本文的主要目的是探討管理階層財務預測與審計公費的關聯性。利用日本強制管理階層揭露財務預測之特殊環境，本文將探討強制性管理階層財務預測如何影響審計公費的定價。本文特別針對強制性管理階層財務預測修改與審計公費之間的關聯性做探討。在日本，上市公司的管理階層被證券交易所要求，每年度開始時都必須做年度的財務預測。同時，日本的金融商品交易法也規定如果管理階層在意識到有重大變動使其財務預測失真時，管理階層需要修改其財務預測。在日本，公司在發佈管理階層財務預測之前，會交由會計師做審閱。因此，如果公司經常修改其管理階層財務預測的話，會增加會計師的工作量。既然，日本的審計公費是以時間計費，那麼本文推論管理階層財務預測修正將會造成審計公費的增加。 本文研究結果發現，管理階層財務預測修正的次數與審計公費無相關。反倒是財務預測修正的累積修正金額與審計公費有正向相關。本文同時發現，初始財務預測與最終實現盈餘之間的差距與審計公費也有正向相關。因此本文結論為會計師將財務預測修正的規模視為審計風險的一部分。 In this paper, we investigate the association between management earnings forecasts and audit fees. Taking advantage of the unique setting in Japan, where management earnings forecasts are mandatory rather than voluntary, we extend the audit fee pricing literature by examining the role of risk associated with management earnings forecasts in the Japanese environment. In particular, we investigate the association between management earnings forecast revisions and audit fees. In Japan, listed firms are requested to issue annual earnings forecasts in the beginning of the fiscal year. In additional, the firms are also required to revise their earnings forecast if they foresee any significant changes will occur. We find that the audit fees are positively associated with firms that have higher cumulated amount from revision of management earnings forecasts. We also find that audit fees are positively associated with firms that have greater discrepancy between their initial forecasts and realized earnings. We, however, do not find any evidences showing that there is any association between the numbers of forecast revisions and audit fees. Our conjecture is that reviewing management earnings forecasts along with quarterly earnings reports may have been included in the auditing package. And the auditors care more about the magnitude of the revisions rather the times of the forecasts revisions.