長期以來，「邏輯實證論」的基本立場均視之為是「基礎論」的。同時，一般人也認為，卡爾納普是導致這個印象的主要人物之一。不過，晚近的研究顯示，這個印象並不正確，因為如果從另一種觀點來看，我們會發現，卡爾納普一樣可以是一個「約定論者」。的確，重新檢視一些卡爾納普當年的作品，我們感到必須承認，他對相關科學觀點所採的立場，確實處於「基礎論」與「約定論」之間。我們在這篇論文中企圖論證，透過研討當年在「維也納學派」中所進行的討論，尤其是介於卡爾納普、石里克與紐拉特之間的辯論，我們始能理解卡爾納普的「搖擺立場」。我們期待能夠清楚地說明，卡爾納普起初採「基礎論」立場，而後卻在紐拉特的影響之下，轉向「約定論」的立場。透過這個論證，我們想要提出如下兩點結論：一、沒有任何「共同立場」足以代表當年在「維也納學派」所進行的討論；二、在受到紐拉特的影響之下，卡爾納普的立場中發展出一種「寬容的倫理態度」。 For long the foundationalist image of logical positivism has been considered a matter of course. And it is basically accepted that R. Carnap has a great deal to do with this traditional image. Recent researches reveal that this image is not entirely true; Carnap can be deemed as a conventionalist also when some key conceptions are understood from a different point of view. Indeed, by examining some Carnap’s works, we are urged to realize that his view of science is somehow situated somewhere between foundationalism and conventionalism. We argue in this paper that Carnap’s weaving situation can be comprehended by taking into account the discussions taking place in the Vienna Circle and notably the debates among R. Carnap, M. Schlick, and O. Neurath. We intend to make it explicit that Carnap’s stance was first in line with that of Schlick’s foundationalism and then moved to a more conventionalist one under the influence of Neurath. By this argument, we intend to demonstrate the following two points: 1) Discussions in the Vienna Circle were far from unanimous; 2) Carnap’s stance containing ‘an ethical attitude of tolerance’ proceeded mainly under Neurath’s influence.
政治大學哲學學報, 10, 35-74 The national Chengchi university philosophical