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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 資訊管理學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/127166
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/127166


    Title: Supplier Quality Management: Investment, Inspection, and Incentives
    Authors: 李曉惠
    Lee, Hsiao-Hui
    LI, Cuihong*
    Contributors: 資管系
    Keywords: quality;incentives;inspection;buyer direct investment;supplier management
    Date: 2018-02
    Issue Date: 2019-10-30 11:12:13 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Buyers can manage product quality sourced from suppliers in three ways: they can improve the quality incoming from suppliers directly by investing in suppliers to improve a process/product, they can improve the incoming quality indirectly by incentivizing supplier quality‐improvement efforts, and/or they can control the quality outgoing to subsequent processes by inspecting incoming units. In this study, we study a buyer's use of these three instruments—investment, incentives, and inspection—to manage the sourced quality. To do so, we consider a general relationship between the buyer's direct investment effort and supplier's quality‐improvement effort, allowing them to be complementary, substitutable, or additive in their quality‐improvement effects. For situations in which the buyer and the supplier decide their efforts simultaneously with contractible internal‐failure events, we identify three types of strategies: the investment‐based strategy (focusing on the buyer's investment effort) for strongly substitutable efforts, the inspection‐based strategy (focusing on inspection) for strongly complementary efforts, and the integrative strategy (emphasizing all three instruments) for additive efforts. If buyer‐investment commitment is possible, then the inspection‐based strategy in which both parties defect in their efforts will be replaced by a collaboration‐based strategy in which both parties exert high efforts to improve quality. Contracting upon external failures (in addition to internal failures) does not change this strategy pattern; however, when combined with buyer‐effort commitment, such a contract achieves the first‐best result.
    Relation: Production and Operations Management, Vol.27, No.2, pp.304-322
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12802
    DOI: 10.1111/poms.12802
    Appears in Collections:[資訊管理學系] 期刊論文

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