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    题名: CD&A語調與Say-on-Pay制度之關聯性
    Association between CD&A Tone and the Say-on-Pay Provision
    作者: 李佩儒
    Lee, Pei-Ju
    贡献者: 陳宇紳
    李佩儒
    Lee, Pei-Ju
    关键词: 薪酬發言權制度
    語調
    薪酬討論及分析
    薪酬績效敏感度
    Say-on-Pay
    Tone
    CD&A
    Pay-performance sensitivity
    日期: 2019
    上传时间: 2019-07-01 10:42:30 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 薪酬發言權制度(Say-on-Pay)賦予股東可對高階主管的薪酬表示支持或反對意見的權利,該投票的結果會對公司的經營構成壓力。薪酬討論及分析(Compensation Discussion & Analysis, CD&A)對於高階主管薪酬的制定有詳盡的解釋,影響了股東對公司薪酬計畫的認知進而影響投票的結果。
    本篇研究主要探討Say-on-Pay制度對CD&A語調的影響,以及探討Say-on-Pay是否會對CD&A語調和CEO薪酬績效敏感度的關係產生影響。本研究以S&P 500公司作為樣本,樣本期間為2006年至2009年與2012年至2015年。實證結果顯示CD&A語調在Say-on-Pay制度實施後變得更負面,並且發現CD&A語調與薪酬績效敏感度在Say-on-Pay制度後為負向關係,顯示公司在Say-on-Pay後更會操控CD&A的語調以影響股東對薪酬的認知,本研究更進一步發現報酬較低、管理權較強、獨董比率較低以及董事會規模較小的公司有更強的動機操控語調以合理化其薪酬績效關係。
    Say-on-Pay provision entitles shareholders to exercise advisory vote on executive compensation program. Either a loss in the Say-on-Pay vote or even a marginal pass is costly to firms because of investor outrage and potential litigation risk. Thus, firms have incentives to manage contents illustrated in Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in order to influence shareholders’ perception about the compensation program with a goal of affecting shareholders’ voting decisions. In this study, I investigate the effect of Say-on-Pay provision on CD&A tone and whether Say-on-Pay affects the relation between CD&A tone and pay performance. I conduct tests using a sample of S&P 500 companies in the pre- and post-Say-on-Pay regimes.
    The results show that tone in CD&A tends to be more negative after the implementation of Say-on-Pay and is negatively related to pay performance in the post-Say-on-Pay period. These findings are consistent with my conjecture that Say-on-Pay provides incentives for firms to manage CD&A tone to manipulate shareholder’s perceptions about the alignment between firm performance and CEO compensation. Furthermore, I find that firms with lower ROA, greater managerial ownership, less independent board, and larger board are more likely to manipulate tone to justify pay performance in the post-Say-on-Pay regime. Overall, this study provides some regulatory implications for Say-on-Pay regulation.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    106353106
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353106
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900046
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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