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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115266


    Title: 商而優則仕?初探中國央企領導人的甄補與流動
    From Entrepreneurs to Officials? An Exploratory Study on Leader Recruitment and Political Mobility of Central State-Owned Enterprises in China
    Authors: 黃信豪
    劉明浩
    Huang, Hsin-Hao
    Liu, Ming-Hao
    Keywords: 中國;中央國有企業;幹部任命;幹部交流
    China;central state-owned enterprise;cadre appointment;cadre exchange
    Date: 2015-12
    Issue Date: 2017-12-19 16:42:16 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文初探1998至2014年中國大陸副部級央企領導人的組成特徵與仕途發展,以瞭解中共如何選拔央企領導崗位與安排央企、黨政職務交流。本文發現央企領導人年齡上相當有晉升潛力、多屬入黨年齡低且具高學歷。央企類型與時期的比較也顯示黨更重視公益型央企崗位的政治篩選,且國資委成立後也帶來幹部任命的專業化效果。就仕途發展方面,本文發現央企官齡愈輕、任職時間愈短與入選中委/中紀委等因素,可分別提升央企領導人轉任黨政職務的機率。這些規律意涵中共在正式制度制約下透過職務安排來培養、測試幹部工作能力,或可由非正式關係嵌入正式制度的觀點來予以解釋。
    This paper addresses how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appoints leaders of the central state-owned enterprise (CSOE) and arranges their work transfer between party/government and CSOE posts. The empirical evidence of this paper is based on a dataset of vice-ministerial-level CSOE leaders from 1998 to 2014. The findings show that the CSOE leaders generally possess potentials for promotion because of their age advantage, and that most of them are well-educated and have joined the party in early adulthood. Different compositions of personal credentials reflect that the CCP has placed a greater emphasis on political screening in public-welfare CSOEs than in competitive CSOEs, and that the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission led to cadre specialization in CSOEs. Also, this paper confirms that the younger age they began to hold leadership posts, the shorter time period they served, and the Central Committee/Central Commission for Discipline Inspection membership can individually increase the likelihood of transferring to party/government posts. The results shed light on how the CCP would cultivate, train, and test the leaders by means of work arrangement under institutional constraints. The proposed idea of this paper - informal relations embedded in formal institutional rules - can provide a suitable explanation.
    Relation: 中國大陸研究,58,93-127
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[中國大陸研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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