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    题名: 非法內線交易行為之研究
    Decoding Illegal Insider Trading
    作者: 詹淑惠
    Chan, Shu-Hui
    贡献者: 周行一
    詹淑惠
    Chan, Shu-Hui
    关键词: 內線交易
    訊息精確度
    價格發現
    下單策略
    模仿跟單
    Illegal insider trading
    Information precision
    Price discovery
    Order submission strategies
    Mimicking
    日期: 2018
    上传时间: 2018-07-10 15:34:05 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文結合台灣證券交易所日內交易資料與內線交易刑事裁判書，詳細比對出內線交易者的交易與下單資料，以台灣上市公司1993年至2006年因內線交易遭起訴的案件為研究對象，並分成兩個部分對非法內線交易行為進行探討。
    第一部分，將內線交易事件分類為好消息與壞消息探討內線交易的特性、股票價量的反應、內線交易者的報酬、比較內線交易與非內線交易對價格發現的貢獻程度，以及訊息精確度與價格發現之關聯。好消息以購併案的內線交易最多，壞消息則以調降財務預測、盈收下降的內線交易最多。首先，由股價反應來觀察，好消息與壞消息的股價反應不對稱，好消息(訊息精確度較高)在宣告日前股價反應較多，在宣告日後股價反應較少；反之，壞消息(訊息精確度較低)在宣告日前股價反應較少，在宣告日後股價反應較多，與過去文獻(Kothari et al., 2009; Baruch et al., 2017)的發現一致。其次，由內線交易者報酬來看，內線交易者獲取鉅額利益，使投資大眾蒙受損失。最後，由價格發現來看，好消息事件的內線交易對股價貢獻度低，而壞消息事件的內線交易對股價貢獻度高。
    第二部分，在考量隱匿性需求下，探討內線交易的下單策略，以及其他市場參與者跟單之可能性。過去文獻受限於內線交易下單行為無法直接觀察，內線交易下單策略與跟單可能性的相關研究付之闕如。實證結果顯示，首先，基於隱匿性需求高低不同，好消息事件的內線交易者(隱匿性需求高)與壞消息事件的內線交易者(隱匿性需求低)之下單策略並不相同，好消息事件的內線交易者拆單情形較壞消息多，且好消息事件的內線交易者下在積極度最高的委託單比例較壞消息低。其次，好消息事件內線交易後經手的證券經紀商之其他客戶可能有跟單行為，與McNally et al.(2017)發現一致；然而，壞消息事件內線交易後其他法人可能有跟單行為，此現象是否與內線交易公司業務往來密切，對公司財務狀況(Alldredge and Cicero, 2015)或內部人交易行為(Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2012)瞭解較多有關，有待後續研究探討。
    This paper combines intraday transaction data with criminal litigation events of illegal insider trading to investigate illegal insider trading prosecution events of listed firms in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) during 1993-2006.
    The first section, besides capturing the characteristics of illegal insider trading comprehensively, this study not only investigates the stock price and volume around illegal insider trading, but also calculates the abnormal return and the dollar profit for every illegal insider. More important, this study explores the price discovery from illegal insider trading under different information precision. First of all, the empirical result shows that stock prices respond more before good news (high information precision) announced, in contrast, stock prices respond less before bad news (low information precision) announced. Furthermore, illegal insiders gained huge profit from uninformed traders in financial market. Finally, I find that the price contribution of illegal insider trading before good news events is weaker, but the price contribution of illegal insider trading before bad news events is stronger.
    The second section, this research examines that order submission strategies of illegal insider trading associated with stealth trading and piggy-backing by market participators. Unfortunately, the extant literature could not provide answers to these issues. First of all, due to the high stealth trading demand, the evidence indicates good news events illegal insiders hide their orders by less aggressive orders and they break up more orders than bad news events illegal insiders obviously. Furthermore, in good news cases, I find a significant positive volume of non-insider clients buying illegal insider’s brokerage firm. The result is consistent with McNally et al.(2017), implies that good news events illegal insiders leak their order submission activities and lead to mimic by other participators. In contrast, in bad news cases, I find other firms perhaps to mimic trades of illegal insiders.
    參考文獻: 中文參考文獻：
    陳振遠、王朝仕、陳振宇，2011，「以買方與賣方觀點探討內線交易對股票價量之影響」，管理評論，第30卷，第1期，頁77-94。

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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    97357506
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0973575061
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/DIS.NCCU.Finance.014.2018.F07
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