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Title:	政治獻金與租稅規避之關聯 Corporate Political Contributions and Tax Avoidance
Authors:	趙珮淳 Chao, Pei-Tsun
Contributors:	何怡澄 Ho, Yi-Cheng 趙珮淳 Chao, Pei-Tsun
Keywords:	政治獻金政治關聯租稅規避 Political contribution Political connection Tax avoidance
Date:	2018
Issue Date:	2018-07-24 11:02:34 (UTC+8)
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學財政學系 104255017
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1042550171
Data Type:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.030.2018.F07
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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