English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 20 |  Items with full text/Total items : 90026/119936 (75%)
Visitors : 24022647      Online Users : 99
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/122745
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122745


    Title: 相同會計師查核關聯企業對租稅規避的影響
    The effect of same accountant to tax avoidance of affiliated companies
    Authors: 楊承軒
    Yang, Cheng-Hsuan
    Contributors: 何怡澄
    He, Yi-Cheng
    楊承軒
    Yang, Cheng-Hsuan
    Keywords: 租稅規避
    關聯企業
    相同會計師查核
    相同事務所查核
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2019-04-01 14:35:58 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究探討關聯企業聘用相同會計師或事務所查核,對關聯企業租稅
    規避的影響。會計師對於企業的整體營運及內部運作有相當程度的瞭解,
    若其同時查核關聯企業,有助於企業稅務資訊的確認與品質提升,甚至可
    以依據關聯企業的整體營運活動,提供一致的最適租稅規劃建議。本研究
    以臺灣上市櫃企業在2000 年至2016 年共9,821 個觀察值為樣本,檢視企業與其關聯企業所聘用會計師或事務所的名單,辨認企業與關聯企業聘用相同會計師或事務所的情況,分別採用相同會計師或事務所的虛擬變數、總數及比例,作為企業與其關聯企業聘僱相同會計師或事務所查核的程度之衡量。實證結果發現,企業與其關聯企業僱用之會計師若相同,企業的租稅規避程度愈高,且僱用相同會計師或事務所家數或比例愈高,企業租稅規避程度愈高。此外,以人工方式蒐集企業關係人交易類型資訊,發現當企業關係人交易類型為進貨或應付款項,其交易金額最大的關聯企業聘用相同會計師或事務所查核時,企業租稅規避程度也愈高。
    This research examines the data of same accounting firms and same accountants between affiliated companies from 2000 to 2016 to study the relationship between same accountants and tax avoidance. Due to the understanding of companies’overall operations while auditing them, accountants are able to confirm and improve the quality of tax information. Therefore, same accounting firms (same accountants) may provide the most optimal tax planning
    recommendation to affiliated companies according to their operations. This research first examines the list of accounting firms and accountants employed by companies, then measure the extent to which the company and its affiliates hire the same accountants by three different mathods. Research shows that tax avoidance is higher when companies hire same accounting firms (same accountants) with their affiliated companies. In addition, the research collects different types of related party transactions manually, and finds that affiliates who hire same accountants, with the largest related party transaction amount, have higher tax avoidance.
    Reference: 參考文獻
    林嬌能, 2017, 會計產業專家,會計師公費與企業租稅規劃相關性之研究,會計學報, 7(1), 51-88。
    財政部賦稅改革委員會,1989,關聯企業課稅之研究。
    陳明進,2003,我國租稅優惠對營利事業租稅負擔之影響,管理評論, 22(1),127-151。
    陳明進與蔡麗雯(2006),財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究,管理學報,23(6):739-763。
    黃美祝與楊佩璇,2011,集團企業與非集團企業避稅程度之比較,會計學報,第4卷第1期,1-22。
    黃德芬與陳秀婷,2011,雙簽制度下會計師產業專精及查核任期對商業銀行盈餘管理之影響,會計審計論叢,1(1):25-60.
    張瑞當、方俊儒與沈文華,2008,集團企業是否委託同一會計師事務所查核財務報表對盈餘管理行為之影響,管理評論,第27卷,第2期:29-52。
    葛克昌(1977),租稅規避之研究,國立台灣大學法論叢,6(2):167-187。
    趙雅儀、蕭哲芬與廖瓊正,2012,關係人交易、稅負與公司績效關聯性之實證研究,桃園創新學報,第三十二期,299-326。
    蔡鴻青,2016,2016華人家族關鍵報告,台灣董事學會華人家族關鍵報告,20-28。
    劉政淮、翁慈青與賴玉鳳,2013,產業環境競爭程度對會計師事務所選擇之影響.,台灣管理學刊,13(1):1-26.
    Benston, G. J. 1985. “The Market for Public Accounting Services: Demand, Supply and Regulation,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 4(1), pp.33-79.
    Barrett, M. J. 2004. Tax services as a Trojan horse in the auditor independence provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. Michigan State Law Review: 463-504.
    Brown, J. L., and K. D. Drake. 2013. Network ties among low-tax firms. The Accounting Review, 89(2), 483-510.
    Branson, J., and D. Breesch. 2004. Referral as a determining factor for changing auditors in the Belgian auditing market: An empirical study. The international journal of accounting, 39(3), 307-326.
    Cai, Y., Y. Kim., J. C. Park., and H. D. White. 2016. Common auditors in M&A transactions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 61(1), 77-99.
    Chen, S., X. Chen., Q. Cheng., and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than nonfamily firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95: 41-61.
    Chen, T., X. Martin and A.X. Sun. 2012.The effect of sharing a common auditor with customers on accounting misstatement by supplier firms. Working paper.
    Chi, H. Y., and C. L. Chin. 2011. Firm versus partner measures of auditor industry expertise and effects on auditor quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 30(May):201-229.
    Cook, K., and T. Omer. 2010. The Cost of Independence: Evidence from Firms' Decisions to Dismiss Auditors as Tax-Service Providers. Working paper, The University of Arizona and Texas A&M University.
    Deloitte. 2006. What do companies want from the corporate tax function: CFO and tax executives’ perspectives on corporate tax. CFO Publishing Corp. From: http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/ Documents/us_tax_cfo_what_companies_want_161106.pdf.
    Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Coporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 78(1):145-179.
    Donohoe, M. P., W. R. Knechel. 2014. Does corporate tax aggressiveness influence audit pricing? Contemporary Accounting Research 31 (1): 284-308.
    Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon., and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long-run corporate tax avoidance. the accounting review, 83(1), 61-82.
    Francis, J.R., M. Pinnuck., and O. Watanabe. 2014. Auditor style and financial statement comparability. Accounting Review 89: 605–633.
    Frank, M. M., L. J. Lynch., and S. O. Rego. 2009. Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive financial reporting. The Accounting Review, 84(2), 467-496.
    Gramlich, J.D., P. Limpaphayom., and S. G. Rhee. 2004. Taxes, Keiretsu Affiliation, and Income Shifting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37(2), 203-228.
    Graham,J.J.,Raedy, and D. Shackelford. 2012. Research in accounting for income taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 53(1-2):412-34.
    Gupta, S., and K. Newberry. 1997. Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16(1), 1-34.
    Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 127-178.
    Hanlon, M., and J. Slemrod. 2009. What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 126-141.
    Heninger, W. G. 2001. The association between auditor litigation and abnormal accruals. The Accounting Review, 76(1), 111-126.
    Janssen, B., H. Vandenbussche., and K. Crabbé. 2005. Corporate tax savings when hiring a Big 4 auditor: Empirical evidence for Belgium. Working paper.
    Jung K., and B. Kim. 2009. Tax Motivated Income Shifting and Korean Business Groups (Chaebol) Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 36(5)&(6) 552-586.
    Brown, J. L., and K. D. Drake. 2013. Network ties among low-tax firms. The Accounting Review, 89(2), 483-510.
    Kim, J. B., Y. Li., and L. Zhang. 2011. Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), 639-662.
    Klassen, K. J., P. Lisowsky., and D. Mescall. 2015. The role of auditors, non-auditors, and internal tax departments in corporate tax aggressiveness. The Accounting Review, 91(1), 179-205.
    Kubick, T. R., and A. N. Masli., 2016. Firm-level tournament incentives and corporate tax aggressiveness. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 35(1), 66-83.
    Lisowsky, P., L. Robinson., and A. Schmidt. 2010. An examination of FIN 48: Tax shelters, auditor independence, and corporate governance. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign working paper.
    Lennox, C. 1999. Are large auditors more accurate than small auditors?. Accounting and business research, 29(3), 217-227.
    Lin, S. 2001. CPA attested tax returns and tax evasion. Taiwan Accounting Review 1:15-36.
    Mills, L. F. 1998. Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments. Journal of Accounting research, 36(2), 343-356.
    Mills, L., K. Newberry., and W. Trautman. 2002. Trends in book-tax income and balance sheet differences.
    Morck, R. K. 2003. Why Some Double Taxation Might Make Sense: The Special Case of Inter-corporate Dividends. NBER Working paper 9651.
    Morck, R. K. 2005. How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups, The Double Taxation of Inter-corporate Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy. Tax policy and Economy 19(1), 135-179.
    Mindzak, J., and T. Zeng. 2017. Why are Pyramid-Affiliated Firms More Tax Aggressive? . Working paper.
    McGuire, S. T., T.C. Omer, and D. Wang. 2012. Tax Avoidance: Does Tax-Specific Industry Expertise Make a Difference? The Accounting Review, 87(3): 975–1003.
    McGill, G. A., and E. Outslay. 2004. Lost in translation: Detecting tax shelter activity in financial statements. National Tax Journal, 739-756.
    Preuss, L. 2010. Tax avoidance and corporate social responsibility: you can't do both, or can you?. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 10(4), 365-374.
    Public CompanyAccountingOversightBoard (2005),“Auditor independence tax services roundtable”
    Porcano, T. 1986. Corporate Tax Rates: Progressive, proportional or regressive. Journal of American Taxation Association, 7 (2), 17-31.
    Rice, E. M. 1990. The corporate tax gap: Evidence on tax compliance by small corporations,Why People Pay Taxes,125-61, University of Michigan.
    Rego, S. 2003. Tax-Avoidance activities of U.S. multinational Corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20, 805-833.
    Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L. 1978. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. Accounting review, 112-134.
    Zimmerman, J. 1983. Taxes and Firm Size. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5 (1): 119-149.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    1053531031
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1053531031
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.006.2019.F07
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    103101.pdf1585KbAdobe PDF0View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback