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|Title: ||亞里斯多德之責任理論： 道德責任作為法律責任之基礎|
|Other Titles: ||Aristotle’s Theory of Responsibility: Legal Responsibility on the Basis of Moral Consideration|
voluntariness;action of injustice;responsibility;moral appraisal;rhetorical persuasion
|Issue Date: ||2016-08-11 15:47:15 (UTC+8)|
The main topic of this article is Aristotle’s theory of legal responsibility which he developed in the Nicomachean Ethics v 8. In fact, Aristotle’s view of legal responsibil¬ity derives from his theory of moral responsibility. That is, he considered voluntariness of actions, originally serving as a condition for moral appraisal, equally to be a decisive concept of assigning legal responsibility. In this article I will argue that Aristotle thereby intends to give in outline an account of what “doing injustice” is, which was a fundamental question of the Athenian law. Furthermore, I will argue that by considering criminal acts in terms of moral views, Aristotle proposes to offer a better form of forensic persuasion concerning the question of assigning legal responsibility. The central claim of Aristotle’s moral theory is that actions of injustice are not simply done accidentally; they are rather produced by vicious states of character or exceedingly strong passions of wrongdoers. These are the intrinsic causal powers in terms of which wrongdoers do their actions “non-accidentally”. The way actions of injustice are produced non-accidentally illustrates also how they are voluntary: they are done by wrongdoers voluntarily to the extent that they are resulting from their defective states of mind. This also gives the reason why voluntary wrongdoers are morally blameworthy and legally punishable. In addition to voluntary actions of injustice, Aristotle considers the question of establishing responsibility for involuntary actions equally from a moral point of view. So he distinguished, among involuntary wrongdoings, the pardonable from the unpardonable like the actions done in ignorance due to drunkenness, anger or negligence. Actions of this sort, though principally being classified as involuntary, are considered by Aristotle to be analogous to voluntary ones, since from the perspective of moral responsibility they are blameworthy.
|Relation: ||政治大學哲學學報, 19, 33-84|
The national Chengchi university philosophical
|Data Type: ||article|
|Appears in Collections:||[政治大學哲學學報 THCI Core] 期刊論文|
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