本文選取中國大陸31個省2006年－2015年十年之間的省級跨時追蹤資料或稱縱橫資料(panel data) ，實證檢視在分稅制改革和農村稅費改革之後中央補助收入的影響因素，綜合隨機效果模型(Random Effect Model)以及雙向固定效果模型(Two- way Fixed Effect Model)的估計結果，同時分為東、中、西三個區域，來看人均中央補助收入和人均中央補助收入的增長率。結果發現，在四大類因素中，第一類，經濟條件中人均省內生產總值對數、一級產業產量值呈現正相關。外商投資呈現顯著負相關。第二類，社會發展因素中，只有農村人口佔總人口的比例呈現負相關。第三類，政治因素不顯著。第四類，特殊因素中，少數民族的人口比例呈現正相關。
我們得到的結論為，第一，分稅制以來，地方在中央的權利，並未能夠幫助地方在中央獲得更多的財政資源的分配權力。第二，中東西的區域差距還是存在的，國家雖然在人均中央補助收入和省的總額上有增加，可是，人均中央補助增長率收入整體卻在降低，一方面說明國家不像之前四萬億政策一樣強制插手經濟，而是讓市場在經濟中扮演更重要的角色；另外一方面，說明國家對地方的財政補貼力度也減少很多。第三，中國大陆城鄉二元的社會結構並沒有發生本質變化，整個政府長期以來還是以城市爲工作重心 。這種狀況反映在中央補助收入上，就是財政轉移支付的資金更多地流向城市化比重大的省份。 Since 1994, a tax revenue allocation system known as the “central to local transfer payments” has been implemented by China’s Central Government. This paper selects panel data from 31 provinces in mainland China from 2006 to 2015 to examine the factors of the central subsidy after the tax-sharing reform. Based on the results of the Random Effect Model and the Two-way Fixed Effect Model, the transfer payment system endows the power for China's central government to balance the regional developments.
From the empirical analysis, we can have the following results. Firstly, local political rights in the Central Government can not help local governments obtain more financial resources in the Central Government. Secondly, the differences of development and the amount of subsidy in three regions are still a big problem. Thirdly, there is no fundamental change in the dual urban-rural social structure in China, and the entire government has long focused on cities. This situation is reflected in the central government subsidy income, that is, the transfer of funds to finance more flow to the more urbanized provinces.
