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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/114431

    Title: 公司章程自治之界限-以章程置入反併購條款之可行性為核心
    The Boundary of the Anatomy of Articles of Incorporation: Cases of Anti-Takeover Provisions
    Authors: 方嘉麟
    Fuang, Kai-Lin
    Chu, Te-Fang
    Keywords: 公司章程;公司自治;強行法;任意法;路徑依賴;董事競業禁止;董事資格限制;董事人數;累積投票制;敵意併購防禦措施
    Articles of Incorporation;Anatomy of Corporate Law;Mandatory Rule;Enabling Rule;Path Dependence;Anti-Takeover Devices;Non-Competition Clause;Cumulative Voting System
    Date: 2015-12
    Issue Date: 2017-11-07 14:44:03 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 現代企業業務經緯萬端,公司法規範有時而盡,尊重公司自治、賦予章程設計彈性幾乎是不可逆轉的趨勢。本文首先討論理論架構面的核心問題,公司法原則上應定位為具任意性與補充性,而我國實務上因法典架構與路徑依賴,公司法強行色彩十分濃厚。其次,本文提出六項政策衡量因素,以建立判斷特定章程設計合法性之架構。本文進一步分析近年兩則主管機關肯認為合法之章程條款,一則涉及限制董事資格,一則為董事彈性人數。本文認為主管機關錯誤援引條文類比,並且誤解章程條款可能的目的與效果,且未納入其他政策考量因素。本文從國家經濟政策、公司法的基本原則、公司控制權市場、保護弱勢者等角度分析,認為此兩條款之合法性有待商榷。期待本文所提出之章程條款合法性評估標準,亦可適用於分析其他具有爭議性的章程條款。
    Taiwan Company Law has long been perceived as a mandatory statute instead of an enabling one in practice. However, the increasing global competition coupled with rapidly changing technology call for more flexibility in corporate law. But where the boundary is not an easy question to answer. This paper aims to propose a framework for evaluating the validity of articles of incorporations. Among others, authors suggest principles of corporate law, the corporate control market, the protection of minority shareholders, and the compatibility between different national policies and laws be considered. The paper further analyzes two articles of incorporation: one is the limit of the directorship of a shareholder, and the other is a variablerange for the size of the board of directors. While the competent authority has accepted their validity, authors suggest differently. By using the framework of evaluation set forth in this paper, authors argue that these two articles not only violate the well-established principles of the Taiwan Corporate Law (i.e., the free transferability of shares and the mandatory cumulative voting system), but also destroy the market for corporate control.
    Relation: 政大法學評論, 143, 239-302
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.3966/102398202015120143005
    DOI: 10.3966/102398202015120143005
    Appears in Collections:[法學評論 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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