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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/119130
    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/119130


    題名: 機構投資人持股對現金持有價值與公司績效影響性
    The Effects of Institutional Investors Ownership on Marginal Value of Cash and Operating Performance
    作者: 江宇騰
    Chiang, Yu-Teng
    貢獻者: 陳明吉
    Chen, Ming Chi
    江宇騰
    Chiang, Yu-Teng
    關鍵詞: 機構投資人
    監督效果
    代理成本
    現金持有價值
    Institutional investors
    Monitor effect
    Agency cost
    Marginal values of cash holdings
    日期: 2018
    上傳時間: 2018-08-01 16:18:04 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究以台灣上市公司作為研究對象,探討機構投資人持股比例與現金持有價值關聯性,是否機構投資人會發揮其監督功能,減少代理問題而使公司之現金持有價值提升。而本研究之實證結果顯示,在具有高機構投資人持股比例組合中,實證結果支持機構投資人之監督效果存在,而原因為在該組合內機構投資人持股比例高,與公司利害關係程度高,故在此時具有足夠誘因且能有效地來監督公司管理階層,進而降低代理問題使得其現金持有價值提高。而本研究另也探討機構投資人之異質性,根據林穎芬(2012)之定義加入主動型機構投資人與外資機構投資人,而實證結果表現外資機構投資人與主動型機構投資人之持股與公司之現金持有價值間不存在顯著正向關聯性。
    除此之外,本研究亦發現公司治理品質會影響機構投資人之監督效果,在公司治理品質優之組別內,本研究實證結果支持機構投資人與主動型機構投資人會發揮其監督功能,而使公司之現金持有價值提升。最後,本研究之實證結果皆能證實機構投資人所發揮之監督功能使公司現金持有價值提升亦能使公司之績效表現提高。
    The study examines whether the institutional investors monitor a firm related to the reduce of the agency problems and the rise of the marginal values of corporate cash holdings. We find that the company in the group with greater institutional ownership exists the monitoring effect from institutional investors, and the reason is the institutional investors with higher holdings would have greater incentive and ability to monitor the management. Further, we also discuss the heteroscedasticity of the institutional investors, but we don’t have sufficient evidence to support the positive correlation between marginal values of corporate cash holdings and active institutional investors, and neither do foreign institutional investors.
    In addition, our empirical result indicates the quality of corporate governance also influence the monitoring effect of institutional investors. In the group with the greatest corporate governance quality, the greater ownership of institutional investors and active institutional investors is associated with a higher marginal values of corporate cash holdings, which can be explained that the quality of corporate governance is an influential factor. At last, our study also observes that the rise of the marginal values of corporate cash holdings improves the corporate operating performance.
    參考文獻: 中文文獻:
    林穎芬、洪晨桓、陳佳成,2012,臺灣上市公司董事薪酬影響因子之研究,臺大管 理論叢,23 卷(1 期):175-207。
    洪于婷,2011,公司治理對現金持有價值及對超額現金與公司績效關係之研究, 臺 北大學會計學系碩士論文。
    楊海燕、韋德洪、孫健,2012,機構投資者持股能提高上市公司會計信息質量嗎?— —兼論不同類型機構投資者的差異,會計研究,9 期:16-23。
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    41
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    105357020
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105357020
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.Finance.021.2018.F07
    顯示於類別:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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