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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120297


    Title: 租稅規避與企業聲望
    Tax Avoidance and Corporate Reputation
    Authors: 葉怡均
    Yeh, Yi-Chun
    Contributors: 郭振雄
    葉怡均
    Yeh, Yi-Chun
    Keywords: 租稅規避
    企業聲望
    聲望成本
    Tax avoidance
    Corporate reputation
    Reputational cost
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-10-01 12:17:32 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究探討租稅規避與企業聲望間之關係。參考Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014) 依據不同的公司利害關係人形成之觀點,對企業聲望做廣泛性之定義。並根據定義選取多個企業聲望代理變數進行實證分析。觀察公司若因為從事租稅規避之行為而被大眾媒體報導後,企業聲望之變化。
      本研究蒐集臺灣2007年至2016年共10年的主流大眾媒體報導資料,2002年至2016年共15年之企業財務資料。使用差異中之差異法,並用配對的方式,選取對照組,進行迴歸分析。對於本研究所選取之企業聲望代理變數,實證結果主要有三:首先,當公司被大眾媒體報導從事租稅規避後,銷售額之成長顯著下降。表示在企業租稅規避報導後,企業聲望有下降的情形;其次,在報導後廣告費用變動顯著上升,表示公司會考慮報導對其聲望之負面影響,進而採取行動維護企業聲望。然而,本研究進行分析所採用的企業聲望代理變數除了以上兩者外,其餘代理變數包括:股價報酬、行銷費用以及雜誌評選之實證結果皆為不顯著。因此,本研究認為目前仍未有足夠之證據證明,公司參與租稅規避而被公開揭露後,對企業聲望會有顯著負面之影響。
    This study discusses the association between tax avoidance and corporate reputation. Follow Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014), using the perceptions formed by different corporate stakeholders to make a broad definition of corporate reputation. Then, select multiple proxies of corporate reputation according to the definition to do my empirical analysis. And observe whether reputation of the corporations change if they were reported by public media because of tax avoidance.
      This study collects media reports in Taiwan from 2007 to 2016 and includes financial data of Taiwanese companies from 2002 to 2016. Use differences-in-differences methodology and choose control group by matching to do the empirical research. For the proxies of corporate reputation, there are three main results in this study. First, after reported by media because of tax avoidance, the sales growth of corporation significant declines. It represents that the corporate reputation will falls after the report of tax avoidance. Second, the advertisement growth significant rises after the report, means that corporations will consider the potential damage of reputation caused by reports and will take action to protect it. The last, however, the other proxies of corporate reputation I analyzed are not significant in this study, including stock return, marketing expenditure and reputation in magazine. As a results, this study does not find enough evidence to prove that corporations will face reputation loss after report of tax avoidance.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    105255010
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105255010
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.029.2018.F07
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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