1990) defines multilateralism as the coordination of policies by three or more countries via institutions or makeshift arrangements. Regionalism stresses the importance of the collective unit and involves formal, informal, institutional and non-institutional relations among countries of the same geographic grouping (Riedel, 2004). This thesis argues for multilateralism as the most suitable approach via the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan and by extension, the Asia-Pacific. First, an introduction to CARICOM and its relations to the Asia-Pacific will be presented.

2.2 CARICOM: The Caribbean Community

Girvan echoes the importance of stating the context within which the definition of the Caribbean region should be framed (Girvan, 2001). In answering the question ‘What is the Caribbean?’ the author illustrates the concept of “Many Caribbeans” based on several interpretations according to their ethno-historical, geo-political, geo-economic or neo-colonial peculiarities as seen in the table below.

Table 2. Definitions of “Many Caribbeans”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Characterisation</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Basin (US)</td>
<td>Mainland &amp; islands</td>
<td>Geo-political/hegemonic</td>
<td>CBI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Caribbean 1 (“El Gran Caribe”)</td>
<td>Mainland &amp; islands</td>
<td>Geo-economic/co-operative</td>
<td>ACS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Caribbean 2 (“El Gran Caribe”)</td>
<td>Mainland &amp; islands</td>
<td>Geo-social/counter-hegemonic</td>
<td>CRIES, Civil Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation Caribbean or “African Central America”</td>
<td>Islands, the three Guianas, and “Caribbean”/black communities on the mainland</td>
<td>Ethno-historic/counter-hegemonic</td>
<td>CSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insular or Island Caribbean</td>
<td>Islands, the three Guianas and Belize</td>
<td>Ethno-historic</td>
<td>CDCC, ACE, CPDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean of CARICOM</td>
<td>Anglophone states, Suriname, Monsterrat</td>
<td>Economic co-operative, strong cultural &amp; linguistic ties</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean of ACP</td>
<td>CARICOM, Dominican Republic, Haiti</td>
<td>Neo-colonial/negotiation, in transition</td>
<td>CARIFORUM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This paper will adopt the ‘Caribbean of CARICOM’ definition of the region.

**Brief History of the Caribbean Community**

CARICOM first came into existence in 1973 through the Treaty of Chaguaramas signed in Trinidad and Tobago. It was the transformation of the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement (CARIFTA) of 1968. But its origins began a decade earlier.

The West Indies Federation of 1958 was the Caribbean’s first attempt at regional integration. Birthed from the Caribbean Federation Act two years prior, the West Indies Federation initially consisted of British Caribbean territories: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, the then St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago that had not yet gained independence from England and relied heavily on agricultural–based economies (CARICOM, 2011).

During the British colonial era, Caribbean countries were prime exporters of agricultural related products (sugarcane, molasses, bananas, tobacco and cotton) to Britain and the United States. This continued through to the late 19th Century and early 20th Century with the mining of bauxite taking over during the 1980s. Even as each country became independent during the mid-late 20th Century, agriculture was still regarded as the primary form of economic sustenance for the region.

However, the Federation’s main focus was to establish a collective political alliance among the ten territories rather than engage in economic integration. Free Trade among these territories was not an avenue that was considered during the Federation’s four year life-span (CARICOM, 2011). In the same spirit of cooperation that was present during the final days of the West Indies Federation, the British Caribbean then sought to include the South American territory of Guyana and the Central American territory of Belize. However, when Trinidad & Tobago gained independence in 1960 with Jamaica following their lead in 1961, the eventual dissolution of the West Indies Federation helped to create the structure of what CARICOM is today (CARICOM, 2011).
2.3 Overview of CARICOM-Asia-Pacific Relations

The dissolution of the West Indies Federation and the gradual movement of the countries into independence gave them full control over their international affairs and the ability to enter into bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries.

The Caribbean Community’s connection with the Asia-Pacific was initially set within the parameters of the Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the British Commonwealth. Relations were limited based on a shared history of British colonization, along with ethno-historic ties represented by migrants who came to the region. The latter set the premise for cultural and diplomatic ties to be established between specific CARICOM states and their counterparts in the Asia-Pacific.

By the 1980s, the emergence of new economies in the Asia-Pacific (including Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea among others) along with the increasing number of newly independent states and regional hubs in the Caribbean, the ensuing environment became conducive (particularly from CARICOM’s end) to pursue further relations with the Asia-Pacific politically, diplomatically and economically.

With regards to global trade and commercial interaction with the Caribbean region in 2013, the region’s top two major trading partners were the United States and the European Union respectively. The majority of trade was done in agriculture, mining and fuels, as well as the manufacturing sectors. In that same year China, Japan and South Korea listed among the Caribbean region’s top 10 major trading partners. China and Japan are placed in the top 10 with the United States and Europe being the region’s top trading partners. China, Japan and South Korea combined, account for almost 10% of major trade with the Caribbean (European Commission 2013).

Trade between CARICOM states and the Asia-Pacific during the mid-1990s was notably inconsistent and saw more products being imported by CARICOM states compared to products being exported to Japan, Taiwan, China, ASEAN and Korea. In light of the lack of natural resources and large-scale manufacturing facilities, what CARICOM states could not make up for economically was counteracted by earnest diplomatic efforts.
Soon, high level visits between CARICOM member states and countries in the Asia-Pacific began to take place.

In May 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping, in his first visit to the Caribbean, met with leaders of the nine CARICOM nations that adhere to the PRC’s ‘One China Policy’. Within three months of President Xi’s official visit, President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan embarked on his first diplomatic visit to the region, touring Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Haiti and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. In July 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with CARICOM leaders at the first Japan-CARICOM Summit in Trinidad and Tobago (Jamaica Information Services, 2014). In October 2014, the fourth High-level Forum on the Korea-Caribbean Partnership was held under the theme “Enhancing the Korea-Caribbean Partnership for Co-Prosperity” (Korea.net, 2014). These occurrences within such a short space of time from each other point to Asia-Pacific’s increasing interest in the region.

Yet, the Caribbean’s relations with the Asia-Pacific run deeper. Haiti and Suriname fought alongside South Korea during the Korean War, and centuries of migration of Chinese labourers to the Caribbean also added to the region’s identity through the presence of the Chinese-Caribbean community.

2.3.1 Diaspora Heritage: The Connecting Factor between the East and West

Following the abolition of the slave trade in 1838, plantation owners, (fearing loss of profit and status) were desperate to find alternative sources of labor. In an attempt to salvage the plantation economies, a system of indentured labor was used which saw relatively large movements of Chinese immigrants from Shantou, Guangzhou, Penang and Xiamen taking the six-month journey by ship to the colonies. In total, 20,000 Chinese were eventually brought over to Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago with the largest numbers being recorded between 1853 and 1866 (Misrahi-Barak, 2012).

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5 CNA, China Post, President Ma Ying-Jeou departs for visit to Paraguay and Caribbean Allies, 2013
ethno-historic narrative, in addition to the presence of Indo-Caribbean and Javanese-Surinamese (that also resulted from indentured labour in the Caribbean) highlight the often overlooked, yet deeply-rooted connections between the Caribbean region and the Asia-Pacific.

In recent years, Japan, China and Taiwan have been expanding their diplomatic relations sphere to the lesser developed states in the Western hemisphere. The following section provides a brief insight into Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese foreign policy and diplomacy and how their policies relate to CARICOM.

2.3.2 CARICOM-Japan Relations

The history of Japanese diplomacy stems from the post-World War II era in an attempt to salvage and to subsequently change its national image (Potter, 2009). It has since gone through several transformations and revisions. Throughout the periods of transformation, Japan’s diplomacy strategies were tailored to suit regional, bilateral and multilateral environments. With specific regard to its approach to small-island developing states, Japan, as a significant international player, has been able to cement relations with island nations on an individual and collective basis.

Japan’s relationship with CARICOM states spans decades. The earliest of these relations was established in 1964 with Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica (MOFA Japan, 2014). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan documented that the total population of CARICOM nationals living in the country as of July 2014 was 714. The population of Jamaican nationals in Japan by July 2014 alone had already exceeded the total population of CARICOM nationals in Taiwan by April 2015. Formal relations between Japan and CARICOM (as a collective) began in 1994 and have since 2002 been elevated to a more official level with the commencement of the Japan-CARICOM Ministerial Conferences.

The Fourth Japan-CARICOM Ministerial Conference in November 2014 came on the heels of the first Japan-CARICOM Summit in July 2014 which was held in Trinidad and
Tobago. Prior to 2014, Japan's bilateral assistance to the region focused mostly on capacity building and institutional building in fisheries. In return, countries in the OECS sub-region in particular supported Japan's position within the International Whaling Commission. Co-chaired by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe it was at this summit that the three pillars of Japan’s CARICOM Policies were introduced (MOFA Japan, 2014).

Japan’s CARICOM Policies according to these three pillars are (i) Cooperation towards sustainable development, including overcoming the vulnerabilities particular to small island states, (ii) Deepening and expanding fraternal bonds of cooperation and friendship and (iii) Cooperation in addressing challenges of the international community (MOFA Japan, 2014).

The second pillar in particular takes into consideration the role of multi-level cultural and educational exchanges that involve the public and private sectors with the important goal of “enhance[ing] mutual understanding and strengthen[ing] the bonds of friendship” (MOFA Japan, 2014). Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, reiterated the importance of such measures; pledging the Japanese government’s support for further cooperation in several areas which include (but are not limited to) continued assistance in, and promotion of Japanese language education at the University of the West Indies, sports, tourism, business and ICT ventures, and the continued funding and promotion of the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme (which aims at promoting and fostering grass-roots international exchanges between Japan and other nations).

Prime Minister Abe also noted the need to establish more embassies throughout CARICOM states which would allow individual relations between Japan and its CARICOM partners to be more fruitful and uninhibited by distance. At present, only 3 out of the 15 CARICOM member states have diplomatic missions and consulates in Japan.
2.3.3 CARICOM and China Relations

China’s foreign policy approach to small-island states and other developing states includes assisting in the advancement of lesser developed countries in a spirit of goodwill and continued cooperation. Added to the political agenda explicitly expressed via the ‘One China Policy’, China’s interest in the lesser developed states of the Asian, African, Latin American and Caribbean region has increased.

The People’s Republic of China has established diplomatic relations with nine CARICOM countries namely Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Dominica, Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, Antigua and Barbuda and The Bahamas. The earliest of these ties was established in 1972 between China and Guyana. China has similarly provided monetary assistance to various developmental projects across educational, economic, agricultural and technological categories. The Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance estimates that China has provided close to US$86 billion dollars in development assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean from 2005 to the first half of 2013 (China-Caribbean Relationship, CCMF, 2013). China is also a member of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank.

The three main goals of relations between China, Latin America and the Caribbean were stated by former Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2004. These goals include: (i) strengthening strategic ties and enhancing mutual political trust, (ii) taking practical and creative steps to tap the potential for economic cooperation, (3) attaching greater importance to cultural exchanges to deepen mutual understanding (Bliss, 2010).

Cultural Diplomacy as a facet of China’s foreign policy gained particular relevance in 2012 and 2013 as it constituted the third pillar of Chinese Diplomacy. “Cultural diplomacy and soft power are important strategies for the Chinese leadership in developing benign impressions about China and securing strategic dividends through

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6Thompson, Fontaine, China Invests billions in the Caribbean while Washington looks on, (TheDominican.net), 2013 http://thedominican.net/2013/06/china-invests-billions-in-caribbean.html
‘virtuous’ policies of engagement” (Palit, 2014). The establishment of Confucius Institutes have aided in promoting China’s cultural diplomacy by bridging academic components and the urge for international dialogue among its neighbours. As of July 2015, all campuses of The University of the West Indies house a Confucius Institute where the curriculum comprises Mandarin Chinese, Chinese calligraphy, Tai chi and Chinese film.

2.3.4 CARICOM and Taiwan Relations
Taiwan has established diplomatic relations with 5 CARICOM nations namely, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Belize. Haiti was the first country to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1956.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on Taiwan refers to Article 141 of the Constitution of Taiwan as a summary of its foreign policy goals:

“…in a spirit of independence and initiative and on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity, cultivate good-neighborliness with other nations, and respect treaties and the Charter of the United Nations, in order to protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world peace.” (MOFA Taiwan, Article 141)

Under the Ma Ying Jiu Administration, Taiwan’s Diplomatic approach to its neighbours in the international community centers round the concept of viable diplomacy or flexible diplomacy. Viable Diplomacy is defined as a compromise that allows Taiwan to continue its diplomatic efforts, while still retaining and maintaining ties with China. It continues to observe the status-quo “while adhering to the principles of dignity, autonomy, pragmatism, and flexibility. This policy has enabled Taiwan to consolidate relations with its diplomatic allies, strengthen substantive ties with countries with which it does not have diplomatic relations, expand its international participation, and obtain visa-waiver treatment.” (MOFA Taiwan, 2014).
Viable Diplomacy forms part of the R.O.C.’s foreign policy towards Cross-strait affairs and international relations.

Though the Republic of China has also provided assistance with similar projects to countries, Taiwan's strategic approach has more of a soft power undertone. This was especially effective in its rapid relief effort in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Ong, 2010).

Moreover, CARICOM countries have benefited from the presence of the Taiwan Cultural Youth Ambassadors program that has since 2009 given CARICOM countries the opportunity to enhance their international awareness of Taiwan’s many roles in the world as peacemaker, provider of humanitarian aid, promoter of cultural exchanges, creator of new technologies and business opportunities, and standard bearer of Chinese culture (Taiwan Today, 2014). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of Education and the International Cultural and Development Fund (ICDF) have also issued scholarships to CARICOM nationals for undergraduate, graduate and doctorate level programs in fields ranging from civil engineering to agriculture.

2.4 The Diaspora, Brain Drain and Monetary Gain

Gamlen (2008) defines a diaspora as having the following characteristics: “[the] dispersion to two or more locations; ongoing orientation towards a homeland; and group boundary maintenance over time. (Butler; Brubaker 2001)” Thus (1) the host country(ies) (2) the country of origin and the (3) the foreign community within that host country comprise a current consensus of the definition used in diaspora research. This sentiment is echoed by Makumi Mwagiru (2012) who notes that debate on a universally accepted definition of diaspora has led to emergent consensus on three specific criteria: dispersion, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance:

“The first refers to any form of dispersion as long as territorial borders are crossed. It has
been argued that ethnic communities divided by territorial borders also constitute a diaspora (Brubaker 2005:5). Homeland orientation requires some loyalty to, or recognition of, a real or imagined homeland from which flow value, identity and loyalty. Boundary maintenance involves maintaining an identity distinct from that of the host society, which can be done by resisting assimilation into the host society through self-segregation, or can be an unintended consequence of social exclusion (Brubaker 2005:6)”(Mwagiru, 2012).

This leads to several common characteristics of diaspora communities, of which retention of collective memory, relation to homeland identity and the desire to use skills acquired in their host countries for the development of their own homeland are a few.

Reasons for the movement and relocation of communities from their countries of origin to new environments are primarily based on factors that Henry (2010) quotes Everett S. Lee as attributing to the negative environments of the homeland versus the positive environments of countries of destination (Frazier: Harvey, 2010). Additionally, personal motivations and intervening obstacles (immigration laws and physical distance) are also determining factors. Asylum seekers, refugees of war and natural disasters, economic migrants can constitute types of diasporic communities.

2.4.1 Small-Island States amidst the Waves of Emigration.

Migration has produced positive and negative impacts on nations and regions. The mass movement of peoples to more developed countries has led to a depletion of much needed talent and human capital. However, with increased diaspora communities abroad, countries have also benefited from their contributions from their host countries. By sending money to relatives back in their native countries, diaspora communities fuel the development of their homelands by injecting foreign currencies into their economies.

Remittances serve as the main and most profitable link between SIDS and their diaspora abroad. According to the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean region exceeded US$60 billion in 2013. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the total amount of remittances was sent from the United States of America, with Spain contributing the second largest flow of capital to the region (Inter-American Development Bank, 2014).

Remittances to the Caribbean increased by 3 percent in 2013 compared to 2012, capping at US$8.5 billion. In 2005, at US$6.4 million, the transmittals had already become the second largest source of capital for the region. But as early as 2002, the Caribbean region was already listed as the largest recipient of remittances globally (Roberts, 2006). It is evident that diaspora communities aid in the economic development of their home countries through remittances and additional capital flows of foreign currencies. Additionally, the diaspora have caused local Caribbean businesses to enter into extra-regional niche markets due to the diaspora’s noticeable presence and their demand for local products. These statistics underscore the importance of capital flows to the region through the diaspora abroad.

Conversely, diaspora communities can also serve the purpose of enhancing the global awareness and cultural sensitivity of their host countries. Their presence and innate need for cultural expression have produced outlets for fostered people-to-people interactions, activism and engagement.

2.4.2 Diaspora Diplomacy: Utilizing Nationals Abroad

Diaspora Diplomacy represents one of ten types of state diplomacy approaches of small island states (Henrikson, 2008). Though an old concept in definition, literature on diaspora studies has gone through several phases; all of which expand and transform the classical perceptions of the term and how it applies to the present. The role and involvement of diaspora in national policy and international relations has become a recent topic of discourse, particularly as a result of increased globalization and the mass movement of peoples that have followed.
The International Organization of Migration (IOM) reiterates the role of the diaspora as one that has the potential to reach “significant levels”. On a financial level, diaspora communities can make contributions to direct business investments, capital market investments and charity in addition to regular channels of remittances. However, the diaspora can also be involved in knowledge and skill transfers, creation of job markets and linkages, advocacy and developing civil society (Ionescu, 2006).

With regards to diaspora-centered policy formation, the IOM alludes to effective diaspora policies as having:

(i) Enabling roles: whereby the focus is on attempting to find solutions to the hindrances that prevent diaspora communities from fully being able to contribute to the development of their home countries. Ministries would also need to be equipped with the necessary capacities to cater to diaspora affairs.

(ii) Inclusionary roles: recognizing and validating diaspora communities as full citizens, their input, potential and their contributions; increasing trust-building between the home-front and their diaspora through institutional change that makes allowances for nationals abroad.

(iii) Partnership roles: connecting the diaspora by creating opportunities for cooperation in between associations, regions, municipalities, public enterprises and the like.

(iv) Catalytic roles: whereby change is incited for the purpose of identifying and addressing issues facing diaspora communities.

2.4.3 Diaspora Affairs: Where Does It Fit?

The brain drain has been an issue faced by both developed and developing nations. However, transforming migration into a source of innovation, change and sustainability

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had been observed by countries as a means of turning a handicap into an advantage. Diaspora Affairs has thus become an important area of investment whereby governments and international organizations seek to maximize on the present contributions and potential contributions of their respective diaspora.

In a survey issued by The Global Forum on Migration and Development, a total of 400 institutions across 56 countries have mechanisms of in place to connect and engage their diaspora communities. These institutions are present in the home and host countries. Out of this number, 77 were formally established with the specific function of focusing on diaspora engagement. Aguinas and Newland (2011) in analyzing the aforementioned data described such diaspora institutions as falling under six main categories:

(i) Ministry level: the establishment of separate ministries solely responsible for diaspora affairs,

(ii) Sub-ministry level: creation of offices or directorates as the subsidiaries of certain ministries (usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor),

(iii) National level: institutions that although are not officially ministry of sub-ministry institutions still interact with the local government by reporting to the highest executive body (i.e. Presidential offices, state councils and legislative branches),

(iv) Local level: specified to particular local regions or territories within a county where diaspora communities still retain ties and possess a strong degree of familiarity, especially if the country is considerably large (ex. India: Department of Non-resident Keralite’s Affairs),

(v) Consular-related: utilizing the presence of overseas missions to take on diaspora related functions,

(vi) Quasi-governmental: under the guise of foundations, commissions and councils, countries are able to avoid possible accusations of intrusion into the affairs of host countries while still maintaining a relatively significant presence in said country.
From Nigeria to the Netherlands, Chile to China, and Guatemala to Georgia the presence of diaspora engagement institutions at the ascribed levels shows the increasing importance, inclusion and utilization of the diaspora in practical areas. Inspiration can thus be derived from these more developed countries as they give insight into what a potential CARICOM-tailored diaspora initiative would involve and at what levels it could be employed.

For the Caribbean region, such avenues for policy formulation are vital for spurring incentive among its diaspora to continue to contribute and invest in their home countries and the region. Mortley (2014) notes that Caribbean migrants are interested in investing in their countries, providing that favorable policy conditions, incentives and benefits are given. Additionally, by consulting the national and regional associations abroad in the policy-making process, the effectiveness of policy implementation is more guaranteed and it also promotes greater transparency.

Though the collective diaspora engagement institutions of specific regional hubs like CARICOM were not included in the survey, it does not diminish the significance of the presence of these individual institutions. Countries such as Jamaica and Haiti have been able to develop diaspora engagement institutions and implement policies to effectively utilize the Diaspora's contributions abroad for their own national development.

2.4.4 Engaging the Diaspora

Mendoza and Newland (2012) provide in-depth suggestions for engagement strategies that hone in on the ways in which the diaspora can be effective in their countries of destination and countries of origin, and how governments of both the home and host countries can collaborate to ensure the success of such strategies and reap mutual benefits. However, there must be mutual understanding and involvement from all partners as governments of destination countries (for instance) can only follow through with cooperating with diaspora communities by assisting in projects on the home-front unless the corresponding governments in the countries of origin recognize and are willing to include that diaspora in its development projects.
The IOM also notes that for diaspora engagement to be incorporated into national (and regional) policy, the process should involve, diaspora mapping, stakeholder mobilization and confidence building. The IOM and the Migration Policy Institute have been instrumental in assisting countries with such practices. Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname have established partnerships with the International Organization of Migration to assist in this regard by staging workshops and training seminars that focus on the fundamental aspects of diaspora research (IOM, 2013).

Kilduff and Corley (1999) noted that although people leave their homeland, they are not severed from its culture. Not only has technology allowed expatriate communities to keep in contact with relatives in their respective countries, “…they often create communities of the displaced to help retain their sense of attachment and identity.” In this way diaspora communities can aspire to two different ways of cultural identity which would either (i) focus on the collective selves or (2) reflects the known similarities and differences which “constitute ‘what we really are’ or rather since history has intervened” (Stald:Tufte, 2002). Though this cultural memory may not be considered equal in monetary value as remittance flows in some circumstances, there is still value that must also be recognized. However, in order for the CARICOM diaspora to promote its culture and add to the multicultural milieu of Taiwan, the definition of culture and how the Caribbean Community and the diaspora relate to it must be defined.

2.5 Culture: A Discourse on Definition

Culture in today’s globalized community harnesses the creative energy and innovation to produce a plethora of opportunities for countries to utilize their own resources and cultural knowledge to promote their own distinct characteristics towards a more sustainable future. The Caribbean’s dynamic culture can be employed in a variety of areas with the overall goal of continuing to strengthen intra-CARICOM and inter-CARICOM relations.
Birukou (2009) presents a discourse on several interpretations of culture in an attempt to produce a standardized concept. Culture is agreed to be “consisting of something that is shared/and/or learned by a group of people” (Birukou, et. al, 2009). What is “shared” is described as the behavior, ideas, beliefs, traditions and knowledge of the said group of people or agents.

UNESCO’s *New Cultural Policy Agenda for Development and Mutual Understanding* emphasizes the importance of culture as a medium for transparency, whereby creating an environment for joint communication and growth⁹. Ganga illustrates how cultural expression, negotiating identities and building bridges are interrelated factors that “can help to build cohesive societies at ease with themselves, because it helps individuals negotiate with confidence amongst the multiple aspects of their identity, thereby preventing or reversing social disintegration.”

The overall goal is to strengthen the relationship between countries and societies as a prerequisite for more fulfilling dialogue and progress on matters that are of mutual relevance.

### 2.6 CARICOM and the Importance of Culture

CARICOM launched its Regional Cultural Policy initiative in 1997. The policy states how culture is an “intersecting continuum” which adapts and modifies itself based on the present while retaining the ideas, beliefs and practices that make life meaning to the everyday Caribbean man, woman and child (CARICOM Regional Cultural Policy, 1997).

Hon. Maxine Wilson, former Minister of Education, Youth and Culture in Jamaica emphasized that building the region’s identity is the facilitator for how Caribbean countries integrate and to what extent they will do so. Culture cannot be defined as a hierarchy, rather, it is made up of differences that have resulted from the people

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⁹UNESCO, *New Cultural policy agenda for Development and Mutual Understanding*  
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002147/214747e.pdf
interacting with their environment and each other\textsuperscript{10}. Understanding the definition of Caribbean identity takes into consideration the existence of the Caribbean person which stands as validation and representation of a national and regional heritage.

Underlined in the 1997 Cultural Policy is an explanation of what CARICOM Heads of State plan to achieve with regards to promoting the region’s culture. The policy describes Caribbean heritage as being made up of the “collective memory”; where “just as no individual can hope for a whole sense of self and authentic action in the world without his or her personal memory, so is it also futile for a people to hope for social harmony and true civilizing achievement without [it].” (CARICOM, 1997).

The cultural memory encompasses the multi-ethnic element of ethos “which upholds the value for people to have and maintain access to the cultures of their ancestors”\textsuperscript{11}. The element of ethos can be seen through visual and artistic channels such as the Caribbean Festival or Carifesta.

\textbf{2.6.1 Carifesta: Embodiment of Caribbean Cultural Expression and Cooperation}

\textit{Carifesta} or the Caribbean Festival of the Arts is a primary tool of the Caribbean Community to advance its foreign policy goals and promote functional co-operation in the human and social development of the region\textsuperscript{12}.

The first installment of what is now \textit{Carifesta} was held in Puerto Rico in 1952. Jamaica and Guyana were the only countries of the present day CARICOM represented. In 1972, under the theme “The Artist in Society with special reference to The Third World”, \textit{Carifesta I} made its official debut in Guyana. The theme highlighted the people and

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\textsuperscript{10} Culture in the Future of the Caribbean Community, Hon. Maxine Henry-Wilson, Minister of Education, Youth and Culture, Jamaica, CARICOM Distinguished Lecture Series, 2003
\textsuperscript{11} CARICOM Secretariat, \textit{Culture in the Future of the Caribbean Community by Hon. Maxine Wilson}, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/30anniversary_lecture_3_henrywilson.jsp
\textsuperscript{12} CARICOM Secretariat, \textit{CARIFESTA: An Embodiment of Caribbean Integration}. http://www.caricom.org/jsp/projects/uwicaricomproject/carifesta_embodiment_integration.jsp
motions put forth at two Caribbean Artists and Writers conferences in 1966 and 1970, respectively. What was discussed was the need for these same artists and writers to share, exchange, educate, support and carouse in the diverse historical, ethnic and cultural spectrum that gave life and meaning to the development of their various art forms\textsuperscript{13}.

Shortly after CARICOM was formed in 1972, Carifesta was officially declared as a celebration of the region’s rich and flamboyant culture with the aim of fostering unity and promoting Caribbean culture regionally and globally. Moreover, CARICOM States have seen the emergence of new outlets for cultural expression such as dance companies, schools of music and performing arts companies, with the emergence of new media such as film, animation, fashion and print. Acknowledging and encouraging these timely creative outlets among the region’s youth can involve them in the continuous preservation and development of ways to promote their culture regionally and internationally. As some emigrate, to become part of the diaspora, this cultural memory is also translated to new environments and shared with local communities.

2.6.2 The Caribbean Diaspora in North America

In the United States for example, the immigrant Caribbean population (also known as the West Indian population) has significantly added to America’s socio-ethnic fabric. In states like New York and Miami, where large populations of West Indian immigrants reside, the region’s influence has been noted by Senator Marty Markowitz in 1994 as being as embedded into society as that of the Italian, Jewish and Irish communities (Purdy, 1994). In 2005 under the G.W Bush administration, The House of Representatives designated June as the month where West Indians and Caribbean Americans alike celebrate their legacy\textsuperscript{14}.

Not only has the hosting of these events aided in the further integration of Caribbean culture into the social fabric of their host countries, it has also benefited their host

\textsuperscript{13} The History and evolution of Carifesta, http://x.carifesta.net/?q=history
\textsuperscript{14} National Caribbean-American Heritage Month marks 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary in 2015, http://www.caribbeanamericanmonth.org/
countries economically. Its presence also reflects a democratic society; portraying an image whereby all are welcomed and celebrated. This image can be developed and promoted for the purpose of boosting regional tourism and other industries.

**Scotia Bank Caribbean Festival/ CARIBANA™ (CANADA):** This festival is considered the largest Caribbean cultural event in North America. Started in 1967, it was driven by members of the community who, over the years became known as the CARIBANA™ Arts Group. In 2010, CARIBANA™ contributed to $438million dollars towards the economy of Toronto (Nangwaya, 2011).

**West Indian Day Parade/ Labor Day Parade (NEW YORK):** The earliest known hosting of the West Indian Day Parade took place in Brooklyn during the 1940s. From a spectacle drawing in a few thousand people, the event now attracts an audience of nearly 3.5million. Having the largest West Indian population in the United States, the state of New York has also shared in the profits made by event patrons and sponsors. In 2003, $86million dollars was made on every 1million attendees, totaling over $300million generated by tourism, local purchases and the use of public transportation (Meschino, 2012).

Events of such magnitude may not be suitable for the diaspora in Taiwan. However, though miniscule in comparison to the Caribbean diaspora in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan remains relevant and, if maximized through the implementation of pertinent projects and schemes, can generate effective avenues for future investment.

**2.6.3 The Diaspora as part of Civil Society**

Discourse on civil society, its overall functions and goals have evolved; taking on a broader significance and position globally. Initially considered as being under the influence of political agendas - as a channel for public and partisan schemas, this concept expanded to include civil society as the “public sphere…[that is] no longer confined to
the borders of the territorial state” and “in which local identities and affiliations are being transformed by broader and more powerful concerns and a new basis of solidarity” (Enjolras, 2009, p.77). Diaspora communities, as part of civil society can be agents of unified action as a distinguishing trait for collective, public aims rather than private, individualistic goals. It echoes the creation and fostering of relations with communities within the global sphere.

Lessons can be learned and models can be applied to the context of CARICOM and its member states. Thus, the following chapter analyzes formal and informal diaspora engagement policies and/or institutions with a view of providing recommendations for a possible diaspora initiative in Taiwan as a pilot initiative for the rest of the Asia-Pacific.
Chapter 3

Case Studies

3.1 Introduction to Case Studies
The purpose of presenting the following supplementary studies is to highlight functions and provide suggestions that would be applicable to a diaspora initiative in Taiwan. It is intended to primarily use small-island states as examples to further justify the reasoning behind the need for SIDS to invest in diaspora engagement strategies. Saint Lucia and Jamaica were chosen for this particular study.

Saint Lucia’s diaspora policy was selected to highlight functions of that policy that can be applied by CARICOM in its approach to the diaspora in Taiwan. Jamaica was selected due to its pioneering diaspora policies, strategies and research especially in the area of diaspora mapping and the establishment of official virtual diaspora platforms and networks.

3.1.1 Brief Overview of Saint Lucia Foreign Policy
Saint Lucia is an island nation in the Caribbean region; one of several protruding volcanic formations that form the archipelago of the Windward Islands. Saint Lucia has an area of 616km2 with a population of nearly 185,000 people of predominantly, African descent. Once an agriculture-based economy, Saint Lucia has in recent years turned to tourism.

Before it gained its independence on 22 February 1979, Saint Lucia's foreign policy was determined by Great Britain. With external affairs handled entirely by The Crown, capacity in crafting policies was limited. After gaining its independence, Saint Lucia’s foreign policy soon began to focus on its position within organizations like CARICOM, the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations. Primary considerations included regional security and trade liberalization with Latin America and the United States and on securing financial and technical assistance for national development.

Saint Lucia’s connection with the Asia-Pacific region began as part of the
Commonwealth of States (Braveboy-Wagner, 1997). Yet, the country’s link to the region (aside from being a recipient of a small population of East Indian immigrants during indentured labour) soon became mostly defined by its dealings with Taiwan and China.

3.1.2 Saint Lucia-Taiwan Relations

Five years after becoming a sovereign nation, Saint Lucia, under the leadership of the late Sir John George Melvin Compton—Saint Lucia’s first Prime Minister and leader of the United Workers Party - established formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Hsiao, 2007).

In 1997, when the then opposition party—The Saint Lucia Labor Party—came to power, ties with Taiwan were severed in favor of China. In 2006, after the UWP returned to Government, diplomatic relations with Taiwan were re-established. However, following another election win in 2011 by the Saint Lucia Labor Party, relations were kept with Taiwan. This decision was upheld despite the party’s ideological affiliation with China. June 2015 saw the country’s first physical presence in the Asia-Pacific region as it established its diplomatic quarters in Taipei, Taiwan (Hou, 2015).

Saint Lucia, as one of the CARICOM states with allegiances to Taiwan has benefitted from significant educational, cultural, technological and agricultural exchanges. The following table provides a brief scope of some of the projects and schemes that the Government of Taiwan has assisted in since the country’s last general elections in 2011 (see Table 3).
Table 3: List of Projects and Schemes in Saint Lucia assisted by the Government of Taiwan since 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grant/Project/Scheme</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>(i) Aquaculture Project, (ii) Fruit and Vegetable Demonstration and extension Project</td>
<td>US$968,000</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$1.84 million</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>(i) Constituency Development Programme (ii) Saint Lucia’s Banana Recovery Rescue Plan (to fight Black Sigatoka disease)</td>
<td>US$2.72 million</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$696,111</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>(i) ICT Technical Cooperation Project (St. Lucia) (ii) Procurement and Forensic Equipment Project</td>
<td>US$1.53 million</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$2.35 million</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>(i) St. Jude Hospital Reconstruction Project,</td>
<td>US$8.4 million</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>(i) Sustainable Energy Programme</td>
<td>US$890,000</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table compiled from multiple sources including the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) and several Caribbean News Agencies.

In addition to providing monetary assistance to national development projects, the Government of Taiwan has also assisted in developing the country’s human resource capabilities. This assistance has gone beyond the issuance of scholarship opportunities for Saint Lucian nationals to pursue higher education and technical training in Taiwan.

The International Cooperation and Development Foundation (ICDF), the Taiwan Youth Overseas Service, the Embassy of the Republic of China to Saint Lucia and the Overseas Volunteers Program have all provided local Saint Lucians with opportunities to enhance their skills in agriculture, information technology, health and language learning. Monetary contributions, though necessary for the timely implementation and completion of projects cannot compare to the value of sharing irrigation technology, technological
expertise in systems security management and imparting the culture and language of Taiwan through people-to-people exchanges. As part of the Taiwanese diaspora abroad, Taiwanese nationals in CARICOM countries offer yet another example of how transnational communities can contribute to their host countries.

3.1.3 Saint Lucia’s National Diaspora Policy

In 2014, the Government of Saint Lucia presented the second draft of its National Diaspora Policy. The goals of the Diaspora Policy revolve around fellowship, cooperation and instilling national pride among Saint Lucians at home and abroad. Yet most dialogue with the Saint Lucian diaspora is done through consulates and diplomatic missions abroad. The policy details specific ways in which the Government of Saint Lucia and the diaspora can collaborate in the public and private sectors. Saint Lucia's diaspora have formed themselves into associations which usually take the form of regional or district fractions as well as general national groups with social, cultural and political functions. The Union of Saint Lucia Associations (USLOA) was designated as the umbrella unit for the majority of Saint Lucian associations abroad. As of 2014, the USLOA, recognized a total of 15 diaspora organizations abroad; the majority being in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.\(^{15}\)

Policies aimed at encouraging Saint Lucians to return to their countries have been tailored to assist them in easily transitioning to their homeland, with added benefits to prompt them to invest. The government of Saint Lucia has recognized the importance of the country’s consulates and diplomatic missions abroad to the diaspora by enforcing functions such as: (i) serving as a platform to receive and address diaspora issues; (ii) being points of engagement and diaspora mobilization; and (iii) being collection of diaspora demographics and information.

Policy recommendations with regards to the diaspora are focused on economic growth,

poverty reduction, good governance and capacity building. It is meant to be an all-inclusive attempt to engage Saint Lucian nationals abroad while addressing rights and issues faced by the diaspora in their host countries.

The Government of Saint Lucia recognized the need to transform its brain drain into brain gain. Strategies have thus been developed that seek to utilize the intellectual and technical skills of the diaspora. With pertinence to reaching out to the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan, The Caribbean Community’s initiative could include the following schemes:

“…c. Establish a Diaspora Volunteer Programme that provides an avenue through which they donate their time and expertise towards worthy causes on the island.

h. Ensure that Diaspora individuals and companies will be given due consideration consistent with regional and international obligations

i. Facilitate the establishment of structured technical networks to facilitate ongoing technical consultations between Diaspora and resident technicians in fields such as education, health, tourism, agriculture, trade, science and technology.

j. Facilitate the participation of skilled and professional non-resident nationals in capacity building programmes at the national level

k. Work with regional bodies, OECS and CARICOM to establish databases with the assistance of key international agencies for the recruitment of qualified members of the Caribbean Diaspora.”

Saint Lucia’s diaspora policy distinctly states areas where the Government of Saint Lucia has pledged to support the diaspora such as culture, arts and exportation of cultural products, adding that “diaspora communities thrive on the principle of a common identity…[and] collective consciousness.” With regards to the diaspora in Taiwan, the following opportunities hint to where CARICOM as a unit can invest in

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“Encourage residents abroad to take appropriate action to retain and promote aspects of our traditional heritage in the host countries.”\(^{17}\)

This can be done through the governing body for ministries of culture throughout CARICOM states and their combined effort to design and produce bilingual or multilingual promotional material. Translations could be a joint effort between alumni associations of CARICOM students who have studied in Taiwan along with members of the Taiwanese Overseas Volunteers and Youth Ambassadors. Additionally, local businesses can be pinpointed based on their reputation for producing quality products to help provide items that can be made available for prospective trade shows and other events in Taiwan. A list of trade shows separated by countries in the Asia-Pacific can be compiled and updated with the help of the diaspora in those host countries.

“Encourage more cultural exchanges between schools and cultural groups in Saint Lucia and the diaspora.”

To offset the cost of travel, virtual classrooms serve as ideal channels for facilitating cross-cultural exchanges. Cost would arise depending on the condition of ICT channels and internet hubs. A pen pal system can also be started between schools in Taiwan and those in CARICOM member states. Schools in Taiwan can have the option of practicing English and interacting with students from across the Caribbean Community in a series of virtual classroom interactions.

Additionally, experts in topics such as regional integration, sustainable development, cultural preservation, economic theories, international affairs, health and entrepreneurship can be exchanged. Symposia and conferences that invite innovative minds in these areas from CARICOM and Taiwan can be hosted. Current regional projects can be presented for discussion on feasible and effective approaches on how they should be

addressed.

In the area of capacity building, CARICOM can issue regional seminars uniting returnees from Taiwan around the region to participate in skills transfer projects. For example, CARICOM nationals, who studied in areas such as agronomy, can collectively meet with representatives to offer insight and suggestions for regional policy formation. This can also be applied in the areas of health and technology among others. Students who have studied business and trade can be sought after to provide perception of the market environment in Taiwan. As attaches, these students can serve as a bridge connecting potential investors interested in regional and national projects, while giving local investors much needed perspective as to business etiquette and prospective niche markets.

3.2 Jamaica: Mapping and Mobilization

Jamaica is home to an estimated 2.7 million people. Grouped as part of the Greater Antilles, Jamaica is usually included in definitions of the Caribbean that include the British-speaking island nations of the Lesser Antilles due to similar colonial past, language and culture.

3.2.1 Brief Overview of Jamaican Foreign Policy

Until its Independence in 1962 Jamaica's foreign policy was essentially that of Great Britain. Under the theme of economic development, Jamaica's foreign policy was characterized by its successful agreements but also by the country’s “inability” to turn these successful foreign policy agreements into “economic growth inducing benefits”. (Thourburn, Morris, 2014).

Unlike Saint Luca with few diplomatic missions globally, Jamaica has reaped the benefit of international recognition and “high visibility” due to the presence of its embassies and consulates around the world. Since 1962, foreign policy considerations shaped by internal

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and external factors have resulted in the emergence of several trends detailing the manner in which Jamaica formerly dealt with its regional and extra-regional counterparts. (see Table 4).

### Table 4 Jamaica’s Development Ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT STANCE</th>
<th>FOREIGN POLICY STANCE (VIS-À-VIS DEVELOPMENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-1972</td>
<td>FDI facilitation</td>
<td>∞ Alignment with the West ∞ FDI attraction ∞ CARIFTA negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1980</td>
<td>Self-reliance and Distributive Justice</td>
<td>∞ Hostility to foreign investment ∞ Attempts to challenge the existing international economic order ∞ CARICOM negotiations ∞ Enhancement of relations with non-Western states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>State-directed Development</td>
<td>* Realignment with the West ∞ Negotiation of the CBI ∞ Development of EPZs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-present</td>
<td>Neoliberal Reforms</td>
<td>* Adapting to a new international economic order (especially in relation to preferences) ∞ Lobbying to prevent the loss of preferences ∞ CSME Negotiations ∞ FTAA Negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jamaica’s Foreign Policy: Making the Economic Link (Thorburn, Marie, 2007)

#### 3.2.2 Jamaica-China Relations

Jamaica’s relationship with China is especially visible through the Chinese-Jamaican communities on the island. As part of its socio-ethnic fabric, Jamaican’s of Chinese descent serve as one of the bridges to the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese celebrations have
been incorporated into Jamaica’s national calendar of events with museums and centers serving the purpose of educating Jamaican nationals about Chinese history, religion, culture, language and the contributions of Chinese-Jamaicans to the island’s national development.

On November 21st 1972, The People’s Republic of China and Jamaica established diplomatic relations which have remained consistent (without sever) for over 40 years. Trade between the two countries commenced shortly after diplomatic relations were established. Jamaica is China’s largest trading partner in the English-speaking Caribbean. Jamaica exports commodities of value to China such as bauxite, aluminum and cane sugar, while China exports textile products and light machinery to the island. Trade cooperation and people-to-people exchanges have been instrumental in upholding economic bilateral ties. Further exchanges have taken place at a government level through visits made by respective government delegations of the two countries. Exchanges at this level began within 4 years of the formal establishment of diplomatic ties.

Efforts in the realm of culture, education and sports have also seen steady mutual involvement between China and Jamaica. In 1991, during the visit of Jamaica's Prime Minister Michael Manley to China, the Sino-Jamaican Cultural Agreement was signed. However, exchanges had already began since 1973. The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to Jamaica notes that Chinese photo exhibitions, performance troupes, puppet theatres and sports teams had already come to Jamaica before the 1980s. Scholarly exchanges also took place between the Social and Economic Institute of the University of the West Indies and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Scholarships that allowed Jamaican students to pursue Chinese language, environmental sciences, construction and international finance (among others) were already being offered since

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the early 1980s\textsuperscript{21}.

Despite such an extensive political, economic and socio-ethnic history between Chinese and Jamaican nationals, diaspora engagement networks do not recognize the Jamaican population in China alongside those of the United States, Canada and Europe. Still, Jamaica’s efforts at diaspora networking, mapping and diaspora policy formation are worth discussing as it presents a framework that can be expanded regionally to suit the CARICOM-Taiwan context and larger regional proportions.

3.2.3 Jamaica and the Diaspora

Jamaica’s diaspora engagement policies and diaspora research have been considered as models worthy of adoption by other CARICOM states. *Migration in Jamaica: A Country Profile* is a report detailing migration patterns and characteristics of Jamaica’s inbound and outbound migration from as early as 1970 to as recent as 2010. Prepared in collaboration with the International Organization of Migration office in Jamaica and the European Union, this document: (i) provides a detailed analysis of migration trends and traits, (ii) links this data analysis to its possible implications on national development (iii) uses this data to justify and improve migration policy frameworks that are of mutual benefits to the diaspora and the homeland\textsuperscript{22}.

The thorough methods of data collection and analysis serve as models that can benefit the Caribbean Community. Data is not restricted to Jamaican migrants but includes an equally detailed presentation of immigrants who have been in Jamaica for at least 1 year. Labour migrants, asylum seekers, inbound tourists, foreign-born nationals with Jamaican citizenship, migrants from Commonwealth nations are some of the categories catered for, in addition to information of outbound migration on Jamaican nationals. Gender, occupation and age have been acquired mostly from statistics bureaus and immigration

\textsuperscript{21} Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to Jamaica, Culture and Education, http://jm.china-embassy.org/eng/zygx/whjy/t211231.htm

agencies from countries of destination.

**The Mapping Project**

The Jamaica Diaspora Mapping Project was an initiative started in 2013 aimed at serving two functions: (i) gathering relative information on the location, interests and skills of the diaspora and (ii) developing government capacities towards effectively engaging the diaspora. Migration records have been compiled since 1970s (Glennie and Chappell, 2010).

Funded by the IOM, the Jamaica Diaspora Project (or the Mapping Project) has been the first project of its kind to be implemented in Jamaica and continues to collect information throughout the diaspora. ‘MAPJADiaspora’ was created as an online platform for data collection via two survey instruments targeted at individual members of the diaspora and diaspora groups. Jamaica’s diaspora engagement movement has produced several achievements in the area of diaspora affairs.

Information on diaspora groups, include membership, date of establishment, contact information, their contributions to Jamaica, information dissemination channels and annual calendar of events. Personal information is kept confidential, however statistics are updated and made available for viewing thus giving a visual representation of specific characteristics of the diaspora and most importantly the impact they are making towards Jamaica’s national development.

The Ministry of Foreign affairs and Foreign Trade has been instrumental in providing formal support to diaspora initiatives and in the development of diaspora policy. Resources such as the Jamaica Diaspora Organization, the Jamaica Diaspora Institute have been created for widespread engagement of the Jamaica diaspora and have amassed repositories of diaspora resources, links to current events in Jamaica and in the respective regions.

The respective diaspora organs have focused on collecting and collating information on
the diaspora and connecting with diaspora groups among three main regions: Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Little information is available on the presence and contribution of the diaspora in the Asia-Pacific. This is where the CARICOM diaspora initiative can help to spur the need for countries like Jamaica to extend their outreach to their nationals in foreign countries. Platforms such as ‘MapJADiaspora’ serve as model for bringing the CARICOM diaspora in the Asia-Pacific together.

Supported by the various diplomatic missions, the online platform for the diaspora in the region can first be created so as to conduct diaspora mapping practices. Through this interactive channel, diaspora organizations can be recruited to aid in compiling databases on communities in their specific host counties and identify ways to better incorporate these communities towards the betterment of those in Asia and in their countries of origin. This platform can also serve as a way to educate individuals who have received scholarships or who have successfully participated in training workshops and seminars in the Asia-Pacific region to become more familiar with their new environments through accessing online testimonials, videos, cultural etiquette fact sheets, and introductory language materials.
Chapter 4

Findings and Discussion

4.1 Survey

In an attempt to collect relevant data to support this thesis, a survey was conducted through social media (Facebook) from May 20th, 2015 to June 13th, 2015. The survey managed to amass a total of 30 respondents from five CARICOM countries. This sample size represents nearly 10% of the total population of CARICOM nationals in Taiwan according to the April 2015 census. The survey was a combination of open-ended and close-ended questions with the addition of a Likert scale (Appendix B).

Apart from collecting basic information on age, occupation, country of origin and county of residence, the survey also included questions which gauged the participants’ affinity with their home country and culture, how frequently they visited their respective countries, how often they interacted with Taiwanese local students, how often did they participate in cross-cultural events and how did they introduce local Taiwanese to the region and their countries of origin. Upon completion of the survey, participants were asked to take part in an email interview to provide additional comments on the diaspora’s role and ways to maximize its potential. Out of the 10 participants who stated their willingness to participate in the email interview, 3 submitted answers (Appendix C).

As predicted, the majority of participants claimed to be scholarship students, with most respondents falling between the 22-25 year age group. Most respondents stated that they had been in Taiwan for more than one year with the maximum length of time spent in Taiwan capped at over 5 years (Appendix B, Question 1, 2, 3).
4.2 Interviews

From May 7, 2015 to May 23rd, 2015, five interviews were conducted. They consisted of face-to-face and Skype interviews. Interviews with Ambassador Cherie Nisbet of Belize and Ambassador Jasmine E. Huggins of Saint Kitts and Nevis were summarized from notes taken during scheduled appointments as audio recordings were politely declined. The remaining interviews were audibly recorded and transcribed. The shortest interview was timed at over 42 minutes while the longest at nearly 90 minutes.

In addition to the presentation and breakdown of the supplementary case studies, the following findings were extracted and expounded upon for the purpose of discussion. The results of the surveys, interviews and supplementary case studies are purposely presented according to the key questions this thesis sought to answer.

The interviews conducted with Ambassadors of CARICOM states in Taiwan and the Director-General of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) supported the need for a united approach towards Taiwan. Viewpoints differed with regards to the actual influence of the diaspora in Taiwan due to its size and other limitations such as the inability to procure income for remittances. However, it was simultaneously admitted that the diaspora community in Taiwan plays a role through cultural exposure and the experience garnered through their academic learning at their respective universities.

The Foundation of International Cooperation and Higher Education in Taiwan (FICHET) is an organization that seeks to attract international students abroad to study in Taiwan. The Foundation operates on three main levels: government level, university level and student level. FICHET facilitates and promotes activities and contests that are primarily targeted to the international student community. Contests such as “Call for Stories” aim to understand the motivations for students to pursue an education in Taiwan. It is through these stories and other media such as video interviews that FICHET aims to reach out to potential international students abroad by using the student community already present within its borders. Participants in FICHET’s programs and contests are not exclusive. Hence, these programs and competitions serve as a potential opportunity for more
students from CARICOM countries to add to the milieu of shared experiences and motivations for studying in Taiwan.

The Quanta Culture and Education Foundation (QCEF) is a non-profit organization established in Taiwan in 1999 and serves to develop creative aptitude and critical thinking through the arts. Additionally, since 2013, this organization has become one of the bridges of culture across time and space; helping people living in the present to understand cultures from all over. Through Quanta’s Global Exchanges Division, programs such as Immerse in Creativity (promoting culture through art) and Cultural Ambassadors Program (whereby international students share their culture with Taiwan’s primary and secondary students), the Foundation’s success and outreach is growing, though admittedly still limited due to lack of other programs. The Cultural Ambassador’s program in particular, has been a channel for primary and secondary school students in Taiwan to learn about the world without leaving their classrooms. The program has also served as a means for Quanta to expand its partnerships with other schools (Appendix A).

Representatives from FICHET and QCEF emphasized the importance of developing a sense of cultural awareness among the Taiwanese population. Responses from both Foundations reiterated the fact that the Taiwanese local community is willing to learn about other cultures, but that the international community would need to take more initiative in reaching out to the Taiwanese. This statement perpetuates the need for enhanced and deepened diaspora involvement with the local Taiwanese communities (student communities in particular) in promoting the region’s culture and creating sustainable platforms for dialogue and cooperation. This is a task for the CARICOM student community in Taiwan. However, CARICOM should aim to employ strategies that will validate the existence of the diaspora and facilitate as well as support such efforts at engagement.

In answering the five key questions, it was intended for the findings to serve as criteria for the formation of a CARICOM diaspora initiative in the Asia-Pacific; with the
diaspora in Taiwan as a pilot project. Discussion of these findings in relation to their corresponding questions, are presented below.

4.3 Discussion of Findings

(i) What tangible, mutual socio-economic benefits have such strategies produced in both the countries of origin and the host countries?

The social and economic benefits of diaspora diplomacy and diaspora engagement strategies can be summarized in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Non-Financial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>Knowledge and skill transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct business investment</td>
<td>Advocacy in host countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital market investment</td>
<td>Development of civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charity</td>
<td>Job creation and market linkages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2014 Conference on Migration trends and policy development in the Caribbean

Additional instances of diaspora engagement that have produced mutual benefits to both the country of origin and the country of destination can be seen through the efforts of the International Congress of Fijians Inc. (ICFI). Such contributions have connected the Fijian community abroad and have provided monetary assistance to areas such as education. Additionally, the ICFI has aided in improving Fiji’s national image with regards to its ethnic diversity and history.

Fiji and Migration

Fiji’s history with emigration is predominantly set against the backdrop of the 1987 and 2000 military coups. According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), 50,050 Fijian
citizens emigrated between 1987 and 1996. From 1987 to 2000, however, nearly 17,000 Fijians had emigrated (Lal, 2003).

Emigration is considered an area of concern as the loss of skilled personnel in the health and education sectors has negatively impacted the quality of services available. Brief labor migration stints have influenced the country’s poverty level through remittances, thus prompting the need for more developed data collection methods to compile statistics of the Fijian community abroad.

This trait, according to the MPI is one of two used to characterize Fiji’s emigration trend; racial demographics (i.e. the “i-Taukei” and the Indo-Fijians) being the other. Sir Arthur Lewis Gordon, first colonial governor of Fiji, introduced immigrant labour (in the form of over 160,000 Indian immigrant labor) to the country as a dual solution to protect and ensure the existence of “i-Taukei” life and society. This fact is significant, as about 90% of emigrants during the above-mentioned emigration waves were Indo-Fijian (Lal, 2003). Though absent, connections are still maintained with the homeland despite the diaspora’s gradual assimilation into their host countries’ culture and society.

**The International Congress of Fiji Inc. (ICFI)**

The International Congress of Fiji Inc. (ICFI), formerly known as the International Congress of Fiji Indians is the only international body representing the Fijian diaspora around the world. The name of the organization was changed in 2012, to reflect a broader objective and to serve as a more inclusive unit for all Fijians, regardless of their ethnicity. The decision to change may also reflect progress made by the government of Fiji to ensure equal rights to all Fijians.

The ICFI is a non-governmental organization based in Australia with members who are community leaders, philanthropists, professionals and benefactors. The organization's

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outreach includes Fijians from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Philippines and Vietnam. Over the past 10 year, the ICFI has been proactive in addressing the needs of its youth in the area of education and poverty reduction. Since 2002, donations to help students in Fiji fund tuition, uniforms and school supplies have resulted in a scholarship program that has assisted a total of 9,709 primary, secondary and university students over a 10 year period.

“…A large number of students are capable of achieving technical and other qualifications but paucity of finance proscribes them from doing so. The ICFI aims to identify such students and grant scholarship so that their progress is not restrained by financial considerations,” (Indian Newslink, 2012)

Through these scholarships, the ICFI has also aided in poverty reduction, as one’s level of education can be a determining factor in alleviating poverty throughout Fiji. Poverty rates for 2012 cited households where the head of the household did not possess a secondary school education at around fifty percent.

In addressing this aspect of poverty alleviation, the ICFI has channeled the monetary capacities of a membership that is mostly made up of those with established financial standing in a positive way.

Finding out the capabilities and constraints among the diaspora in Taiwan is important in understanding ways that the community can contribute to various causes in Taiwan and in CARICOM countries.

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(ii) What specific aspects of regional diaspora-based diplomacy models can be applied to the CARICOM-Asia-Pacific context?

The data analysis of the survey supports the need for a united CARICOM initiative in Taiwan. Responses also reflected that continued cultural exchanges and knowledge transfer opportunities between the home countries and host country are effective ways that can further strengthen relations (Appendix B, Question 37 & 38). The presence of small diaspora communities should not be seen as being synonymous with a lack of migration. Rather, it is due to the small populations of certain countries. Yet, even with a significantly smaller size, countries of origin have nevertheless felt the impact of the exodus of its nationals; a majority of whom possessed skills necessary for their home countries' overall development. What follows pertains to determining plausible ways and devising capable mechanisms that adequately maximize the skill-sets and experiences of the diaspora.

The Role of Diaspora Youth

“Youth is in fact a metaphor for capability, for optimism, for challenge to accepted standards for the pursuit of the alternative path, for change,” (Charles, 2008, pg. 147)

To focus on the diaspora in Taiwan means to focus on the presence of the student and the young professional community in the country. With the majority of students falling within the 18-30 age range, the community in Taiwan is made up of individuals in the ideal age range with the potential to make valuable contributions in different areas. Charles (2008) describes youth as possessing nine different intelligences namely, factual, analytical, linguistic, spatial, musical, practical, intuitive and interpersonal. These nine skills become enriched with different perspectives upon interaction with different environments and peoples outside of the homeland. Nevertheless, these skills should be further harnessed, developed and channeled into appropriate areas.

The definition of capacity building initially provided in this thesis, highlights areas in
which skills and talents can be maximized for desired outcomes. However, in applying capacity building to the context of this thesis, practical examples have been presented. These examples serve to take the concept of capacity building and produce realistic scenarios. Taking into consideration the characteristics and limitations of the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan, the following suggestions are thus provided.

**Capacity Building among the Youth: Application to the Diaspora in Taiwan**

Satterwhite, Teng and Fernandopulle (2007) address the link between culture and capacity building. The approaches involving capacity building and culture are divided into “culturally competent” and “culturally-based”. Culturally-competent approaches are described as strategies geared to “enhance the quality of life, create equal access to necessary resources, and…foster strategic and progressive social change resulting in a just society”. Culturally-based capacity building in contrast describes the “provision of transformational and technical support and training schemes for individuals, organizations and communities…” This training stresses on utilizing knowledge, cultural sensitivity on issues such as race/ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and identity, age, language, disability and religion. The latter approach is of more relevance to this thesis.

Employing culturally-based strategies towards developing and empowering the diaspora in Taiwan takes into consideration that the youth and young professional communities are acquiring a unique perspective due to their induction into Taiwan’s education system, language and society. The goal is to have structured mechanisms that are able to channel this perspective and additional skill sets towards desired outcomes.

As a collective, the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan has the responsibility of portraying their interest and willingness to become part of an initiative that is mutually beneficial. Due to size and other constraints, efforts must be made by diaspora members to show their interest, willingness and commitment to diaspora engagement and mobilization schemes in order for a diaspora initiative to be successful.
David P. Levine, author of *The Capacity for Civic Engagement*, quotes Robert Putnam’s definition of civic engagement as the embodiment of connection; uncovering or emphasizing “the many ways we are linked” which “increases tolerance and empathy”. Putnam warns against the simple assumption that adopting the definition of connection as only involving generating feelings of benevolence, trust, charity, friendship. He notes their importance in strengthening specific means through which connection is achieved in enhancing civic life (Levine, 2011, p. 4-7).

By understanding the ways in which the CARICOM diaspora communities and local communities in Taiwan can interact and cooperate, it can add to the positive development of civil society of both regions. These interactions help to create culturally aware societies that allow for further social cohesion and the creation of platforms for extensive modes of cooperation.

Organizations such as ASEAN, the African Union and the Pacific Island Forum have recognized the conceivable results of mobilizing students and young professionals in this manner. Born from the joint aspirations of members of civil society or created as official initiatives of regional organs, national and regional councils and associations have been founded as hubs for the dissemination of information, cooperation and advocacy while empowering the youth.

**Collective Diaspora Youth Organizations**

*The African Students Association in Telangana States (ASA-TS)*

The African Students Association in Telangana States (ASA-TS) is an example of an organized platform that aims to connect the African student diaspora in India. Based in Hyderabad, the capital city of the southern Indian state of Telangana, the ASA-TS is a non-political, non-religions and non-profit organization that represents 7,000-10,000 students from a total of 22 registered African countries (ASA-TS). With the slogan “One, Africa, One Voice” ASA-TS seeks to encourage unity and mutual understanding.

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among African students throughout different education institutions in Telangana while adhering to a culture of academic excellence.

_The ASEAN University Network (AUN)_

The ASEAN University Network was created in November 1995, to “hasten the solidarity and development of a regional identity through the promotion of human resource development so as to further strengthen the existing network of leading universities and institutions of higher learning in the region.” It was the collaborative effort of ASEAN member states at the 4th ASEAN Summit of 1992. Initially the AUN was concerned with facilitating exchanges among student and faculty, cooperative research, ASEAN studies and networking. The ASEAN University Network is now active in the following five areas: (1) Youth mobility (2) Academic Collaboration (3) Standards, Mechanisms, Systems and Policies of Higher Education (4) Courses and Programmes Development (5) Regional and Global Policy Platforms.

_The Pacific Island Youth Council (PYC)_

The Pacific Youth Council or interchangeably referred to as the Pacific Youth Congress is a non-governmental organization that acts as the collective body for 10 National Youth Councils throughout the Pacific Islands. The PYC primarily caters to uniting youth on the home front with the goals of youth development, regional and international engagement and promoting global awareness of region-specific issues and challenges affecting the youth. The Council comprises a Secretariat, a committee executive board (which equally represents 5 of the 10 registered national councils) and holds elections every three years at a General Assembly.

Established in 1997, the Pacific Youth Council has engaged additional partners such as USAIDS, UNESCO and the Commonwealth Local Government Forum to develop projects and workshops aimed at cultivating a capable, knowledgeable and influential youth resource within the region. The PYC not only derives strength and validity from its

membership, but through the support of the state and other regional hubs. The establishment of the PYC as a legitimate organization of its nature and mission was recognized by three entities: the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (the region’s largest collective body), the Pacific Leadership Program and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). The prominence of this organization can be seen through its participation in the review of the 2010 Pacific Youth Strategy and Pacific Youth Report issued by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.29

**Cooperation with Educational Institutions**

Ambassador Jasmine E. Huggins of the Embassy of Saint Kitts and Nevis in Taiwan alluded to the possibility of the twinning of educational institutions in Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Asia-Pacific. As the oldest and longest running educational institute for the English-speaking Caribbean, The University of the West Indies (UWI) has established partnerships with several universities and research centers globally (Appendix A2).

In the Asia-Pacific region, the UWI Mona Campus in Jamaica currently holds institutional partnerships with Shanghai University, China University of Political Science and Law, and Dokkyo University in Japan. The UWI Saint Augustine Campus in Trinidad and Tobago is twinned to Shriram Institute of Industrial Research in India. Additionally, the UWI Cavehill Campus in Barbados has established partnerships with China’s Zhejiang Wanli University, Japan’s Osaka Gakuin University and Taiwan’s Chia-nan University of Pharmacy and Science and Da-yeh University. Thus, students have the option of participating in study abroad programs that enrich their academic career and personal development (UWI).

Granted that the number of partnerships in the Asia-Pacific is relatively lower in comparison to partnerships in Europe, North America and Latin America, the existence of these partnerships gives further testament to the growing mutual interest between the two regions through tertiary education. These partnerships also hint to the need to further

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utilize the knowledge and cultural experiences that CARICOM nationals receive from their study abroad visits to these universities.

(iii) In what ways can the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan enhance on the opportunities and environments presented to them by their host country?

To further promote the proposition of a ‘culture-based’ engagement initiative in Taiwan, participants in the survey were also asked questions about their experiences with cross-cultural exchanges in Taiwan and the ways in which they promote their country. Twenty-six (26) participants (86% of responses) stated that they had participated in cross-cultural activities at their individual institutions of study with their Taiwanese peers (Appendix B, Question 20 & 21).

In relation to questions on how participants educated Taiwanese about the Caribbean region and their individual countries, a Likert scale was used to record how participants viewed their knowledge and familiarity to the region and their countries of origin (Appendix B, Question 15). Participants were asked to rate the following statements based on their personal level of agreement or disagreement:

(i) I am knowledgeable about my culture
(ii) I feel proud of my culture
(iii) I feel that my country’s culture is unique
(iv) I have a desire to share my culture with those I meet.

Most participants responded favourably to the statements, with ‘4’ and ‘5’ being the most frequently chosen markers. The last question posed in this section was meant to measure how willing CARICOM nationals would be in sharing their culture, thus adding further evidence to support their willingness to be a part of cross-cultural activities in the future.

When it came to analyzing how CARICOM nationals educated their Taiwanese peers about their individual countries, responses indicated that first-time face-to-face
introductions with local Taiwanese provided them the most opportunities to talk about their countries (Appendix B, Question 17). Participants stressed on location, history and culture, language and diversity, and country size as particular characteristics that were emphasized. Seventeen (17) participants noted that they took part in these cross-cultural activities along with fellow nationals, while 13 did so individually (Appendix B, Question 19).

With regards to participation in future activities of a similar cultural nature, the majority of students stated their willingness to be involved (Appendix B, Question 30).

Yet, in order to decipher what sort of cross-cultural activities would prove most appealing and generate considerable levels of participation, a list of activities (with the inclusion of class presentations) were listed. The list included (i) informal/formal cross-cultural panel discussions, fundraising for local causes in Taiwan, (ii) formal events or festivals orchestrated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan) and (iii) Caribbean Callaloo30 (Appendix B, Question 31).

In analyzing the reasons which would dissuade participants from being involved in such future events, responses indicated that disorganization, lack of participation from other fellow nationals and lack of financial support were the most common deterrents.

Nearly 87% of responses revealed that participants did consider themselves as being citizen diplomats for their home country and region (Appendix B, Question 32).

Opportunities for CARICOM nationals to exercise their role as cultural ambassadors and citizen diplomats can also be created through joint grassroots events with a larger outreach with less restrictions than university planned events. Though planning such events outside preset university arrangements may prove challenging, it allows for more cooperation among the diaspora; particularly giving students the experience of managing

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30 Caribbean Callaloo is a grassroots event started by Caribbean students in Taiwan that seeks to holistically educate the people of Taiwan about the Caribbean’s multifaceted culture.
internal conflicts, event management and further exercising their interpersonal skills. It was as a result of the similar interaction of ideas, skills and viewpoints of scholarship students in 2009 that Caribbean Callaloo was designed and executed for the first time.

**Caribbean Callaloo: The Caribbean Experience in Taiwan**

Caribbean Callaloo is a social and educational platform designed for cross-cultural exchange in which islands connect over oceans and seas. Beginning in 2009, it was the birth child of a core group of students from some of the representative countries. This event was proposed as a vehicle that would allow Taiwan to experience another form of island culture; one that has been influenced by indigenous, European, West African, Indian and also Chinese cultures. Through food, music, dance and art, Caribbean Callaloo aimed to provide an all-inclusive opportunity where the Taiwanese public can be introduced to, or become more familiar with, the culture of the Caribbean region. It also allowed Caribbean nationals to learn more about their neighbours.

Caribbean Callaloo aims to fulfill the following goals:

(i) To fulfill our part of the “cross-cultural exchange” equation,

(ii) To further aid in shaping a Taiwanese local community that is more knowledgeable and accepting of the growing diverse ethnic and cultural population in Taiwan,

(iii) To further promote solidarity in Taiwan as diplomatic allies,

(iv) To help establish a more united front as members of the Caribbean diaspora in Taiwan,

(v) To aid in promoting the presence of our Embassies and through the continued efforts of the diaspora, assist in the possible establishment of diplomatic Missions for the Caribbean countries who have established ties with Taiwan, but are still without a Mission.

In May 2012 on the grounds of National Taiwan University, the third Caribbean Callaloo was held under the theme "Kaleidoscope: the Caribbean's past, present and future. Haiti,
Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent & the Grenadines were represented (with the Embassy of Belize in Taiwan providing material on behalf of Belize). In total, around 200-300 persons attended the event out of a projected 400-500 people. The Ambassador of Saint Kitts and Nevis and Belize were both present at the festivities.

Promotional Activities for Caribbean Callaloo: Avenues for further exchanges

“East Meets West” Sports Tournaments: In 2012, a series of basketball games were held at National Taiwan University, Mingchuan University, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology and Fu Jen Catholic University. An all-male basketball team comprising players from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia, was arranged to challenge school teams from the selected universities. These universities were chosen for the primary reason that they were the schools which most of the team members attended.

These basketballs games were initially meant to be a form of advertisement for Caribbean Callaloo. The competitive, sportive spirit of the local university teams and international students was utilized. Victories were awarded with Caribbean Callaloo bands along with a gift bag containing various items and about the region. Committee members were able to utilize each opportunity spent at these games to reach out to the respective student communities. Flyers were printed in both English and Mandarin Chinese. In addition, Caribbean students with strong Mandarin Chinese language proficiency were charged with the task of speaking directly with Taiwanese students who attended these games. Though this event served as a mere promotional tool, it could be further utilized for sports exchanges between the youth of Taiwan and the Caribbean countries. These sports exchanges could expand to encompass several sports including football, martial arts and volleyball among others.

‘Welcome to the Caribbean’: On different occasions, Caribbean students have had opportunities to educate Taiwanese students about the Caribbean region. From elementary schools to universities, local Taiwanese students were able to be introduced to the culture, history, climate, geography and the people of the Caribbean countries represented in Taiwan. The presentations were done in both English and Mandarin
Chinese. Bookmarks depicting the flags of the different countries were distributed to the students after the presentations were made. These opportunities however, became more available after Caribbean Callaloo was held in 2012 and were mostly done in Taipei. School presentations such as the aforementioned can be orchestrated to reach many more schools not only in Taipei, but throughout other districts in Taiwan where the diaspora reside.

These opportunities for further exchange only represent a small proportion of what could be done by the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan. As more scholarship recipients arrive in Taiwan, new ideas and fresh insight into creative and sustainable avenues for cultural expression and dialogue can be proposed and acted upon.

(iv) **What obstacles must be addressed if the projected benefits of a diaspora initiative in Taiwan are to be achieved?**

To overlook factors that would hinder the success of any diaspora initiative would influence the legitimacy of this study. One of the obstacles facing a united CARICOM diaspora engagement initiative or policy in Taiwan (and the Asia-Pacific) would be the size and influence of the student diaspora.

This fact was reiterated by Ambassador Nisbet and Ambassador Huggins who noted that the creation of a diaspora policy would require the involvement of a “critical mass of people” which the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan lacks (Appendix A1, A2). Additionally, the power that the diaspora possesses compared to the influence of government officials and economic investors are limited. This disadvantage is addressed in some degree by the Network of African Students in Japan.

*The NASJ: Network of African Students in Japan*

The Network of African Students in Japan was launched in June 2013 in Yokohama in timing with the hosting of the 5th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V). From an initial membership of 30 students, the NASJ has
expanded to include more than 200 African students in Japan\textsuperscript{31}. It was through the active involvement of the executive and members that side events related to TICAD V were successful and aided in securing a firm foundation for the organization. These events included a symposium under the theme “Uniting students to bridge the gap and enhance mutual understanding between Africa and Japan” and an exhibition booth that highlighted the achievements of African students in Japan alongside the achievements of their respective countries.

The NASJ also enhanced its presence and promoted its agenda by meeting with the then Dean of the African Diplomatic Corps and Ambassador of Zimbabwe to Japan, H.E. Stuart Comberbach. It also managed to attain four additional objectives: (i) the consideration of the H.E. Comberbach to be the association’s patron, (ii) discussion on the transformation of NASJ to a non-profit organization (ii) invitation to the next African Diplomatic Corps meeting and (iv) the introduction of NASJA to the diplomatic corps at ambassadorial meeting scheduled for June of that year\textsuperscript{32}.

Dr. Didacus Jules, Director-General of the OECS Commission to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) noted that the potential of the diaspora surpasses its small size. Speaking from the standpoint of this sub-regional bloc, Dr. Jules noted that the diaspora in Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific possesses a linguistic and cultural knowledge ideal for translation and the building of friendships on a deeper person-to-person level. China and Taiwan each have relations with three members of the OECS (Appendix A5). Dr. Jules additionally made reference to the Goals and Development Strategy recently initiated by the OECS. This strategy targets the youth as a special demographic. It focuses on empowering youth to become entrepreneurs, and giving them the capacities that will allow them to make a contribution without relying on the present systems and social ideologies that have hindered them (Appendix A5). This strategy can be adopted by CARICOM and expanded to include diaspora youth in Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{31} Network of African Students in Japan, http://netasjapan.weebly.com/
\textsuperscript{32} Wanjiru, Melissa, Interim Vice Chair, Report on NASJA Launch and TICAD V Side Events 1s-3rd June,2013, http://netasjapan.weebly.com/events.html
Though respondents to the email survey stated their concurrence on the effectiveness of a united approach versus an individual national approach, allusions were made to the disunity among the diaspora as a matter that must be addressed if this initiative were to be effective as a united approach.

“I think that students often stand in their own way and in the way of collaborations. It is often difficult to try to get a group of Caribbean people together to work on a project or event…Some students do not realize the vital role that they could and should play when it comes to representing their countries in Taiwan and so it is often left to a select few persons to push for events. This often means that no fresh ideas are flowing or ideas do emerge but cannot be realized because of a lack of manpower or support from fellow peers…Also the fact that not all CARICOM islands here have a representative to support the various association could lead to some inequalities impact wise as funding is always an issue, especially in event coordination.” (Appendix C1)

Solutions to address the issue of disunity within the CARICOM diaspora were at the same time proposed. One particular response proposed the need to reach out to prospective scholarship students prior to their arrival in Taiwan:

“I think that ‘capturing’ the attention of students before they depart for Taiwan will help students realise the importance of unity in such a country. The continued organization of activities no matter how small or seemingly insignificant will help. The support of and encouragement from ambassadors, governments, ministry officials etc. can definitely help in the promotion of a sense of unity amongst CARICOM nationals.” (Appendix C1)
Despite this insight (which is valuable towards intra-diaspora relations), respondents agreed that working as a collective would prove more effective and would be of mutual benefit to both Taiwan and CARICOM.

“Students can participate in or organized cross cultural activities or clubs to afford Taiwanese the opportunity to learn about different cultures and languages and for students themselves to learn about other cultures. Students can also create blogs, videos etc. (social media activity) to enlighten classmates, friends etc. about their countries. Students should also participate wholly in international festivals by their schools to further educate Taiwanese students as well as other international students about CARICOM etc.” (Appendix C1)

“We need a big CARICOM gala, with our cultures portrayed; carnival costumes, national costumes, the sweet sounds of pan, calypso, soca, poetry, art and dance. FOOD!” (Appendix C3)

In using Taiwan as the main case study for CARICOM’S diaspora initiative in the Asia-Pacific, this research and the likelihood of actualization brings the One China Policy into the discourse. Though focusing mainly on cultural promotion and diaspora engagement aspects, increased efforts and increased recognition by CARICOM would inevitably be noticed by China.

(v) Could such strategies progress to noted significance that could warrant concern amidst tension brought on by the ‘One China’ Policy?

The intention of this paper was to focus on a strictly culture-based approach that can be extended to other countries throughout the Asia-Pacific. However, avoiding the One China Policy would mean exclusion of the most important factor that could impact the rationale for this thesis. In theory, a diaspora diplomacy strategy between CARICOM and
Taiwan would not impact cross-strait relations and upset intra-CARICOM relations. Reasons include current China-Taiwan relations, the nature of this scheme and the objective of solely presenting Taiwan as a catalyst for a larger undertaking.

Culture has been known to aid in circumventing political tension between countries thus aiding in promoting mutual understanding (as can be seen during the Cold War). Granted some exchanges had underlying political agendas or saw persons or organizations from both the United States of America and Russia explicitly using cross-cultural channels to spy on the other, the probability of similar instances for deception occurring in this particular circumstance would be low. As developing states facing various challenges, such tactics would be of no advantage to bilateral and multilateral relations.

On the contrary, it would be worth examining the varying perceptions of the ‘One China’ definition among CARICOM diaspora communities in both China and Taiwan to gauge whether the One China Policy would affect their ability to cooperate towards the success of this initiative. With mutually defined objectives directed at jointly promoting the region through students and young professionals in the Taiwan, much can be addressed as well as avoided so as not to incite causes for concern.

The supplementary survey posed this question to participants. Those who replied stated that a united CARICOM diaspora initiative in Taiwan would not interfere with the current status quo of Cross-Strait relations and China and Taiwan’s dealings with CARICOM.

“No, as this is not mainly focused on diplomacy, in my opinion.”

“I don’t think that a student organization or initiative will affect these ties. I think that these organizations and initiatives are crucial in the development and survival of students in any foreign country. If students remain politically unbiased, example no presence at any protests etc., then there should be no upset due to this initiative/organization.” (Appendix C1)
However, one response alluded to a change in the political environment as possibly affecting this.

“That is indeed a ticklish issue, because as it stands now, Taiwan is not to interfere with China’s allies and vice versa. This agreement depends on the politics of the day in Taiwan. With a change in government, there could be changes in allies.” (Appendix C3)

Other possible scenarios would involve the sudden deterioration of ties between China and Taiwan. Another possible scenario would arise concerning balancing prospective bids made by China and Taiwan to assist in areas in the Caribbean region indicated by the collective CARICOM diaspora unit. Dr. Didacus Jules made mention of the Caribbean region serving as a low risk zone whereby China and Taiwan could enhance further cooperation amidst current Cross-strait relations.

“When president Ma visited Saint Lucia, He had given an address to parliament and that address was a very fascinating one because he spoke of the increasing rapport between the People’s Republic and Taiwan, and pointed to the fact that they would be looking at increasing cooperation…So, my thinking was, half of the OECS countries have links with the People’s Republic, the other have with Taiwan. Now that there’s that rapport, the feeling I put out was to find out whether the two countries would be prepared to treat the OECS as a low risk diplomatic area in which they could test out a different…their different ways of collaborating. Ideally, I could see the two of them complimenting each other on the Developmental Assistance Fund...because People’s Republic tends to invest in big projects and so on. The Taiwanese tend to do small community-based action stuff.” (Appendix A5)

The Findings and Discussions chapter elaborated upon the key questions posed in this thesis. In further supporting the thesis, the task lastly to be addressed concerns the
proposal of practical recommendations towards the formation of a tentative diaspora initiative in Taiwan.
Chapter 5

Recommendations and Conclusion

5.1. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Diaspora Data Repository

Diaspora data collection methods need to be more all-inclusive. Having a repository that combines information from statistics bureaus in each of the CARICOM nation states would help encourage the upkeep of records and the accuracy of intraregional migration flows. With recent achievement of free flow of goods, services and people (though limited to specific categories) a database that documents countries of origin, occupational status upon leaving, occupational status upon arrival in the host country along with intra-regional and extra-regional remittance flows can be accessed for the collective benefit of the Community.

This would first require national statistics bureaus and migration research centers to be developed and technically equipped to provide and upkeep accurate data and develop more efficient methods of data analysis. Establishment of IOM branches among the CARICOM member states or facilitating diaspora mapping, quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis workshops with IOM can be pursued. Jamaica can help achieve this goal.

As a subset of this larger CARICOM diaspora database (or a CARICOM Global Citizens Databank), a category should be reserved for the student diaspora (student migrants) and young professionals abroad. This subset would particularly keep record of educational migrants and young labour migrants. Information can be derived and compiled from regional, extra-regional institutions, national statistics bureaus, scholarship foundations, non-profit organizations as well as student organizations. Documentation of age, gender, country and region of destination, projected length of stay in the host country (according to scholarship or training guidelines), subject of study, institution of study and type of scholarship or financial assistance received, would be necessary. This recommendation would need to be initiated as a national project before expanding to a regional level.
Among the functions of CARICOM’s Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) stated in paragraph 2, Article 12 of the Treaty of Chauguramas, there is the opportunity for an addendum to be attached. The fifth function looks at policies and programs targeted towards facilitating the transportation of people and goods. A note specifically denoting qualitative and quantitative data collection and upkeep on intra-regional and extra-regional flows of people can allow the task of diaspora research to be formally institutionalized (thus hinting at its need to be done).

If inclusion under the fifth function is deemed unsuitable, the aforementioned clause could be included in the last clause as a miscellaneous function, but one that is still explicitly viewed as the responsibility of the COFCOR or affiliate division committed to this task of diaspora research. Embassies of CARICOM member states in Taiwan can collaborate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, the International Cultural and Development Fund and the National Statistics Bureau to keep track of scholarship recipients, students, interns and young professionals from their arrival till completion of their studies or training. Data regarding the number of returnees, students remaining in the host country post-graduation or after the completion of their respective programs will also be collected to analyze the factors that have led to their decisions.

**Recommendation 2: CARICOM Global Youth and Professionals Network (CGYPN)**

As of June 2015, four of the five CARICOM countries with formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan have now established embassies; the Embassy of Saint Lucia to Taiwan, being the most recent to open. With the embassies’ proximity to other embassies in the Asia-Pacific region, the existing network can be boosted. The combined presence of the CARICOM nationals scattered throughout the region can be an added motivator to the formation of an institutionalized hub that can be accessed. To facilitate the formation of a body of CARICOM nationals, the creation of a CARICOM Global Youth and Professionals Network (CGYPN) which connects active national associations within the host countries is suggested.
This umbrella network would then consist of regional factions or subgroups (i.e. CGYPN-Asia, CGYPN-Americas, CGYPN-Europe). Each faction would add to the CARICOM Global Citizens repository while simultaneously contributing to the development of diaspora policies with regional specificities. Upon recognition by embassies and other diplomatic missions, and the support of the COFCOR (as an organ of CARICOM), these factions can utilize the resource of knowledge and cultural expertise present in the diaspora. In forming these sub-groups, certain models of student-driven initiatives, such as the previously mentioned African Student Alliance and the Pacific Youth Council, can provide guidance.

The CGYPN-Taiwan, for example, would include:

(i) an executive board which comprises representatives from the active Associations present in Taiwan; the position of the CGYPN-Taiwan representative could automatically be given to the President and/or Vice-President of each association,

(ii) a general election that would be held based on consensus by the Executive

(ii) the collective drafting of a constitution that would state the Council’s mission statement, oath or creed, duties of the Executive, objectives of the Council, contact information of the registered associations, collective CARICOM youth networks on the home front, relative Embassies, the COFCOR, and the CARICOM Secretariat;

(iv) a supplementary document detailing potential projects, partnerships with non-profit organizations throughout Taiwan in the areas of cross-cultural education, cultural promotion, social development, volunteerism, charity, and other opportunities for engagement with the host country and the home country;

A collective platform that unites respective student associations across the regions can be an independent and viable project, but unless supported by established structures and institutions that are specifically put in place to meet their needs and channel their potential, its success will be impeded. The presence of a non-politically aligned entity with a common objective to promote the region and its culture may provide the following benefits:
(i) allowing youth of various disciplines an additional channel to be able to connect with their fellow youth abroad;
(ii) serve as an additional database for CARICOM to inquire about the demographics of CARICOM nationals in Taiwan and the rest of the Asia-Pacific;
(iii) serve as a cultural and language resource from the perspective of CARICOM nationals;
(iv) foster relations with prospective non-profit or quasi-governmental organizations that could be of assistance to grassroots schemes in the Caribbean region;
(v) help expand CARICOM’s outreach and develop rapport within Asian and Pacific host countries;
(vi) promotion of regional culture.

Recommendation 3: Opportunities for enhanced cultural-exchanges in Taiwan

In addition to the continuation of the tournaments and class visits, activities of an even deeper cultural value can be explored. These may take the forms of panel discussions and workshops that can further engage local Taiwanese and Caribbean students via common channels.

Caribbean-Asia Diaspora Panel Discussions

Introducing the Caribbean-Asia diaspora to the people of Taiwan creates a sense of commonality with the region. Taking place at schools, coffee-shops and other pertinent venues the concept behind hosting this particular panel discussion is to present something relatable as a means of translating a lesser known experience to the audience. By highlighting the lives and experiences of Asian descendants in the Caribbean, it is hoped that those in attendance will be intrigued to learn more about the region and the people who live there. The panel would consist of 5 panelists of Asian-descent who are from 3-5 different Caribbean countries. A suitable date for this type of event would tentatively fall within the month leading up to Caribbean Callaloo. Holding this event would require the panelists to be flown to Taiwan, accommodations and meals to be arranged, as well as tours around the island. However, to create even more of a connection with Taiwanese
locals, inviting participants of the Taiwanese Youth Ambassador Program and the Overseas Taiwanese Volunteers who lived in some of these Caribbean countries would be ideal to present a more familiar perspective and incite discussion.

‘Rhythm and Vibe’ Dance Workshops
Street dancing has become an ever-popular phenomenon in Asia. Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan have notably excelled in dance genres such as locking, popping, hip-hop and breaking. Competitions either take place within university dance teams, among universities in specific districts, or across Taiwan. Students have invested in local dance studios where seasoned Taiwanese and Japanese dancers take the role of instructors. Merry Monarch Studios in Taipei hosted its first Dancehall choreography Workshop “Fyah to di World” in 2014. This workshop brought in two of some of the top Dancehall, Soca and West African dancers from France to aid in diversifying Taiwan’s vibrant and ever growing street dance scene. The Caribbean Callaloo Committee, upon reaching the level of a noted stability with relatively stable financial support, can partner with some of these local dance studios; supporting them in ventures of this kind and collectively brainstorming other forms of collaboration.

SID Youth Conferences on Cultural Preservation and Promotion
Conducting conferences that draw on the perspectives of youth in relation to their cultural heritage can be another opportunity worthy of investment in the future. Once the umbrella body of the CARICOM Global Youth and Professionals Network in the Asia-Pacific has been established and has developed to a certain degree, participation in conferences and seminars of this nature further enables the diaspora youth to take action towards safeguarding their cultural collective memory, and finding ways to transform that resource into tangible results. In the presence of other youth councils and organizations, dialogue would produce possible policy recommendations and suggestions that would be presented to their respective regional hubs like the Pacific Island Forum, CARICOM or the Indian Ocean Commission. Presided over by expert facilitators associated with organizations like UNESCO, conferences such as these boost the profile of youth
organizations and their capacity for making valuable contributions to regional and international affairs.

Collaboration with Educational Foundations and Cultural Organizations
The CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan can also draw on the assistance of non-profit organizations and quasi-governmental units that target international students for the fulfillment of their objectives. Two such organizations are the Foundation of International Cooperation and Higher Education in Taiwan and the Quanta Cultural and Educational Foundation. Both organizations utilize members of the international student to do various levels of outreach.

The Foundation of International Cooperation and Higher Education in Taiwan, hosts events and competitions where they seek to highlight the experiences of international students pursuing degrees in Taiwanese universities. The goal is to use the international perspective presented through projects like “Call for Stories”, to encourage prospective students around the world to choose Taiwan as a destination of study. Operating on three levels—government to government, Foundation to universities and Foundation to students—FICHET’s outreach and reputation is growing.

FICHET, through its “Call for Stories” competitions, “Study in Taiwan” projects and other initiatives, has identified the role and importance of the international student body in Taiwan and strives to utilize their presence. However, what the organization has not ventured further into is adding another function whereby FICHET can serve as a platform for promoting additional exchanges between the international student community and Taiwanese.

In hosting discussions with organizations like FICHET and QUANTA, ideas can be shared on how international students can reach out to the Taiwanese community in effective ways and how organizations like these can utilize the perspective of the international community to help develop additional functions as a platform to connect local and international communities within Taiwan.
5.2 Conclusion

In presenting the topic of “Diaspora diplomacy and Capacity Building between CARICOM and Taiwan”, the opportunity to expand this research to include the rest of the Asia-Pacific arises. What lacks is the abundance of information of specific nature to this thesis to be compiled, analyzed and utilized. This does not imply that the current thesis in its structure and content is complete. By acknowledging the weaknesses of this novel study, there is reason to encourage further research into this subject area through the (i) analysis of additional case studies, and the (ii) inclusion of added discourse and assessment of the conceptual and factual models employed for the development of a diaspora engagement framework.

Embassies of CARICOM states present throughout the Asia-Pacific region should also not be overlooked, with countries like Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti and Belize having established more than two missions within one country. The opportunity for networking among the various embassies and diaspora in the Asia-Pacific is evident. For diaspora initiatives, the embassies serve as sources of support in ways that can range from the provision of material to showcase at regional and international expos, to funding forums that unite diaspora communities throughout the Asia-Pacific in dialogue on diaspora issues and issues affecting CARICOM and the larger Caribbean region.

There is undoubtedly potential present in the form of the diaspora abroad. The contributions they can make as part of a joint initiative supported by CARICOM are numerous, but must be harnessed properly in order to produce the desired results. This thesis—with its limitations—forms part of literature in a comparatively lesser explored area. In so doing, it is hoped that more extensive research will be conducted.
References


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Appendix

Appendix A1

Questions for the Embassies of CARICOM Member States in Taiwan (Belize)

1. Is it possible to pursue a collective regional initiative (as CARICOM) nations with regards to implementing a diaspora diplomacy strategy in Taiwan (and by extension in East Asia?)

2. What sort of policies would a united CARICOM foreign strategy in East Asia involve? What would be the costs and benefits of such schemes?

3. In what ways do/can Missions of CARICOM states abroad enact their countries’ objectives abroad?

4. Is it the responsibility of the overseas mission (as the established representative body in Taiwan) to spur activism among the Belizean community with regards to spreading cultural awareness about Belize within Taiwan? Or is it largely the responsibility of the members of the diaspora present to take the incentive?

5. What are the main objectives of the diaspora policy of Belize?

6. What are some of policy’s main strengths and weaknesses and have these strategies particularly involved students abroad? In what ways?

7. In what ways can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan be empowered and equipped for the role of being citizen diplomats? What role do missions of CARICOM states play in this process?

8. What are the obstacles that have hindered such efforts at diaspora diplomacy or diaspora engagement in the past? Or what factors do you think would impact the success of such efforts?

9. In your opinion, what sort of structures or institutions on the home front can be utilized in building capable members of the CARICOM’s civil society abroad, especially with regards to East Asia?

10. Do you think that diaspora diplomacy can alleviate the developmental challenges facing the CARICOM community itself?

11. The CARICOM Secretariat recently issued a revised 4-year Strategic Plan that emphasized the need for coordinated foreign policy and a “people-centeredness approach”. What steps have been taken to ensure the effectiveness of this approach?

12. Have there been any formal or informal attempts at civic engagement with nationals from Belize in Taiwan regarding the promotion of the country and its culture?

13. Do you believe that the diaspora in Taiwan could do more to help boost the region’s
profile? In what ways do you think the diaspora can further be maximized and mobilized for the benefit of CARICOM and Taiwan?
Summary of interview with Ambassador Cherie Nisbet (Embassy of Belize to Taiwan R.O.C.)
7th May, 2015
Thesis Topic:
Diaspora Diplomacy and Capacity Building
between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Taiwan

1. Is it possible to pursue a collective regional initiative (as CARICOM) nations with regards to implementing a diaspora diplomacy strategy in Taiwan (and by extension in East Asia?)
Yes. Though it would be good, it would be limited since it would mostly involve students. Diaspora in Belize is mostly students. We used to have an economic citizens program whereby Taiwanese coming to Belize for economic investment were given Belizean citizenship status and passports Belizean Taiwanese due to passports but have not made contributions.

2. What sort of policies would a united CARICOM foreign strategy in East Asia involve? What would be the costs and benefits of such schemes?
Culture based. Definitely. Advantage is language especially through language exchange. The Embassy of Belize focuses on getting investment. Unfortunately, trade with Taiwan is low because trade tariffs are high.

3. In what ways do/can missions of CARICOM states abroad enact country’s public diplomacy plans abroad?
Through investment

5. What are the main objectives of Belize’s diaspora policy?
Just had its diaspora program; specialized educated diaspora, bring them back home to live, to help develop in their expertise. Try to get diaspora to return with benefits, reduced tax.

6. What are some of policy’s main strengths and weaknesses and have these strategies particularly involved students abroad? In what ways?
Strengths outweigh the weaknesses; inability of reaching out to the diaspora effectively. Interest vs. non-interest. Questionnaires directed to Belizean Diaspora.

7. In what ways can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan be empowered and equipped for the role of being citizen diplomats? What role do missions of CARICOM states play in this process?
Country pride/patriotism, keeping abreast with the news in Belize, visiting the embassy, Belize-Guatemala issue, culture, differences and similarities, develop a broad sense of the country.
8. What are the obstacles that have hindered such efforts at diaspora diplomacy or diaspora engagement in the past? Or what factors do you think would impact the success of such efforts?
*Size of diaspora, expectations of the diaspora, coming back, “What can the government do for me?” mentality, education, Why do we need you back home?*

10. Do you think that diaspora diplomacy can alleviate the developmental challenges facing the CARICOM community itself?
*I don’t think it can alleviate, but it would help. Soft Power Diplomacy. There may be a possibility of alleviation in the long run. Young professionals can be a bridge for the region. CARICOM is thriving.*

11. Have there been any formal or informal attempts at civic engagement with Belizean nationals in Taiwan regarding the promotion of Belize and Belizean culture in Taiwan?
*Yes, do it through students a lot. Support is given (depending on what the embassy needed. Trade shows, food shows, we try to do it.*
Appendix 2

Questions for Director Matt Van Pelt of Global Exchange Division at Quanta

1. In what ways does the international community in Taiwan play into Quanta’s objectives?
2. Have there been any events that Quanta has done in collaboration with other organizations or even with government units?
3. Are programs targeted only to international students or to young professionals as well?
4. What programs or events hosted and promoted by Quanta have been particularly successful in aiding to promote global and cultural awareness in Taiwan?
5. What is your opinion on the level of global and cultural awareness of the Taiwanese community? On average how many international students apply to participate in Quanta’s programs?
6. What is your opinion on Quanta’s outreach into the local Taiwanese community?
7. Are Quanta’s projects primarily aimed at junior-high and high schools in Taiwan?
8. How is information about events and programs disseminated to the international student community in Taiwan?
9. What model or models has Quanta sought inspiration from with regards to its mission and the planning of its subsequent cross-cultural projects.
10. How does Quanta assess the impact of its projects and programs on the local Taiwanese community that you specifically target?
11. Are there a lot of students from the Caribbean region who participate in Quanta’s programs and projects?
12. With regards to activities and programs such as the Global Ambassador program, what is the demographic of international students who typically apply? Do you receive more applicants from certain countries? Are there countries that are not as represented as others and that you would like to reach out to?
13. How are students prepared/trained to participate in the cross-cultural activities that Quanta offers?
14. In what other ways does Quanta engage the international student community in Taiwan aside from cross-cultural presentations and other activities that you mentioned?
Summary of interview with Director Matt van Pelt  
(Global Exchange Division at Quanta)  
21st May, 2015 (1hr 24mins)  
Thesis Topic:  
Diaspora Diplomacy and Capacity Building  
between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Taiwan

1. **In what ways do the international community in Taiwan play into Quanta’s objectives?** The international community plays two important roles. We’re hoping to bridge the cultural gap (Cultural ambassadors) as a facilitator for innovation in education, we engage educators from around the world finding out how what they are doing in areas that Quanta has expertise and has interest in. We should not just include the international community in Taiwan; we need to reach out to the global community abroad as well. Become a bridge of culture across time and space; help people living in the now understand cultures all over. My unit is specialized with creating projects. Some of the projects have proposed haven’t really left the table. However those we have launched and have tried to implement (particularly international one) have been very successful. I’m not particularly knowledgeable about the programs that are specifically going on throughout Taiwanese schools, but in generally are successful. Immerse in Creativity has been going on for about 10 years. It was a project that was developed to meet the board’s requests, but overtime, Quanta’s mission has expanded so there are opportunities to be taken advantage of.

2. **Have there been any events that Quanta has done in collaboration with other organizations or even with government units?**  
We don’t function in a vacuum. We work alongside schools, museums, exhibitions, the Board of Education of New Taipei City, Ministry of Education

3. **What programs or events hosted and promoted by Quanta have been particularly successful in aiding to promote global and cultural awareness in Taiwan?**  
Immerse in Creativity in itself is cultural awareness program. We take a themed art exhibition of some kind, we build an exhibition around it and schools are encouraged to apply the curriculum into that exhibition. So, even though the exhibition may discuss Picasso, there are also cultural components in it. There’s another program called Take your Planet, make the change. IN terms of environmental awareness it has been wildly successful. In terms of what Quanta hosts, Cultural ambassadors was very successful last year. My Town is an international program aimed at high school kids (will expand to other students). Student teams choose aspects about specific aspects about their respective towns
and present it however they want. Through this program, students are also able to bring up social issues in these places.

4. What is your opinion on the level of global and cultural awareness of the Taiwanese community? On average how many international students apply to participate in Quanta’s programs?

I’m not sure. I lived in Japan for about 10 years, and I see that there’s certainly bit of enthusiasm and desire to understand different cultures among local Taiwanese compared to Japanese who usually learn things by the book and think that this is person is that way or this way just via that medium. In Taiwan, I the level of cultural awareness is not optimal, but there is a desire. The closer and closer you get to Taiwan, the more cultural awareness there is. They are aware of the internal diversity. The further you move away from Taiwan, the less cultural awareness there is present among the Taiwanese. Taiwanese are willing to listen, but the international community needs to reach out to them. Language can be a big thing here even though some schools have English programs.

5. What is your opinion on Quanta’s outreach into the local Taiwanese community?

Our flagship program Immerse in Creativity, its principle audiences include elementary schools with some junior high school’s over time it has come to include some high schools. 4th grade and above have been mostly targeted as, 1st and second graders in Taiwan have a hard time understanding. However first graders and second graders overseas have participated. Last year was when we began reaching out to universities by seeking out students who are studying Mandarin Chinese. We work across the board. But our flagship program mostly caters to elementary and junior high schools.

6. How is information about events and programs disseminated to the international student community in Taiwan?

For schools, we kinda have two routes; deeper level—reach out through schools that we have a good, close relationship with and ask them to promote the program. Due to these relations particularly, the network has been able to be expanded. When we tried reaching out to the international community schools, we asked their cultural and educational representatives that would propose ways for efficient means of program. Ministry of education and various boards of educations to promote this program. In reach out to the students, since My Town was a pilot we went to the board of education. Advertizing on Facebook page,
web page. For cultural ambassadors, we went to the language centers with well over 200 students, gave a presentation. Sent posters and postcards to smaller schools. Cultural Ambassadors sometimes brought their friends to their sessions and that way their friends know about it. We are a non-profit organization so this needs to be taken into consideration when promoting.

7. How does Quanta assess the impact of its projects and programs on the local Taiwanese community that you specifically target? 
   Program is still young so there have not really been any mechanisms put in place to fully assess. Surveys are what we have at the time, comments from people the boards of education. Looking at number of participants and applicants. Evaluating impact is tough, but the best is being done with what the organization has.

8. Are there a lot of students from the Caribbean region who participate in Quanta’s programs and projects? 
   No, not really.

9. With regards to activities and programs such as the Cultural Ambassador program, what is the demographic of international students who typically apply? Do you receive more applicants from certain countries? Are there countries that are not as represented as others and that you would like to reach out to? 
   Responses from people about the candidates and the countries represented, there was an interesting trend whereby people thought people’s expectations about Cultural ambassadors and foreign peoples were very limited. We have had people from Spain, South Africa, the Dominican Republic, the United States, and Vietnam. Hopes for more diversity. I’m not sure about the international community in Japan, but it Taiwan it seems to be very insular. More interaction between the groups needs to be seen.

10. How are students prepared/trained to participate in the cross-cultural activities that Quanta offers? 
    There aren’t trained. We give them tips on how to conduct themselves, tips on practicalities and logistics. We tried something similar last year and it proved a bit difficult for some applicants to understand. Judging based on how they present themselves in their video productions—so technical savvy, can you post videos online that you can get the word out, how do you act in a camera, etc. responsible for working with school. We give people a chance to try, but due to this judging
process for applicants we can tell who may or may not be suited for this program, but we welcome everyone. We have a 1-2 hour process that would include signing contracts, how to get in contact in the schools. Problems will be solved, however it’s more of a matter of steering applicants in the right direction. In terms on how to present, it’s all on them. We want people to blog about their experiences in the Cultural Ambassadors Program. We have guidelines on how to make a video so we can use it for promotion.

11. In what other ways does Quanta engage the international student community in Taiwan aside from cross-cultural presentations and other activities that you mentioned?
   It’s a little hard to say, we have some volunteer opportunities, The Immerse in Creativity Awards, students, former winners, parents, teachers. We have a pretty tight relationship with the representative of cross-strait international education in Taiwan, and they give us more ideas on things they will like to be seen done. Though may not come to fruition in 2015, some programs can be developed in the following year. Programs would include a version of cultural ambassadors that would reach out to the international community more and have them come to schools, programs that engage the international schools and teach them about the cultural mélange of Taiwan. It’s tricky sometimes because questions revolve around their interests “what’s in it for us?” “How does this benefit my country?” creating mutually beneficial programs that connect the international and Taiwanese community is still a little tricky. We know of students who are willing to be volunteers. Support can be given, just not monetary. Other opportunities are not as deep as the ones we have already, but new programs have been proposed and are in the works.
Appendix A3

Questions for the Embassies of CARICOM Member States in Taiwan
(Saint Kitts and Nevis)

1. Is it possible to pursue a collective regional initiative (as CARICOM) nations with regards to implementing a diaspora diplomacy strategy in Taiwan (and by extension in East Asia?)

2. What sort of policies would a united CARICOM foreign strategy in East Asia involve? What would be the costs and benefits of such schemes?

3. In what ways do/can missions of CARICOM states abroad enact their countries’ objectives abroad?

4. Is it the responsibility of the overseas mission (as the established representative body in Taiwan) to spur activism among the Saint Kitts and Nevisian community with regards to spreading cultural awareness about Saint Kitts and Nevis within Taiwan? Or is it largely the responsibility of the members of the diaspora present to take the incentive?

5. What are the main objectives of the diaspora policy of Saint Kitts and Nevis?

6. What are some of policy’s main strengths and weaknesses and have these strategies particularly involved students abroad? In what ways?

7. In what ways can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan be empowered and equipped for the role of being citizen diplomats? What role do missions of CARICOM states play in this process?

8. What are the obstacles that have hindered such efforts at diaspora diplomacy or diaspora engagement in the past? Or what factors do you think would impact the success of such efforts?

9. In your opinion, what sort of structures or institutions on the home front can be utilized in building capable members of the CARICOM’s civil society abroad, especially with regards to East Asia?

10. Do you think that diaspora diplomacy can alleviate the developmental challenges facing the CARICOM community itself?

11. The CARICOM Secretariat recently issued a revised 4-year Strategic Plan that emphasized the need for coordinated foreign policy and a “people-centeredness approach”. What steps have been taken to ensure the effectiveness of this approach?

12. Have there been any formal or informal attempts at civic engagement with nationals from Saint Kitts and Nevis in Taiwan regarding the promotion of the country and its culture?

13. Do you believe that the diaspora in Taiwan could do more to help boost the region’s profile? In what ways do you think the diaspora can further be maximized and mobilized for the benefit of CARICOM and Taiwan?
Summary of interview with Ambassador Jasmine E. Huggins (Embassy of Saint Kitts and Nevis to Taiwan R.O.C.)
22nd May, 2015
Thesis Topic:
Capacity Building and Diaspora Diplomacy
between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Taiwan

1. Is it possible to pursue a collective regional initiative (as CARICOM) nations with regards to implementing a diaspora diplomacy strategy in Taiwan (and by extension in the Asia-Pacific?)

It may not be possible for obvious reasons (for you have to have a comprehensive policy which needs a critical mass of people for it to have a meaningful impact). It should involve more people and definitely not students. But it might. There are only four countries in CARICOM with whom Taiwan has diplomatic relations. The impact will be more meaningful if we have a critical mass of CARICOM citizens. The regional initiative should involve more people and not students (by virtue of their status and focus). But if we look beyond the China/Taiwan dilemma, it might be possible.

2. What sort of policies would a united CARICOM foreign strategy in East Asia involve? What would be the costs and benefits of such schemes?

It may involve joint promotion of the region as a tourist destination marketing goods and services (professionals in Hong Kong, Malaysia have been doing so). Additionally, it can involve the joint cultural activities that build awareness about the region, finding new markets in the region.

3. In what ways do/can missions of CARICOM states abroad enact their countries’ objectives abroad?

Speaking for Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Missions abroad interact with relevant institutions in government and business to promote political, economic, cultural and developmental priorities for the country. The (Saint Kitts and Nevis) Missions would also engage various actors to encourage the (is also trying to do) twinning of institutions, universities, hospitals, transfer knowledge and expertise.

4. Is it the responsibility of the overseas mission (as the established representative body in Taiwan) to spur activism among the Saint Kitts and Nevisian community with regards to spreading cultural awareness about Saint Kitts and Nevis within Taiwan? Or is it largely the responsibility of the members of the diaspora present to take the incentive?

It should be the responsibility of each citizen (student), but it is also a matter of national pride. Back home, national pride should be instilled. If it comes from within, you would want to succeed and make sure that whatever you try to do is well received. If you’re told to do something the effort is much less than if it comes from your heart and soul…it would not have the same feeling. The embassies can encourage (d) and support efforts
made by their citizens (only after the initiative comes from the individual.)

5. What are the main objectives of the diaspora policy of Saint Kitts and Nevis?
There is a short section for diaspora policy due to Kittitian and Nevisian diaspora being spread so thinly. However, the policy looks to encourage the return of citizens to positively contribute to national development. We also encourage the members of the diaspora to participate actively in events at home and welcome their support, financial or otherwise, in activities geared towards improving the lives of the fellow citizens at home. Constructive suggestions on government policies are also encouraged (seek investments from the diaspora, citizenship by investment covered by the Ministry of national policy for returnees). Saint Kitts and Nevis has (no) a (Ministry) Department in Prime Minister’s office responsible for returning nationals (of Diaspora Affairs).

6. What are some of policy’s main strengths and weaknesses and have these strategies particularly involved students abroad? In what ways?
Strength: encourages people to come back and invest. The Government has duty free concessions, benefits for those coming back home even to retire. Mechanisms have also been put in place to offer loans for entrepreneurship from the National Bank.
Weakness: Infrequent contact with people in power. There can be more interaction of ministers and diaspora outside of election cycles. (Constitution allows people living outside of Saint Kitts and Nevis to vote during election period). There is insufficient information about investment opportunities for the diaspora.

7. In what ways can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan be empowered and equipped for the role of being citizen diplomats? What role do missions of CARICOM states play in this process?
Students’ objective is to go to school and get a degree thus diplomatic role is very limited. Time to partake in cross-cultural activities would depend on their individual schedules. It would also depend on the attitudes and behaviours of members of the diaspora participating in school activities. The Embassy would not want to burden students in that way. However, a suggestion to students would be to expose yourself and Taiwan; go beyond your circle of Caribbean friends, befriend Taiwanese. Do what can be done within the framework of being students. Once again this goes back to having a sense of pride.

8. What are the obstacles that have hindered such efforts at diaspora diplomacy or diaspora engagement in the past? Or what factors do you think would impact the success of such efforts?
One obstacle is the limited amount of CARICOM nationals in the ROC. In the case of Saint Kitts and Nevis, less than 40 individuals, and with the exception of 2 individuals all students, whose presence here is for the express purpose of gaining an education and whose status brings with it certain limitations. (The number is too small to be considered as a diaspora here. This is due to the unique situation of Taiwan).
10. Do you think that diaspora diplomacy can alleviate the developmental challenges facing the CARICOM community itself?
*Not alleviate, but it can help. Different countries would have different results. Can help shape policy. A lot of the times it depends on the strength of the representative of the diaspora.*

12. Have there been any formal or informal attempts at civic engagement with nationals from Saint Kitts and Nevis in Taiwan regarding the promotion of the country and its culture?
*Past participation in the annual travel fairs, MOFA events, FOXCON party (performed traditional national masquerade), MOFA brought a cultural group to Taiwan to perform. Enhance and take further advantage of cultural exchanges, learn Taiwanese and other languages.*

13. Do you believe that the diaspora in Taiwan could do more to help boost the region’s profile? In what ways do you think the diaspora can further be maximized and mobilized for the benefit of CARICOM and Taiwan?
*Revitalize the Caribbean Calaloo event. Host and OECS evening. Maybe have a CARICOM Callaloo event that focuses on the CARICOM countries. Poetry nights, cook ups or pot lucks, the recreation of Caribbean events at local community centers.*
Appendix A4

Questions for FICHET representatives Allen Hung and Chia Ming
12. In what ways does the international community in Taiwan contribute to FICHET’s objectives?
13. Have there been any events that FICHET has done in collaboration with other organizations or even with government units?
14. Are programs targeted only to students or to young professionals as well?
15. What programs or events hosted and promoted by FICHET have been particularly successful in aiding to promote global and cultural awareness in Taiwan?
16. What is your opinion on the level of global and cultural awareness of the Taiwanese community? On average how many international students apply to participate in FICHET’s programs?
17. What is your opinion on FICHET’s outreach into the local Taiwanese community?
18. Are FICHET’s projects primarily aimed at junior-high and high schools in Taiwan?
19. How is information about events and programs disseminated to the international student community in Taiwan?
20. What model or models has FICHET sought inspiration from with regards to its mission and the planning of its subsequent cross-cultural projects?
21. How does FICHET assess the impact of its projects and programs on the local Taiwanese community that you specifically target?
22. Are there a lot of students from the Caribbean region who participate in FICHET’s programs and projects?
23. With regards to activities such as the Global Ambassador program, what is the demographic of international students who typically apply? Do you receive more applicants from certain countries? Are there countries that are not as represented as others and that you would like to reach out to?
24. How are students prepared/ trained to participate in the cross-cultural activities that FICHET offers?
25. In what other ways does FICHET engage the international student community in Taiwan aside from cross-cultural presentations and other activities that you mentioned?
Interview with FICHET Representatives Allen Hung and Chia-Ming
22nd May, 2015 (40mins 36 seconds)
Thesis Topic:
Capacity Building and Diaspora Diplomacy
between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Taiwan

1. In what ways does the international community in Taiwan contribute to FICHET’s objectives?
As I mentioned before, in our Foundation, our main job can be divided into three different kinds. The first one is government to government, for example like Taiwan and maybe another country like Japan or America, and certain states like Florida and Maryland. Taiwan and the other government agency, this is the first level. And the second level is …our Foundation and other universities. The university level. And the third level is student. I think our project Study in Taiwan project refers to your question. I would say the international community in Taiwan contribute to our objectives. The international students join or participate in our Study in Taiwan event like the ‘Call for Story’ or the ‘Call for Speakers’. We also interview, or we ask them to share their study in Taiwan experiences and we make the interview videos.

2. Are programs targeted only to students or to young professionals as well?
So usually we only target the student because the main purpose of the Study in Taiwan project or in short SIT project is to encourage international student to know Taiwan and then, inspire them or encourage them to come to Taiwan to study, so usually our target is international student…the future international student. But in this year, the Taiwanese government has some research scholarship for young professionals in south East Asian countries so this year our target will also will be the young professors from South East Asia. The program is not our program, it’s from the Ministry of Education. There is an office that is Elite Study in Taiwan office and they do the program ESIT to recruit the young professionals, especially in Thailand Vietnam, Indonesia. I think the SIT program join the international conferences We do some bilateral conferences like Allen will go to Boston and next week the professionals from all over the world will get together in a conference to discuss the exchange program and the degree program or the cooperation between and among universities. I’m not quite sure if the circumstance quite fit your program. Several years ago, our foundation supported a student organization named Taiwan International Student Union. It was a student organization or student club and the purpose was to be a platform for international students in Taiwan. And also play a platform between international students and Taiwanese students, so if TISU was successful then maybe we can answer this questions.
3. **What is your opinion on the level of global and cultural awareness of the Taiwanese community?**

It could be my personal opinion, I think most of the Taiwanese understand, that to have global or cultural awareness is very important but sometimes, I think even we know it is very important or it is good to have that kind of awareness sometimes I think people just not very interested in it. That’s just my perspective. But one interesting fact is that Taiwanese people are very interested in learning English. But when you do learn it doesn’t progress into anything else. You are very interested in learning English, it should be that with your English ability you can like to explore or to know learn different things about the country, about the world. So I would say Taiwanese people have some specific global and cultural awareness. Maybe the big events of developed countries, are very important for Taiwanese people, but they will be less interested in events from third world countries. But in terms of programs, probably no. FICHET, actually don’t have that kind of program.

4. **On average how many international students apply to participate in FICHET’s programs?**

So our Study in Taiwan program, the target could be two different kinds of students. The first one is future international student. Our project is to spread or give them information about studying in Taiwan. And the other target is the international students already in Taiwan. So, we will ask those in Taiwan to share their experiences or even tell us how they think about studying in Taiwan. So these are the two targets. So for the international students in Taiwan, every year we will host some two or three events and the participants usually are nearly one hundred and twenty students, probably around 100 each year.

5. **How is information about events and programs disseminated to the international student community in Taiwan?**

I think there are two ways: the first one is the internet. Usually we use Facebook, and sometimes we use YouTube. So basically the first one is the internet. And the other is the office of international affairs in different universities. So we will send them our official paper and then they will help us to announce our event or help us to spread the information and posters.

6. **What model or models has FICHET sought inspiration from with regards to its mission and the planning of its subsequent cross-cultural projects?**

Models...this is a bit difficult. For example the SIT program, when we make the not only the website but also the Facebook fan page, we will go online what other countries has done before and also...so like every month we will kind of like check out different countries, their study in that country’s Facebook page, such as Study in Sweden, study in Germany. So uh every month we will deeply look into to see what they have done in this month. SO we know that right now the other countries have used other technologies to make the videos or do the website. SO we will understand the new strategy to promote your country or to target the future student.
I would say it is successful, because although we didn’t or do not do the assessment uh for example like we have taken a lot of interview videos and many universities they will take our videos as one of their promotion resources. So, I mean...because they love our...because I mean, you will that interview videos and the universities love to use that interview videos, so...

7. How does FICHET assess the impact of its projects and programs on the local Taiwanese community that you specifically target?
I think it’s very hard to say evaluate. Because we just started...I mean the promotion program, maybe 2-3 years. I think we are in the beginning so we try to do everything we can do, so we didn’t actually do the evaluation. Yes, but for example our study in Taiwan Facebook in the beginning probably 2 or three years ago, the amount of likes is around two or three hundred and after one year it raised up to 30,000. And the next year is 70,000. And right now is 80,000. So we think it is successful, but we are still on the road to do the promotion. And the universities they have noticed that our foundation probably did a good job on promoting study in Taiwan information. So when we ask them to cooperate to do something during our event to help us promote our Study in Taiwan program. Usually they are very willing to enjoy our event.

8. Are there a lot of students from the Caribbean region who participate in FICHET’s programs and projects?
Uh...in the beginning I think there are very few Caribbean region students but in fact, we have some. Actually we have some. Including...I think it’s about 22 countries. Latin American countries are also considered, all those count. There are some, so I would say a few. But most of them came from countries with diplomatic relations. SO most of them came from Central America: If those (Saint Lucia, Haiti, Belize, Saint Christopher and Nevis 5, but there are just as less. But still the majority of them come from El Salvador, Honduras. Before we had Belize, but not as much as from Central America.

9. How are students prepared/ trained to participate in the cross-cultural activities that FICHET offers?
For example, every year we will raise an event called Call for story. We ask students to share their stories or specific topic experiences to share with us. And when we review all the entries we think, usually the entries or the works are usually good. That means above the average. I think that when they participate in our activities, I think students usually prepare, maybe not very well, but well. No other workshops like that.

10. In what other ways does FICHET engage the international student community in Taiwan aside from cross-cultural presentations and other activities that you mentioned?
It seems that we don’t have any other programs. Uh….we….um in these two years, our foundation has sort of cooperation with one specific student organization. I think the name of the organization is Foreign Student in Taiwan, so, in these two years, we kind of like support them a few budget to help them to host some event.

Additional Comments
Actually I thought of…in general when we do the study in Taiwan program, I think that we should not only include international students to come to study in Taiwan. IN the meantime, if possible, we should also create a platform to create some opportunities to help or to make international students and Taiwanese student so have more interaction. But for the latter part we have not done much anything about it. So I think that after this interview we will start to think of how to create this platform and opportunities to make this interaction happen. But you know like, for the government or for some people, they usually...they maybe...uh...they will focus more on the first part, to recruit international students in Taiwan. The latter part has not been really thought of yet.
Appendix A5
Interview Questions for the Director-General of the OECS

1. What can OECS/CARICOM countries offer to our counterparts in the Asia-Pacific (specifically China, Taiwan and Japan)?

2. What collective strategies, if any, are driving relations between the OECS/CARICOM and the Asia-Pacific region?

3. What strategies would a unified CARICOM foreign policy in East Asia involve? What would be the costs and benefits of such schemes?

4. In what ways do/can diplomatic missions of OECS/CARICOM states promote the mission and goals of OECS/CARICOM’S abroad?

5. What role can the youth abroad play in advancing CARICOM’S vision creating opportunities for cooperation and investment for The Community?

6. Have efforts towards the creation of a formal collective OECS/CARICOM diaspora activism initiative been furthered? What is the status of this initiative?

7. If so, what sort of collective projects or schemes have been put in place to target the diaspora (specifically OECS/CARICOM’s youth) in the areas of public policy, foreign policy or cultural diplomacy?

8. In what ways can OECS/CARICOM nationals be empowered and equipped for the role of being citizen diplomats? What role do missions of CARICOM states play in this process?

9. What of the CARICOM Youth Ambassadors? What are the specific ways in which these young professionals and students are equipped to represent the region abroad?

10. Does the CARICOM Youth Ambassadors program extend to include CARICOM nationals abroad? If not, has there been discussion to expand this program to recruit and train youth for region-specific branches (i.e. Latin America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific)?

11. What are the obstacles that have hindered or have the potential to hinder efforts at diaspora diplomacy or diaspora engagement? Do you think that the One China Policy could be one of those factors?

12. What structures or institutions on the home front can be utilized in building capable members of the CARICOM’s civil society abroad, especially with regards to East Asia?

13. Do you think diaspora diplomacy can alleviate the developmental challenges facing the OECS/CARICOM community itself?
14. The CARICOM Secretariat recently issued a revised 4-year Strategic Plan that emphasized the need for coordinated foreign policy and a “people-centeredness approach”. Can you please describe this further and discuss what steps have been taken to ensure the effectiveness of this approach?

15. In what ways do you think the diaspora can be mobilized for the benefit of CARICOM and Taiwan (and by extension the rest of the Asia-Pacific)?

16. In terms of the region’s cultural diplomacy, is Carifesta still seen as the region’s best option for the promotion of the region? How has Carifesta been developed for this role? What other strategies towards the development of the region’s cultural diplomacy have been employed?
What can OECS/CARICOM countries offer to our counterparts in the Asia-Pacific (specifically China, Taiwan and Japan)?

China, Taiwan and Japan...Frankly that’s a bit of a tough question because we don’t have any natural resources of any quantum that can be of value to those countries in terms of their manufacturing. I think our biggest leverage is our diplomatic relations. There are areas of collaboration that I was learning about recently in the area of yachting for example. For both China and Taiwan there have been cooperation in agriculture with agricultural missions from both of these countries coming to the Caribbean.

The area of tourism is another one, because both for China and Taiwan, people are looking more outward. Tourism is a huge area of growth. But again I think for this to succeed, the countries of the OECS and the Caribbean would have to work more collaboratively to quality destination tourism. Now that there’s that rapport, the feeling I put out was to find out whether the two countries would be prepared to treat the OECS as a low risk diplomatic area in which they could test out their different ways of collaborating.

Ideally, I could see the two of them complimenting each other on the Developmental Assistance Fund because the People’s Republic tends to invest in big projects and so on. The Taiwanese tend to do small community based action stuff. It’s a low risk thing for them. We are below the international arena it would be a great testing ground to work out the modalities of operation and dialogue. And they could, if it works well, extend to the wider diplomatic arena...and that’s why I was thinking that it would be great if rather than this thing becoming a point of division, it could become a point of leverage for the OECS because we have three countries recognizing Taiwan, three countries recognizing the People’s Republic. So imagine the possibility if we were able to broker that repertoire, at least in our own space. If it works well, would encourage them to deepen their relations at a broader more public international level if it works well, it works for us because then it wouldn’t matter really which of the Chinas the OECS countries are associated with because everybody benefits.

2. What collective strategies, if any, are driving relations between the OECS/CARICOM and the Asia-Pacific region?

I think it would involve looking carefully at what are the priorities, what assistance is offered by each of the two countries, what are the areas of convergence of these things, where do they differ, and how can we use both the convergence and the divergence to our advantage. So where they converge, the possibility of having a couple of multilateral projects that w to use the comparative strength of each so it could very well be that,
major investment in certain types of infrastructure might be done by the People’s Republic and other softer types can be done by the Taiwanese.

3. What role can the youth abroad play in advancing CARICOM’S vision creating opportunities for cooperation and investment for The Community?
I think you all have a very vital role to play. For one, I think the facility in language is important and they are many levels at which you all can play a role, even in terms of translation and helping to build friendships between the peoples. I’m sure for a lot of Chinese people it would still be highly unusual to meet third world people—black Caribbean people—who can speak Mandarin, so that would be an impressive form of outreach. And people are always impressed when you can converse with them in their native tongue. So, playing a role in helping to deepen the understanding between peoples even at a person-to-person level...I believe that at the level of the state that there are opportunities that we should be shaping that we have not started to really look at seriously. I know that some countries. I think that Saint Kitts has a mission, Saint Lucia is thinking of establishing one and so on. I truly believe that the establishment of these missions provides an opportunity.

First of all, we should be trying to look at this in a cohesive way so that the OECS countries, although each country can have their own emissary, but we can do it as a joint collective mission. And I think that, one of the key functions of that mission is servicing the student body and representing the diaspora; the OECS diaspora in Taiwan. And leverage you all presence under whatever areas you all are studying in a formal way, so that people who might be doing say economics or commerce in Taiwan have an opportunity in Taiwan to serve as, even if it’s as unofficial trade attaché, broker trade relations between Taiwan and the OECS countries. People who are into culture might look to organizing cultural exchanges—now that’s at the level of the state. If for whatever reason the authorities are reluctant to formerly leverage that, I think that there are still opportunities in a private capacity for people like yourself to become your own business facilitators.

4. Have efforts towards the creation of a formal collective CARICOM diaspora activism initiative been furthered? What is the status of this initiative?
Within the OECS different member states, there are many arrangements that are being made with respect to the diaspora. I think the diaspora has come of age; people are aware of the importance of the diaspora and a range of initiatives are being undertaken. Well first of all, we have had a strengthening of the national associations abroad. Whether that’s good or bad, I’m not sure, in the sense that, like for example in the case of Saint Lucia, in London you have a Choiseul association, you have a Micoud Association. There’s also the national association. Now, what I’m not sure about is whether the community-focused diaspora associations are a positive thing. I guess they are positive in the sense that because they are geographically focused, to people’s community of birth, there’s that commitment to giving more assistance and everything. They certainly have to mobilize resources for their community. But it can detract from the national opportunity. The other thing is, people like the International Organization of Migration have been doing a lot of work on remittance and that has been a major focus.
In fact the inter-American bank just produced a report showing that remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean are almost at several million dollars. That was a 2014 report that was just published. My concern about this clearly remittances play a huge role, especially considering the impact of the global economic crisis on the Caribbean. Remittances play a huge role in helping communities and people, families manage crisis. But the concern here is that people at the IMF are beginning to look at remittances as an economic opportunity in terms of, their ideas like diaspora bonds. They’re talking in terms of being able to leverage the resources of the diaspora. Now I think that would be detrimental in the long run because you should not treat remittances as a source. I think remittances are a family matter, it’s a form of direct capital flows from the diaspora to the communities and families and that should remain untouched. I think a lot more needs to be done in a more systematic way in engaging the diaspora.

From the OECS end, we have been talking with the IOM about working together to do sort of joint research and initiatives around the diaspora and one of the things I would like us to do is to reach a point so that when we do a national census, the national census is a census of the nationals at home and abroad. Just as you can tell from the national census how many people in Anse La Raye, Canaries, Laborie, you can also say how many Saint Lucians are there in London, Toronto, New York...Taiwan. And even do the same analysis; break them down by age, socio-economic status, whatever. So, right away if you want to start exporting cassava cakes, then you will know that London, with the Choiseul people, would be a natural place to do that export because you have a ready-made home market in there. They now can become like a Trojan horse for the cultivation of that taste in the wider London area where they live. You can have a cassava festival which overtime can grow just as the Carnival in Knotting Hill.

5. If so, what sort of collective projects or schemes have been put in place to target the diaspora (specifically CARICOM’s youth) in the areas of public policy, foreign policy or cultural diplomacy?

Now with respect to the youth, let me say that at the OECS level we are working on something called the OECS Growth and Development Strategy. And what we are trying to do here is take a very different approach to economic planning, because for the last 20-30 years in the Caribbean, we have had national development planning; these have not been particularly successful. A lot of the initiatives are repeats of the same things which we have been trying over and over and they have not yielded different results. We are saying it’s time for us to take a different look at how we approach national development and to do so in an integrated manner as possible, because the problems that we face are interrelated and if these problems are interrelated the solutions must be integrated. So, we have to take that integrated approach.

Now to come to the youth question, we are looking at youth as a special demographic in the context of the growth and development strategy because young people are the ones most affected by the global economic crisis. The youth unemployment in all of the OECS countries is at least twice the unemployment rate of the population. They are the ones posing the greatest health challenges from obesity, non-communicable diseases,
especially for those in the productive age range. So that’s why we’re saying we need to give a special focus on youth. So we’re working on a youth strategy now that has several pillars. One of the pillars is entrepreneurship and employment, we are looking at citizenship, we are looking at culture and identity...there are about six pillars...health and wellness etc. So that, the intention there is to do it in a way to reinforce each other so as to create an enabling environment for youth empowerment and improve the prospects of young people.

6. In what ways can CARICOM nationals be empowered and equipped for the role of being citizen diplomats? What role do missions of CARICOM states play in this process?

Well first of all, there are two ways—both in terms of the initiatives we design, and also in terms of the process by which those initiatives are created. One of the problems in the youth sphere is that for too long, older people have defined what young people need. So the youth issue has been seen as a problem. We have to see it as an opportunity and if anything, the problem is on our side. How have we failed the young people? How have we failed to provide opportunities that can excite them, that can motivate them, opportunities for them to take responsibility for themselves. I hear old people all the time say that young people are irresponsible, but how do you expect them to show responsibility if you have never given them the challenge of taking responsibility for themselves. But what about developing citizen diplomats in Taiwan, in China in Japan, utilizing for instances students here in Taiwan, in Japan in Mainland China. That actually is an interesting idea. I know that it is something that is very workable... but we do need to leverage that youth talent. We need to make use of it to create exciting possibilities and fresh ideas. These are things we can explore.

7. What of the CARICOM Youth Ambassadors? What are the specific ways in which these young professionals and students are equipped to represent the region abroad?

I’m not sure how well that CARICOM Youth Ambassadors Program is going. I think it’s more traditional. I think for these things to be effective we have to find really fresh ways of doing so and ways that cannot be token representations of youth; not a tokenization of young people but a real empowerment. So if we say someone is a Youth Ambassador, it means that they shouldn’t be a pretend ambassador, they should have some substantive ambassadorial knowledge--as a trainee ambassador and be positioned in such a way that there are career options for them to take them forward.

8. What structures or institutions on the home front can be utilized in building capable members of the CARICOM’s civil society abroad, especially with regards to East Asia?

Well we have the OECS business council, which is supposed to be like the private sector forum, that’s one area for those who are involved in the sphere of business, I mean it’s all within the OECS right now. If you’re talking business, you need to talk business for persons living at home and abroad. And given the increasing globalization of today’s world, we cannot clog business and commerce into a vacuum, our economies are too small to just conceptualize doing business as Saint Lucia alone or Grenada alone, or
even just the OECS as a unit alone. So, we have to see everything in its wider context. In Saint Lucia there are opportunities where you see that, but you must be able to extrapolate these opportunities to the wider OECS space and then contextualize it in the broader global environment. So, the business forum is one...again what we’re trying to do with the youth strategy is to create other forms for where we’ll be able to get that kind of outreach by younger persons.

9. In terms of the region’s cultural diplomacy, is Carifesta still seen as CARICOM’s best option for the promotion of the region? How has Carifesta been developed for this role? What other strategies towards the development of the region’s cultural diplomacy have been employed?

I think there are huge opportunities in there. But the thing is, I have a different perspective on that. I think we need to make use of more festivals and so on to project Caribbean culture internationally, but I’m undecided as to what extent we can rely on governments doing those things. Now, creative industries is a big thing, talents have emerged outside of all of this. So, I don’t know whether, a bureaucratic solution is the answer to that, or if it’s a matter of more of us creating the type of environment that grows talent and allows it to flourish. I don’t think any ministry or any program for cultural development would have created a Rihanna. Students must have a foundation of skills and knowledge in those areas for you to be able to read music, write music, and all of that. But what you can do, in the area of promotion..., there is a very important role for the state and perhaps at a state level or at a diplomatic level, in engaging these Asian countries in doing festivals, in helping to finance festivals, like you have...Imagine if you have an Asian Carifesta, where you bring the best talent of the Caribbean to Asia. That would be a powerful thing. Now that would open doors to a lot of possibilities.
Appendix B

Survey Questions and Results

Summary

Please confirm your agreement to participate in this survey.

I hereby confirm my participation in this survey and affirm that my answers will reflect my honest opinions and will be as accurate as possible.

1. Age

- 16-21: 6 (27%)
- 22-23: 13 (61.9%)
- 24-25: 6 (27%)
- 26-30: 9 (40.9%)
- 31-40: 2 (8.7%)
5. Are you a scholarship recipient?

- Yes: 28 (92.9%)
- No: 2 (6.7%)
- I am a working professional in Taiwan: 0 (0%)

6. How long have you been currently living in Taiwan?

- Less than 1 year: 11 (33.3%)
- Less than 2 years: 9 (20%)
- More than 3 years: 9 (20%)
- More than 5 years: 1 (3.3%)

7. How much time do you have left in Taiwan?

- Less than 1 year: 11 (33.3%)
- Less than 2 years: 7 (20.5%)
- More than 3 years: 10 (30.3%)
- More than 5 years: 2 (0.7%)

8. On average, how often do you return to your country?

- More than once every 6 months: 6 (0%)
- Once a year: 6 (20%)
- Once every 2 years: 3 (10%)
- Once every three years: 3 (10%)
- I have not returned home since I came to Taiwan: 18 (60%)

9. On average, how long do you stay in your country when you visit?

- Less than 1 week: 6 (0%)
- 1-2 weeks: 1 (3.3%)
- 2-4 weeks: 2 (6.7%)
- 1-2 months: 7 (23.3%)
- 2-3 months: 3 (10%)
- I have not returned home since I came to Taiwan: 17 (57.1%)
10. Why do you return to your home country?

- Holiday: 2 (7%)
- To visit friends and family: 9 (32%)
- Education: 6 (21%)
- Summer jobs: 9 (32%)
- Reconnect with my home country and culture: 3 (10%)
- I have not returned home since I came to Taiwan: 16 (54%)

11. Do you intend to return to your home country on a permanent basis in the future?

- Yes: 17 (55.7%)
- No: 2 (6.7%)
- Not sure: 11 (35.7%)

12. Are there any barriers to your return?

- Yes: 5 (15.7%)
- No: 21 (68.3%)

13. If yes, what would prevent you from returning?

- Financial constraints: 6 (20%)
- Lack of job opportunities: 12 (40%)
- Safety of your home country: 1 (3.3%)
- Nothing in the foreseeable future will prevent me from returning to my home country: 16 (54%)

14. Would you be interested in staying in Taiwan?

- Yes: 13 (43.3%)
- No: 6 (20%)
- Not sure: 11 (35.7%)
15. Please rate your response based on the following (1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest)

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I feel proud of my culture

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I feel that my country's culture is unique

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I have a desire to share my culture with those I meet

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16. Do you interact with Taiwanese locals?

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17. Where do you interact with Taiwanese locals the most?

- University: 26 (80.7%)
- Off-campus social gatherings: 11 (33.3%)
- Friends: 2 (6.7%)
- Language exchanges: 9 (27.8%)
- Other: 0 (0%)

18. Do you participate/have you participated in cross-cultural activities at your institution of study in Taiwan?

- Yes: 26 (80.7%)
- No: 2 (6.7%)
- I do not participate/have not participated in cross-cultural activities at my institution of study in Taiwan: 2 (6.7%)

19. Are these activities usually done with fellow country-mates or individually?

- With fellow country-mates: 17 (52.9%)
- Individually: 13 (41.9%)

20. In what ways do you educate Taiwanese locals about your country?

- Through class presentations: 16 (53.3%)
- Through language exchanges: 9 (28.6%)
- Through first-time face-to-face introductions: 22 (72.3%)
- Through university-led cultural events: 15 (48.4%)
- Other: 1 (3.3%)

21. What specific characteristics do you emphasize when telling someone about your country?

- Population size: 8 (25.7%)
- History and culture: 14 (45.1%)
- Diversity: 12 (39.4%)
- Country size: 11 (35.7%)
- Location: 12 (39.4%)
- Language: 12 (39.4%)
- All of the above: 13 (42.3%)
22. How do you maintain a connection with friends and family in your home country?

- Social media (FB, twitter, LinkedIn...): 21 (70%)
- Postcards: 2 (7%)
- Instant messaging and texting mediums (whatsapp, Line, viber...): 24 (80%)
- Telephone, Skype, MagicJack: 24 (80%)
- Word of mouth: 1 (3.3%)

23. Is it easy to meet other Caribbean nationals in Taiwan?

- Yes: 18 (60%)
- No: 12 (40%)

24. Are you part of a collective Caribbean nationals networking group in Taiwan?

- Yes: 14 (45.7%)
- No: 16 (54.3%)

25. How often do you interact with Caribbean nationals? (aside from your country-mates)

- Always: 4 (12.9%)
- Often: 5 (15.7%)
- Sometimes: 10 (32.9%)
- Seldom: 10 (32.9%)
- I don't interact with Caribbean nationals aside from my countrymates: 1 (3.3%)

26. Do you belong to a diaspora network (formal or informal)?

- Association of your country's students/residents in Taiwan: 24 (80%)
- Social networking groups: 4 (15.7%)
- I am not part of a formal nor an informal diaspora network: 2 (6.7%)
27. How is information shared among members of your country’s diaspora in Taiwan?

- Meetings: 9 (20%)
- Emails: 11 (26.7%)
- Websites and social media: 27 (60.7%)
- Word of mouth: 4 (10.3%)

28. Is there a contact person/focal point or team for your diaspora network?

- Yes: 24 (80%)
- No: 6 (20%)

29. If yes, does this person/focal point or team provide adequate, constant outreach to your country’s diaspora in Taiwan?

- Never: 0 (0%)
- Seldom: 3 (10%)
- Often: 4 (13.3%)
- Sometimes: 14 (46.7%)
- Regularly: 9 (30.3%)

30. Would you be willing to involved in activities with other Caribbean nationals that showcase Caribbean culture to Taiwanese locals?

- Yes: 29 (90.7%)
- No: 1 (3.3%)
- Other: 0 (0%)
31. If yes, what sort of activities would you be willing to participate in?

- Caribbean Carnival (grassroots events started by Caribbean students in Taiwan that seeks to indirectly educate the people of Taiwan about the Caribbean’s multifaceted culture) 23 (70.7%)
- Class presentations of different schools 23 (70.7%)
- Informal/formal cross-cultural panel discussions 17 (55.7%)
- Formal events/festivals orchestrated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan) 21 (62.9%)
- Fundraising for local causes in Taiwan (such as domestic violence, HIV awareness and tolerance, clothing donations, education, disaster relief) 19 (55.5%)
- I don’t want to participate in these activities 1 (3.3%)
- Other 0 (0%)

32. What would dissuade you from taking part in such activities?

- Disorganization 29 (88.7%)
- Conflicts of interest with those involved 12 (40.0%)
- Lack of financial support 14 (45.7%)
- Executive decisions made by your country’s association in Taiwan 4 (12.9%)
- Lack of participation from other countries/members 16 (55.5%)
- Lack of personal interest 19 (61.3%)
- Other 0 (0%)

33. Is there an alumni association or diaspora group in your home country?

- Yes 22 (72.3%)
- No 1 (3.3%)
- I don’t know 7 (23.3%)

34. Does the alumni association or diaspora group in your home country connect with your country’s association in Taiwan?

- Yes 12 (40%)
- No 3 (10%)
- I don’t know 15 (50%)
35. Would you be interested in returning to your home country to participate in knowledge transfer or transition programs for new scholarship recipients coming to Taiwan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I would be interested</td>
<td>22 (78.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, I would not be interested</td>
<td>2 (7.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like to stay in Taiwan</td>
<td>3 (10.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. As students or young professionals in Taiwan, do you also consider yourselves citizen diplomats of your home country and the region?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. Do you think that Taiwan can benefit from the presence of the CARICOM diaspora?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38. Do you think that the CARICOM diaspora in Taiwan can benefit from a collective approach to in-service training for the local Taiwanese population?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I think the CARICOM diaspora can benefit from a collective approach</td>
<td>30 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, I think an individual approach per country is more effective</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. In what ways do you think the diaspora in Taiwan can be of an advantage to CARICOM?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would allow the Taiwanese population to understand and Trust CARICOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given the fact that this is an aging society they need persons to keep up their cultural heritage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The provision of more accurate or real-time information based on the events and experiences that would otherwise go unknown or misunderstood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share their experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared and more unified cultural exchanges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. (End of Survey) Please state if you would like to participate in a follow-up interview?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, I would like to take part in a follow-up interview</td>
<td>40 (13.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, my answers are sufficient</td>
<td>30 (10.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix C1

Post-survey Email Interview Questions

1. In what ways do you think the CARICOM student community in Taiwan can help to strengthen relations between CARICOM and Taiwan?

2. Do you think that a collective approach in Taiwan would be more effective than operating based as individual countries? Please briefly explain your reason.

3. What obstacles do you think would influence the success of a united diaspora initiative in Taiwan?

4. Do you think that such a united cultural approach (as a pilot initiative) would have the potential to upset the current China-Taiwan situation within the Caribbean Community itself? Please explain your response.

5. In light of scholarship restrictions and time restraints, what more can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan do to enrich the cross-cultural understanding among their Taiwanese peers thus promote the region for future cooperation?

6. In what ways do you think CARICOM countries can best prepare scholarship recipients to help them maximize their time abroad in countries like Taiwan?

7. Do you believe that this joint approach should be initiated by the student or should be the responsibility of embassies or respective organs within CARICOM? Should it be government affiliated or not?

8. Please describe ways you think that can help promote a sense of unity among CARICOM nationals in Taiwan.
Appendix C2

Supplementary Email Interview (Response) 1.

9. In what ways do you think the CARICOM student community in Taiwan can help to strengthen relations between CARICOM and Taiwan?
Students who act as ambassadors for their countries can play a crucial role in the strengthening of ties between CARICOM and Taiwan. Students who participate in or organize cultural festivals and expositions help to strengthen relations because they educate the wider Taiwanese public about the existence, culture, food etc. of their country. This in turn creates curiosity in the Taiwanese public; some persons will become interested in travelling to or investing in CARICOM countries. Food items prepared by students at these festivals and expos can also act as a gateway to trade if home grown products are used. Taiwanese may then become interested in purchasing these products thereby creating a market and strengthening the economic ties between the two. The number of interns, volunteers and workers from Taiwan that have been placed in various CARICOM countries over the years has increased and students can aid with this placement by conversing with persons who may or may not be initially interested in working in their countries. This may aid in an increase in the number of interns or workers from Taiwan. Finally students who perform exceptionally whether it be at school or in extra-curricular activities open the gateway for future students; the number of scholarships issued has increased over the years and part of this is due to the excellent performance of CARICOM nationals at the various schools in Taiwan.

10. Do you think that a collective approach in Taiwan would be more effective than operating based as individual countries? Please briefly explain your reason.
I definitely think that a collective approach in Taiwan would be more effective because the reach and power of any joint approach would be greater than that of a single country. My reasoning for this is that each country has a relatively small population of students here; these students also have limited resources and skills. Through the joining of these populations and combination of resources and skills to goals which may have been unattainable by one individual or association may now seem feasible and reachable.

11. What obstacles do you think would influence the success of a united diaspora initiative in Taiwan?
I think that students often stand in their own way and in the way of collaborations. It is often difficult to try to get a group of Caribbean people together to work on a project or event because many students try to move away from their fellow country mates when they leave home to study. Some students do not realize the vital role that they could and should play when it comes to representing their countries in Taiwan and so it is often left to a select few persons to push for events. This often means that no fresh ideas are flowing or ideas do emerge but cannot be realized because of a lack of manpower or support from fellow peers.
12. Do you think that such a united cultural approach (as a pilot initiative) would have the potential to upset the current China-Taiwan situation within the Caribbean Community itself? Please explain your response.
I don’t think that a student organization or initiative will affect these ties. I think that these organizations and initiatives are crucial in the development and survival of students in any foreign country. If students remain politically unbiased, example no presence at any protests etc. then there should be no upset due to this initiative/organization.

13. In light of scholarship restrictions and time restraints, what more can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan do to enrich the cross-cultural understanding among their Taiwanese peers thus promote the region for future cooperation?
Students can participate in or organized cross cultural activities or clubs to afford Taiwanese the opportunity to learn about different cultures and languages and for students themselves to learn about other cultures. Students can also create blogs, videos etc. (social media activity) to enlighten classmates, friends etc. about their countries. Students should also participate wholly in international festivals by their schools to further educate Taiwanese students as well as other international students about CARICOM etc.

14. In what ways do you think CARICOM countries can best prepare scholarship recipients to help them maximize their time abroad in countries like Taiwan?
Provision of information on scholarships, schools and life would definitely better prepare students before they leave and thus enable them to maximize their time in Taiwan. Support for student associations would also play a crucial role in this.

15. Do you believe that this joint approach should be initiated by the student or should be the responsibility of embassies or respective organs within CARICOM? Should it be government affiliated or not?
I think that these approaches should be initiated by the students because that way it would give them a sense of pride as opposed to being ‘forced’ to participate in something that they have no interest in. This approach should be supported and recognized by embassies, local organizations and government ministries no matter what government is in power. Governmental support should exist but organizations or joint approaches should not be pinned or show biased support to any one political party or government.

16. Please describe ways you think that can help promote a sense of unity among CARICOM nationals in Taiwan.
I think that ‘capturing’ the attention of students before they depart for Taiwan will help students realise the importance of unity in such a country. The continued organization of activities no matter how small or seemingly insignificant will help. The support of and encouragement from ambassadors, governments, ministry officials etc. can definitely help in the promotion of a sense of unity amongst CARICOM nationals.
Appendix C2

Supplementary Interview (Response) 2

17. In what ways do you think the CARICOM student community in Taiwan can help to strengthen relations between CARICOM and Taiwan?
By virtue of the fact that we are studying here and are able to form ties which would go a long way in getting investment in, since we are the professionals who would go home to introduce to introduce some of what we’ve seen and learnt, and we can invite others to share their knowledge, create employment and open avenues for people at home to trade with Taiwan.

18. Do you think that a collective approach in Taiwan would be more effective than operating based as individual countries? Please briefly explain your reason.
There is always more strength in numbers, so I think coming together and laying our claims to see how everyone can get in some way is better than the individual approach. CARICOM would have been in a better position today if the countries worked as one single market and economy, as they have been ‘singing” for some time.

19. What obstacles do you think would influence the success of a united diaspora initiative in Taiwan?
The first obstacle is the lack of unity amongst CARICOM nations. We see it happening right now with the Dominican Republic and Haiti (both allies of Taiwan they share a land mass). If the can’t come together in the domestic sense, there is no hope for any form of international approach. Secondly, of late the nations are politically polarized with no end in sight. As a result there are rifts within countries, which in turn would spill over in the form of rifts between countries. We are our own obstacles.

20. Do you think that such a united cultural approach (as a pilot initiative) would have the potential to upset the current China-Taiwan situation within the Caribbean Community itself? Please explain your response.
That is indeed a ticklish issue, because as it stands now, Taiwan is not to interfere with China’s allies and vice versa. This agreement depends on the politics of the day in Taiwan. With a change in government, there could be changes in allies.

21. In light of scholarship restrictions and time restraints, what more can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan do to enrich the cross-cultural understanding among their Taiwanese peers thus promote the region for future cooperation?
We need a big CARICOM gala, with our cultures portrayed; carnival costumes, national costumes, the sweet sounds of pan, calypso, Soca, poetry, art and dance. FOOD!

22. In what ways do you think CARICOM countries can best prepare scholarship recipients to help them maximize their time abroad in countries like Taiwan?
They can have exchanges with current and past students, organize some basic mandarin classes, help and encourage them to do internships within Taiwan or Asia.
23. Do you believe that this joint approach should be initiated by the student or should be the responsibility of embassies or respective organs within CARICOM? Should it be government affiliated or not?
   I think it should be student initiated. The students are exposed to the culture; they know the little idiosyncrasies of the Taiwanese people and are not politically driven. They make the best candidates.

24. Please describe ways you think that can help promote a sense of unity among CARICOM nationals in Taiwan.
   - Caribbean Food Fest
   - Caribbean games and sports day
   - Independence day activities with invitation opened to other CARICOM nationals
   - Cultural shows and exhibitions
   - CARICOM tours Taiwan (organized trips and hikes around the island)
Appendix C3

Supplementary Email Interview (Response) 3.

25. In what ways do you think the CARICOM student community in Taiwan can help to strengthen relations between CARICOM and Taiwan?

To strengthen ties between the two they must first understand each other as a people and have the students can be an avenue in exploring that exchange of cultural information. Seeing that most of the CARICOM countries depend heavily on tourism students can help in campaigning about our hospitality and uniqueness which could indirectly influence Taiwanese visits to the islands. For CARICOM students we learn an important language which has influenced the global trading market and also we get training which could be used to develop our islands to make us more marketable.

26. Do you think that a collective approach in Taiwan would be more effective than operating based as individual countries? Please briefly explain your reason.

Well as it relates to the needs of CARICOM nations I would think a collective approach is more sensible seeing that each island tends to have similar needs for development. For instance the need to a better health system, or infrastructural needs.

27. What obstacles do you think would influence the success of a united diaspora initiative in Taiwan?

Key word in this question that would be an obstacle is “united”. Too many times we fail to keep that “mindset” in our aims and goals and tend to fall apart as power or too much cultural pride blinds unity. Also the fact that not all CARICOM islands here have a representative to support the various association could lead to some inequalities impact wise as funding is always an issue, especially in event coordination.

28. Do you think that such a united cultural approach (as a pilot initiative) would have the potential to upset the current China-Taiwan situation within the Caribbean Community itself? Please explain your response.

No as this not mainly focused on diplomacy in my opinion.

29. In light of scholarship restrictions and time restraints, what more can CARICOM nationals in Taiwan do to enrich the cross-cultural understanding among their Taiwanese peers thus promote the region for future cooperation?

For now in school activities can help with spreading awareness about our culture whether be incorporating knowledge through class assignments, school competitions, social media, school media outlets e.g. school’s weekly papers as well as themed occasions such as international day on campus.

30. In what ways do you think CARICOM countries can best prepare scholarship recipients to help them maximize their time abroad in countries like Taiwan?

I would think that learning the language before you leave is essential for basic
survival skills and exposure (at least a 3 months intense course). They could also target high school kids who wish to take a year/summer program or exchange program for a term to just do language training, as some students who come across are from other countries are within that high school age bracket. Also, push the alumni association in each CARICOM island to promote and guide those who may have an interest.

31. Do you believe that this joint approach should be initiated by the student or should be the responsibility of embassies or respective organs within CARICOM? Should it be government affiliated or not?
The responsibility should be on the students firstly, and embassies should be at the background to support their initiatives.

32. Please describe ways you think that can help promote a sense of unity among CARICOM nationals in Taiwan.
There would be many perks to being part of this as folks moving to Taiwan would be coming to a community which they are used too so culture shock would be reduced as there would be a support system in place. Also, exchange of information would be a lot more efficient at any level (student to student, employee to student, employee to embassy etc.) as most would be seeking opportunities for growth and assistance. It can also give opportunity to build a new culture as it would have persons with diverse backgrounds and talents who could formulate new ideas. E.g. cooking competitions fusing Taiwanese food with a Caribbean twist