Under the presidential system, the public may have an ambivalent attitude toward presidential powers. Based on the system of checks and balances, on the one hand, presidents are asked to be constrained on the abuse of executive power. The mass, on the other hand, expects a responsive government and wants the president to be powerful to solve a wide range of social issues. The literature has shown that the public is discontent with political parties and legislative gridlock due to party conict. To overcome the problems of government dysfunction, the public might support presidential unilateralism. This paper examines how antipartyism in uences the public's preferences for the tools of presidential powers by focusing on the case of Taiwan. In the preliminary analysis, we nd that cultural antipartyism is positively associated with support for the president's power to unilaterally appoint judges and to direct agency implementation of policies passed by the legislature. In contrast, reactive antipartyism leads to less support for executive privilege, unilateral judicial appointments, and the authority to direct agency implementation of policies passed by the legislature. The results have important implications for how the use of presidential powers is shaped by public opinion.
2018 Annual Meeting of Japanese Association of Electoral Studies,, Japanese Association of Electoral Studies 日本選挙学会 2018年度総会・研究会 【分科会B】 比較部会1「Politics and Elections in Taiwan」