English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 92604/122928 (75%)
Visitors : 26738648      Online Users : 368
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 文學院 > 哲學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/110690
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/110690

    Title: 從「我是什麼?」論同一性判準
    On the criteria of self-identity from the viewpoint of ";What am I ?"
    Authors: 趙茂林
    Chao, Mao-lin
    Contributors: 戴華
    Chao, Mao-lin
    Keywords: 同一性
    Human animal(organism)
    Criterion of identity
    Egoistic concern
    The psychological approach
    The biological approach
    Prenatal genetic intervention
    Advance directive
    Precedent autonomy
    Best interests
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2017-07-03 14:40:20 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 關切並意圖解決如妳我對象相關的生命議題是撰寫本論文的出發點,從理解當代研究進路並進而建構出融貫的生命整體解釋架構則是目的。在這樣的研究過程中包含了二個主要問題需要作出進一步的釐清,一是「如妳我的個體屬於存有學範疇中的哪一種類?」(即「我是什麼?」的問題),另一則是「如妳我的個體又是如何跨越時間而持續存在的?」釐清了自我的形上學本質,攸關於自我對過去與未來的生命歷程該如何作出為己關懷的理解。因而,採取什麼樣的同一性判準而將過去與未來的對象當作是「同一個人」是貫串本論文的核心討論。學界對此議題的相關探討大致可分為二種進路:心理研究進路與生命(物)研究進路。如何能夠合理地將「我」建立成為一個有意義的「生命整體」,進而因應我們所面對的生命倫理議題,筆者執此標準作為測試的依據,並試圖從對二種進路的析論中得出能對於生命做出最合理的說明架構。

    Concern and with intent to solve life issues related to individuals like you and me is the start of this dissertation. Research into modern approaches and construct an explaining structure is its aim. There are two main questions included in the process of research. One is the question “individuals like you and me belong to which kind of entity” (question “what am I ?”), the other is “how and what is involved in an individual continued existence over time”. Clarification of the metaphysical nature of self is connected to understanding of one’s egoistic concern. Therefore, which identity criterion can connect a past one and a future one as a ‘same individual’ is the core through this dissertation. There have two approaches focus on this discussion: the Psychological Approach and the Biological Approach. How to construct a self as a meaningful life as a whole, then rationally respond to life issues are taken as the test basis. A reasonable explaining structure that makes life as a whole is derived from research to two approaches.

    Actual life issues are verified touchstone of explaining structure. Take “prenatal genetic intervention (PGI)” and “advance directive (AD)” as examples and discuss them constitute the second half of this dissertation. Whether identity arguments based on moral reasons or precedent autonomy can be responded and reasonable explained, whether it also provide basis for interpretation of morality of PGI, authority of AD, and patient’s best interests are taken as verified standards of rationality of explaining structure.
    Reference: 書籍
    Baker, L. R. (2000). Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    Baker, L. R. (2007). The metaphysics of everyday life: An essay in practical realism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Buchanan, A. E., & Brock, D. W. (1989). Deciding for others: The ethics of surrogate decision making. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press.
    Buchanan, A. E. (2000). From chance to choice: Genetics and justice. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    DeGrazia, D. (1996). Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    DeGrazia, D. (2005). Human identity and bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    DeGrazia, D. (2012). Creation ethics: Reproduction, genetics, and quality of life. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
    Dworkin, R. (1993). Life's dominion: An argument about abortion, euthanasia, and individual freedom. New York: Knopf.
    Dworkin, R., & Burley, J. (2004). Dworkin and his critics: With replies by Dworkin. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
    Furberg, Elisabeth. (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity. Stockholm University.
    Holland, S. (2003). Bioethics: A philosophical introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
    MacBride, F. (2006). Identity and modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    McMahan, J. (2002). The ethics of killing: Problems at the margins of life. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Noonan, H. W. (1989). Personal identity. London: Routledge.
    Olson, E. T. (2004). The human animal: Personal identity without psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Olson, E. T. (2007). What are we?: A study in personal ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Perry, J. (1975). Personal identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
    Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford [Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press.
    Williams, B. (1973). Problems of the self: Philosophical papers 1956-1972. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press.
    Wilkes, K. V. (1988). Real people: Personal identity without thought experiments. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Buchanan, A. E., & Brock, D. W.等著,蕭郁雯譯,2004,《從機會到選擇:遺傳學與正義》,台北:巨流圖書。

    Berghmans, R. L. (January 01, 1998). Advance directives for non-therapeutic dementia research: some ethical and policy considerations. Journal of Medical Ethics, 24, 1, 32-7.
    Berghmans, Ron (January 25, 2006). Advance Directives and Dementia. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 913, 1, 105-110.
    Buchanan, A. (October 01, 1988). Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 17, 4, 277-302.
    Chappell, T. (January 01, 1995). Personal Identity, `R-Relatedness' and the Empty Question Argument. The Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 178, 88-92.
    Dresser, R., & Whitehouse, P. J. (July 01, 1994). The Incompetent Patient on the Slippery Slope. The Hastings Center Report, 24, 4, 6-12.
    Dresser, R. (November 01, 1995). Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy. Hastings Center Report, 25, 6, 32-38.
    Elliot, R. (January 01, 1991). Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement. The Philosophical Quarterly, 41, 162, 55-75.
    Elliot, Robert (January 01, 1993). Identity and the Gene Therapy. Bioethics, 7, 1, 27-40.
    Garrett, B. (1998). Personal identity and self-consciousness. London: Routledge.
    Gendler, T. S. (January 01, 2002). Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52, 206, 34-54.
    Hawkins, J. (April, 2014). Well-Being, Time, and Dementia. Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 3, 507-542.
    Jaworska, Agnieszka (April 01, 1999). Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer's Patients and the Capacity to Value. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 28, 2, 105-138.
    Jones, D. Gareth, & Telfer, Barbara (January 01, 1995). Before I was An Embryo, I was A Pre-Embryo: or was I?. Bioethics, 9, 1, 32-49.
    Korsgaard, C. M. (April 01, 1989). Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 18, 2, 101-132.
    Kuczewski, Mark G. (January 01, 1994). Whose Will Is It, Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics. Bioethics, 8, 1, 27-48.
    Ott, A. (January 01, 2009). Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives. The Pluralist, 4, 2, 38-54.
    Persson, I. (January 01, 1997). Genetic therapy, person-regarding reasons and the determination of identity -- a reply to Robert Elliot. Bioethics, 11, 2, 161-9.
    Sider, T. (October 01, 2001). Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Nous, 35, 189-209.
    Taliaferro, C. (January 01, 1986). Pollock's Body-Switching. The Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 142, 57-61.
    Woodward, J. (July 01, 1986). The Non-Identity Problem. Ethics, 96, 4, 804-831.
    Zohar, Noam. J. (October 01, 1991). Prospects for “Genetic Therapy”- Can A Person Benefit from Being Altered?. Bioethics, 5, 4, 275-288.
    Description: 博士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093154503
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[哲學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    450301.pdf1441KbAdobe PDF406View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback