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    政大機構典藏 > 文學院 > 哲學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/110690
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/110690


    Title: 從「我是什麼?」論同一性判準
    On the criteria of self-identity from the viewpoint of ";What am I ?"
    Authors: 趙茂林
    Chao, Mao-lin
    Contributors: 戴華
    趙茂林
    Chao, Mao-lin
    Keywords: 同一性
    人格人
    人類生物
    同一性判準
    為己關懷
    心理研究進路
    生命(物)研究進路
    產前基因干預
    預立醫囑
    先前的自主
    最佳權益
    Identity
    Person
    Human animal(organism)
    Criterion of identity
    Egoistic concern
    The psychological approach
    The biological approach
    Prenatal genetic intervention
    Advance directive
    Precedent autonomy
    Best interests
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2017-07-03 14:40:20 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 關切並意圖解決如妳我對象相關的生命議題是撰寫本論文的出發點,從理解當代研究進路並進而建構出融貫的生命整體解釋架構則是目的。在這樣的研究過程中包含了二個主要問題需要作出進一步的釐清,一是「如妳我的個體屬於存有學範疇中的哪一種類?」(即「我是什麼?」的問題),另一則是「如妳我的個體又是如何跨越時間而持續存在的?」釐清了自我的形上學本質,攸關於自我對過去與未來的生命歷程該如何作出為己關懷的理解。因而,採取什麼樣的同一性判準而將過去與未來的對象當作是「同一個人」是貫串本論文的核心討論。學界對此議題的相關探討大致可分為二種進路:心理研究進路與生命(物)研究進路。如何能夠合理地將「我」建立成為一個有意義的「生命整體」,進而因應我們所面對的生命倫理議題,筆者執此標準作為測試的依據,並試圖從對二種進路的析論中得出能對於生命做出最合理的說明架構。

    實際的生命倫理議題便是驗證說明架構的試金石。故本論文後半部分別以「產前基因干預」與「預立醫囑」為例,作出介紹與討論。針對反對者依據道德理由、先前自主而提出的同一性論證,驗證說明架構是否能明確地做出解釋與回應,並積極為產前基因干預的道德性、預立醫囑效力與建立病患的最佳權益提供合理的依據。
    Concern and with intent to solve life issues related to individuals like you and me is the start of this dissertation. Research into modern approaches and construct an explaining structure is its aim. There are two main questions included in the process of research. One is the question “individuals like you and me belong to which kind of entity” (question “what am I ?”), the other is “how and what is involved in an individual continued existence over time”. Clarification of the metaphysical nature of self is connected to understanding of one’s egoistic concern. Therefore, which identity criterion can connect a past one and a future one as a ‘same individual’ is the core through this dissertation. There have two approaches focus on this discussion: the Psychological Approach and the Biological Approach. How to construct a self as a meaningful life as a whole, then rationally respond to life issues are taken as the test basis. A reasonable explaining structure that makes life as a whole is derived from research to two approaches.

    Actual life issues are verified touchstone of explaining structure. Take “prenatal genetic intervention (PGI)” and “advance directive (AD)” as examples and discuss them constitute the second half of this dissertation. Whether identity arguments based on moral reasons or precedent autonomy can be responded and reasonable explained, whether it also provide basis for interpretation of morality of PGI, authority of AD, and patient’s best interests are taken as verified standards of rationality of explaining structure.
    Reference: 書籍
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    波伊曼編著,魏德驥等譯,1997,《解構死亡:死亡、自殺、安樂死與死刑的剖析》台北:桂冠圖書。
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    約翰‧哈里斯著,蔡甫昌等譯,2006,《複製、基因與不朽:基因革命的反思》,台北:桂冠圖書。
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    維吉尼亞‧貝爾、大衛‧儲克索著,蔡佳芬譯,2012,《你忘了我,但我永遠記得你:以友善尊嚴方式照顧失智症親友》,台北:心靈工坊文化。

    期刊文章
    Berghmans, R. L. (January 01, 1998). Advance directives for non-therapeutic dementia research: some ethical and policy considerations. Journal of Medical Ethics, 24, 1, 32-7.
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    Hawkins, J. (April, 2014). Well-Being, Time, and Dementia. Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 3, 507-542.
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    Ott, A. (January 01, 2009). Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives. The Pluralist, 4, 2, 38-54.
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    哲學系
    93154503
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093154503
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[哲學系] 學位論文

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