黑格爾《邏輯學》中的判斷論大多被理解為對於傳統邏輯中的判斷形式的演繹，而對應於康德所提出的判斷表。康德建立判斷表時並不純然依據邏輯的原則，同時也具有知識論的動機。本文論證：即使把知識論的動機納入考慮，也不能解釋黑格爾對於判斷形式的奇特界定；相反地，根據他的界定，所謂的判斷其實指的是某種表達同一性的命題。本文進一步論證：此一對於判斷的理解與黑格爾在《精神現象學》〈前言〉中對於判斷的批判一致。 Hegel’s theory of judgment in the Science of Logic is generally taken to be a deduction of the forms of judgment in the traditional logic that correspond to those listed in Kant’s table of judgment. Kant did not construct his table merely according to logical principles, but was motivated epistemologically too. In this paper, it is argued that, even taking epistemological motives into consideration, one cannot account Hegel’s eccentric determination of the forms of judgment. On the contrary, according to his determination, so-called judgments are certain propositions expressing identity. It is then further argued that such an understanding of judgment is in accordance with the criticism of judgment that Hegel issued in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
政治大學哲學學報, 17, 51-88 The national Chengchi university philosophical