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    政大機構典藏 > 政大學報 > 第59期 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/104493
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/104493

    Title: Deregulation and the Theory of Regulation: An Application of the Core in the Game Theory
    Authors: 王國樑
    Wang, Kuo-Liang
    Contributors: 經濟系
    Date: 1989-05
    Issue Date: 2016-12-05 15:04:16 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 此文試圖建立一個同時能解釋管制與解除管制的競局理論模型。假設政策變動需要此一競局裏全部參與者的同意,透過對核心解存在與否的檢定,我們發現對於解除管制的形成與否,需求的成長既不是充分,也不是必要條件;技術的進步是必要條件;但,唯有很顯著的技術進步才是充分必要條件。
    This paper presents a game-theoretical model which seeks to account for both regulation and deregulation in a single model. By assuming that a policy change requires the unanimous consent of all players in the game and through checking the existence of the core, we conclude that an increase in demand is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for deregulation; an improvement in technology condition is a necessary condition for deregulation; however, only a significant improvement in technology condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for deregulation.
    Relation: 國立政治大學學報, 59,75-98
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[第59期] 期刊論文

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