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    Title: 寬恕政策與競爭法有效執行之研究—以制度設計暨其他執法機制為核心
    Study on Leniency Program and Effective Competition Law Enforcement: Focusing on Institutional Design and Other Mechanisms of Enforcement
    Authors: 連彬翰
    Lien, Pin-Han
    Contributors: 王立達
    Wang, Li-Dar
    連彬翰
    Lien, Pin-Han
    Keywords: 聯合行為
    卡特爾
    寬恕政策
    刑事處罰
    民事責任
    檢舉獎金
    法令遵循
    權利拋棄聲明
    Cartel
    Leniency program
    Criminal sanctions
    Damages claim
    Informant reward system
    Compliance program
    Waiver
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-08-07 16:40:17 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 限制競爭之聯合行為有損於市場競爭、消費者利益與整體社會福祉,然而聯合行為具有秘密性而難以察覺。於國際間寬恕政策被認為係有效之執法工具,各國遂紛紛引入,我國亦於2011年引入寬恕政策,然而迄今僅有三起成功適用案件,且公平會近年來查處聯合行為之數量亦呈現下滑之趨勢,而有檢討我國寬恕政策與相關執法之必要。
    本文整理國內外相關文獻、規範與制度,以寬恕政策與競爭法有效執行為核心,探討寬恕政策之制度設計及與其他執法機制。本文除了介紹寬恕政策之理論基礎及美國、歐盟與我國之規範外,並討論聯合行為之執法趨勢及處罰方式是否應採刑事處罰,探討寬恕政策之制度內涵及與其他執法途徑之互動,並檢視寬恕政策制度之優缺點及對於公司而言申請寬恕政策之利與弊,以及寬恕政策申請人陳述之證據價值。最後,以上述關於寬恕政策有效性之各議題作為基礎,檢視我國現行之寬恕政策與執法,並提出相關改善之建議。
    欲使寬恕政策有效,對於違法之處罰應足夠嚴厲,規範與執法過程應具有透明性與可預測性,寬恕政策應僅作為補充之執法工具而非替代手段,執法機關在無寬恕政策下亦應有能力查緝到聯合行為,以及搭配其他相關制度以促使申請人及早申請寬恕政策,並且不應使寬恕政策申請人處於相較於未申請寬恕政策更糟之處境。
    Cartel brings much harm to market competition, consumers’ benefit and social welfare. However, cartel is so secret that it is difficult for competition authorities to detect it. Today, competition authorities among the world regard leniency program as an effective tool in detecting cartel, and many jurisdictions have introduced leniency program. Taiwan also has introduced leniency program since 2011. However, there are only 3 successful application cases until now, and the number of detected cases per year of FTC seems to decline. So, we need to examine Taiwanese leniency program and competition law enforcement.
    The study focuses on the effectiveness of leniency program and researches on institutional design and other mechanisms of enforcement under competition law. First, the study introduces the basis of leniency program and the U.S., EU and Taiwanese regimes of leniency program. Then, the study discusses on the trends of cartel enforcement and whether to criminalize cartel. The study also researches on the contents of leniency program, the interaction with other mechanisms of enforcement, the pros and cons of leniency program, and the probative value of statement of applicants. Finally, the study examines current Taiwanese leniency program and competition law enforcement on the basis of above issues concerning the effectiveness of leniency program and brings some recommends.
    An effective leniency program is built on the followings. Sanctions for those who don’t cooperate with competition authorities should be severe enough. Policies and processes of law enforcement should have transparency and predictability. Leniency program should not be a substitute but a complement tool, and competition authorities should have the ability to detect cartel without leniency program. It is much better that more cartel members can apply leniency program, so it is appropriate not to exclude leaders and recidivists to apply leniency program. Corporates should establish effective compliance programs to prevent to participate in cartel and early to apply leniency program. In addition, some mechanisms like individual leniency program or informant reward system could trigger corporates to apply leniency program. Finally, and most importantly, leniency applicants should not face a worse situation than non-cooperation.
    Reference: 中文文獻
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    專書論文
    1.Beaton-Wells, Caron, Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion? in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE-LENIENCY RELIGION 3 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
    2.Beaton-Wells, Caron & Ariel Ezrachi, Criminalising Cartels: Why Critical Studies? in CRIMINALISING CARTELS-CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 3 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).
    3.Ezrachi, Ariel & Jiří Kindl, Cartels as Criminal? The Long Road from Unilateral Enforcement to International Consensus, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS-CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 419 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).
    4.Fisse, Brent, Reconditioning Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making Compliance Programmes a Condition of Immunity, in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE-LENIENCY RELIGION 179 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
    5.Forrester, Ian S. & Pascal Berghe, Leniency: The Poisoned Chalice or the Pot at the End of the Rainbow? in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE-LENIENCY RELIGION 159 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
    6.Harding, Christopher, Caron Beaton-Wells & Jennifer Edwards, Leniency and Criminal Sanctions, in Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows? in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE-LENIENCY RELIGION 233 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
    7.Marvão, Catarina & Giancarlo Spagnolo, What Do We Know about the Effectiveness of Leniency Policies? A Survey of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence, in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE-LENIENCY RELIGION 57 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
    8.Murphy, Joe, Combining Leniency Policies and Compliance Programmes to Prevent Cartels, in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE-LENIENCY RELIGION 315 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
    9.O'Brien, Ann, Leadership of Leniency, in ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE-LENIENCY RELIGION 17 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015).
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    期刊論文
    1.Aubert, Cécile, Patrick Rey & William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-Blowing Programs on Cartels, 24(6), I.J.I.O. 1241 (2006).
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    法律科際整合研究所
    105652011
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105652011
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900302
    Appears in Collections:[法律與科技整合研究所] 學位論文

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