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    题名: 微型保險對保險市場的衝擊
    The Impacts of Microinsurance on Insurance Market
    作者: 許修豪
    Hsu, Hsiu-Hao
    贡献者: 何靜嫺
    許修豪
    Hsu, Hsiu-Hao
    关键词: 微型保險
    保險市場
    競爭
    Microinsurance
    Insurance market
    Competition
    日期: 2018
    上传时间: 2018-11-09 15:50:37 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 微型保險常被許多人稱為"金字塔底層的財富"，但這些低所得消費者過去多被傳統保險市場所拒絕；保險人是否真的可以從提供服務給這群額外的消費者中獲益呢?本論文試圖藉由探討一個存在兩個保險人的完整保險市場來回答這個問題。我們由理論分析結果得知，當保險市場只有傳統保險時，在考慮垂直面的財富效果下，則均衡保費會下降、均衡利潤卻會上升。而在引進微型保險商品後，保險人的垂直需求會減少。然而，當不存在財富效果時，提供微型保險對傳統保險市場的均衡保費不會有影響，且在第二章節中，我們也得到在微型保險採取邊際成本訂價下，保險人的利潤會相同。當我們考慮財富效果後，提供微型保險會使均衡保費和利潤都降低，但傳統保險的均衡保費會因為競爭效果而隨著微型保險保費的提高而上升。最後，因為許多國家政策雖鼓勵保險人提供微型保險卻不強制性要求，而針對這樣的情況，我們也得到當保險人 1提供微型保險時:(1)保險人1傳統保險的均衡保費會比不提供微型保險時的均衡保費低。(2)保險人1的均衡保費會比保險人2的均衡保費低。(3)保險人1的均衡利潤會小於保險人2的均衡利潤。(4)保險人1的均衡利潤會隨著微型保險價格的增加而上升。最後實證對我們理論分析的結果得到一個強烈的證實:在微型保險採取邊際成本訂價時，微型保險所 帶來額外的利潤為0，那麼微型保險商品的引進會增加市場競爭的程度，同時降低均衡保費及垂直需求，因而導致保險人的利潤下降。
    Microinsurance has been articulated as "the fortune at the bottom of the pyramid", but these low income customers were previously precluded by conventional insurance, will insurers really benefit from serving a larger amount of customers? This current paper attempts to provide answers to these questions by examining a completive insurance market with two insurers. Our analytical results show that when there are only conventional insurance, the equilibrium premiums are smaller but the equilibrium profits will increase after considering the wealth effect on vertical demands. After introducing the microinsurance product, insurer`s vertical demand will reduce. However, if there is no wealth effect, adding microinsurance has no impact on the premiums of conventional insurance, and given marginal cost pricing for microinsurance, the insurers` total profits are the same as in Section 2. If the wealth effect is considered, after providing microinsurance, both the equilibrium prices and profits are lower, but the equilibrium premiums of conventional insurance will increase with the premiums of microinsurance, due to the competition effect. Finally, any countries encourage insurers to provide microinsurance products but not compulsorily. We show that when only insurer 1 provides microinsurance, (i) insurer 1`s equilibrium premium of conventional insurance is lower than when not providing micorinsurance. (ii) Insurer 1`s premium for conventional insurance is lower than insurer 2`s premium. (iii) Insurer 1`s profit is also smaller than insurer 2`s. (iv) Insurer 1`s profit will increase with the premium of microinsurance products. Finally, our empirical results provide strong support for our analytical results that even if microsinsurance is marginal pricing so that the additional profit from microinsurance is zero, then the introduction of microinsurance will increase the degree of competition, lowering the equilibrium prices and vertical demand, which result in a decrease in insurers` profits.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    1002580182
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1002580182
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ECONO.023.2018.F06
    显示于类别:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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