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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112109

    Title: Vertical separation versus vertical integration in an endogenously growing economy
    Authors: 賴景昌
    Chang, Shu Hua
    Lai, Ching Chong
    Contributors: 經濟系
    Keywords: Endogenous growth;Imperfect competition;Industrial structure;Vertical separation;Vertical integration
    Date: 2016-07
    Issue Date: 2017-08-23 11:11:02 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper sets up an endogenous growth model with a learning-by-doing externality in capital accumulation under both vertical separation and vertical integration structures. Some major findings emerge from our analysis. First, an increase in monopoly power has a detrimental effect on the balanced growth rate. Second, a vertical integration structure leads to a more balanced economic growth rate than a vertical separation structure. Third, the first-best subsidy rates on labor income and capital income under a vertical separation regime are higher than those under a vertical integration regime. Finally, with the additional externality from productive government spending, the government may levy positive taxes on both labor income and capital income if the extent of the productive public spending externality is sufficiently high.
    Relation: International Review of Economics and Finance, 44, 359-380
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.005
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.005
    Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 期刊論文

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