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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115541

    Title: Hidden Regret in Insurance Markets
    Authors: 曾郁仁
    Huang, Rachel J.;Muermann, Alexander;Tzeng, Larry Y.
    Contributors: 風險與保險研究中心
    Keywords: Adverse Selection;Asymmetric Information;Equilibria;Equilibrium;Information;Insurance;Preference
    Date: 2016-03
    Issue Date: 2018-01-09 15:49:11 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: We examine insurance markets with two-dimensional asymmetric information on risk type and on preferences related to regret. In contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the equilibrium can be efficient; that is, it can coincide with the equilibrium under full information. Furthermore, we show that pooling, semipooling, and separating equilibria can exist. Specifically, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, the equilibrium includes a contract that is offered but not purchased.
    Relation: Journal of Risk and Insurance,83(1), 181-216
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jori.12096
    DOI: 10.1111/jori.12096
    Appears in Collections:[風險管理與保險學系 ] 期刊論文

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