English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 11 |  Items with full text/Total items : 88837/118541 (75%)
Visitors : 23545819      Online Users : 460
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 理學院 > 心理學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/127393
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/127393


    Title: The modulation of self-interest instruction on the fair-proposing behavior in ultimatum game
    Authors: 顏乃欣
    Yen, N. S.*
    Yang, T. H.
    Huang, W. H.
    Fang, Y. F.
    Cho, H. W.
    Contributors: 心理系
    Keywords: Ultimatum game;self-interest;altruistic;fear of rejection.
    Date: 2017-03
    Issue Date: 2019-11-21 10:42:04 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Ultimatum game is an experimental paradigm to study human decision making. There are two players, a proposer and a responder, to split a fixed amount of money. According to the traditional economic theory on ultimatum game, proposer should propose the selfish offers to responder as much as possible to maximize proposer’s own outcomes. However, most evidences had showed that people chose more fair offers, hence two hypotheses – fairness favoring and strategic concern were proposed. In current study, we induced the motivation in participants to be either selfish or altruistic, and manipulated the task variables, the stake sizes (NT$100, 1000, 10000) and the share sizes (the 40%, 30%, 20%, 10% of the sum as selfish offers, and the 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% of the sum as altruistic offers), to examine the two hypotheses. The results showed that most proposers chose more fair offers with longer reaction times (RTs) no matter in choosing between the fair and selfish offers, or between the fair and altruistic offers. However, the proposers received explicit self-interest instruction chose more selfish offers accompanied with longer RTs in choosing between the fair and selfish offers. Therefore, the results supported the strategic concern hypothesis that previous proposers choosing the fair offers might be resulted from the fear of rejection by responders. Proposers would become more self-interest if the fear of being rejected is eliminated.
    Relation: International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering, Vol.11, No.3, pp.699-703
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1130201
    DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1130201
    Appears in Collections:[心理學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    There are no files associated with this item.



    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback