對密勒坎目的論觀點之語意學的主要批評是皮托司基(Pietroski)的指控：1.在密勒坎的理論中可能心靈表徵與引起它們的肇因完全不連貫；2.密勒坎沒有提出對其理論的否證條件；3.她的觀點極端且不能提供充分的動機；4.她忽略了未被選擇的分辨能力可能在意向性說明中扮演的角色；以及5.她把目的論及意向性的說明混為一談。雖然皮托司基的批評，特別是第一項，直覺上有某種程度的說服力，但我論證它的實質內涵並不若表面所呈現的重要，且不能對密勒坎的語意學構成挑戰。此外，我嘗試說明密勒坎的理論不只適用於天擇的個案，也適用於人類的學習。再者，我提出了密勒坎的理論中，那些部分予以修改或許是適當的，而那些部分在我們達到某種概念上的澄清及更了解相關的經驗科學資料之前，是不能有所進展的。 Typical of the criticisms leveled at Millikan's teleosemantics are Pietroski's charges: (1) under Millikan's theory it can be the case that items of content are completely disconnected from that which causes them; (2) Millikan fails to identify conditions that would count against her theory; (3) her view is radically revisionary but she provides no independent motivation for it; (4) she ignores the role unselected discriminating abilities may play in intentional explanation; and, (5) she conflates teleological and intentional explanation. Although Pietroski's criticisms, especially (1), have a measure of intuitive appeal, I argue that they are less substantial than they might appear and that they do not constitute a serious challenge to Millikan's semantic theory. I defend Millikan's position through conceptual analysis, thought experiment, and data from evolutionary biology. To demonstrate how teleosemantics can be expanded, I attempt to show it is applicable not just to cases of evolutionary selection, but also to human learning. Furthermore, I identify places where revision of Millikan's theory might be in order and places where we are unlikely to make substantial progress until we achieve certain conceptual refinements and a greater understanding of relevant empirical phenomena.