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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118653


    Title: 混合寡占市場下公營事業民營化效率提升效果之分析
    An Analysis of Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Privatization under a Mixed Oligopoly
    Authors: 傅明捷
    Fu, Sarah
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    傅明捷
    Fu, Sarah
    Keywords: 混合寡占市場
    民營化
    效率提升效果
    成本差異
    Mixed oligopoly
    Privatization
    Efficiency-enhancing effect
    Cost differentials
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-07-13 15:18:32 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 傳統探討公營事業民營化的文獻中，大多忽略了因為民營化所導致廠商的效率提升，因此本文在基本的混合寡占市場模型中加入了民營化的效率提升效果後有幾點重要發現：(1) 考慮效率提升效果因素將使得民營化廠商的最適產量增加，原本外國民營廠商所生產的數量則會因為策略性替代效果而減少，進而提升整體產業的生產配置效率；(2) 當公營廠商可以透過民營化來改善生產效率時，釋股比例將不具有獨立性；(3) 當公營廠商沒有生產效率改善效果時，關稅政策和民營化政策之間是有等價性，反之若公營廠商民營化後的生產效率會改善時，則關稅政策和民營化政策之間將不具有等價性。
    This paper investigates a quantity-setting oligopoly involving a domestic private firm, a foreign private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. We consider a efficiency-enhancing effect in this model and find that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are higher than the situation without efficiency improvement. Moreover, if the tariff and the privatization policies are independent of each other, then the optimal trade liberalization and optimal privatization would not be equivalent in welfares. Besides, the degree of state ownership affects welfare if the government chooses optimal subsidy and privatization policy with economic efficiency.
    Reference: 翁堃嵐、林宛儀與郭虹瑩(2014)，《混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性與最適釋股比例》，應用經濟論叢，96，105-126。
    邱俊榮與黃鴻(2006)，《公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析》，經濟論文叢刊，34，246-259。
    翁永和、羅鈺珊與劉碧珍(2003)，《市場結構與最適民營化政策》，經濟論文叢刊，31，149-169。

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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    1052550252
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1052550252
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.003.2018.F07
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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