政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/124927
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 109952/140887 (78%)
Visitors : 46282206      Online Users : 1156
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124927


    Title: 道德特殊主義：批判性縱覽
    Moral Particularism: A Critical Survey
    Authors: 周境林
    Zhou, Jing-Lin
    Contributors: 王華
    陳建綱
    Wang, Hua
    Chen, Chien-Kang
    周境林
    Zhou, Jing-Lin
    Keywords: 道德特殊主義
    原則消除論
    道德原則
    理由整體論
    道德判斷
    Moral particularism
    Principle eliminativism
    Moral principle
    Holism of reasons
    Moral judgement
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-08-07 16:46:28 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文以回顧圍繞道德特殊主義——特別是原則消除論——的論戰為主線，呈現各方為辯護自己的立場而在理由理論和道德之本質兩個層次上掀起的辯論。文章旨在檢視哪些論證是關鍵性，哪些論證是有定論的，哪些論證又使得論戰陷入僵局。筆者也嘗試在文章中做一些概念澄清與區別，比如暫時性地闡明何謂道德原則、何謂道德特殊主義、將道德特殊主義與其它容易與之混淆的理論分辨開來。經過抽絲剝縷，筆者將行文過程中的線索串在一起，在結論中指出關於道德原則是否存在的辯論礙於「無限制的」理由整體論上的分歧難有進展。但是，由於道德特殊論揭示了道德生活的複雜性，筆者認為相較於道德原則是否存在、這些道德原則是否有利於我們的道德實踐這些議題，特殊論應該將討論重心放在我們如何在極其複雜的道德生活中做好特殊個案中的實踐推理上。同樣地，本文也認為倫理學研究應該聚焦具體個案，而非抽象原則。
    This article aims to be a survey of the debates around moral particularism, especially principle eliminativism. It will represent the arguments made by different parties in defence of their respective positions, with the intention to investigate which arguments are vital, which allow of determinate verdicts and which draw the controversy into a deadlock. In this article, I will also attempt to clarify some concepts, including the notions of moral principles and moral particularism. Eventually, I will draw, from the clues revealed in the course of the discussion, the conclusion that the debate about whether there are true moral principles confronts a standoff due to the difficulty in ascertaining the plausibility of ‘unrestricted’ holism of reasons. However, I will suggest that compared with the existence of moral principles and their practical value, moral particularism should concentrate on how to appropriately conduct practical reasoning in particular cases, given the complexity of our moral life. Finally, the article will suggest that the cause of ethics should pay more attention to concrete moral cases rather than abstract rules.
    Reference: Alvarez, Maria. 2017. "Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
    Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33 (124):1-19.
    Aristotle. 2000. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Baker, Derek. 2018. "Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter." In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, 230-252. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Bakhurst, David, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little, ed. 2013. Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Bentham, Jeremy. 1970. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Copp, David, ed. 2006. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Crisp, Roger. 2000. "Particularizing Particularism." In Hooker and Little 2000, 23–47.
    Dancy, Jonathan. 1983. "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties." Mind 92 (368):530-547.
    Dancy, Jonathan. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
    Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Dancy, Jonathan. 2017. Moral Particularism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
    Dancy, Jonathan. 2018. Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Darwall, Stephen. 2006b. The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    Darwall, Stephen. 2013. "Morality and Principle." In Bakhurst, Hooker, & Little 2013, 168–191.
    Dreier, James. 1990. "Internalism and Speaker Relativism." Ethics 101:6–26.
    Dreier, James. 1992. "The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:13–38.
    Dreier, James. 2006. "Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism " In Copp 2006.
    Foot, Philippa. 1972. "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives." The Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
    Goldman, Alan. 2001. Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don’t. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Harman, Gilbert. 1975. "Moral Relativism Defended." Philosophical Review 84 (1):3–22.
    Harman, Gilbert. 2000. Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Harman, Gilbert. 2012. "Moral Relativism Explained." In Problems of Goodness: New Essays on Metaethics [online].
    Holton, Richard. 2002. "Principles and Particularisms." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:191–209. doi: 10.1111/1467-8349.00095.
    Hooker, Brad. 2000a. "Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad." In Hooker and Little 2000, 1–22.
    Hooker, Brad. 2000b. Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-consequentialist Theory of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Hooker, Brad. 2008. "Particularism and the Real World." In Lance, Potrč, and Strahovnik 2008, 75–106.
    Hooker, Brad & Margaret Little, ed. 2000b. Moral Particularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Jackson, Frank, Philip Pettit, & Michael Smith. 2000. "Ethical Particularism and Patterns." In Hooker and Little 2000, 79–99.
    Kant, Immanuel. 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Lance, Mark Norris & Margaret Little. 2006a. "Defending Moral Particularism." In Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, edited by James Dreier, 306 -321. Oxford: Blackwell.
    Lance, Mark Norris & Margaret Little. 2006b. "Particularism and Antitheory." In Copp 2006.
    Lance, Mark Norris & Margaret Little. 2007. "Where the Laws Are." In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, 149–171.
    Lance, Mark Norris, Matjaž Potrč, & Vojko Strahovnik, ed. 2008. Challenging Moral Particularism. New York: Routledge.
    Little, Margaret. 1994. "Moral Realism: Non-Naturalism." Philosophical Books 35:225–232.
    Little, Margaret. 2000. "Moral Generalities Revisited." In Hooker and Little 2000, 276–304.
    Mackie, John. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin Books.
    McDowell, John, and I. Geoff McFetridge. 1978. "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 52:13-42.
    McKeever, Sean & Michael Ridge. 2005a. "The Many Moral Particularisms." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35:83 -106.
    McKeever, Sean & Michael Ridge. 2005b. "What Does Holism Have to do with Particularism?" Ratio 18:93–103.
    McKeever, Sean & Michael Ridge. 2006. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    McNaughton, David. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Blackwell.
    McNaughton, David and Piers Rawling. 2000. "Unprincipled Ethics." In Hooker and Little 2000, 256–275.
    Moore, G. E. 1993. Principia Ethica 2ed: With the Preface to the Second Edition and Other Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    O’Neill, Onora. 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Havard University Press.
    Raz, Joseph. 2000. "The Truth in Particularism." In Hooker and Little 2000, 48–78.
    Raz, Joseph. 2006. "The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy`s Version)." Mind 115:99 -120.
    Ridge, Michael & Sean McKeever. 2016. Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
    Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and The Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. ‎Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Scanlon, T.M. 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Schroeder, Mark. 2011. "Holism, Weight, and Undercutting." Noûs 45 (2):328-344.
    Shafer-Landau, Russ. 1997. "Moral Rules." Ethics 107 (4):584 - 611.
    Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy & Public Affairs:229-243.
    Singer, Peter. 1973. "Animal Liberation." In Animal Rights, 7-18. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Singer, Peter. 1977. Animal Liberation. Towards an End to Man`s Inhumanity to Animals. London: Granada Publishing Ltd.
    Stojanovic, Isidora. 2018. "Metaethical Relativism." In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by Tristram & David Plunkett McPherson, 119-132. New York: Routledge.
    Stratton-Lake, Philip. 2000. Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth. London: Routledge.
    Strawson, P. F. 1962. "Freedom and Resentment." Proceedings of the British Academy 48:1–25.
    Street, Sharon. 2006. "A Darwinian Dilemma For Realist Theories of Value." Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
    Street, Sharon. 2008. "Constructivism about Reasons." In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, 208–245. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1971. "A Defense of Abortion." Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
    van Roojen, Mark. 2015. Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge.
    Väyrynen, Pekka. 2004. "Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):53–79. doi: 10.1023/B:ETTA.0000019980.79568.2f.
    Väyrynen, Pekka. 2008. "Usable Moral Principles." In Lance, Potrč, and Strahovnik 2008, 75–106.
    Väyrynen, Pekka. 2011. "Moral Particularism." In The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum, edited by Christian B. Miller, 478-483. New York: Bloomsbury.
    Williams, Bernard. 1981. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana.
    Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1965. "I: A Lecture on Ethics." The Philosophical Review 74 (1):3-12.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    政治學系
    105252024
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105252024
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900170
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Political Science] Theses

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    202401.pdf1177KbAdobe PDF20View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback