政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/117632
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 91280/121421 (75%)
Visitors : 25439470      Online Users : 205
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/117632


    Title: 優步公司訂價演算法關於價格聯合行為爭議之研究─以美國休曼法為中心
    A Study on Price-Fixing Controversies over Uber's Pricing Algorithm Focusing on U.S. Jurisprudence of Sherman Act
    Authors: 劉穎蓁
    Contributors: 楊培侃
    劉穎蓁
    Keywords: 優步公司
    訂價演算法
    高峰動態訂價法
    價格聯合行為
    休曼法
    Uber
    Pricing algorithm
    Surge pricing
    Price-fixing
    Sherman act
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-06-12 16:58:47 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近來共享經濟商業模式崛起,對各國既有相關市場皆造成不少之衝擊,當中,優步公司用以計算車資之「訂價演算法」,於美國實務亦引起許多爭議。美國司法案例中其中一個重要爭議即為優步公司單方制定之「訂價演算法」與其採行之「高峰動態訂價法」究否構成價格聯合行為。於美國實務近來2起與價格聯合行為相關之案例,即包含Meyer v. Kalanick案與Chamber of Commerce & RASIER, LLC v. City of Seattle案(以下簡稱「City of Seattle案」)中,皆可見Uber企圖正當化其價格聯合行為,以免於競爭法審查下有違法之嫌。而美國對於價格聯合行為之規範,載明於休曼法第1條;依據休曼法第1條規定,若原告擬主張被告行為違反卡特爾行為,則應證明系爭卡特爾行為符合合意主體要件、具合意或共謀行為,與造成限制性之競爭效果等三項要件。由於上述二案皆仍於訴訟前階段,判決尚未出爐,因此,此議題值得吾等分析之。本文擬以美國實務判決為基準,彙整相關爭議,進而探討Uber所採訂價演算法是否構成價格聯合行為。
    本文發現,雖然此等訂價演算法究否構成價格聯合行為尚未有定論,然由於訂價演算法中之高峰動態訂價法可提高駕駛於尖峰時段中提供載客服務之誘因,將有助於調節市場機制與促進競爭。此外,Uber亦可利用其訂價演算法與設置平台所奠立之優勢,使其得以潛在破壞市場秩序之形式,創造競爭優勢。據此,Uber除可克服既有行政管制下市場進入之劣勢外,亦得使相關市場交易效率大幅提升、市場更加競爭。因此,於探討Uber價格聯合行為合法與否時,亦應將此等因素納入考量。
    The rapid expansion of sharing economy enterprises around the world has led to many challenges. And among these enterprises, one of the most disruptive examples is Uber because of its algorithm. In the United States, the lawsuits regarding Uber's algorithm has also gained massive attention. One of the controversial issues of the complaints relies upon whether Uber's algorithm which set by Uber, and “surge pricing” model do constitute an illegal price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In 2 recent high-profile cases, Meyer v. Kalanick & Chamber of Commerce & RASIER, LLC v. City of Seattle, Uber has tried to justify its price fixing to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are three specific facts that the Plaintiff must prove to establish its antitrust claim in Section 1 of the Sherman Act: 2 or more entities entering into an agreement, conspiracy, and unreasonably restrains competition. Analysis regarding Uber's algorithm is significant because the trials are ongoing. Therefore, the thesis examines whether Uber's algorithm do constitute an illegal price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by exploring the potential problems with regard to the elements based on U.S. judicial decisions.
    The thesis believes that Uber's algorithm can enhance the efficiency of transaction and has pro-competitive effects, leading to the impact of Uber's surge pricing on providing the incentives for drivers during peak hours. Establishing platform and Uber's algorithm create Uber's strengths and advantages. By having disrupted the existing industry, Uber's algorithm serves pro-competitive purposes.
    Reference: 中文文獻
    王姿雅,「Uber在臺灣之適法性研究─以汽車運輸業法規為中心」,國立成功大學交通管理科學系碩士在職專班學位論文(2016年)。
    甘琳、王立達,「共享經濟有問題?─探討Uber所面臨之競爭法挑戰」,月旦法學雜誌,270期,頁187至211(2017年)。
    吳揚,「共享經濟網路平台之民事法律問題分析」,國立臺北大學法律學系碩士論文(2017年)。
    李欣,「共享經濟的困境與限制─以Airbnb 為例」,國立政治大學科技管理與智慧財產研究所碩士論文(2015年)。
    李姿瑩,「歐盟共享經濟法制推動綜覽」,科技法律透析,28卷11期,頁24至32(2016年)。
    李綱信,「歐美競爭法之初步研析」,經濟研究,12卷,頁341至368(2012年)。
    沈怡伶,「網路運輸業興起對臺灣汽車運輸業管理架構之影響」,月旦法學雜誌,248期,頁107至121(2016年)。
    邱淑芬,知識經濟時代公平交易法對競爭者間合作聯盟之規範,行政院公平交易委員會計畫, 2003年3月22日,網址:http://open.nat.gov.tw(最後瀏覽日:2018年4月20日)。
    殷其儂,「共享經濟商業模式之法律問題探討─以Airbnb為例」,東吳大學法律學系碩士論文(2016年)。
    許俊雄,「軸輻式共謀」,公平交易通訊,第76期,頁18至21(2017年)。
    許賜福,「我國廠商對於美國反托拉斯法應有的認識—以華映與奇美案為例」,經貿透視雙周刊,294期,http://www.trademag.org.tw/content02.asp?id=535708&type=29。
    陳志民,「美國及歐盟反托拉斯法對國際卡特爾行為之規範」,貿易政策論叢,14期,頁37至61(2010年)。
    陳姿妙,「Uber 經營模式與法律爭議之探究」,國立政治大學科技管理與智慧財產研究所碩士論文(2015年)。
    陳琪,「美國反托拉斯法之簡介」,公平交易季刊,1卷4期,頁45至67(1993年)。
    黃柏偉,「歐洲推動共享經濟之策略方向─以歐盟及英國為例」,臺灣經濟研究月刊,38卷8期,頁58至63(2015年)。
    黃鈴晏,「聯合行為之成立及法律效果—以美國、歐盟及我國規範為中心」,國立成功大學法律系碩士班碩士論文(2012年)。
    廖義男,「公平交易法規範之事業概念─第二條之詮釋」,公平交易季刊,1卷2期,頁1至33(1993年)。
    廖謹志,「共享經濟應用於交通運輸業之法律研究」,東吳大學法律學系碩士論文(2016年)。
    劉孔中,「論聯合行為規範之革新」,國立臺灣大學法學論叢,33卷2期,頁43至92(2004年)。
    劉穎蓁,「優步公司針對西雅圖市政府允許運輸網路公司駕駛組織工會相關法令提起控訴」,政治大學國際經貿組織暨法律研究中心經貿法訊,211期,頁7至11(2017年)。
    韓毓傑,「聯合行為之研究─以行政院公平交易委員會之實踐為中心」,育達學院學報,11期,頁157至183(2006年)。
    蘇永欽,「自由化、解除管制與公平交易法」,月旦法學雜誌,22期,頁15至21(1997年)。



    英文文獻
    Anderson, M. & Huffman, H., The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, or Something in Between?, 2017 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW (2017).
    Bork, R. H., The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE LAW JOURNAL 785 (1965).
    Brass, R. S. & Higney, C. A., Practical Advice for Avoiding Hub-and-Spoke Liability, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Vol. 16, No.1, 1, 1 (2016).
    Burger-Smidt, A. & Wickins, G., The Uber price-fixing ride: What are the antitrust co-ordinates?, WERKSMANS ATTORNEYS, https://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/061416-Uber-Pricing-Fixing.pdf
    Coase, R., The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937).
    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, The "Sharing" Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants & Regulators, Nov. 2016.
    Hamari, J., Sjöklint, M. & Ukkonen, A., The sharing economy: Why people participate in collaborative consumption, JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 67, No. 9, 2047 (2016).
    LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Antitrust: An Overview, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust.
    Paul, S. M., Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and its Implications, Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2017).
    PWC CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES, Consumer Intelligence Series “The Sharing Economy”, at 15, Apr. 2015, available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf
    Rubinfeld, D. L., Antitrust Policy, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 553 (N. J. Smelser & B. Baltes eds., 2001).
    San Francisco County Transportation Authority, The TNC Regulatory Landscape: An Overview of Current TNC Regulation in California and Across the Country, at 10 (Dec., 2017).



    法律文件
    15 Civ. 9796 Opinion and order, Spencer Meyer, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated v. Meyer v. Kalanick and Uber Technologies, Inc. at 1 (2016.3.31) (No. 16-2750).
    15 Civ. 9796 Opinion and order, Spencer Meyer, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated v. Meyer v. Kalanick and Uber Technologies, Inc. at 1 (2018.3.5) (No. 1:15-cv-09796).
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America & RASIER, LLC v. City of Seattle, 2:17-cv-00370-RSL, 13-15 (9th Cir. 2018).
    FHDR-1, Qualifying driver and lists of qualifying drivers, Department of Finance and Administrative Services, City of Seattle.
    KING COUNTY, WASH., Ordinance 124968.
    Lyft Terms of Service.
    Order Decision or Award of The Labor Commissioner at 1-2, Barbara Ann Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc. & Rasier-CA LLC, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco (2015) (No. 11-46739 EK) (Docket No. CGC15546378).
    Order Decision or Award of The Labor Commissioner at 7, Barbara Ann Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc. & Rasier-CA LLC, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco (2015) (No. 11-46739 EK) (Docket No. CGC15546378).
    Order Denying Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Douglas O'Connor, et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Northern District of California (2015) (No. C-13-3826 EMC) (Docket No. 211).
    Order Denying Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Douglas O'Connor, et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Northern District of California (2015) (No. C-13-3826 EMC) (Docket No. 211).
    Order Denying Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Douglas O'Connor, et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Northern District of California (2015) (No. C-13-3826 EMC) (Docket No. 211).
    Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. v. The City of Seattle, et al., Western District of Washington at Seattle (2017) (No. C17-0370 RSL) (Docket No. 42).
    Raiser LLC Technology Services Agreement.
    Seattle Complaint, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. City of Seattle & Fred Podesta.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營與貿易學系
    103351048
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103351048
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of International Business ] Theses

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    104801.pdf1516KbAdobe PDF193View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback