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    政大機構典藏 > 法學院 > 法律學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/127696


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/127696


    Title: Are Independent Directors Effective Monitors in Taiwan? A Theoretical Analysis
    Authors: 周振鋒
    Chou, Cheng-Fong
    Contributors: 法律系
    Keywords: Independent Directors;Corporate Governance;Supervisors;Company Act;Controlling Shareholders
    Date: 2013-03
    Issue Date: 2019-12-04 14:48:38 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: About a decade ago, Taiwan introduced the institution of independent directors, which has long been advocated as a good corporate governance practice in the United States of America (“U.S.”). At the time, the concept of independent directors then was a whole new legal idea in Taiwan that fundamentally changed the original intention behind the internal corporate governance system in the Taiwan Company Act in which supervisors were supposed to address oversight and to take action against the board of directors and managers. Traditionally, the U.S. corporate conventional wisdom argues that independent directors benefit companies in some aspects, but it is also believed that they could face some inherent limitations while carrying out their monitoring tasks. The most serious issue is how to ensure an independent director has true independence from management. In addition to the limitations that U.S. independent directors normally face, Taiwanese independent directors also encounter other constraints arising from characteristics of Taiwan’s business environment. This article argues that independent directors in Taiwan have few chances to rid themselves of the controlling shareholders’ influence. Even in the absence of such powerful shareholders, they would still encounter other difficulties in carrying out the monitoring tasks such as insufficient information. This article concludes that as a result, Taiwanese independent directors will function in a very limited way, and can hardly be effective monitors for Taiwanese companies under the current business and legal environment in Taiwan.
    Relation: National Taiwan University Law Review, Vol.8, No.1, pp.49-95
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.3966/181263242013030801002
    DOI: 10.3966/181263242013030801002
    Appears in Collections:[法律學系] 期刊論文

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