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Corporate Political Contributions, Tax Avoidance and Stock Returns
|Issue Date: ||2018-07-24 11:01:44 (UTC+8)|
In the past, researches support that corporate political contributions could enhance the firm’s value and have a positive relation with tax evasion. Political connection influences firm value and tax avoidance directly, but there is no evidence that detects the firm value changes after political connection with the degree of tax avoidance. Evidently, the corporate is well-governed or transparent, tax avoidance will enhance firm value. As a result, this paper will investigate how political connections affect the degree of tax avoidance and the effect towards firm’s value.
This paper takes the opportunity to use the listed stock company in Taiwan as sample research, estimating four election years during 2004 to 2016. The method panel fixed effect model and ordinary least squares(OLS) analyze the issue. Results show that: first, political contributions will bring positive abnormal returns to the corporate; second, the relation between tax avoidance and abnormal return is not significant; thirdly, corporate political contributions have a positive impact on the relevance of tax avoidance and firm’s value. In comparison to the firm’s disengagement in political contribution, tax aggressive firms get more positive abnormal returns by the more candidates firm support, the increase party power in congress and the elections winning. It shows that corporate political contribution and tax avoidance will affect firm’s abnormal returns.
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105255003|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[財政學系] 學位論文|
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