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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118832


    Title: 政治獻金、租稅規避與股票報酬
    Corporate Political Contributions, Tax Avoidance and Stock Returns
    Authors: 林立妤
    Lin, Li-Yu
    Contributors: 郭振雄
    Kuo, Jenn-Shyong
    林立妤
    Lin, Li-Yu
    Keywords: 租稅規避
    政治獻金
    企業異常報酬
    Tax avoidance
    Political contribution
    Abnormal returns
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-07-24 11:01:44 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去研究支持企業捐贈政治獻金能提升企業價值,且與租稅規避呈正向關係。企業的政治關係對公司市值與其租稅規避兩者皆直接有影響,但沒有研究分析企業的政治關係影響其租稅規避程度後,間接對公司價值的影響。企業從事租稅規避需在公司內部治理良好,或企業透明度佳的情況,避稅才會對企業價值正面影響。對此,本研究進一步探討企業的政治關係對其從事租稅規避與公司價值關聯性的影響。
    本研究以臺灣上市與上櫃企業,在2004年至2016年的4個選舉年度,共2,518個觀察值為樣本,採用橫斷面分析及追蹤資料固定效果模型分析。結果發現,首先,政治獻金確實會為企業帶來正向的異常報酬;其次,避稅指標對企業異常報酬之影響卻不顯著;第三,企業捐贈政治獻金對企業租稅規避與企業價值的關聯性有正面影響。亦即,相較於未捐贈政治捐獻的企業,捐贈政治獻金者在支持候選人人數、候選人所屬政黨在立法院影響力,及候選人是否當選等政治獻金指標,隨著企業從事租稅規避程度愈高,對企業的異常報酬影響程度愈高。顯示企業捐贈政治獻金與其租稅規避,對企業異常報酬的影響具互補關係。
    In the past, researches support that corporate political contributions could enhance the firm’s value and have a positive relation with tax evasion. Political connection influences firm value and tax avoidance directly, but there is no evidence that detects the firm value changes after political connection with the degree of tax avoidance. Evidently, the corporate is well-governed or transparent, tax avoidance will enhance firm value. As a result, this paper will investigate how political connections affect the degree of tax avoidance and the effect towards firm’s value.
    This paper takes the opportunity to use the listed stock company in Taiwan as sample research, estimating four election years during 2004 to 2016. The method panel fixed effect model and ordinary least squares(OLS) analyze the issue. Results show that: first, political contributions will bring positive abnormal returns to the corporate; second, the relation between tax avoidance and abnormal return is not significant; thirdly, corporate political contributions have a positive impact on the relevance of tax avoidance and firm’s value. In comparison to the firm’s disengagement in political contribution, tax aggressive firms get more positive abnormal returns by the more candidates firm support, the increase party power in congress and the elections winning. It shows that corporate political contribution and tax avoidance will affect firm’s abnormal returns.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    105255003
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105255003
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.011.2018.F07
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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