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Corporate Social Responsibility and principle of Commodity Taxation
Corporate Social Responsibility
|Issue Date: ||2019-08-07 16:50:02 (UTC+8)|
|Abstract: ||隨著全球貿易自由化的影響，各國經濟整合日漸頻繁，國際商品稅的課稅原則議題長期備受關注，貿易商品應該採用消費地課稅原則或是生產地課稅原則的議題一直存在爭議。傳統上，世界貿易採用消費地課稅原則。但由於消費地課稅原則過度依賴邊境稅率的調整，難以在同一市場中管理，因此許多國家逐漸將商品稅的課徵從原來的消費地課稅原則改為生產地課稅原則。為了讓模型更貼近現實，本研究採用Haufler, Schjelderup and Stähler (2005) 兩商品課稅原則的架構，並建立一個包含企業社會責任 (Corporate Social Responsibility，CSR) 活動的本國廠商，進行探討。本文研究顯示：(1) 當採用消費地課稅原則下，本國廠商重視CSR的程度會影響本國政府的最適商品稅率，但不影響外國政府的最適商品稅率。相反地，當採用生產地課稅原則下，本國廠商重視CSR的程度不僅會影響本國政府的最適商品稅率，也會影響外國政府的最適商品稅率。(2) 傳統文獻發現，本國及外國廠商皆為傳統追求利潤極大化的廠商，則本國及外國政府皆採補貼政策。但本文發現在最適課稅原則下，當本國廠商為傳統追求社會福利極大化的廠商，外國廠商為傳統追求利潤極大化的廠商。依照消費地課稅原則，本國政府的最適商品稅率為一正值，外國政府的最適商品稅率為一負值。依照生產地課稅原則，本國政府的最適商品稅率趨近無窮大，外國政府的最適商品稅率為一負值。不論前者抑或是後者，本國政府皆採課稅政策，外國政府皆採補貼政策。(3) 傳統文獻發現，當需求為線性時，當0≤γ≤1，只要s≥0，生產地課稅原則優於消費地課稅原則，但本文發現當產品為同質(γ=1 )下，當本國廠商重視CSR的程度越高，本國政府會採取消費地課稅原則，反之當本國廠商重視CSR的程度越低，本國政府則會採取生產地課稅原則。|
As the global trade becomes more liberalized, the economic integration becomes more frequent, and the taxation principle of international commodity tax becomes an important issue. Whether the commodity should adopt the destination principle or the origin principle has always been controversial. Traditionally, world trade tends to apply the destination principle. However, the destination principle is overly dependent on the adjustment of the border tax rate. So, it is difficult to manage in the interregional market. Therefore, many countries have gradually switched their commodity taxation from destination principle to origin principle. In order to make the model closer to the reality, this study uses Haufler, Schjelderup and Stähler (2005)’s structure of taxation principle and takes domestic firm into account on which engages in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) .
The major findings of this paper are:
(1) When the destination principle is adopted, the degree of how much domestic firms value CSR will affect the domestic optimal commodity tax rate, but it will not affect the foreign optimal commodity tax rate. On the contrary, when the origin principle is adopted, the degree of how much domestic firms value CSR will affect not only the domestic optimal commodity tax rate but also that of the foreign countries.
(2) The traditional literature found that both domestic and foreign firms aimed to pursue the maximal profit, so both domestic and foreign governments adopt subsidy policies. Yet, we found out that under the principle of optimal taxation, the domestic firms used to pursue the maximal social welfare, while the foreign firms used to pursue the maximal profit. Under the destination principle, the domestic government's optimal tax rate is a positive value, while the foreign government's optimal tax rate is a negative value. Under the origin principle, the domestic government's optimal tax rate is approaching infinity, while the foreign government's optimal tax rate is still a negative value. Regardless of these two conditions, domestic government adopts tax policies, while foreign governments adopt subsidy policies.
(3) The traditional literature found that when the demand was linear, that is when0≤γ≤1 and s≥0, the origin principle would be better than the destination principle. However, this paper finds that when the product is homogeneous, that is whenγ=1, the higher the degree of how much domestic firms value CSR is, the more possible the domestic government will adopt the destination principle. Otherwise, the less the domestic firms value CSR, the more possible the domestic government will adopt the origin principle.
|Reference: ||翁堃嵐、林宛儀與郭虹瑩 (2014) ，混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性與最適釋股比例，應用經濟論叢，96，105-126。|
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105255022|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[財政學系] 學位論文|
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