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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120228

    Title: 垂直結合廠商防止連續結合的先占策略
    Preempting Successive Mergers by a Vertically Merged Firm
    Authors: 張馨云
    Contributors: 溫偉任
    Keywords: Preempting successive mergers
    Vertically merged firm
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-10-01 12:05:35 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: We investigate strategies that an incumbent vertically merged firm will implement to achieve maximal profit. When a horizontal merger occurs, it will decrease the profit of a vertically merged firm. Thus, the vertically merged firm will preempt the horizontal merger by merging with one of the downstream firms. However, this leaves open possibility for remaining firms to merge vertically. We then further analyze how a vertically merged firm preempts subsequent vertical mergers. We find that, among various preempting strategies, it is most profitable for the firm to merge with all of the downstream firms.
    Reference: [1] Clark, D. and Worthen, B., 2009. “Oracle Snatches Sun, Foiling IBM,” The Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, New York, N.Y., 21 April, 2009: A.1.
    [2] Colangelo, G., 1995. “Vertical vs. Horizontal Integration: Pre-emptive Merging,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 43(3), 323-337.
    [3] Greenwald, T., 2018. “Why Intel Is So Wary of a Broadcom-Qualcomm Merger,” The Wall Street Journal, (March 11), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-intel-isso-wary-of-a-broadcom-qualcomm-merger-1520800808
    [4] H¨ackner, J., 2000. “A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Di↵erentiated Oligopolies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 93, 233-239.
    [5] H¨ackner, J., 2003. “Vertical Integration and Competition Policy,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 24(2), 213-222.
    [6] Hung, F. and Gold, M., 2014. “Foxconn to buy 390 million dollars stake in Taiwan telecom operator in 4G push,” Yahoo Finance, (May 27), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/foxconn-buy-390-million-stake-071639997.html
    [7] Meyersohn, N. and Horowitz, J., 2018. “Broadcom officially ends bid for Qualcomm,” CNNMoney, (March 14), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/14/news/companies/broadcom-qualcommdeal-trump/index.html
    [8] Narioka, K., 2018. “China Approves Toshiba’s 18 Billion Dollars Sale of Its Memory-Chip Unit,” The Wall Street Journal, (May 17), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-approves-toshibas-18-billion-sale-of-memorychip-unit-1526552434
    [9] Ordover, J. A., Saloner, G. and Salop, S. C., 1990, “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure,” The American Economic Review, 80(1), p.127-142.
    [10] Yao, Z. and Zhou, W., 2015, “Vertical or Horizontal: Endogenous Merger Waves in Vertically Related Industries,” The B.E. Journal of Economics Analysis and Policy, 15(3), p.1237-1262.
    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1053510151
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IB.036.2018.F06
    Appears in Collections:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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