English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 94559/125088 (76%)
Visitors : 29774409      Online Users : 360
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112233

    Title: 考慮利潤移轉下之最適稅率
    The Optimal Tax Rates in the Presence of Profit Shifting
    Authors: 陳怡君
    Contributors: 賴育邦
    Keywords: 利潤移轉
    Profit shifting
    Optimal taxation
    Duopoly model
    Concealment service
    Date: 2017
    Issue Date: 2017-08-28 11:53:55 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去有關廠商避稅行為的文獻,大多以完全競爭市場為架構,且政府的稅率政策通常為外生。為彌補此項文獻上的缺漏,本文以Singh and Vives (1984)與Slemrod and Wilson (2009)的模型為基礎,並考慮封閉經濟體系下的雙占市場模型,分別以兩階段賽局和三階段賽局模型來檢視在政府制定利潤稅稅率時,廠商的避稅行為所扮演的角色。本文發現:在考慮利潤移轉下,最適稅率的決定會同時受到公共財淨效果與避稅效果所影響,在查緝較寬鬆或利潤移轉的風氣盛行的國家,較可能發生公共財淨效果小於或等於零的情形,故最適稅率容易訂在下界;在查緝較嚴密或利潤移轉的風氣不盛行的國家,最適稅率則須視兩種效果的相對大小而定,而有上界、內部解與下界等不同的情形。此外,就產品市場的結構而言,在不考慮利潤移轉下,利潤稅稅率的決定獨立於產品市場的結構;而考慮利潤移轉下,若保密服務的函數型態不相同,產品市場的結構可能影響利潤稅稅率的訂定。
    Most of the literatures regarding the firms’ tax avoidance is based on the structure of perfectly competitive markets. Furthermore, the tax rates are generally exogenously determined. To fill the gap in the literature, this thesis follows Singh and Vives (1984) and Slemrod and Wilson (2009), and considers a duopoly in a closed economy. We establish a two-stage game and a three-stage game, respectively, to examine how the firms’ tax avoidance shapes the making of the profit tax rates. In the presence of profit shifting, I find that the optimal tax rate depends on the public-good effect and the tax-avoidance effect. In addition, it is more likely that the public-good effect is less than zero in countries where profit shifting is more prevalent, or the tax avoidance is not strictly audited. In this case, the optimal tax rate will be set at the lower bound. However, in countries where profit shifting is less prevalent, or the tax avoidance is strictly audited, the optimal tax rate depends on the public-good effect and the tax-avoidance effect. Depending on which force is stronger, the optimal profit tax rate can be set at the upper bound, lower bound, or be an interior solution. In terms of the product market structures, the optimal profit tax rate is independent of the product market structures in the absence of profit shifting. However, if the types of the concealment service functions are different, then the optimal profit tax rate is likely to rely on the product market structures.
    Reference: Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer, 1985. “Export Subsidies
    and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of
    international Economics. 18(1-2): 83-100.
    Brander, J. and P. Krugman, 1983. “A ‘Reciprocal Dumping’
    Model of International Trade,” Journal of international
    economics. 15(3-4): 313-321.
    Haufler, A. and G. Schjelderup, 2000. “Corporate Tax
    Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting,” Oxford
    Economic Papers. 52(2): 306-325.
    Hong, Q. and M. Smart, 2010. “In Praise of Tax Havens:
    International Tax Planning and Foreign Direct
    Investment,” European Economic Review. 54: 82-95.
    Johannesen, N, 2010. “Imperfect Tax Competition for
    Profits, Asymmetric Equilibrium and Beneficial Tax
    Havens,” Journal of International Economics. 81: 253-264.
    OECD, 1998. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global
    Issue. Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-
    operation and Development.
    Singh, N. and X. Vives, 1984. “Price and Quantity
    Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly,” The RAND
    Journal of Economics. 546-554.
    Slemrod, J. and J. D. Wilson, 2009. “Tax Competition with
    Parasitic Tax Havens,” Journal of Public Economics. 93:
    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104255020
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    502001.pdf417KbAdobe PDF0View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback