本研究探討權益基礎薪酬是否影響審計委員會之審計公費決定。根據2004至2013年間的 1707 觀察值，本研究發現權益基礎薪酬與審計公費之間呈現相反關係。這個結果意謂著權益基礎薪酬可能誘使審計委員會妥協其獨立性，因此購買較少之審計服務。本研究進一步發現，較低的審計公費導致會計師提供較少的審計努力與較低的盈餘品質。這些發現具有管制面的意涵。 Motivated by Section 301 of SOX and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms’ independent directors, I examine the relation between equity-based compensation paid to audit committee members and audit fees. Based on a sample of 1,707 firm-year observations during 2004-2013, I find a negative relation between audit committee equity incentives (measured by portfolio delta and vega) and audit fees, consistent with our prediction that larger equity incentives may induce audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. I further show that this lower audit fee level is associated with lower audit effort and lower earnings quality. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firms’ ex ante litigation risk, and relative power of CFOs and audit committees. These results bear important implications for regulators and investors.
