

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告 期末報告

普丁第三任總統任期俄羅斯反對運動之研究

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報告附件：移地研究心得報告

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中華民國 103 年 10 月 31 日

中文摘要：在普丁於 2012 年重返總統寶座，以及俄國於 2014 年兼併克里米亞之後，政治反對力量已去動員化和邊緣化了。本研究旨在探究俄國政治體制的本質與運作，先前反對力量何以再度集結抗爭，以及反對運動的組成與何去何從。本研究強調在政治機會結構與國內外連結的脈絡下，威權政體的調適性與韌性。在全國大選的關鍵時刻，抗爭活動並未能促成民主突破。反對運動得以永續發展的條件為何，應是進一步研究的焦點。

中文關鍵詞：俄羅斯；普丁；克里姆林宮；反對運動；政治機會結構

英文摘要：After Putin's return to the Kremlin in 2012 and especially Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the political opposition has been demobilized and marginalized. The study aims to explore the following questions during Putin's third presidency: What are the nature and operation of Russia's political system? Why did Russia's popular protests remobilize against the regime? What are the main components and trajectory of opposition movement? The study emphasize the authoritarian regime adaptation and resilience in the contexts of political opportunity structure and domestic-external linkage. The awakening protest movements did not contribute to a democratic breakthrough at the critical juncture of national elections. Further research has to be focused on the conditions that make opposition movement sustainable.

英文關鍵詞：Russia；Putin；Kremlin；Opposition Movement；Political Opportunity Structure

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告

(期中進度報告/期末報告)

(計畫名稱)

普丁第三任總統任期俄羅斯反對運動之研究

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計畫主持人：林永芳

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本計畫除繳交成果報告外，另含下列出國報告，共 2 份：

執行國際合作與移地研究心得報告

出席國際學術會議心得報告

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中 華 民 國 103 年 10 月 31 日

Contents

Introduction

The Political Context

The Kremlin's Counter-Strategy

The Perceptions of Internal and External Threats

Conclusion

Appendix

References

中英文摘要及關鍵詞

在普丁於 2012 年重返總統寶座，以及俄國於 2014 年兼併克里米亞之後，政治反對力量已去動員化和邊緣化了。本研究旨在探究俄國政治體制的本質與運作，先前反對力量何以再度集結抗爭，以及反對運動的組成與何去何從。本研究強調在政治機會結構與國內外連結的脈絡下，威權政體的調適性與韌性。在全國大選的關鍵時刻，抗爭活動並未能促成民主突破。反對運動得以永續發展的條件為何，應是進一步研究的焦點。

關鍵詞：俄羅斯；普丁；克里姆林宮；反對運動；政治機會結構

After Putin's return to the Kremlin in 2012 and especially Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the political opposition has been demobilized and marginalized. The study aims to explore the following questions during Putin's third presidency: What are the nature and operation of Russia's political system? Why did Russia's popular protests remobilize against the regime? What are the main components and trajectory of opposition movement? The study emphasize the authoritarian regime adaptation and resilience in the contexts of political opportunity structure and domestic-external linkage. The awakening protest movements did not contribute to a democratic breakthrough at the critical juncture of national elections. Further research has to be focused on the conditions that make opposition movement sustainable.

Keywords: Russia; Putin; Kremlin; Opposition Movement; Political Opportunity Structure

Introduction

In 2012, twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin has successfully returned to his third presidency, whose tenure has extended from four years to six years. In the past twelve years of Putin's paramount rule (2000-2012), Russia experienced political stability, and Putin enjoyed high approval rating. In the beginning of the second twelve years of Putin's highly likely two-term presidency (2012-2024), the regime's legitimacy has been confronted with the awakening civic activism.

Despite the incumbent regime's prevailing dominance, the 2011-2012 parliamentary and presidential elections witnessed the reoccurrence of a series of spontaneous mass protests against electoral frauds, inequality, and corruption.¹ After Putin's return to the Kremlin and especially Russia's annexation of Crimea, the political opposition has been demobilized and marginalized.

The study aims to explore the following questions during Putin's third presidency: What are the nature and operation of Russia's political system? Why did Russia's popular protests remobilize against the regime? What are the main components and trajectory of opposition movement?

The Political Context

Regime Type

Based on the Democracy Score (a straight average of the ratings for all categories covered by *Nations in Transit*) and its scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest, Freedom House provides the aggregate for comparative and interpretive purposes of evaluating democratic status in the former Communist countries and defines the following regime types:

¹ Vladimir Gel'man, "Cracks in the Wall: Challenges to Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (March-April 2013), pp. 3-10; Graeme Robertson, "Protesting Putinism: The Election Protests of 2011-2012 in Broader Perspective," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (March-April 2013), pp. 11-23; Samuel A. Green, "Beyond Bolotnaia: Bridging Old and New in Russia's Election Protest Movement," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (March-April 2013), pp. 40-52; and Grigorii V. Golosov, "The 2012 Political Reform in Russia: The interplay of Liberalizing Concessions and Authoritarian Corrections," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 59, No. 6 (November-December 2012), pp. 3-14.

1-2	Consolidated Democracy
3	Semi-Consolidated Democracy
4	Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime
5	Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
6-7	Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

Source: Freedom House,

<http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-2014/nations-transit-2014-methodology#.VFDZK6Nxmpo>

For Freedom House's *Nations in Transit* 2005-2014, Democracy Scores, which represent the average of a post-communist country's 7 democratization indicators (i.e., electoral process; civil society; independent media; national democratic governance; local democratic governance; judicial framework and independence; and corruption) have steadily declined in Eurasia.² Since Putin's 2nd term of presidency, as *Nations in Transit* ratings and averaged scores indicated, Russia has been classified as an authoritarian regime. Measuring the practices of democracy after the fall of Communist regime, post-Soviet Russia has been through a process of authoritarianization instead of democratization.

² Sylvana Habdank-Kolaczowska, "Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia's Rupture with Democracy," <http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-2014/nations-transit-2014-eurasias-rupture-democracy#.VFDg-aNxmpo>

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Electoral Process	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Civil Society	4.75	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.25	5.50	5.75
Independent Media	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25
National Democratic Governance	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Local Democratic Governance	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00
Judicial Framework and Independence	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00
Corruption	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75
Democracy Score	5.61	5.75	5.86	5.96	6.11	6.14	6.18	6.18	6.21	6.29

Source: Freedom House,

<http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/russia#.VFDbnqNxmpo>

Political Opportunity Structure

Sidney Tarrow argues that “the onset of a wave of mobilization can be seen as a collective response to generally expanding political opportunities, in which the costs and risks of collective action are lowered and the potential gains increase.”³ He indicates the importance of political opportunities in transforming the potential for mobilisation into action, and identifies five major ways in which political opportunity structure can be seen to expand:

1. When levels of access to institutional participation have begun to open up;
2. When political alignments are in disarray and new realignments have not yet been formed;
3. When there are major conflicts within the political elite that challengers can take advantage of;
4. When challengers are offered the help of influential allies from within or outside the system;

³ Sidney Tarrow, “‘Aiming at a Moving Target’: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe,” *PS: Political Science & Politics* (March 1991), p. 15.

5. When there is a decline in the state's capacity or will to repress dissent.⁴

Accordingly, the political opportunity structure explains the timing of collective action, the form of movement, and the outcomes of movement activity.⁵ Therefore, the revival of popular democratic mobilization in late 2011 and early 2012 were due to the expanding political opportunities, such as potential splits within the ruling elite in the form of Medvedev-Putin tandem, the access to political participation via parliamentary and presidential elections, and a decline in the hybrid regime's capacity or will to repress dissent. The expansion of the public arena diminished the role of central control and inevitably gave new impetus to the emergence of opposition movement.

A Dual State Contradiction

According to Richard Sakwa, the eruption of popular democratic protest in late 2011 reflected the clash between the constitutional (legal-rational) state and the administrative (neo-patrimonial) regime, and this dualism has become the defining features of Russia's current political order.⁶

Modernization Project under Medvedev-Putin Tandem

The "Forward, Russia!" modernization project, stimulated by the Medvedev-Putin tandem government, was the main goal of Russia's domestic and foreign policy. Putin published seven position papers on major domestic and international issues in major newspapers during his third presidential campaign.⁷

⁴ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 71-90.

⁵ Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in Doug McAdan, et al., eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 29.

⁶ Richard Sakwa, "Whatever Happened to the Russian Opposition?," Russia and Eurasia Program (May 2014), The Royal Institute of International Affairs; Richard Sakwa, *The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dural State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Richard Sakwa, *Putin Redux, Power and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia* (London: Routledge, 2014).

⁷ Putin's seven presidential campaign position papers in 2012 are the following: "Russia Muscles Up – the Challenges We Must Rise up to Face," *Izvestiya* (16 January 2012); "Russia: the Ethnicity Issue," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (23 January 2012); "Economic Tasks," *Vedomosti* (30 January 2012); "Democracy and the Quality of Government," *Kommersant* (6 February 2012); "Building Justice: A Social Policy for Russia," *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (13 February 2012); "Being Strong," *Rossiiskaya gazeta* (20 February 2012); and "Russia and the Changing World," *Moskovskiye Novosti* (27 February 2012). For primary concerns with policy implications, please see John P. Willerton, "The Hegemonic Executive," in Stephen White, Richard Sakwa, and Henry E. Hale, eds., *Developments in Russian Politics 8* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), pp. 37-39.

Inspired by the electoral model of democratization and caused by the diffusion effects,⁸ Russian opposition became increasingly assertive in the dual contexts of economic modernization that cultivated urban middle class and online generation as well as the global atmosphere of protest that sparked the Arab Spring uprisings and the earlier color revolutions.⁹

The Kremlin's Counter-Strategy

In a hybrid regime (semi-/competitive/electoral authoritarianism or managed/illiberal/delegative democracy), as Henry E. Hale points out, the incumbent authorities use a range of coercive or corrupt methods, including media manipulation, coercing or buying votes, supporting informal groups to attack opposition, manipulation of the choice set, pressuring, co-opting, or blackmailing elites, selective prosecution, and falsification, to defeat their opponents.¹⁰

In addition to the study of authoritarianism through the lens of regime type, “work on domination and resistance, political spectacle, quotidian forms of political engagement, education, state development projects, and the politics of visual separation suggests how ‘authoritarian’ practices can occur in a wide variety of institutional contexts.”¹¹

For understanding authoritarian regime resilience in former and existing Communist countries, Martin K. Dimitrov et al. offer a theoretical argument that emphasizes the importance of institutional adaptations as a foundation of regime resilience.¹² These institutional adaptations include the economy, ideology, the mechanisms for inclusion of potential rivals, and the institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability.¹³

⁸ Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Staffan I. Lindberg, ed., *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

⁹ Yung-Fang Lin, “Putin’s Return to Presidency: Implications for Russia’s Foreign Policy,” *Prospects & Perspectives*, March 30, 2012.

¹⁰ Henry E. Hale, “Hybrid Regimes: When Democracy and Autocracy Mix,” in Nathan J. Brown, ed., *The Dynamics of Democratization: Dictatorship, Development, and Diffusion* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 23-45.

¹¹ For the related literature on how authoritarian practices can occur in a wide variety of institutional contexts, see Marc Morje Howard and Meir R. Walters, “Explaining the Unexpected: Political Science and the Surprises of 1989 and 2011,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2014), p. 400.

¹² Martin K. Dimitrov, ed., *Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Resilience in Asia and Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹³ *Ibid.*

Encountering a massive anti-systemic protest mobilization and a humiliating parliamentary election result in December 2011(See the table of State Duma elections), the regime adapted to popular aspirations for political participation and initiated political system reform, including a simplified procedure to register political parties, the return to direct elections for regional leaders, and the revival of mixed electoral system for State Duma with a 5% threshold for party list. On March 4, 2012 after his third presidential election victory (See the table of Presidential elections), Putin triumphantly spoke about “Glory to Russia” to an enthusiastic crowd. Since the moment, Putin has resumed his hegemonic presidency, and the protest movement has been forced to sideline.

Elections to the Russian State Duma, 2007 and 2011 (7% election threshold, PR)				
	2007 (voter turnout 63.7%)		2011 (voter turnout 60.2%)	
Name of Party	Share of Votes (%)	Seats	Share of Votes (%)	Seats
United Russia	64.30	315	49.39	238
Communist Party of the Russian Federation	11.57	57	19.19	92
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia	8.14	40	11.65	56
Just Russia	7.74	38	13.22	64

Source: ЦИК РФ, ИТАР-ТАСС

Russian Presidential Elections, 2000-2012					
Elected President	Year	Voters	Turnout (%)	Votes	Votes (%)
Putin	2000	109372043	68.74	39740467	52.94
Putin	2004	108064281	64.38	49558328	71.31
Medvedev	2008	107222016	69.81	52530712	70.28
Putin	2012	109863118	65.31	45591642	63.60

Source: *Коммерсантъ*, № 40 (2012/3/6)

The Perceptions of Internal and External Threats

In multi-ethnic societies formerly under communist rule, global democratization triggered ethnic conflicts and problematic national identities, thereby contributing to the collapse of communist regimes and the dissolution of ethno-federal states.¹⁴ Russia and Eurasian countries have been dealing with the legacies of ethnic separatist movements, such as Chechnya in Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Transnistria in Moldova.¹⁵ With the resurrection and rise of Russia, the international political and economic map as well as the frozen conflicts have been facing restructuring. In light of NATO's eastward expansion into the former Soviet states, Russia's foreign policy has shifted from a defensive position in the 1990s to a more assertive and offensive direction in the 2000s, as indicated by the war with Georgia in August 2008, the Eurasian Union project initiated by Putin after his announcement of his decision to run for president in October 2011, and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In the position paper "Russia and the Changing World," Putin expressed continuing priority attention to status of Russian minorities and denounced the illegal instruments of soft power. He concluded that "the activities of 'pseudo-NGOs' and other agencies that try to destabilize other countries with outside support are unacceptable." Russian officials at the May 2014 Moscow Conference on International Security, which was sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Defense and was focused on the role of popular protest and color revolutions in international security, described color revolutions as "a new technique of aggression pioneered by the United States and geared toward destroying a state from within by dividing its population."¹⁶ It is quite obvious that defusing the potential danger of color revolution in the post-Soviet space—and Russia in particular—has become Russia's major concerns.

Color revolutions and the Arab Spring happened when a regime remained in power for too long and the system failed to adapt to social change, popular aspirations, and external challenges. The fear and perception of external threat of regime change caused by the US's "democracy promotion" has led to the Kremlin's control of

¹⁴ See, for example, Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹⁵ Nina Casperson and Gareth Stansfield, *Unrecognized States in the International System* (London: Routledge, 2011).

¹⁶ Dmitry Gorenburg, "Countering Color Revolutions: Russia's New Security Strategy and Its Implications for U.S. Policy," *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, No. 342 (September 2014), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm342_Gorenburg_Sept2014.pdf

NGOs and civic activism through the foreign agents law that target NGOs with foreign funding. Russia's State Duma deputies charged that the West was using the media to denounce the Kremlin and overwhelmingly passed a bill on Sept. 23, 2014 that would limit foreign ownership of Russian media outlets to 20 percent. The bill would force several publications critical of the government, such as *Vedomosti*, the Russian edition of *Forbes*, the English-language newspaper *Moscow Times* and dozens of other news, to change ownership or close by 2017 and would extend the Kremlin's control over the independent media.¹⁷ Pro-Kremlin youth group *Nashi*, nation-wide Public Chambers, and People's Front of Russia were created to co-opt and counterweight the fragmented opposition forces.

Conclusion

There is a wide spectrum of anti-systemic opposition, including civil activists, liberals, leftists, and nationalists (See the appendix). A few notable opposition figures stand out, such as Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzkhov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Alexei Navalny, Left Front leader Sergei Udaltsov, and the National Bolshevik Party leader Eduard Limonov, but there is no alternative one to Putin's leadership. The opposition lacks a clear leader, positive and forward-looking program, and an alliance with political society and economic society. Confronting and intentionally overcoming the highly fragmented nature of anti-systemic opposition, a Coordination Council of Russian Opposition consisted of 45 members was elected in an internet poll in October 2012 (See the appendix), but it was dissolved in October 2013 due to the lack of a quorum for most of its meetings.

Applying Alfred Stepan's interpretation of the role opposition actors played in democratizing authoritarian regimes to Putin's Russia, i.e. (1) resisting co-optation into the regime, (2) guarding zones of autonomy vis-à-vis the regimes, (3) undermining the regime's legitimacy, (4) raising the costs of preserving the status quo, and (5) creating a credible democratic alternative, Vladimir Gel'man argued that tasks 3 and, particularly, 5 were complicated for Russia's opposition to achieve.¹⁸

¹⁷ Andrew Roth, "Russia Moves to Extend Control Media," http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/world/europe/russia-takes-step-to-extend-control-over-news-media.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As&_r=0

¹⁸ See Alfred Stepan, "On the Tasks of Democratic Opposition," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1990), pp. 41-49; Vladimir Gel'man, "The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition in Russia," *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, No. 341 (September 2014); and Владимир Гельман, "Трудное возрождение российской оппозиции», *Pro et Contra* (Январь-апель 2014), С. 106-123.

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Appendix:

Coordination Council of Russian Opposition Election Result, October 2012							
Total : 45 members							
Civil activists List (30)		Leftist List (5)		Liberalist List (5)		Nationalist List (5)	
Candidates: 169		Candidates: 16		Candidates: 11		Candidates: 13	
Total Votes: 81325		Total Votes: 68645		Total Votes: 70144		Total Votes: 67814	
Against All: 159		Against All: 11872		Against All: 8202		Against All: 17246	
Навальный Алексей Анатольевич	43723	Гаскаров Алексей Владимирович	22935	Давидис Сергей Константинович	27216	Константинов Даниил Ильич	21433
Быков Дмитрий Львович	38520	Аитова Екатерина Петровна	22921	Пивоваров Андрей Сергеевич	23314	Артёмов Игорь Владимирович	17393
Каспаров Гарри Кимович	33849	Николаев Александр Александрович	14632	Долгих Антон Витальевич	21164	Бондарик Николай Николаевич	16800
Собчак Ксения Анатольевна	32529	Палчаев Аким Нажмудинович	13720	Каретникова Анна Георгиевна	19174	Крылов Константин Анатольевич	15895
Яшин Илья Валерьевич	32478	Развозжаев Леонид Михайлович	12760	Царьков Пётр Анатольевич	17729	Кралин Владлен Леонидович	10593
Гельфанд Михаил Сергеевич	32260						
Чирикова Евгения Сергеевна	32221						
Шац Михаил Григорьевич	30580						
Ашурков Владимир Львович	28754						
Гудков Дмитрий Геннадьевич	28708						

Лазарева Татьяна Юрьевна	28707						
Пархоменко Сергей Борисович	27434						
Дзядко Филипп Викторович	27122						
Гудков Геннадий Владимирович	26973						
Соболь Любовь Эдуардовна	25270						
Немцов Борис Ефимович	24623						
Романова Ольга Евгеньевна	23318						
Кашин Олег Владимирович	22496						
Илларионов Андрей Николаевич	22445						
Удальцов Сергей Станиславович	21424						
Кара-Мурза Владимир Владимирович	20845						
Адагамов Рустем Ринатович	20813						
Винокуров Александр	20382						

Иванович							
Кац Максим Евгеньевич	19770						
Газарян Сурен Владимирович	18986						
Албуров Георгий Валентинович	18844						
Пионтковский Андрей Андреевич	17662						
Мирзоев Владимир Владимирович	16026						
Шеин Олег Васильевич	15744						
Наганов Владислав Игоревич	15541						

Source: http://cvk2012.org/news/rezultaty_golosovaniya

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科技部補助專題研究計畫執行國際合作與移地研究

心得報告

日期：__年__月__日

計畫編號	MOST-102-2410-H-004-147		
計畫名稱	普丁第三任總統任期俄羅斯反對運動之研究		
出國人員姓名	林永芳	服務機構及職稱	政治大學俄羅斯研究所副教授
出國時間	2014年1月20日至2014年1月27日	出國地點	俄國莫斯科
出國研究目的	<input type="checkbox"/> 實驗 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 田野調查 <input type="checkbox"/> 採集樣本 <input type="checkbox"/> 國際合作研究 <input type="checkbox"/> 使用國外研究設施		

一、執行國際合作與移地研究過程

計畫主持人為求研究資料上的突破，利用寒假期間赴俄國莫斯科進行為期一週的實地研究，蒐集第一手資料，對研究計畫的進行助益頗多，相關文獻如下：

Кара-Мурза, С. Г., О. В. Куропаткина. *Нациестроительство в современной России* (M.: Алгоритм, 2014).

Кочетков, В.В. *Российская элита и модернизация политической системы* (М.: Инфра-М, 2013).

Кынев, А. В., А. Е. Любарев. *Партии и выборы в современной России: Эволюция и деволюция* (М.: Новое литературное обозрение, 2011).

Соловьев, А. И. под гл. ред. *Государство и общество в пространстве власти и политических коммуникаций. Политическая наука: Ежегодник 2013* (М.: Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 2013).

Патушева, С. В. под ред. *Гражданское и политическое в российских общественных практиках* (М.: Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 2013).

Федорова, Валерия под ред. *От пребисцита – к выборам: как и почему россияне голосовали на выборах 2011-2012 гг.* (М. Праксис, 2013).

二、研究成果

本研究旨在探究俄國政治體制的本質與運作，先前反對力量何以再度集結抗爭，以及反對運動的組成與何去何從。在普丁於 2012 年重返總統寶座，以及俄國於 2014 年兼併克里米亞之後，國內政治反對力量已去動員化和邊緣化了。本研究強調在政治機會結構與國內外連結的脈絡下，威權政體的調適性與韌性。在全國大選的關鍵時刻，抗爭活動並未能促成民主突破。反對運動得以永續發展的條件為何，應是進一步研究的焦點。

三、建議

無。

四、本次出國若屬國際合作研究，雙方合作性質係屬：(可複選)

- 分工收集研究資料
- 交換分析實驗或調查結果
- 共同執行理論建立模式並驗證
- 共同執行歸納與比較分析
- 元件或產品分工研發
- 其他 (請填寫) _____

五、其他

科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2014/10/31

科技部補助計畫	計畫名稱: 普丁第三任總統任期俄羅斯反對運動之研究
	計畫主持人: 林永芳
	計畫編號: 102-2410-H-004-147- 學門領域: 比較政治
無研發成果推廣資料	

102 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：林永芳		計畫編號：102-2410-H-004-147-					
計畫名稱：普丁第三任總統任期俄羅斯反對運動之研究							
成果項目		量化			單位	備註（質化說明：如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等）	
		實際已達成數（被接受或已發表）	預期總達成數（含實際已達成數）	本計畫實際貢獻百分比			
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	0	0	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力 （本國籍）	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	0	0	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		章/本
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力 （外國籍）	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		

<p style="text-align: center;">其他成果</p> <p>(無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">無</p>
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	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與(閱聽)人數	0	

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

本研究旨在探究俄國政治體制的本質與運作，先前反對力量何以再度集結抗爭，以及反對運動的組成與何去何從。本研究強調在政治機會結構與國內外連結的脈絡下，威權政體的調適性與韌性。在全國大選的關鍵時刻，抗爭活動並未能促成民主突破。反對運動得以永續發展的條件為何，應是進一步研究的焦點。本一年期專題計畫以英文撰寫之初步研究成果仍在持續修改中，預計近期投稿國際期刊，盼能增進國人對俄國事務之瞭解，與國際學術社群對話，進而提升國內俄國區域研究之專業水平。