科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告
期末報告

以競合觀點探討從代工到自有品牌策略(第 2 年)

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中文摘要： 代工已成為企業實務上普遍的現象，儘管代工在國際分工佔有關鍵角色，然而有關代工之相關研究卻甚少受到策略管理學者之注意，即使在有限的代工相關研究中，過去文獻多是從品牌客戶角度探討，少有從代工廠觀點切入。在實務上，由於代工利潤不斷壓低，許多代工廠商紛紛轉型自創品牌，然而此舉可能將原本與品牌客戶間的合作關係轉變成競爭關係，代工廠如何維持與品牌客戶間既合又競的關係，是本研究主要探討之議題。本研究結合動態競爭及競合觀點，探討從代工到自創品牌歷程中，代工廠如何預測及掌握品牌客戶的回應，並採取哪些策略作為來維持競合關係。本計畫執行期間共兩年，採質性研究法，針對台灣企業從代工起家到自創品牌並具有國際知名度之廠商，進行深度的多重個案研究。研究成果包括兩篇文章，一篇為中文文章，已於「台灣組織與管理學會 2014 年會暨研討會」發表，並已投稿至國內 TSSCI 期刊，獲一審通知修改回覆中；另一篇為英文文章，已完成文稿撰寫，潤稿修改中，預計投稿至 SSCI 期刊。

中文關鍵詞： 代工、自創品牌、動態競爭、競合

英文摘要： Despite contract manufacturing plays its key role in internationalization, the pressure of profit shrink has led to the transformation from OEM supplier to OBM. However, such transformation may turn the cooperation into competition between an OEM supplier and its brand partner. In the cooperation-based competition, how an OEM supplier can predict its brand partner's responses and take initiatives for balancing the co-existence of cooperation and competition? Prior research has not been paid to exploring the competitive dynamic and coopetition between an OEM supplier and its brand partner. Based on the perspectives of Awareness-Motivation-Capability (A-M-C) and coopetition, this study conducted an exploratory multiple case research. The outcomes of this project include two articles. The first article has been presented in a conference in Taiwan. This article was further revised and submitted to a TSSCI journal and is now in the process of first R&R. The second article is now in the proof-reading process and is expected to submit to a SSCI journal.

英文關鍵詞： OEM, OBM, competitive dynamics, coopetition

國科會期末報告

以競合觀點探討從代工到自有品牌策略

摘　要

代工已成為企業實務上普遍的現象，儘管代工在國際分工佔有關鍵角色，然而有關代工之相關研究卻甚少受到策略管理學者之注意，即使在有限的代工相關研究中，過去文獻多是從品牌客戶角度探討，少有從代工廠觀點切入。在實務上，由於代工利潤不斷壓低，許多代工廠商紛紛轉型自創品牌，然而此舉可能將原本與品牌客戶間的合作關係轉變成競爭關係，代工廠如何維持與品牌客戶間既合又競的關係，是本研究主要探討之議題。本研究結合動態競爭及競合觀點，探討從代工到自創品牌歷程中，代工廠如何預測及掌握品牌客戶的回應，並採取哪些策略作為來維持競合關係。本計畫執行期間共兩年，採質性研究法，針對台灣企業從代工起家到自創品牌並具有國際知名度之廠商，進行深度的多重個案研究。研究成果包括兩篇文章，一篇為中文文章，已於「台灣組織與管理學會 2014 年會暨研討會」發表，並已投稿至國內 TSSCI 期刊，獲一審通知修改回覆中；另一篇為英文文章，已完成文稿撰寫，潤稿修改中，預計投稿至 SSCI 期刊。

關鍵詞：代工、自創品牌、動態競爭、競合

ABSTRACT

Despite contract manufacturing plays its key role in internationalization, the pressure of profit shrink has led to the transformation from OEM supplier to OBM. However, such transformation may turn the cooperation into competition between an OEM supplier and its brand partner. In the cooperation-based competition, how an OEM supplier can predict its brand partner’s responses and take initiatives for balancing the co-existence of cooperation and competition? Prior research has not been paid to exploring the competitive dynamic and coopetition between an OEM supplier and its brand partner. Based on the perspectives of Awareness-Motivation-Capability (A-M-C) and coopetition, this study conducted an exploratory multiple case research. The outcomes of this project include two articles. The first article has been presented in a conference in Taiwan. This article was further revised and submitted to a TSSCI journal and is now in the process of first R&R. The second article is now in the proof-reading process and is expected to submit to a SSCI journal.

Key words: OEM, OBM, competitive dynamics, coopetition

計畫成果報告自評

此計畫依進度執行完成。計畫研究成果包括兩部份：第一篇為中文文章，第二篇為英文文章。第一篇文章針對四家公司進行個案研究，第二篇研究對象共有八家公司，其中有兩家公司與第一篇之個案公司重複，但係另外安排個案訪問，其中一家訪問對象也有所不同。第一篇文章，已於「台灣組織與管理學會 2014

年會暨研討會」發表，研討會後修改內容，並已投稿至國內 TSSCI 期刊，目前進入一審完畢通知，正在修改回覆中；第二篇也已完成文稿撰寫，潤稿修改中，預計投稿至 SSCI 期刊。以下分別就兩篇文章摘錄部份內容來說明本計畫之成果報告。

第一篇

緒論

儘管代工到自創品牌為一普遍存在的實務現象，過去對於此議題的相關研究多是從代工廠商內部目標及條件來探討，如管理者主觀意向(瞿宛文，2006)、企業使命感(洪清德，2004)、代工廠能力(瞿宛文，2006；吳豐祥、林子正，2008)，尚未有從動態競爭及競合觀點切入。而實務上，從代工到自創品牌，雙方間競合關係的調整，彼此間行動與回應的動態競爭，以及代工廠如何克服進入障礙，都直接影響代工廠決策與行動之成敗，過去研究卻尚未從策略與外部環境互動之角度來探討。因此本研究以動態競爭中的察覺-動機-能力(A-M-C) 架構為基礎，結合競合與進入障礙觀點，探討從代工到自創品牌的歷程中，代工廠採取哪些策略，來管理品牌客戶之察覺-動機-能力(A-M-C)，以克服品牌客戶等既有業者所建立的進入障礙，並維持與品牌客戶間的競合關係。據此，本研究主要問題有二：(一)從代工到自創品牌的不同歷程中，代工廠採取哪些策略來管理品牌客戶之察覺、動機、與回應能力？(二)在以合作為基礎的競爭關係中，對應於品牌客戶(對手)其察覺-動機-能力之不同，代工廠採取哪些策略以克服不同的進入障礙？

文獻探討

從代工到自創品牌

一般所稱的代工廠即為 OEM 供應商(original equipment manufacture contractor/supplier)或 ODM 供應商 (original design and manufacture contractor/supplier)，根據 Hobday(1995)定義， OEM 供應商意指協助海外品牌客戶生產最終產品的廠商，當最終產品完成後，由海外品牌客戶自行從事其他行銷及品牌活動，OEM 供應商僅是價值鏈上負責製造活動的協力成員。此種生產模式在 1980 年代後蔚為風行，國際品牌客戶將製造活動外包給後進的代工廠以降低生產成本，方能策略性地將經營重心轉移至具有高附加價值的營運活動 (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994)。瞿宛文(2006)認為，OEM 供應商的出現突顯了後進國家在國際分工的角色，當 OEM 供應商經歷長期與海外品牌客戶合作下的學習成長，逐漸累積多方的能力與條件(Hobday, 1995；陳振祥、李吉仁，1997；黃延聰，2006)，海外品牌客戶因此可授予代工廠更多價值鏈上的活動與責任，促使 ODM 供應商的出現，因此代工廠在國際分工地位的變化亦是重要的議題。

無論 OEM 或 ODM 供應商(於後統稱代工廠)，在長期發展上仍有許多不利之處，例如，由於訂單來自品牌客戶使代工廠缺乏自主性，此外，一些較有價值的技術、零組件、通路及品牌等，皆掌握在品牌客戶的手上，使得代工廠面臨單邊關係專屬投資的處境(康敏平、司徒達賢，2007)，品牌客戶也經常藉以限制或壓縮代工廠的行動與獲利空

間(Hobday, 1995)；就代工廠而言，長期聚焦於製造活動，使得廠商無法發展出具有更高附加價值的品牌活動，不利於其在國際市場上的競爭(Hobday, 1995)。鑑於諸多不利，導致代工廠逐漸將營運活動延伸至製造以外的其他活動，如自創品牌(OBM, own branding & manufacturing)，以擺脫在價值鏈上受限的地位。Chen(2005)也指出，當代工廠已累積了相當充裕的技術實力時，其更會竭力爭取擴張營運至最終產品市場的機會，儘管此舉可能與原有品牌客戶發生衝突。

Arruñada & Vázquez (2006)認為由於代工廠已具有產製最終產品的設備廠房，可克服在進入新市場時可能遭遇高固定成本投資上的阻礙，有利於其創造新公司或新部門，當代工廠在製造上達到規模經濟而具有成本優勢時，可針對品牌客戶未聚焦的次級市場創造新品牌；或可與下游具有一定市場地位的通路商或零售商合作開發自有品牌，有利於快速進入市場，代工廠也可移轉自原有品牌客戶學習之技術應用於新市場。上述作法雖可促使代工廠轉型自創品牌，卻難免與原有品牌客戶競爭，一旦客戶反擊時，代工廠可能面臨代工業務與新品牌業務間的兩難，影響其自創品牌成效。Liu, Liu, and Lin(2008)主張為了降低與品牌客戶間的矛盾，代工廠應專注於核心能耐所能觸及的新市場、審慎區隔與選擇目標市場，並聚焦於成長階段的市場範疇，以減少與品牌客戶直接競爭的可能性。

除了來自品牌客戶的威脅外，Chu(2009)認為代工廠由原本單純的製造業務跨足至自創品牌，勢必遭遇在行銷或品牌經營等能力上的挑戰；吳豐祥、林子正(2008)以動態能力及組織學習的觀點詮釋代工廠建構行銷通路的歷程，提出代工廠轉型自創品牌時在行銷能力上提升的作法。此外，為了突破在諸多能力上不足之困境，代工廠尚可能採取改變經營模式、重整組織結構、取得研發與行銷能力以及調整人力資源等作法。雖然過去的研究已指出品牌客戶(先進者)與代工廠(後進者)的差異(Chu, 2009)，但僅由單方能力之角度探討，忽略了兩造間的相互關係變化對轉型的影響，因此若以動態競爭的思維重新檢視，即是在後進者的決策與行動中考量先進者可能的回應，有助於更深度瞭解代工到自創品牌的具體現象。

動態競爭觀點

廠商間競爭的研究在策略管理領域中已行之有年(Bettis & Weeks, 1987; Chen, 1996; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; MacMillan, McCaffery, & Van Wijk, 1985; Porter, 1980; Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991)，有關廠商間相對競爭地位的動態演化與改變開始受到較多學者注意，由於競爭本身即是一個動態的過程，任何不利於對手競爭地位的行動必然會招致其回應與反擊，如何降低、延緩或完全消除競爭對手的回應，甚至在對手採取行動前便構思適當作為，不僅關係著一個競爭行動的成敗，更牽動廠商在市場地位的變化(Chen，2009)。Chen, Smith, & Grimm (1992)首次探究廠商間競爭互動行為，認為行動者需能有效臆預測競爭對手的回應，思索如何降低競爭回應的機會，方能提升其行動方案的有效性；Chen(1996)提出察覺ー動機ー能力模型(awareness-motivation-capability, A-M-C model)，主張唯有當競爭對手察覺到競爭性行為，且有動機及能力採取競爭性回應時，此時才會有「競爭互動」的發生(Chen, 1996; Chen &

Miller, 1994；Kiesler & Sproull, 1982)。此一架構具體分析廠商間的競爭互動，對於競爭本質有更深層的瞭解。

察覺 (awareness) 被視為任何競爭行為發生的先決條件，意指覺察對手的競爭行動並瞭解其意涵(Chen, 1996)。競爭對手的諸多行為都是一種訊號，分析這些訊號有助於廠商臆測對手的目標、策略、優勢及劣勢(Porter, 1980)。對於競爭互動中的防禦者而言，一項競爭行動的察覺程度，與其是否採取反擊以及反擊力道的大小息息相關，若防禦者並未察覺到對手的競爭行動，則不會有任何回應發生，而察覺後的反擊程度也與察覺的內容與方式有直接關係。

*動機 (motivation)*係指驅使對手做出反擊決定的誘因，通常涉及利潤、營收或市場地位等經濟元素的消長，當然也包括心理因素等獲利與損失間的評估(Chen, 1996)。根據 Chen(1996)的解釋，當一項競爭行動對於對手在經濟元素上有重大影響，或撼動對手重視且心理上認為重要的關鍵要素時，則有較強烈的回應動機；反之，即使對手已明顯察覺到競爭的發生，但若該競爭行動對於自身的影響甚小時，則對手並不會有回擊的動機，亦即較不會觸發競爭互動(Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2005)。

*能力 (capabilities)*係指對手擁有並可用於反擊的有形、無形資源及能力，包括執行反擊行動的技術、資源配置及調度、配套措施等(Chen, 1996; Hitt et al., 2005)，若反擊所需的技術層次高、資源調度複雜或配套措施繁複時，即使對手已明顯察覺競爭的發生，且也有回應的動機，但礙於能力上的限制，採取反擊行動的可能性仍偏低。

動態競爭觀點主張廠商的績效不僅由其自發的行動決定，也會受到對手採取的回應手段與強度而影響，透過一系列的「行動─回應」競爭互動，不但可能削減廠商的獲利，甚至可能危及其生存機會(Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004)，因此廠商在進行任何決策行動時，必需審慎考量對手的回應，即密切瞭解競爭對手在察覺-動機-能力上的回應。而本研究所探討的代工轉自創品牌情境，則是在合作關係上增加競爭元素，此時動態競爭觀點可應用於解釋代工廠(行動者)的策略與品牌客戶(對手)之回應，即代工廠採取任何一項轉型行動之有效性，都會受到品牌客戶回應之影響，若代工廠能有效管理品牌客戶之察覺、動機與能力(A-M-C)時，較可能提高自創品牌成功機率。

競合觀點

傳統的動態競爭觀點多聚焦於兩個對立廠商間的競爭互動，然而從代工到自創品牌係為既合又競之現象，代工廠的行動除了受到品牌客戶可能採取的回應所影響外，既有合作關係的變化也是重要的考量，在合作的前提下探討競爭，將傳統動態競爭觀點之內涵延伸到動態競合。

Brandenburger 及 Nalebuff 於 1996 年在《競合(Co-opetition)》一書中提出競合的概念，認為廠商間的關係不僅止於單純的競爭，亦同時有生合作的關係，此種競合關係突破了零和的競爭局面，強調競爭者為了共同擴張市場大餅而合作，競爭則是為了瓜分此一逐漸擴張的市場機會。過去有關競合的相關研究主要為競合的驅力、過程及結果(Peng, Pike, Yang & Roos, 2012)，然而過去研究中較少對競合關係中動態及複雜的本質進行討論。有別於過去將競爭與合作視為兩極互斥對立的觀點，Chen(2008)主張競合是一種更

複雜、超越對立(transparadox)的關係，Chen & Miller (2014)進一步以關係觀點(relational perspective)剖析競爭與合作，認為動態競合應更聚焦在持續互利之互動，強調其存在之價值創造、間接競爭、長期互動及多元利害關係人之內涵，這些議題過去較少被探究，現已逐漸受到重視。

本研究中代工廠與品牌客戶間的關係，呼應 Chen(2008)所提出之超越對立的競合觀點，一旦代工廠走向自創品牌，即發展出既合又競的雙元關係，基於過去長期合作，後續的競合互動將更為複雜，其存在的價值創造、間接競爭及長期互動，都是具有動態性本質的關係，因此前述之 A-M-C 架構有助於分析代工廠與品牌客戶間的動態競合關係。

進入障礙

進入障礙的概念源自產業組織經濟學，學者提出在具有高度進入障礙的產業中，廠商較可享有持續的高額報酬(Demsetz, 1982)。Bain(1956)首度對進入障礙提出定義，認為進入障礙是產業內既有廠商相對於新進廠商所獨有的優勢，這項優勢會具體表現在當既有廠商不斷提高售價而賺取利潤時，卻沒有任何新進廠商能進入與之瓜分；Ferguson(1974)呼應同樣的想法，認為進入障礙可使既有廠商將售價設定在超過邊際成本的標準上，進而持續賺取獨佔性報酬。相較於 Bain(1956)或 Ferguson(1974)以結果論定義進入障礙(McAfee, Mialon & Williams, 2004)，Stigler(1968)認為進入障礙是一種生產成本的概念，企圖進入產業的新進廠商必須容忍這些生產成本的衍生，因此相對於既有廠商，新進者具有經營上的不利性，而 Von Weizsacker (1980)也呼應相同的概念。Carlton & Perloff (1994)加入時間的概念，主張每一產業基本上都存在一定程度的進入障礙，任何新進廠商在短期內都會面臨資本需求的限制，然而唯有一些長期無法克服的成本才會真正阻絕新進者的進入。

在進入障礙種類方面，Porter(2008)提出七種由既有廠商所築起的壁壘，包括供應面的規模經濟、需求面的規模經濟(或「網絡效應」)、顧客轉換成本、資金需求、與規模無關的既有公司優勢(如品牌知名度、較佳的地理位置、獨家技術或原料等)、既有公司對通路的掌控權、以及政府政策限制。此論述提出更多策略面的考量，例如公司累積的優勢或對上下游的掌控權等，指出廠商不再僅限於靜態的成本比較，而是可透過策略作為影響新進者的進入考量。

若從動態競爭觀點檢視進入障礙，Caves & Porter(1977)主張新進廠商對於既有廠商回應進入者的預期，亦是影響新進廠商進入決策的重要因素，若預期既有廠商會採取強力的反擊行動，使新進者不易生存，則進入行為較不易發生；進一步來看，若既有廠商過去已有報復新進者的紀錄、有充沛的資源或能力，或對於產業存在極大的企圖心時，新進者都可預期既有廠商可能在進入回應上採取較為激烈的手段，故較不會輕易做出進入的決策(吳思華，2000)。Harrigan(1981)認為，新進廠商必須準備好面對既有廠商的報復行動及可能遭遇到的進入障礙，否則將難以在進入上發揮效果。

從代工到自創品牌中，當品牌客戶與代工廠雙方經營的某些價值活動發生重疊時，新進者(代工廠)自然會對既有廠商(品牌客戶)的獲利造成不利的影響(Demsetz, 1982；Porter, 2008)。進入障礙的存在能確保既有廠商保有獲利空間，同時對代工廠形成壓力與

成本，進而影響代工廠自創品牌的成敗。因此從進入障礙觀點分析，可說明代工廠以後進者的身份進入市場，應如何克服品牌客戶等既有業者所建立的障礙壁壘，以提高自創品牌的成功機會。

文獻探討意涵

本研究探討從代工到自創品牌，與過去對此議題之相關研究有兩大差異，一為以動態競合的角度重新檢視代工廠自創品牌的歷程，透過代工廠對於管理品牌客戶在察覺、動機與能力上的回應，提升自創品牌的成功機率；二為結合進入障礙與動態競爭觀點，以及將代工廠自創品牌視為價值鏈上新進入者的概念，探討代工廠與品牌客戶間的競爭關係，說明其如何克服品牌客戶等既有業者所建立的進入障礙。

代工廠需克服的進入障礙可從品牌客戶在察覺-動機-能力上的回應來看，本研究結合動態競爭的 A-M-C 與進入障礙觀點，分別將品牌客戶的察覺、動機與能力視為代工廠自創品牌時需積極克服在心理與經濟上的進入障礙。

首先，Porter(2008)認為，雖然新進者進入所導致既有廠商獲利降低是其反擊的原因之一，然而關鍵並非在於新進者是否真的進入，而是在於新進者認為既有廠商一旦產生負面感知，其可能的報復對於新進者所造成的「威脅感」，亦即當代工廠自創品牌時，若無法降低品牌客戶對其進入的負面感知，則可能挑動品牌客戶發動反擊。因此，若代工廠能確保與品牌客戶間的良好關係，在進入時消除品牌客戶的負面感知，則可提高自創品牌的成功機率。因此，代工廠必須克服自創品牌時對於品牌客戶因為負面感知而形成在察覺上的心理障礙，方能有效轉型自創品牌。

其次，既有廠商之所以會對新進者反擊，皆因於經濟利潤上的損失(Demsetz, 1982；Harrigan, 1981；Porter, 2008)，此為品牌客戶回擊的動機，進一步延伸 Chen(1996)的觀點，若代工廠自創品牌的作為對於品牌客戶在經濟利潤上有重大的影響，或撼動品牌客戶認為重要的關鍵要素，則有較強烈的動機回應。因此，代工廠必須降低品牌客戶在經濟上的反擊動機，亦即克服品牌客戶構築在經濟上的進入障礙。

最後，Porter(2008)指出當既有廠商擁有豐沛資源時(包括現金、閒置產能或對通路及顧客的掌控程度等)，較有可能對新進者發動回擊，因此，代工廠應設法降低自身與品牌客戶間的能力差距，當雙方能力勢均力敵時，品牌客戶發動反擊的代價較高，故可能減少其報復的可能性，也因此降低其報復對於代工廠產生的經濟損失。總括來說，代工廠必須克服自創品牌時相較於品牌客戶間的能力差距，亦即降低因為品牌客戶所構築在能力上的心理與經濟障礙，才能順利自創品牌。

研究方法

Eisenhardt (1989)指出個案研究是能洞察動態現象的研究途徑，Ketchen et al.(2004)、Snow & Thomas(1994)則更進一步認為個案研究是能瞭解競合關係過程與機制的最佳研究方法，透過個案研究的深入討論，也有助於系統性的探知動態競合關係的內涵(Gnyawali & Park, 2009；Yin, 1981)，由於過去對於代工廠商轉型自創品牌的相關研究中，幾乎沒有以動態競合觀點探討代工廠商與品牌客戶間的互動關係，因此本研究採個案研

究法進行探索性研究，以深度訪談收集初級資料，並輔以次級資料，分析現象之發展脈絡。

研究對象

由於代工廠轉型自創品牌在台灣是許多產業共同的議題，本研究選擇不同產業類別的個案公司進行訪談，同時輔以次級資料推論研究發現及結論。個案公司之選取需符合以下條件：(一)個案公司係以代工或設計代工型式(OEM/ODM)創業，之後轉型為自創品牌(OBM)；(二)個案公司以自有品牌銷售於國際市場，且自創品牌產品佔營業收入 50%以上。在徵詢有願意參與此研究的個案公司之後，共有四家個案公司，其基本資料彙整如表 1 所示。

表 1　個案公司基本資料彙整表

	A 公司	**B 公司**	**C 公司**	**D 公司**
公司成立年份	1975	1979	1979	1972
自創品牌年份	1996	1985	1985	1986
產業類別	運動健身器材	旅行用品	衛浴用品	自行車
營業額 (2013 年)	150 億台幣	33 億台幣	188 億台幣	544 億台幣
海外營運市場	美國、歐洲	美國、歐洲、日本	美國、歐洲、中國	歐、美、日、中國
自創品牌佔比	92%	60%	70%	70%
自創品牌前主要代工客戶	Omron、Mizuno、Nautilus、Universal	TUMI、Samsonite、CK、PUMA、BOSS、Ferrari	Home Depot、Lowe's、Wal-Mart、B & Q	Schwinn、Trek、Colnago
自創品牌後主要代工客戶	Omron、Mizuno、Nautilus、Universal	TUMI、CK、Samsonite、Dunlop、BOSS、Ferrari、Delsey、Esprit、PUMA	Home Depot、B & Q	Trek、Scott、Panasonic、Specialized

資料蒐集與分析

本研究初級資料蒐集係來自四家個案公司之企業主及高階主管深度訪談，受訪者分別為 A 公司集團董事長、B 公司董事長、C 公司董事長、D 公司資深發言人。本研究亦收集次級資料來源，包括個別公司網站、新聞資料與評論、報章雜誌報導或宣傳文件等，藉由初級及次級資料之交互驗證，以提高研究分析之可靠性。在資料處理上，首先經受訪者同意下進行錄音並整理為逐字稿，透過與理論架構間的呼應與對話，逐步萃取出可供分析或延伸的概念性內容，經由跨個案間比較對照後，歸納彙整類似或共同現象，最後形成研究發現與結論。

研究結果

本研究透過個案分析來檢視從代工到自創品牌的歷程中，代工廠針對品牌客戶之察

覺-動機-能力(A-M-C)採取哪些策略行動，以克服品牌客戶等既有業者所建立的進入障礙。在既合又競的動態競爭關係中，以後進者身份的代工廠如何管理與品牌客戶間的關係(A-M-C)與克服進入障礙，是自創品牌成功的關鍵因素。本研究結果分別針對 A-M-C 三面向說明代工廠採取的策略作為以及欲克服的進入障礙。

察覺(Awareness)與進入障礙

當代工廠決定要自創品牌時，首要關切的問題在於品牌客戶在察覺上是否有負面感知，若客戶對於代工廠的自創品牌行動產生警覺或負面感知時，較有可能採取大規模的反擊或報復行動，來抑止代工廠可能侵蝕利潤的行為，因此，代工廠在轉型自創品牌時，品牌客戶的負面感知成為代工廠的心理障礙，代工廠會先致力於克服此項心理障礙，以降低自創品牌後續行動的進入門檻。依本研究個案分析發現，代工廠對於降低或消除品牌客戶的負面感知以克服心理上的進入障礙，其作法主要有二：一為主動對品牌客戶提出自創品牌的構想與計畫，透過開誠布公的方式以減少品牌客戶於事後發現的負面感知，此可視為一種對雙方合作關係間尊重；其二為在長久互信基礎下，代工廠傾向採取不互損利益的策略作為，避免挑釁與品牌客戶間的衝突。說明如下。

主動告知

本研究發現基於原本的代工合作關係，個案公司於自創品牌前反而會向客戶主動告知，並未因擔心可能遭受品牌客戶之反擊而選擇隱匿消息。即代工廠的主動告知與否反而是品牌客戶是否進行反擊的決定性因素，此項作為被視為是代工廠基於合作考量，尊重雙方關係的一種具體表現，因而能有效降低品牌客戶在察覺上的負面感知，避免破壞雙方互信的局面。

「最重要的是你一開始怎麼跟他們講。要轉型時我都主動跟他們講，這很重要，因為主動講人家就不覺得是背叛，反而會感受到誠意；如果不講自己偷偷搞那就完蛋了，重要的是要主動去講，絕對不能偷偷搞，被人家發現那就真的完蛋了。」 (B 公司)

「當然有，(要轉型自創品牌)一定要講的，不然他會想打我，不主動講就慘了，(如果主動講的話，)他們會想到你在一開始答應他的好處，所以他就覺得 OK 了。我們有事先想好要怎麼跟他們講，所以他們還是會接受。」 (C 公司)

除了向品牌客戶主動告知自創品牌的構想與計畫外，亦須明確指出可能切入的市場範疇及定位方向，主動分析對於品牌客戶的影響範圍，降低品牌客戶在察覺上的負面感知，進而提升雙方持續合作及互信的關係。代工廠的主動告知作為除了可降低品牌客戶在察覺上的負面感知外，對於品牌客戶而言，由於可事前評估可能產生的風險及相關影響，因此可事先與代工廠達成互不損害的共識基礎；若代工廠採取隱匿的作法，可能促使品牌客戶在被動察覺後不得不採取報復性制裁，一方面在於懲戒代工廠對於合作關係的破壞，另一方面也藉以延緩代工廠的進一步動作，避免額外的利潤損失。綜合以上分析，本研究提出發現一如下。

發現一：當代工廠要開始進行自創品牌之時，基於過去的合作關係，會主動向品牌客戶

告知其自創品牌之決定，此雖提高品牌客戶之察覺，卻可降低品牌客戶在察覺上的負面感知，以克服其所建立的威脅性心理障礙。

善用長久合作基礎

在長期代工合作的基礎下，代工廠與客戶已累積相當程度的互信互賴關係，且在個人網絡關係上，雙方內部的高階主管間大多也皆彼此熟識，因此品牌客戶在被告知代工廠自創品牌決定之後，基於雙方友好的基礎，只要代工廠並未採取直接攻擊或威脅品牌客戶之主要市場時，通常會持觀望態度並傾向不直接立即反擊。特別是當產業內競爭者為數不多，或產業仍處於成長期時，由於現有業內的生存空間仍相當充裕，新進入者的加入對於既有獲利空間並不會造成太大衝擊，也減低了品牌客戶反擊的動機。此外，本研究發現與品牌客戶交情越好、關係越密切的代工廠，也會傾向採取避免衝突的自創品牌策略，相對應的品牌客戶也較傾向採取尊重的態度，基於雙方長久互信基礎，形成一個共存共榮的產業生態。

「即使在我當初轉型時，我們都不會打來打去，因為市場上就這麼幾個老闆，彼此相處認識都幾十年了，不會這樣子。我們現在 TOP 3 在參展時也常聊天、常交換情報，我們這個產業彼此之間氣氛也都很好，像美國第一大品牌公司，也來過這裡好幾次。」（A 公司）

「那種大家長期合作的一種關係，那時候我們一方面是想說做個嘗試來推出自己的品牌，台灣市場比較小，當時我們的客戶都沒有在台灣經營，沒有銷售，所以我們就可以做這樣的嘗試，所以 1981 年自創品牌，因為我們知道長期經營、永續經營一定要有自己的品牌，只是也有很多考慮，不敢做這樣的決定。我們的情況就是在台灣比較沒有這樣的顧慮，所以我們在台灣做自己的品牌…，我們覺得在台灣創品牌衝擊會比較小，而且可以做小市場範圍來嘗試。」(D 公司)

綜合以上分析，本研究提出下列發現二。

發現二：當代工廠要開始進行自創品牌之時，若代工廠與品牌客戶之合作關係越長久密切，代工廠越傾向採用避免衝突的自創品牌策略，因而降低品牌客戶在察覺上的負面感知，較能克服因顧慮破壞既有合作關係所形成的心理障礙。

動機(Motivation)與進入障礙

經濟障礙主要來自代工廠對於品牌客戶可能造成之利潤侵蝕，進而使得品牌客戶產生必須反擊的防衛動機，此一障礙大小與品牌客戶受影響的利潤損失幅度呈正向關係，當代工廠嚴重危及品牌客戶之主要市場及利潤來源時，品牌客戶將會採取一些經濟上的制裁手段以警告代工廠的踰矩行為。根據個案訪談結果，品牌客戶會採取的經濟制裁手段主要為兩種，一是對代工廠抽單，使其失去主要的資金來源，進而達到抑止的效果；二為價格競爭，逼使代工廠在成本劣勢下退出市場；針對上述兩種經濟制裁手段，代工廠可透過兩種策略作為以降低經濟障礙，即產品與市場區隔及分散訂單來源。

產品與市場區隔

並非所有競爭行動都會挑起對手的回應動機，以品牌客戶的觀點來看，若代工廠的自創品牌產品並未明顯與自身產品相似，或對於整體績效影響不大時，基於合作的基礎，品牌客戶多會傾向容忍，甚至有時會抱持冷眼旁觀的態度，對於代工廠自創品牌的能力與成效感到懷疑；反之，若代工廠企圖切入品牌客戶核心的產品或市場時，為了捍衛市場地位及經濟利益，品牌客戶必然會採取報復性制裁，包括價格競爭或抽單等。因此代工廠在轉型自創品牌初期之市場區隔與定位即決定了其與品牌客戶間的競爭張力(competitive tension)，此直接影響品牌客戶的反擊動機，若代工廠僅針對品牌客戶非主力的市場或產品，甚或開發品牌客戶尚未涉足的市場與產品，則可大幅降低對品牌客戶利潤及市佔率等經濟利益上的衝擊，提高品牌客戶對代工廠自創品牌之容忍程度，進而降低其反擊動機。此外，由於代工廠之新創品牌在市場上知名度較小，不利於與品牌客戶的既有產品進行對抗，透過選擇利基市場的區隔策略，除了可避免與品牌客戶在其主力市場直接交戰外，對於後進的代工廠而言也較有發展空間與機會。

以 C 公司為例，其在自創品牌過程中發掘了一個品牌客戶尚未切入的市場，即家庭內客用廁所。相較於一般家庭用廁所，客用廁所並不需要裝設沐浴設備，但卻較為講究設計與裝潢上的精緻度，C 公司以自身在設計能力上的優勢切入此一利基市場，不僅避開品牌客戶之主要市場，且面對的競爭者較少，也藉此成功開創自有品牌，獲得穩健的市佔與利潤。基於此一經驗，C 公司於自創品牌初期即避免與品牌客戶之市場與產品正面競爭，極力開發品牌商未重視之市場區隔，透過提供獨家專賣產品等方式避免直接衝突。

另外，A 公司為自有品牌產品獨立設計開模，產品之外觀與規格都與代工產品區隔，且在自創品牌之過程中也即極力避免與品牌商之市場重疊，包括最初成立的 J 牌及 M 牌即切入歐洲而非美國市場，此外，A 公司旗下四個子品牌定位都相當明確，分別專營個別市場，瞄準單一客群，即使到後期也盡可能控制與品牌客戶差距在一定範圍內。

D公司在自創品牌的初期刻意與代工客戶在通路上區隔，產品售價也走不同定位。

「初期我們也會避免，比如說通路上面有賣他們的產品，盡量不碰，可是有的時候還是難免，像美國第一品牌Trek他90%的產品是我們供應的，那我們的產品跟他產品同時在市場上銷售，我們價格大概就會比他低兩成。」(D公司)

綜合以上分析，本研究提出發現三如下。

發現三：代工廠在自創品牌之初期，會採取產品與市場區隔策略，來降低品牌客戶之反擊動機，以克服其所建立的經濟障礙。

分散代工訂單來源

相對於在下游的產品與市場區隔策略避開直接競爭，代工廠也會在上游分散代工訂單來源，以降低彼此間的依賴關係，此也是維持既合又競的策略方案。雖然避開品牌客戶的主力市場可減少被反擊的可能性，然而當代工廠的產品或利基市場不足以支撐新創品牌的成本與規模時，仍無可避免的與品牌客戶發生重疊，此時品牌客戶採取抽單反擊

的動機與可能性也大幅增加，進而危及代工廠的基本資金來源，因此代工廠必需先行準備，分散訂單來源，可降低一旦品牌客戶抽單所造成的衝擊。

「我想這裡面你會考慮到對既有客戶的衝擊。所以其實後來，我們在自創品牌的時候同時也繼續在找 OEM 的客戶。」(D 公司)

「那個時候有個大客戶(非既有品牌客戶)本來說好要來談，但後來到台灣後又不來了，我就急忙趕到台北去在他飯店電梯口攔到他，給他看目錄，他看了覺得不錯所以就來跟我談，生意就是這樣做出來的。……(在做自創品牌之前，)東西都是我做出來後掛上他們的牌子，這個就做到 1995 年，(因為)我們也有自己的研發，那個時候我還想到要測試(新)產品線，我就想到旁邊就有陸戰隊基地，我就去問他們的指揮官：『既然有時候下雨你們也不能出來操練，我生產健身器材就擺在你們基地免費給你們用』，這樣我就有測試新產品線的來源了。」 (A 公司)

「之前有個英國 A 牌，是英國最大的行李箱品牌，他原本是我 OEM 客戶，當我要轉型時他因為不想讓我轉，怕我可能成氣候變成他對手，當時就主動來跟我說要把別的廠的單轉給我，總共值上千萬美金，而且答應只要品質不出問題會一直給我，當時我就是不要(因為單子大了依賴就大了，一旦被抽單影響也會很大)。」 (B 公司)

代工廠的訂單分散主要有兩大優點，首先，訂單分散不只降低對品牌客戶的經濟性依賴，也減少單一品牌客戶的佔比，雙方間的依賴關係較不緊密，不僅可降低品牌客戶的反擊動機，即使面對單一品牌客戶抽單，代工廠也不至於無力招架，仍可透過其他訂單支持基本營運；第二，代工廠的接單能力與其製造技術等級密切相關，當代工廠有能力接收多元訂單時，顯示其在製造能力上有一定的優勢，品牌客戶基於合作利益大於競爭的考量，較可能傾向選擇容忍的態度。

而分散訂單來源需考慮到產業結構的影響，產業結構分散或與集中亦會影響品牌客戶的反制動機，當產業結構相當分散，市場上許多品牌廠商林立時，代工廠不但能從多家品牌廠商獲得訂單來源，且對於個別一家品牌客戶而言，若代工廠同時自創品牌進入市場，也較不會對既有產業結構的競爭態勢造成重大影響，因此可能降低個別品牌客戶對於代工廠自創品牌的反擊動機。綜合以上分析，本研究提出下列發現四。

發現四：代工廠在自創品牌之初期，會分散代工訂單來源，以降低品牌客戶以經濟報復反擊之動機。

能力(Capability)與進入障礙

除了管理品牌客戶的察覺與動機之外，代工廠與品牌客戶之相對能力差距也是重要因素。代工製造能力與品牌經營能力之差異成為代工廠轉型時主要的能力障礙，若加上品牌客戶的競爭性回擊，可能使得轉型之路更加艱鉅。訪談結果發現代工廠之上下游供應鏈整合不僅提升其能力基礎，且能縮小與品牌客戶間的能力差距，間接地弱化品牌客戶反擊的能力，以克服品牌客戶建立的進入障礙。

整合上下游供應鏈

長期的代工經驗使代工廠累積製造的優勢基礎，甚至有助於代工廠由 OEM 發展為 ODM。然而跨足品牌經營所需的能力必須同時具備供應鏈上下游之整合，尤其是下游的通路佈局及品牌行銷等，是大部分代工廠最為缺乏的能力，也成為其轉型自創品牌時面對的最大進入障礙之一。

從經濟面進入障礙而言，代工廠在下游佈局處於相對弱勢，加上跨足品牌所需投入的成本極高，營運風險較過去大幅增加，一般代工廠多無法克服此階段之障礙，此時若品牌客戶抽單，更可能讓代工廠的轉型告終。本研究中所訪談的 A、B、C 三家公司皆是透過併購以延伸供應鏈整合能力，透過在品牌經營及行銷能力之建構，強化轉型自創品牌之基礎，並形成足以與品牌客戶相互抗衡的實力，當代工廠已整合供應鏈上下游，此時與品牌客戶之能力差距縮小，相對而言，客戶的反擊能力也較為弱化，此可克服品牌客戶在供應鏈下游價值活動所建立的經濟性進入障礙。

另外，就心理上的進入障礙而言，當代工廠在上游的製造能力已具有優勢，如設計能力、關鍵零組件之掌握或專利佈局等，其相對於與品牌客戶間的談判力則較為提升，加上品牌客戶對於代工廠長期合作而形成的依賴與信任基礎，使得其對於代工廠在自創品牌的各種作為上的干預能力大幅降低，因此當代工廠透過併購向下游整合時，品牌客戶多已無法主動反擊，且基於在代工合作關係的重要與依賴，品牌客戶常傾向選擇容忍的態度，此時若代工廠已建構完整的上下游供應鏈，且在轉型自創品牌的態度相當強烈，更可讓品牌客戶選擇放棄回應，此可克服代工廠擔憂品牌客戶已建立的威脅性或報復等心理障礙。

例如 A 公司自創品牌後雖擁有與品牌客戶相似之資源及能力，但運用方式則明顯不同，A 公司以代工起家，深知製造及研發之重要性，即使自創品牌站穩腳步後也未曾改變研發與行銷部門的組織結構，目的即為讓兩部門充份溝通了解產品。A 公司還充份掌握供應鏈上中下游之能力及部份專利，加上 95%的零組件為完全自製，至少領先對手 10%-15% 以上的毛利彈性空間，顯示其在自創品牌過程中充份具備製造商優勢，以製造的獨特能力為後盾，結合在品牌上日漸累積的能力，使其在全球品牌策略中有完善的上下游供應鏈。

另外 C 公司分別於 1985 年及 1996 創立兩個自有品牌，之後於 2000 年即開始一連串的併購。其後則開始以此為灘頭堡，大動作併購世界各衛浴品牌以獲取通路，進而切入各國廚衛市場，達到以最快速度切入市場之目的。C 公司於 2007 年併購英國著名廚衛通路商 P 公司即為一例，P 公司為在英國經營衛浴、廚房用具及廚房家電之最大通路品牌，與超過 2700 個客戶有通路關係，在此併購案之後，C 公司一舉取得英國市場之品牌及零售通路，以彌補歐洲市場之不足。

C 公司較獨特之能力為其以五金貿易商創業後併入生產工廠，故可跳過代理商直接從事國外客戶的貼牌代工，C 公司在最主要的美國市場採取代工及品牌雙軌模式，同時收編美國第三大水龍頭商PP公司所裁撤之行銷團隊以擴展通路，從此切入高價區市場。C 公司從貿易併入生產，再收編行銷通路，形成完整的供應鏈。

又如 B 公司，由於行李箱製造向來極為注重研發，B 公司的競爭優勢在於能極為快速設計並開模製成樣品供客戶參考，因此雖然在自創品牌期間許多品牌客戶選擇離開，

但在 B 公司逐漸穩固後，許多品牌客戶又回頭找 B 公司設計產品，此顯示其優勢能力造成了品牌客戶的依賴性，加上 B 公司自創業以來皆主打與產業內主要品牌商不同之市場區隔，品牌客戶對於 B 公司的自創品牌行動不僅沒有反擊，反而更加深代工的合作關係。

「對方主動提，你們每年那麼大的產銷量，你們跟海運關係應該不錯吧，你可不可以跟他們談，介紹我們認識。這樣的價格，給我們互惠。所以你看他們提的都是這幾個東西，無非是運用我們的資源…我們最大的 OEM 客戶，在五六年前，他也是跟我們提出什麼要求，他說，那時候我們只供應他們鋁合金的車種。你們既然有那麼強的碳纖業技術，可不可以幫我們做碳纖的代工。第二個他說，你們有那麼多廠，我不是只跟你談台灣廠合作，我們是不是可以跟你的歐洲廠合作。我們歐洲也需要很多產品，可不可以從你歐洲廠供應。」 (D 公司)

綜合以上分析，本研究提出發現五如下。

發現五：一旦代工廠自創品牌有初步成效，代工廠會趁勢提升在供應鏈上游之研發、設計與製造相關能力，並逐步發展下游之品牌行銷能力，藉由整合供應鏈上下游以縮小與品牌客戶間的能力差距，相對弱化品牌客戶之反擊能力，克服其所建立的經濟障礙及心理障礙。

綜合上述五個主要研究發現，從察覺-動機-能力(A-M-C)三面向彙整代工廠的策略作為與相對應的進入障礙如表 2 所示。

討論與命題

察覺是任何行動必要的前提驅力(Chen,1996)，Porter (2008)指出後進者對於既有廠商回應進入者的預期是重要因素，新進者認為既有廠商一旦產生負面感知，其可能的報復對於新進者將造成心理上的「威脅感」，因而阻卻新進者前進。Chen, Su, & Tsai(2007)亦認為，公司與特定競爭對手間關係的認定，將影響其在察覺上的評價，若廠商能竭力於維繫雙方關係之穩定，當其中一方採取行動時，另一方較不會有負面感知。就代工廠而言，在代工關係上自創品牌，終究免不了被品牌客戶察覺，因此代工廠在構思自創品牌計畫之初，即應先妥善處理與品牌客戶間的關係，如何能有效的降低品牌客戶對於其自創品牌的負面感知，將是代工廠在決定要自創品牌時需面對的首要問題。

而在自創品牌初期，既有廠商之所以會對新進者採取回擊，主要來自於既有廠商在經濟利潤上的損失(Demsetz, 1982；Harrigan, 1981；Porter, 2008)，此說明了品牌客戶的回擊動機，也顯示代工廠在開始轉型之初可能面臨的經濟性反擊，其反擊力道之大小與品牌客戶受影響的利潤損失幅度呈正相關，當代工廠嚴重危及品牌客戶之市場地位或利潤來源時，品牌客戶將會採取嚴厲的經濟制裁手段以回擊代工廠的踰矩行為。

代工廠轉型自創品牌能否成功，其關鍵除了來自於品牌客戶在察覺與動機相關的進入障礙外，一旦代工廠自創品牌初有成效，其與品牌客戶間的能力差距將成為關鍵的影響因素。基於上述，在從代工到自創品牌過程中，代工廠會經歷不同的階段，而所聚焦

於管理品牌客戶之察覺-動機-能力亦有所不同，依據本研究發現，代工廠在開始決定要自創品牌之時，會先注重品牌客戶在察覺上的反應，在自創品牌之初期，則將焦點放在品牌客戶之回應動機，而一旦自創品牌有了初步成效，則強調與品牌客戶之能力差距。據此，本研究提出下列命題一。

命題 1：隨著代工廠從代工到自創品牌之不同的階段歷程，代工廠之策略聚焦於管理品牌客戶(對手)其察覺-動機-能力有所不同。當代工廠要開始進行自創品牌之時，策略行動首重品牌客戶之察覺；在自創品牌之初期，策略行動首重品牌客戶之反擊動機；一旦自創品牌有初步成效，策略行動首重品牌客戶之反擊能力。

Ghemawat(1999)認為廠商間若能發展互信關係,則可大幅減少彼此行動所產生的威脅感。由訪談結果發現，個案公司均表示降低品牌客戶的負面感知乃是轉型自創品牌前必要的動作，即透過開誠佈公的方式降低品牌客戶於事後察覺的負面感知，此亦可消弭品牌客戶在由合作轉變為競爭時之衝突感。因此，代工廠在決定自創品牌之初，若能降低品牌客戶在察覺上負面感知,則能克服代工廠擔心破壞既有合作關係而遭到品牌客戶反擊的心理威脅，意即克服品牌客戶所構築的心理層面之進入障礙。

就回應動機而言,根據個案訪談結果，品牌客戶會採取抽單及價格競爭兩種經濟制裁手段，品牌客戶在察覺到代工廠的轉型意圖前，並不會產生回擊的動機，然而一旦代工廠商自創品牌的意圖被察覺後，若其嚴重侵蝕品牌客戶的利潤時，品牌客戶就會有強烈的回擊動機，進而採取經濟制裁。因此，一旦自創品牌的意圖已被察覺時，代工廠應致力於降低品牌客戶採取價格競爭或抽單的動機,以克服品牌客戶構築於經濟上的進入障礙。

就回應能力來說，Porter(2008)指出當既有廠商擁有豐沛資源時，較有能力對後進者採取懲罰或報復性回擊。因此，代工廠商應設法強化自身資源稟賦，縮小與品牌客戶能力上的差距，唯有當雙方勢均力敵時，品牌客戶發動反擊的代價較高，才可能減少代工廠受報復所致的經濟損害。此外，Ghemawat(1999)亦提到「專屬性」議題，當品牌客戶合作的代工廠不只一家時，代工廠對品牌客戶而言不具有專屬性，品牌客戶因而掌握「轉單」的權力，並以此作為限制代工廠自創品牌的心理威脅，特別是當代工廠感受到與品牌客戶間能力差距越大時，更會限縮自創品牌的企圖；此外，當代工廠自創品牌有初步成效，由於此階段之自創品牌規模仍相對較小，雖然對品牌客戶不致於有大範圍的衝擊，但品牌客戶除了採取競價等經濟性制裁，亦可能透過報復性喊話形成代工廠的心理壓力，此時代工廠除了需克服在經濟上的進入障礙，亦需突破品牌客戶威脅等心理層面的進入障礙。據此，本研究提出命題二如下。

命題 2：對應於品牌客戶(對手)其察覺-動機-能力之不同，代工廠之策略在於克服不同的進入障礙。

命題 2-1：當代工廠聚焦於品牌客戶之察覺，其策略在於降低品牌客戶在察覺上的負面感知，以克服心理的進入障礙。

命題 2-2：當代工廠聚焦於品牌客戶之反擊動機，其策略在於降低品牌客戶之反擊動機，以克服經濟的進入障礙。

命題 2-3：當代工廠聚焦於品牌客戶之反擊能力，其策略在於縮小與品牌客戶間的能力差距，以克服心理及經濟的進入障礙。

從代工到自創品牌不同於純粹的競爭關係，在既合又競的情境下，品牌客戶較可能產生衝突感，進而誘發其負面感知，觸發後續的反擊行動。因此代工廠如何在同時存在的競爭與合作中取得平衡則顯得更為重要(Peng & Bourne, 2009)。由個案訪談可知，就管理品牌客戶的察覺而言，基於合作關係，代工廠均認為主動告知是必要的動作，此舉較不會破壞原本在合作關係上所建立的信任基礎；此外，由於雙方長期的互動已累積較高的互信互賴，而雙方高階主管間也建立個人的網絡關係，代工廠既已經主動告知以示誠意，品牌客戶也會考慮在雙方友好的基礎下，只要代工廠並未直接攻擊或威脅到品牌客戶之主要市場時， 品牌客戶通常會持觀望態度並傾向暫不反擊。

Ghemawat(1999)認為當核心的營運範疇受到侵入，或報復的成本較為便宜時，既有廠商會傳遞強烈的報復訊念嚇阻新進者，甚至會透過懲罰其他踰矩廠商，以顯示出其「有仇必報」的決策特性。而在合作為基礎的前提下，代工廠為了避免上述的報復行動發生，進而影響到原有合作所產生的利益，將會更有意願降低品牌客戶在回擊上的動機。根據訪談結果，代工廠可有兩種策略作為：首先透過分散訂單來源以減少對於單一品牌客戶的依賴性，進而降低因合作關係變化造成代工廠經濟損失之風險；其二，Chen(1996)認為高度的市場共同性可能促使雙方的競爭張力提升，因此藉由不同的產品與市場區隔，減少與品牌客戶的市場共同性，可有效緩解與品牌客戶間的緊張關係，進而避免危及既有的合作關係。因此以合作為基礎的兩廠商間，傾向透過減少市場共同性以避免面對面的直接競爭，維繫雙方關係的穩定性。

而代工廠在能力的佈局上主要有兩大考量，首先，為了強化與品牌客戶間的合作關係，甚至減少單邊關係專屬投資的困境(康敏平、司徒達賢，2007；許文宗、王俊如，2012)，代工廠會致力於提升在上游的研發、設計與製造等能力，藉由為品牌客戶創造更多價值以穩定訂單來源，並可逐步提升品牌客戶對代工廠在價值鏈上的依賴；其次，為了避免品牌客戶透過通路或品牌的優勢採取反制行動，代工廠會逐步佈局下游的資源與能力，藉由縮小與品牌客戶在下游的能力差距，相對地弱化品牌客戶採取反制行動時所造成的負面影響。據此，本研究提出如下列命題三。

命題 3：從代工到自創品牌係以合作為基礎的動態競合，其策略行動會同時考慮到與品牌客戶(對手)間同時存在的競爭與合作關係。

命題 3-1：以合作為基礎的競爭，代工廠的策略行動會主動告知且善用長久的合作關係，提高品牌客戶之察覺。

命題 3-2：以合作為基礎的競爭，代工廠的策略行動會分散代工訂單來源，降低合作之依賴性；且基於合作關係，代工廠會避免直接競爭，採取產品與市場區隔，藉由降低市場共同性來減低品牌客戶競爭回應之動機。

命題 3-3：以合作為基礎的競爭，代工廠的策略行動會整合供應鏈上下游，藉由在上游的優勢強化合作關係，在下游提高資源相似性，相對地弱化品牌客戶競爭回應之能力。

結論與建議

本研究以動態競爭中的 A-M-C 架構為基礎，結合競合與進入障礙觀點，探討從代工到自創品牌的歷程中，基於原本的合作關係，代工廠採取哪些競爭策略行動來管理品牌客戶之察覺(A)、動機(M)、與回應能力(C)，以克服品牌客戶等既有業者所建立的進入障礙。研究結果發現在代工廠要開始進行自創品牌之時，基於過去的合作關係，會主動向品牌客戶告知其自創品牌之決定，並採用避免衝突的策略，來降低品牌客戶在察覺上的負面感知，克服心理上的進入障礙；在自創品牌之初期，代工廠會採取產品與市場區隔與分散代工訂單來源等策略，來降低品牌客戶之反擊動機，克服經濟上的進入障礙；一旦自創品牌有初步成效，代工廠會趁勢整合供應鏈上下游，以縮小與品牌客戶間的能力差距，相對弱化品牌客戶之回應能力，克服心理及經濟上的進入障礙。

就實務面的管理意涵而言，本研究結果提供代工廠如何洞察品牌客戶(對手)之察覺-動機-能力意向，並採取哪些策略作為，使其得以在原有合作基礎上，進一步克服進入障礙，與既有品牌業者競爭。本研究結果所提出的發現與命題有助於瞭解在代工到自創品牌的歷程中，代工廠在面對特定的競爭對手(主要的品牌客戶) (who?)之回應時，可能採取哪些策略行動(what?)，為何採取這些策略行動(why?)，這些策略行動如何讓後進的代工廠突破既有業者所設立的進入障礙(How?)等重要的策略決策議題。本研究更詳細分析過去未被審慎檢視的實務現象，而研究結果與意涵也有助於實務上對於代工廠自創品牌策略決策行動之重要參考。

儘管代工到自創品牌是一個普遍存在的現象，過去針對此現象之探討尚未有從動態競爭、競合、與進入障礙等觀點切入，因此本研究以探索性為出發點，採取深度的個案研究，以瞭解相關理論如合詮釋實務現象。本研究所分析的四家個案公司雖來自不同產業，但所得的結論仍難以一般化擴大應用，此為本研究最大限制，特別是四家皆非過去相關研究探討代工議題時常用之指標性科技大廠為樣本，本研究結果是否能類推至其他代工廠則有待斟酌。例如，產品標準化程度較高的 ICT 產業，又如產業集中度較高的手機產業，其代工廠自創品牌時與品牌客戶之間的關係很可能受到不同的產業特性與結構等情境因素影響，因此建議未來研究在產業層次考量代工廠與品牌廠在產業鏈上下游之產業結構特性加以分析。

此外，在對偶關係(dyad)的分析層次上，傳統的動態競爭觀點主張行動者的策略行動應設法降低對手的察覺，而本研究指出以合作為基礎的競爭，行動者(代工廠)反而主動告知，提高對手的察覺，可見代工廠與品牌客戶過去的互動關係是一重要影響因素，例如過去長久互動良好，代工廠會主動表示善意，徵詢對手的看法，但若兩造過去曾有過矛盾或衝突，則代工廠未必會主動告知，因此建議後續研究可考量過去代工廠與品牌客戶間互動關係的矛盾嚴重性之影響，更深入分析代工廠行動與品牌客戶(對手)回應之間一來一往的動態競合發展。

最後，本研究從對手之 A-M-C 面向探討代工廠自創品牌需克服的心理上及經濟上的進入障礙，然而就新進入者而言，突破 A-M-C 對應的各項進入障礙之間是否有先後順序，是值得未來探究的議題。Chen & Miller (1994)指出突破進入障礙方式可分為「關卡式(gate)」及「鏈鎖式(chain)」兩種型態，前者意指每項進入障礙一如一道道閘門，除非每項障礙都能被順利突破，否則任一項行動將不會產生任何對偶的回應，所以新進入者需逐一克服個別障礙，直到每道閘門都被開啟才能順利過關；後者係指只要其中一項進入障礙被突破，整體來說一項行動就會觸發相對應的連鎖反應發生。

例如代工廠針對品牌商之察覺、動機與能力上需克服不同的心理及經濟障礙，從對手品牌客戶的角度來看，由於代工廠過去一直以來是密切的合作夥伴，或許會較以較寬容的態度看待代工廠的自創品牌決策，因此當一家代工廠商做到了主動告知，突破在察覺(A)面向之心理障礙，是否可能引起連鎖反應？由於品牌客戶基於合作之考量，使得代工廠在其後需突破動機(M)及能力(C)面向上的障礙更為順利？或代工廠既使主動告知，但仍需逐一克服一關又一關的障礙？即在察覺(A)面向之心理障礙，但到了動機(M)及能力(C)面向上的障礙時，品牌客戶有了更高的防衛，使得代工廠的每個下一關都更難突破。從動態競爭的觀點而言，每一次的行動引發下一個對手的回應，在一連串的行動與回應之間，以後進者切入的代工廠而言，不論是「關卡式」或「鏈鎖式」，對於代工廠的每一個策略行動都有重要的決策意涵。本研究雖結合動態競爭與進入障礙觀點，但並未分析在「關卡式」或「鏈鎖式」之下的策略決策，建議未來可進一步分析在兩種模式下，代工廠如何突破品牌客戶在 A-M-C 三面向的進入障礙？而 A-M-C 三者的策略行動優先順序不同是否有不同的關卡式路徑或連鎖式路徑？此值得後續研究深入探討。

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第二篇

Actions and responses from OEM to OBM: Cooperation-based competition

INTRODUCTION

In the emerging countries, many enterprises start the business as contract manufacturing suppliers. They supply the manufacturing function to multinational brand owners, who then sell the product to the customers worldwide. Since the manufacturing function executed by contract suppliers is usually less pivotal to the final product performance than R&D, product design, or branding and marketing, contract manufacturing suppliers could only apprehend a small portion of the profit from sales of final products. As time goes by, there is a dynamic nature of the relationship between a contract manufacturing supplier and its brand partners (contract buyers). In practice, many contract suppliers expand their territory in the value chain, either forwardly integrating the logistics or backwardly internalizing the product design, as an attempt to generate more profitability. In many cases, the pattern of transformation is that those contract manufacturing suppliers start from supplying "original equipment manufacturing (OEM)" or "original design manufacturing (ODM)" contracts then transform as brand-owned manufactures[1].

Developing own-brand is an attempt to forwardly integrate the channels and directly market the product to end customers. In most of the industries, brand and marketing are one of the most critical assets and value activities. While making the decision to have own-brand, OEM/ODM suppliers not only have to gauge their organizational capabilities, changes in the environmental condition, but also have to consider the impact resulting from direct competition with existing brands in the marketplace. In practice, once an OEM supplier moves toward brand-owned strategy, it would adopt a variety of strategic actions to avoid the direction confrontation with its OEM contract buyers (i.e. brand partners), trying to maintain a balance of interests among transactional partners.

The OEM supplier not only takes the challenges but also has an existing OEM agreement to maintain. The brand-owned buyer's reaction to contract manufacturer's brand building action might arouse serious impact on the survival of the contract manufacturer in the early stage of the brand building (Amsden and Chu, 2003). From the brand-owned buyers' viewpoint, when they perceive that a contract manufacturer might turn into a potential competitor, they would have some reactions like withdrawal of order in place to prevent the contract manufacturer's action to build own-brand or to attack the contact manufacturer's new brand by investing more resources into the downstream competition of the brand and product market.

From the contract manufacturers' viewpoint, the endowments of contract manufacturer are by nature different from those of the brand-owned companies; therefore, the competitive strategies should be different accordingly. If entering a different product market that fully utilizes its existing resources, a contract manufacturer could, in one way, mitigate brand-owned buyers' concern of direct competition, and turns the brand and technology disadvantage into advantage in the other. In their path from OEM to OBM, contract manufacturers have following questions to think about: how to avoid overly reaction from brand-owned buyers, how to differentiate from the brand-owned buyers in product, market segmentations, and

[1] It is also called as OBM (owned-brand manufacturing) in practice.

geographic territory, as well as how to concurrently cooperate and compete with the brand-owned buyers in different segments of the value chain.

From the above practical aspect, contact manufacturers should also put existing transaction partners' interests into consideration while making an own-brand building strategy, and try to predict the aroused reaction or counter attack. Thus, utilizing a theoretical lens of competitive dynamic and cooptition dynamics would help depict the interaction and relationship between contract manufacturer and brand-owned buyer, and explain the plausibility of firm's decision and behaviour.

Chen (2008) proposed a transparadox framework to further depict three generic conceptions of competition-cooperation interrelationships. He argued that competition and cooperation can be transcended and are interdependent, and that the approach taken to predict a competitors response can also be used to anticipate a partner's reaction. Based on the competitive dynamics perspective (Chen, 2008; Chen and Miller, 2014), we argue that the change of relationships from OEM to OBM strategy can also be explained by using the lens of "coopetition dynamics" perspective. That is, how the contract manufacturer predicts its own-brand buyer's response and reaction when shifting from OEM toward OBM. We consider that linking coopetition perspective with OEM/OBM research could be another important contribution to strategic management theory.

Therefore, this research aims at understanding the proliferating phenomenon of "OEM toward OBM" strategy based on coopetition perspective. Despite previous literatures have not showed many publications either in OEM/OBM research or in coopetition research, none of them has been paid to linking these two research stream. As both fields have become heated issues in practice and in research, it is clear that some questions remain unanswered.

While an OEM supplier moves toward brand-owned strategy, in order to balance between competition and cooperation, the OEM supplier has to predict the possible responses from its brand partner before it take any initiatives. That is, any action of a focal OEM supplier depends on its prediction of possible responses from the brand partner. In addition, the OEM supplier will act to create barriers. Thus, this study aims at answering the following questions:

1. What are the possible responses that a focal OEM supplier predicts its brand partner's reactions?
2. Given various predicted responses from the brand partner, what are the actions does the OEM supplier take?
3. What are the barriers that an focal OEM supplier moves to create?

THEORETICAL REVIEWS

Strategies from OEM to OBM

OEM is a specific arrangement of subcontracting, evolved out of the joint operations of buyers and latecomer suppliers and became the most important channel for export marketing during 1980s. Under OEM, the latecomer produces a finished product to the precise specification of a foreign brand-owned buyer, who then markets the product under its own brand name using its own distribution channels (Hobday, 1995: 1178).

OEM is able to be contrasted with ODM (own design and manufacture), in which the buyer cooperates with the latecomer on the design. ODM signifies the internalization of system design skills, and sometimes complex production technologies and component design abilities on the part of the latecomer. ODM also offers a mechanism for latecomers to capture more of the design value-added while still avoiding the risk of launching own-brand products and the costs of investing in foreign marketing and distribution channels (Hobday, 1995:1178).

Successful OEM/ODM arrangements often involve close long-term relationships between partner companies because the brand-owned buyers depend on the quality, delivery, and price of the final output from the contract manufacturers. However, the OEM/ODM has its disadvantages. The brand-owned buyer often imposes restrictions on the sales activities of latecomer supplier, who often should be subordinated to the decisions of the buyer and is dependent on buyers' market channels (Hobday, 1995:1178). Therefore, as contract manufacturers grew in size and competence, they may have extended their roles to brand territory, becoming an own-brand manufacture (OBM). A host of formerly anonymous makers of brand-name products are increasingly stepping up and pushing the brands themselves aside (Arrunada and Vazquez, 2006). OBM occurs where the firm sells goods under its own brand name, capturing more of the post-production added-value (Hobday, 1995).

Chen (2005) indicated that sometimes contract manufacturers are encountering with the low profitability of their OEM businesses. As long as the contract manufacturers with strong capabilities in low-cost manufacturing still rely on own-brand buyer for technological knowledge, OEM should remain the optimal governance structure. However, when the contract manufacturers have become technologically self-sufficient, they may attempt to grab the right to serve the final products market, although this action would trigger more conflicts and escalate the cost of contracting arrangement.

The extended territory of contract manufacturers moving from OEM/ODM toward OBM has highlighted competition in the following ways: (1) the creation of new firms and divisions that they can bypass the traditional deterrents to entering into new market; (2) the creation of new brands that they can regain sustainable advantages by undertaking the value-adding activities; and (3) movement up the value chain that they can work with most powerful retailers and distributors to produce items equal in quality to those of the finest brand owners (Arrunada and Vazquez, 2006).

As Chen (2005: 243) emphasized, OEM is often misunderstood as a shortcut taken by latecomer supplier to enlist marketing resources, particularly reputable brands from its own- brand buyer. For example, Gereffi (1999) considered that OEM is a shortcut used by local firms to expand into international markets. Hobday (1995) and Cyhn (2000) considered that OEM is used by contract manufacturers in newly industrialized nations to assimilate advanced technologies from developed nations.

Although the brand-owned buyer has faced the potential or inevitable competition from latecomer supplier, whether it is easy for contract manufacturers going through the path from OEM, ODM to OBM? Chu (2009: 1057) stated that switching into OBM, the latecomer supplier represents a relatively high-risk strategy because its inherited capabilities are substantially different from those required for doing OBM. To take the OBM route, the OEM-supplier has to do innovative R&D and marketing, which requires rather different capabilities from those accumulated by doing OEM contract, the OEM experiences does allow the latecomer supplier to acquire knowledge about the industry, however, to shift into OBM, the contract manufacturer needs to learn more about the market in the advanced foreign countries, and to build up separate R&G and marketing organizations. The contract manufacturer has to transform into a different firm by changing its business model, restructuring its organization, acquiring its R&D and marketing capabilities, and integrating its human resources. It takes strong determination for the OEM-supplier to decide moving toward OBM strategy.

Coopetition

The term "coopetition" was coined earlier by Ray Noorda in the 1980s. However, research on coopetition started lately, which can be traced back from its introduction into the strategic management field in 1996 when Adam Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff published their book *Co-opetition*. Previous research has three veins on coopetition including the antecedents driving to coopetition, the coopetition dynamics, and the outcome of coopetition (Peng, Pike, Yang, and Roos, 2011).

The research stream focuses on antecedents of coopetition, emphasizing what theoretical mechanisms and determinants lead to coopetition. Scholars in coopetition field have indicated driving factors that influence coopetition. At the firm level, some internal contingencies such as heterogeneous or complementary resources (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Peng and Bourne, 2009), similar or common resources (Gnyawali and Park, 2009), and relationship development (Chin, Chan, and Lam, 2008) may influence coopetition. At the industry level, some external contingencies such as competitive position or pressure in the markets (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Zeng and Chen, 2003), industrial structure (Clarke-Hill *et al*., 2003), higher market diversity (Gnyawali, He, and Madhavan, 2006), short product life cycle, and technological convergence (Gnyawali and Park, 2009) may affect coopetition. When contract manufacturers move from OEM strategy toward OBM strategy, they actually add competition into the prior cooperative partnership, which turns the relationship into a coopetition.

Competitive dynamics

Competitive dynamics reveals how competitive moves can help develop advantages and improve performance. Firm’s performance is determined not only by how its actions affect customers but also by how its rivals may react. A serious of competitive action (move) and response (countermove) can create a destructive pattern that sabotages rivals’ profits and even threatens the survival of some firms (Ketchen, Snow, and Hoover, 2004).

Chen (1996) proposed a model for the analysis of interfirm rivalry at action/response dyadic level, in which the *awareness-motivation-capability* framework provides an integrative understanding of three key behavioral drivers to define a competitor’s response (Chen, 1996; Chen, Su, and Tsai, 2007). A competitor will not be able to respond to an action unless it is *aware* of the action, *motivated* to react, and *capable* of responding (Chen and Miller, 2014).

When the contract manufacturer moves from OEM to OBM, the relationship between contract manufacturers and its brand-owned buyer is similar to the relationship between challenger (later-entrant) and market leader (first-mover). Based on the *awareness-motivation-capability* model, how the contract manufacturer predict its own-brand buyer’s response and reaction? That is, once the contract manufacturers decides to move toward OBM, it may choose strategic actions to diminish the awareness of competition tension within the partnership, to decrease the possibility of response motivation from its own-brand partner, or even to weaken the response capability of own-brand partner.

Competition-cooperation dynamics

As the above-mentioned, the second research vein of coopetition focuses on competition-cooperation dynamics. Empirical studies such as Bengtsson and Kock (1999) found that a firm could be involved in four different types of horizontal relationships at the same time including coexistence, cooperation, competition, and coopetition. In addition, a relationship between a firm and a specific competitor can change over time, as the business context in which they are embedded normally is very dynamic. Madhavan *et al*. (2004) explore the distinction between competitive motive and cooperative motive, concluding that competitive motive triads can be observed in technology blocks, while cooperative motive triads can be observed in geographic blocks.

Peng and Bourne (2009) examine the simultaneous competition and cooperation between two healthcare networks. They indicate that two organizations would compete and cooperate simultaneously when each organization has complementary but distinctly different sets of resources and when the field of competition is distinctly separate from the field of cooperation. In addition, two networks will find it easier to balance competition and cooperation when each network has compatible but distinctly different structures.

By linking the Western and Eastern thoughts, Chen (2008) developed a transparadox framework for transcending the competition-cooperation paradox. The line between competition, cooperation, and even collaboration is obscured (Chen, 2008). Chen and Miller (2011) further indicated that the conventional view of competitive dynamics has mainly focused on combative competition, which emphasizes on head-on competition—on rival and combat, on attack and response, and on how a focal firm can get the better of an opponent. He stated that a move toward a more relational variety of competitive dynamics should be paid more attention. The relational perspective of competition-cooperation dynamics focuses more on sustainable, mutually beneficial interactions among competitors. Compared to the combative view that emphasizes on value appropriation, direct competition, short-term interaction, and duality, the relational perspective highlights value creation, indirect competition, long-term interaction, and multiple stakeholders (Chen and Miller, 2014).

In the relationship between contract manufacturer and own-brand buyer, the interaction evolved from cooperation to coopetition as the contract manufacturer heads to OBM strategy. Since adding competition on cooperation is inevitable, considering the own-brand buyer is an important stakeholder, the contract manufacturers may adopt indirect competition rather than head-on competition. Therefore, the competition-cooperation dynamics may focus on maintaining the long-term cooperative relationship in order not to hinder value creation.

METHODOLOGY

Research approach

Case-based research is likely to be the most useful method to study the coopetition (Ketchen *et al*., 2004; Snow and Thomas, 1994). In-depth case study could examine competition-cooperation dynamics more systematically and deeply (Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Dussauge *et al.*, 2000). Therefore, this study is designed to be conducted by a case study approach for gathering more rich data, which makes multifaceted descriptions of OEM/OBM strategy and coopetition possible.

Research samples

Taiwanese contract manufacturing firms have reached success in own-brand building. Since 2003, the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (or TAITRA) has been working with Interbrand[2] to evaluate the Top Taiwan Global Brands league. This research investigates case companies out of the Top 20 Taiwan Global Brands. The criteria for sample selection are as follows:

1. The company had been or currently is still engaged in OEM business, acting as OEM contract supplier who make final product for OEM contract buyers (brand partners). In addition, the case company must have an own-brand product, which is recognized by the end customers.
2. The case company must have at least one-third of brand revenues generated from the overseas market outside of Taiwan.
3. The case company must have at least 20% of revenues generated from its own-brand business versus OEM contract business.

We have contacted with possible informants form the Top-20 Taiwan brand list. Eventually we have got the permissions from 8 companies who are willing to arrange the interview. Table 1 shows the backgrounds of these case companies.

Table 1. Backgrounds of sample brands interviewed

	Total Revenue 2013 US$ millions (NTD millions)	Share of Brand-owned Revenue	Major Overseas Market	Major OEM Partners
Acer	$12,065 (360,132)	100%	Europe, Central South America	IBM, Apple, Dell
HTC	$6,814 (203,402)	90%	Europe, USA, Asia	Palm, Sony, British Telecom
Maxxis	$4,458 (133,086)	80%	USA, Europe	TOYO, Specialized, Toyota
Giant	$1,822 (54,391)	70%	Europe, USA, Japan	Schwinn, Trek Colnago
Merida	$848 (25,309)	40%	Europe	GT/GTSchwinn Specialized Scott
Johnson	$505 (15,071)	92%	USA, Europe	Omron, Mizuno, Nautilus
Gigabyte	$1,712 (51,118)	70%	Europe, North America, Asia, Middle East, ANZ	Fujitsu, Compaq
Genius	$276 (8,246)	60%	EMEA, Latin America, Asia Pacific	Microsoft HP Best Buy

2 "Interbrand" is a consulting company in UK that is engaged in brand evaluation.

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

When an OEM supplier moves to become a brand-owned manufacturer, this might turn its brand partner into a strong competitor. Through the lens of competitive dynamic, this study analyzes the strategic actions of OEM suppliers and expected response barriers. We argue that the actions of OEM suppliers may vary with the predicted possible responses from their brand partners. That is, the OEM suppliers will firstly predict the possible responses from their brand partners and then take the actions based on the prediction. The purposes of OEM suppliers' actions are to decrease the awareness and motivation and to weaken the capabilities of brand partners, who are potential competitors. Therefore, the expected response barriers such as unawareness, no motivation, and lack of capabilities may create less hostile space for OEM suppliers' brand-owned strategy.

The following section firstly addresses how OEM suppliers predict the possible responses from their brand partners. According to the predictions, we address what are the actions that OEM supplies will take and what are the expected barriers that the OEM suppliers intend to create.

The predicted responses from the brand partner

The existed relationship between an OEM supplier and its brand partner is mutually cooperative. However, as the OEM supplier moves toward brand-owned strategy, it must consider the possible attitudes and responses of its brand partner. Despite the final competition is inevitable, to simultaneously maintain the existing cooperation yet to develop its brand-owned strategy is definitely the best situation for an OEM supplier, since maintaining the cooperation not only ensures the cash flow but also gain more time for brand development. However, launching brand-owned strategy under the cooperation is more likely to be noticed by brand partner. Therefore, the OEM supplier has to predict the possible reactions taken by brand partner and also consider the antecedents and consequences.

This study found that in the worst scenario, the brand partner will terminate the OEM contract to cut the cash flow of the OEM supplier (Chu, 2009) or fight back by initiating price war. In a worse scenario, the brand partner may invest more resources in marketing campaigns, quality improvement or product differentiation in order to keep far distance from the late newcomers (Days and Reibstein, 1997).

Under some circumstances, for example, when the market is growing or when the prior cooperative relationship is good and strong, the brand partner may tolerate the competitive behaviours taken by the OEM supplier, leaving space for OEM supplier to develop a new brand. If the business scale of an OEM supplier's new brand is small, the brand partner may unaware or ignore the existence of such new brand. It may not respond and just wait and see (Days and Reibstein, 1997). In short, when an OEM supplier is moving toward brand-owned strategy, its brand partner could respond by fighting back, forbearing, or ignoring and being unaware.

Be unaware or ignore. This study found that when the business scale of an OEM supplier's new brand is small, its product position is far distance from that of brand partner, normally, the brand partner would not regard the OEM supplier as a competitor. Especially when the OEM supplier keeps doing its best to fulfil the requirements of OEM contract, the brand partner may choose to maintain the contractual relationship. In some cases when the brand partner regards itself as a market leader and is reluctant to respond to small competitors, it is likely to be unaware or ignore the OEM supplier's brand-owned strategy.

For example, when Genius started to create its brand, the product scale and marketing capability were so small so that Microsoft did not even aware the brand of Genius. Another case such as Johnson, when Johnson started to enter the commercial fitness equipment market by its own brand "Matrix", it has already maintained a long-term OEM contractual relationship with its brand partner. At that time, because the fitness market was growing tremendously and the OEM contract was important to the brand partner, it did not terminate the contract but ignored Johnson's new brand. The results indicate the following finding 1.

Finding 1: When the business scale of an OEM supplier's new brand is small, its product position is far distance from that of brand partner, the existing cooperative relationship is stable, and the brand partner is reluctant to respond to small competitors, the OEM supplier can predict that its brand partner is more likely to be unaware or ignore the brand-owned strategy.

Forbear. If the market was growing fast, there might be enough space for new brands as well as old brands to survive. Thus, the conflict between an OEM supplier and its brand partner would not be so significat. Based on prior long-term cooperation, the OEM supplier may strengthen the partnership by enlarging the scope of OEM contract. The closer the partnership, the less possibility for the brand partner to shift the OEM contract, since it may be more challenging for the brand partner to find better OEM suppliers, in terms of cost, delivery, and compliance. Under such circumstances, if the OEM supplier develops its own brand, the brand partner would do nothing but forbear.

For example, during the mid-term cooperation between Genius and Microsoft, they have been jointly getting the top-tier certification, thus strengthen their partnership. In addition, Genius enlarged the scope of OEM contract from the products of "mouse" to "X Box Controller". Despite the mouse-SBU has received minor complains, Microsoft basically chose to forbear with the brand-owned strategy of Genius in the beginning. Therefore, we propose the following finding 2.

Finding 2：When the OEM supplier becomes strategically important to its brand partner, the partnership is stable and with mutual trust, and the brand partner used to keep "let alone" attitude, the OEM supplier can predict that its brand partner is more likely to forbear with the brand-owned strategy.

Fight back. If the new brand of a focal OEM supplier is competitive and with great potential, it might cause the tension and conflict. Moreover, if the brand partner used to react fast and toughly, once being noticed, the OEM supplier can predict that its brand partner will fight back by warning or even threatening with contract termination. For example, when ASUS became the top-10 in computer market, it encountered with difficulties arose by its brand partners, who have threaten ASUS to exit the market or to separate brand business from OEM business. ASUS eventually did the separation to establish a subsidiary company-PEGATRON and transferred its OEM-supply business to the other suppliers. Even worse, one of its brand partners insisted that if PEGATRON produce ASUS's brand products, the OEM contract will be terminated. Therefore, we proposed the following finding 3.

Finding 3: When the OEM supplier's new brand is competitive to escalate the tension and conflict between the partnership, and the brand partner used to react toughly, the OEM supplier can predict that its brand partner is more likely to fight back.

The actions of OEM suppliers and expected response barriers

The competitive dynamic perspective indicates that a firm will move based on its prediction of competitor's responses. According to Chen (1996), there are three essential antecedents that affect a firm's competitive activity: the *awareness* of another firm's move, the *motivation* to act or respond, and the *capability* to act or respond (Chen, 1996; Day and Reibsteein, 1997; Chen and Miller, 2014). These three antecedents are affected by the market commonality and resource similarity between a focal firm and its rival (Chen, 1996). For example, the greater the rival's market commonality with a focal firm, the less motivated that rival would initiate an attack against the firm for fear of retaliation across multiple markets. The greater the rival's resource similarity with an attacking firm, the greater the rival's ability to respond to the attacker (Chen and Miller, 2014).

Based on Chen (1996)'s awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) lenses, we found that in order to create response barriers, the moves of a focal OEM supplier toward brand-owned strategy are based on its prediction of brand partner's responses. A focal OEM supplier may initiate various strategic moves such as to decrease the market commonality, to decrease resource similarity, to increase the interdependency, to escalate mutual forbearance, and to increase the brand partner's response costs. These actions are expected to create barriers in awareness, motivation, and capability. That is, while moving toward a brand owned strategy, a focal OEM supplier will move to decrease its brand partner's awareness, to decrease the response motivation of its brand partner, and/or to relatively weaken the brand partner's capability of response.

Response barrier in awareness. In order to decrease the possibility of being noticed by the brand partner, a focal OEM supplier may adopt differentiation strategies in the arena such as product scope, target markets, channels, and geographic areas. In addition, the OEM supplier may separate the brand-owned business from OEM-supply business. Those differentiation strategies may decrease the market commonality and resource similarity, which are expected to not be noticed at least in a period of time.

For Example, when Giant started to develop its own brand, it deliberately separates itself from the brand partners by entering a different segmentation and uses a price positioning which varies from its brand partners. "*Initially we try to avoid the channels which sell brand partner's products, but it is sometimes unavoidable.*" ; "*For example, we supply 90% of the products to the number one brand in the U.S. market: Trek. If we choose to sell our own-brand products in the same market as then our price will be 20% lower than Trek's.*" (Giant's Spokesperson)

Merida uses geographical categorization as segmentation, "*I tell my clients (brand partners) openly, that I will not enter the U.S. market. Therefore, let me enter Europe, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and other areas. Under this principle, our clients coincide with our way of business which allows us to sell our products outside* *of the U.S.*" (Merida, CEO)

When Acer first started to internationalize, it chooses to enter emerging market in order to go under the radar of mainstream brands. Acer then enters the European and other high-end markets after it establishes a certain market share within the emerging market. "*Acer has targeted those emerging market from the very beginning. We had our eyes on Southeast Asia, Central and Southern America and developed these markets before the major brands even started considering.*" (Acer, Marketing Director)

When Johnson first started its own brand: Vision, it targets the high-end family market which differentiates it from its main brand partner-Schwinn. Furthermore, Vision selects specialty stores as its channel while Schwinn chooses to collaborate with major franchise sport equipment stores. Their channels are segmented from each other. Johnson develops its moulding from scratch so its product's appearance and specs can be easily differentiated from brand partner's products. Johnson even sets up dedicated plant and production lines within the manufacturing factories for the brand partners to decrease their concerns. "*You must have your own unique specs, we told him 'If it is your design, then we will not use it.' We did accomplish this promise and Vision knows that, so we were fine for several years.*" (Johnson, Assistant R&D Manager)

"*The process of developing our own brand does indeed make our customer nervous. Therefore, we have to promise them that we will develop our own products and will not use anything from them. Our instincts tell us to have a clear segmentation with our brand partners which allows us to keep their business for several years to come. We had two to three plants back then, and we dedicated one plant for their production. Our chairman does not allow us to share the usage of moulds. If it is client's mould then we will not use it, unless it was ours from the very beginning, then we will use it.*" (Johnson, Assistant R&D Manager)

When Genius was supplying for Microsoft in 1999, Genius had its manufacturing and research development centers separated at Microsoft's request. ZyXel on the other hand, utilizes the method of virtual organization to separate its OEM-contract business unit and its brand-owned business unit. "*We separate our production facilities where OEM contract has its own sector and it is dedicated to Microsoft; we make sure we have a divided production zone segmented specifically for this purpose." ; "Sales team and R&D team are also segmented. After all, when we talk about branding, its concerns are products, and OEM supply is more concerned about the technology and the production utility. Therefore, these two are segmented.*" (Genius, CEO)

Gigabyte made its independent R&D within each OEM supply business unit and branding business unit. The differentiation includes a branched management system to manage different functions within each business-unit. "*We actually spin off the business unit right off the bat. This is fairly painful. We made it to the third year before we realized we had to spin off R&D. It was an extremely difficult time and the process is full of struggles. The world of R&D is very realistic, how does your company assess employee performance? What are you going to do when the ODM is not profitable but brand-owned is? It took us lots of time to tweak and get used to* *the system and policies. We finally had it all settled and manages to separate the ODM part and brand-owned part.*" (Gigabyte, Senior Vice President)

The above-mentioned strategic actions in these case companies indicate the following finding 4.

Finding 4. While moving toward brand-owned strategy, a focal OEM supplier may differentiate its product scope, target markets, channels, and geographic areas from that of its brand partner. It may also separate the brand-owned business from OEM-supply business. The purposes are to decrease market commonality and to decrease resource similarity for the creation of response barrier in awareness.

Response barrier in motivation. The potential competition is inevitable when an OEM supplier moves toward brand-owned strategy. However, based on cooperation, a focal OEM supplier may try to increase the interdependency so that the brand partner could be less motivated to respond to the OEM supplier's brand-owned strategy. The OEM supplier may maintain or even enlarge the production scale of OEM contract. Benefiting from the enlargement of economy of scale, the OEM supplier share the benefits to its brand partner, therefore, strengthening the interdependency and decreasing the brand partner's response motivation.

For example, it takes Giant 10 years in the OEM supply business to become an enormous company. The scale of the company allows it to leverage advantages in economy of scale, which provides OEM-supply services with the ability to cooperate and control costs and quality. The economy of scale and services allows Giant to retain the key accounts and find new brand partners despite shifting towards brand-owned strategy. Giant leverages its economy of scope in logistics and share the benefits with Giant's brand-partners to enhance client's dependence towards Giant. "*The advantage here is we possess the best manufacturing capability in Taiwan and second in Asia. If we compare R&D, manufacturing and sales, then manufacturing is definitely our greatest strength. When compared to other business in Taiwan, our R&D should be the best as well.*"; "*Our brand partner came to us and asked us to introduce marine-transportation companies to them. They noticed we have such a great manufacturing capacity and therefore, we should have a great relationship with marine-transport companies. They want marine-transportation firms to give them more discounts which is actually utilizing our resources. This partner also brings up its interests in cooperating with our manufacturing plants around the globe. They want to work with our factory plants based in Europe and consult us if it is possible to supply them from there.*" (Giant, Spokesperson)

Genius and Microsoft have developed a very close partnership through long-term collaboration. It makes it very difficult for Microsoft to find another OEM supplier with the same cost, lead-time, and the willingness to adapt. "*We become a very trustworthy partner. We are so intertwined that we even build X-Box and its controllers. At our highest collaboration level, the scale has reached NT $3 billion to $4 billion."; "We took our partnership one step at a time, eventually we have built up a level of chemistry and great understandings." ; "We matches Microsoft's grading criteria and on most criteria we manage to receive the highest scores.*" (Genius, CEO)

In Merida's case, the upper stream has become an oligopoly due to the change of industrial structure. The brand partner had to accept Merida's brand-owned strategy since they have no other options. "*Taiwan has been moving forward and the average unit price continues to be on the rise. Two things happen as a result; First of all, the technology involved in production increases. Secondly, some OEM suppliers go out of business. Most of our competitor's factories have relocated and there isn't many left. Among those who stay, they are pretty locked up by their brand partners. Just like my clients would not move over to Giant, Giant's clients would not come to us either. Therefore, the entire industry remains fairly stable.*"…. "*We have been working on this for twenty, thirty years. The large manufacturing plants in the United States have all shut down and we continue to overcome the obstacles to be in an advantageous position today. Many bike manufacturers went out of business, and small manufacturing plants continue to shrink or relocate to China and do mass productions. There isn't many left that can handle the mid to high-end quality; among those who remain are Merida and Giant*." (Merida, CEO)

HTC is one of the pioneers in smart-phone manufacturing. At the time, other OEM suppliers such as Quanta and Asus have yet to enter the industry. The telecom companies are highly reliant on HTC's ODM ability. Despite being impacted by HTC's brand-owned strategy, these telecom companies can't afford to transfer orders to other ODM suppliers. "*HTC going brand-owned may upset telecom companies, but what can they do about it? What are the alternatives? If the telecom companies have many alternatives then this could become a significant issue. Since they don't have many options, then the situation is not as significant.*" (HTC, Executive Vice President)

Johnson satisfies its brand partners by being highly cooperative and adaptive. When Johnson first started the brand-owned strategy, other OEM-suppliers on the market couldn't fulfil the needs of clients like Johnson does. This is the reason why Johnson's clients did not transfer orders right away, despite being unhappy of Johnson's brand-owned strategy. "*Our boss treats our brand partners great and kind. Many U.S. firms place their orders here at our factories because this is how we do business; we rarely say no.*" "*Our advantage is based on our collaboration. The R&D prototype only takes a few days, we really fight hard to meet the lead-time.*" "*You place your orders, tell me when and how much you want and we assure you, it will ship out.*" (Johnson, R&D Assistant General Manager)

Marrix's brand-partner realized Marrix has an advantage in scale and product design and expended their collaborations. "*For example, our clients started placing orders with the two-wheels until they realize we have the capabilities to do the four-wheels as well, then they started coming to us. This increased collaboration includes international brand. I believe an important turning point is that we develop many different types of products and our overseas arrangements are all very successful. When you reach a certain scale, instead of competing with you, they also start seeking partnership opportunities.*" (Marrix, Assistant General Manager)

"*Basically they start to look at this from various angles and realize they can benefit from our economy of scale and our cost advantage. It can be difficult to swallow in the beginning but as long as you don't compete with them directly in the U.S. market and focus in Taiwan, then many firms don't really care about what we are doing.*"

(Marrix, R&D Assistant General Manager)

In general, if the OEM supplier is able to maintain or to enlarge its competitive advantage in production, the cooperative interdependency could be reinforced by sharing the advantages from economy of scale. Thus, the brand partner would be less motivated to terminate the contract even being aware that its OEM supplier is developing brand products. The above results indicate the following finding 5.

Finding 5. While moving toward brand-owned strategy, a focal OEM supplier may maintain or enlarge its competitive advantage in production. Benefiting from sharing such advantages, the cooperative interdependency could be reinforced. Therefore, the brand partner is expected to be less motivated to respond.

Response barrier in capability. In order to create the response barrier in capability, a focal OEM supplier may attack in full range and with speedy pace. The purpose is to escalate the possible costs of response so that the brand partner will be relatively less able to respond.

For example, Giant speed up its brand-owned strategy and quickly progressed to international market and set up sales outlet at major markets when it heard Schwinn is going to establish factory at Mainland China. "*As soon as we know Schwinn is going to establish factories at China, we marched into the international market very quickly. Our primary markets are Europe and the United States. As you can see, we established the Europe office at the Netherland in 1986 and the U.S. office at the very next year! Before you know it, there is the Japan office at 1989 and the Australia office at 1991, and Canada office at 1993. Within five years, we have developed a sales post in these major markets. It is also important to note that our first Europe office is located at Netherland. Since then, we have set up offices at Germany, France, England and Italy.*" (Giant, Spokesperson)

As soon as Marrix catches up to Japanese firm's technology, they start to sell products with the same positioning. "*To be honest, when we first collaborate with the Japanese firms we were only a few percentile of their size, much smaller than they are, but a decade later, we have surpassed them.*" "*I think the critical turning point is that we develop many products on our own, in addition, entering into foreign markets is basically successful. When we reached a certain scale, they not just compete with us but also look for cooperation.*" (Marrix, Assistant General Manager)

Based on the results, we found that when a focal OEM supplier equipped with better resources and capabilities, and its brand partner is less competitive, it may aggressively develop its own brand and enter into the market. The full scale of investment and fast speed in internalization of the OEM supplier makes its brand partner become relatively weakened. The results indicate the following finding 6.

Finding 6. Moving toward brand-owned strategy, a focal OEM supplier may attack aggressively when its brand partner is less competitive. It may speed up internalization and market expansion with full range so as to escalate the response costs of its brand partner. The purpose is to create the response barrier in capability.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Based on the lens of competitive dynamics, the above results demonstrate that any action of a focal OEM supplier depends on its prediction of possible responses from the brand partner. In addition, the focal OEM supplier will act to create barriers. While moving toward a brand-owned strategy, the focal OEM supplier can predict that its brand partner could respond by fighting back, forbearing, or ignoring and being unaware. As the predicted responses are different, the focal OEM supplier may initiate various strategic moves such as to decrease the market commonality, to decrease resource similarity, to increase the interdependency, to escalate mutual forbearance, and to increase the brand partner's response costs. Those actions are expected to create barriers in awareness, motivation, and capability. More importantly, in order to create multiple barriers, the focal OEM supplier will combine its strategic moves including primary and secondary actions. Given various predicted responses from brand partner, the combination of strategic actions are different and dynamic.

If the brand partner is more likely to fight back, the first priority is to avoid being found. Aggressive actions for brand-owned strategy not only increase the exposure risk but also involve in more resource investments. Thus, the OEM supplier will normally move to decrease market commonality such as entering into a relatively small market where the brand partner has never engaged. In addition, the OEM supplier will also move to decrease resource similarity such as launching different products with relatively small scale and delivering such products via different channels.

In contrast, if the brand partner is more likely to forbear, the primary action of an OEM supplier would be to increase interdependency rather than to decrease market commonality and resource similarity. Despite the brand partner has already been aware the brand-owned strategy of the OEM supplier, with multi-market contact, the OEM supplier may simultaneously cooperate and compete with its brand partner. It may move to strengthen the cooperative relationship in the OEM contract. By sharing more benefits and contributing more in the existed cooperation, the OEM supplier could decrease the possibility of brand partner's response motivation due to mutual forbearance. In the mean time, this could gain more space for the OEM supplier to develop its own brand products.

If the brand partner is more likely to be unaware or ignore, the primary action of an OEM supplier is to act aggressively by speeding up its international market expansion. Once it has been successfully penetrated into the market resulting in being noticed by the brand partner, even the brand partner is motivated to respond, however, the response costs might be too high to fight back. In general, given different predicted responses, the strategic moves of an OEM supplier is composed of primary and secondary actions for the purpose of creating multiple barriers in awareness, motivation, and capability. The priority of these three types of barriers is also different depending on various possible responses. We therefore propose the following three implications to address the competitive dynamics of actions and responses.

Implication 1: When the OEM supplier predicts that its brand partner is more likely to fight back, the primary action is to differentiate itself from the brand partner in product scope, target markets, channels, geographic areas, and organizational structure for the creation of barrier in awareness. The secondary action is to maintain or enlarge competitive advantage in production and to share such advantages for the creation of barrier in motivation, and then to speed up *internalization and market expansion for the creation of barrier in capability. The priority of response barrier creation is Awareness-Motivation-Capability (AMC).*

Implication 2: When the OEM supplier predicts that its brand partner is more likely to forbear, the primary action is to maintain or enlarge competitive advantage in production and to share such advantages for the creation of barrier in motivation. The secondary action is to differentiate itself from the brand partner in product scope, target markets, channels, geographic areas, and organizational structure for the creation of barrier in awareness, and then to speed up internalization and market expansion for the creation of barrier in capability. The priority of response barrier creation is Motivation-Awareness-Capability (MAC).

Implication 3: When the OEM supplier predicts that its brand partner is more likely to be unaware or ignore, the primary action is to speed up internalization and market expansion for the creation of barrier in capability. The secondary action is to differentiate itself from the brand partner in product scope, target markets, channels, geographic areas, and organizational structure for the creation of barrier in awareness, and then to maintain or enlarge competitive advantage in production and to share such advantages for the creation of barrier in motivation. The priority of response barrier creation is Capability-Awareness-Motivation (CAM).

CONCLUSIONS

This study focused on the strategic transformation from OEM contract supply to brand-owned manufacturing. In such context, maintaining the existing cooperation and simultaneously developing a brand-owned strategy without contradiction seems to be an ideal scenario for an OEM supplier. However, from the brand partner's view, the sense of being betrayed or being threatened may provoke even vicious retaliation. Having controlled with the OEM contract, the brand partner is much easier to initiate such retaliation. Therefore for an OEM supplier, the first lesson of coopetition is to convince or to guarantee that the brand-owned strategy cause no harm with its brand partner. It is then possible to keep the OEM contract as the main source of supporting brand development. In the earlier stages of moving toward brand-owned strategy, maintaining cooperation is the main strategy such as sharing competitive advantages and benefits. Until the OEM supplier has made preliminary success in its own brand, it will take more aggressive moves such as to speed up internationalization and market expansion. However, based on cooperation, the OEM supplier choose to avoid head-on competition by differentiating itself from the brand partner in product scope, target markets, channels, geographic areas, and even separating the OEM-contract sector from brand-owned business.

Linking cooperation-based competition with competitive dynamics perspective, this study demonstrates different implications. In the competitive dynamics perspective (Chen, 1996), a series of actions and responses composes the base of inter-firm rivalry. According to an integrated framework proposed by Chen (1996: p.111), both market commonality and resource similarity influence three drivers of competitive behaviour, *awareness-motivation-capability*, which further predict the likelihood of actions and responses in the inter-firm rivalry. However, the dynamics of cooperation-based competition is different from the traditional view of competitive dynamics. The findings derived from this study indicate an extensive causality in Chen's framework. We argue that in cooperation-based competition, the likelihood of predicted responses of a defender (i.e. brand partner) determine the actions of the attacker (i.e. OEM supplier). The attacker's actions are to create barriers in awareness, motivation, and capability that further change the status quo in both market commonality and resource similarity. The argument addresses that the profile of market commonality and resource similarity is not regarded as a given premise but as a strategic target to reach. On the path of moving toward brand-owned strategy, the change of profile in market commonality and resource similarity between the OEM supplier and its brand partner is dynamic, depending on how the OEM predicts the possible responses, what it moves to act, and whether the barriers in awareness-motivation-capability work. Based on cooperation, the competitive actions are initiated to decrease market commonality, to decrease resource similarity, and also to increase interdependency.

This study is exploratory because of its pioneering effort on linking OEM/OBM strategy with coopetition perspective. However, our intention is to conduct in-depth case research to provide new evidence in order to give an insight into what is occurring. By unfolding the phenomenon of coopetition dynamics in the OEM/OBM setting, this research demonstrates the exploratory findings and proposes implications for strategy research practice.

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科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2014/10/02

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="3">科技部補助計畫</td><td>計畫名稱: 以競合觀點探討從代工到自有品牌策略</td></tr>
<tr><td>計畫主持人: 彭朱如</td></tr>
<tr><td>計畫編號: 101-2410-H-004-209-MY2　　　學門領域: 策略管理</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">無研發成果推廣資料</td></tr>
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101 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：彭朱如　　計畫編號：101-2410-H-004-209-MY2

計畫名稱：以競合觀點探討從代工到自有品牌策略

成果項目			量化：實際已達成數（被接受或已發表）	量化：預期總達成數(含實際已達成數)	量化：本計畫實際貢獻百分比	單位	備註（質化說明：如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等）
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	0	1	100%	篇	已發表之討會論文修改，並已投稿至國內 TSSCI 期刊，目前進入一審完畢通知，正在修改回覆中。
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	0%		
		研討會論文	1	1	100%		已於「台灣組織與管理學會 2014 年會暨研討會」發表。
		專書	0	0	0%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	0%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	0%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	0%	件	
		權利金	0	0	0%	千元	
	參與計畫人力（本國籍）	碩士生	1	1	100%	人次	
		博士生	3	3	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	0%		
		專任助理	0	0	0%		
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	0	1	100%	篇	完成文稿撰寫，潤稿修改中，預計投稿至 SSCI 期刊。
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	0%		
		研討會論文	0	0	0%		
		專書	0	0	0%	章/本	
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		博士後研究員	0	0	0%		
		專任助理	0	0	0%		

其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)	無

	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
科教處計畫加填項目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與（閱聽）人數	0	

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

■達成目標

□未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

□實驗失敗

□因故實驗中斷

□其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文：■已發表 □未發表之文稿 □撰寫中 □無

專利：□已獲得 □申請中 ■無

技轉：□已技轉 □洽談中 ■無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

研究成果包括兩篇文章，第一篇文章，已於「台灣組織與管理學會 2014 年會暨研討會」發表，研討會後修改內容，並已投稿至國內 TSSCI 期刊，目前進入一審完畢通知，正在修改回覆中；第二篇也已完成文稿撰寫，潤稿修改中，預計投稿至 SSCI 期刊。

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

儘管代工到自創品牌是一個普遍存在的現象，過去針對此現象之探討尚未有從動態競爭與競合觀點切入，因此本研究以探索性為出發點，採取深度的個案研究，以瞭解相關理論如何詮釋實務現象。在學術價值方面，本研究不同於過往文獻聚焦於探討代工廠自身的能力或價值觀，而是由既合又競的雙元觀點予以探究，檢視在以合作為基礎的動態競爭關係中，代工廠的策略作為。在理論面擴大應用陳明哲老師的動態競爭學說(Chen, 1996)，並呼應其主張以超越矛盾(transparadox)的觀點來檢視競爭與合作之間的雙元關係(Chen, 2008)，透過詮釋代工到自創品牌的實務現象，在理論面將「動態競爭」延伸到「動態競合」，應用 A-M-C 架構來詮釋以合作為基礎的競爭策略(cooperation-based competition)。在實務應用方面，本研究結果提供代工廠如何洞察品牌客戶(對手)之察覺-動機-能力意向，並採取哪些策略作為，使其得以在原有合作基礎上與既有品牌業者競爭。本研究結果所提出的發現與意涵有助於瞭解在代工到自創品牌的歷程中，代工廠在面對特定的競爭對手(主要

的品牌客戶) (who?)之可能回應為何(what)?，可能採取哪些策略行動(what?)，為何採取這些策略行動(why?)，代工廠如何應用這些策略行動維持與品牌廠之間的競合關係(How?)等重要的策略決策議題。本研究詳細分析過去未被審慎檢視的實務現象，而研究結果與意涵也有助於實務上對於代工廠自創品牌策略決策行動之重要參考。