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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/111653
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111653

    Title: Incentive vs. punitive conditional audit policy
    Authors: Guo, Ruey-Ji;Chen, Ming-Chin
    Contributors: 會計學系
    Keywords: Asymmetric information;Agency problem;Conditional audit
    Date: 2015-12
    Issue Date: 2017-08-07 17:43:07 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: While audit action is a prominent measure for reducing agency cost, it remains inconclusive how the previous audit experience has an effect upon current audit decision. Guo et al. (2005) conclude that it is unnecessary for the principal to use conditional audit in two-period audit policy, suggesting that the optimal audit policy in current period is tomaintain the same audit probability as that in previous period. However, their analyses are based on punitive conditional audit. Thispaper modifies their model by introducing an incentive conditional audit regime. We find that, provided both audit cost and underdeclaring benefit are moderate, the incentive conditional audit policy will dominate the punitive conditional audit policy and the conditional audit mechanism will be a desirable solution. © 2015 College of Management, National Cheng Kung University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Taiwan LLC.
    Relation: Asia Pacific Management Review, 20(4), 234-240
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apmrv.2015.02.002
    DOI: 10.1016/j.apmrv.2015.02.002
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

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