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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/130518
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130518

    Title: 企業揭露品質與獨立董事之關聯:以強制經理人盈餘預測修正為例
    Corporate Disclosure Quality and Independent Directors: Evidence from Mandatory Management Earnings Forecasts Revision
    Authors: 陳佩妤
    Chen, Pei-Yu
    Contributors: 潘健民
    Pan, Chien-Min
    Chen, Pei-Yu
    Keywords: 揭露品質
    Disclosure quality
    Management earnings forecasts
    Mandatory earnings forecasts
    Independent directors
    Corporate governance
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-07-01 13:36:08 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 先前文獻中已大量探討過獨立董事與財務報表揭露品質之關聯性。然而,在日本強制性經理人盈餘預測之揭露制度下,存在著財務報導期間多次修改盈餘預測與財務報導日後修改盈餘預測等特殊現象。前述此等現象與獨立董事之間的關係於公司治理中的定位尚不明確,故本研究以日本東京證券交易所上市之公司為研究對象,探討獨立董事與揭露品質之關聯性。本研究以是否聘用獨立董事與已聘用之獨立董事比率,測試其對企業修正盈餘預測之次數多寡與於財務報導日後修正盈餘預測可能性之影響。實證結果顯示,獨立董事比率越高之企業,較有可能多次修正盈餘預測。而聘用獨立董事及獨立董事比率越高之企業,則較可能會在財務報導日之前就修正盈餘預測,不會等到財務報導日之後才修正。本研究結果,即獨立董事比率越高之企業比較有可能多次修改盈餘預測,亦即公司治理較好之企業比較有可能多次修改盈餘預測,與先前研究多次修正盈餘預測之企業揭露品質較好之結果相同。
    The association between independent directors and disclosure quality of financial statements has been intensively examined in the literature. However, some specific events occur in Japan because management earnings forecasts are mandatory, namely, multiple forecast revisions and last minute revisions. Such events have not been examined from a corporate governance perspective. This study tries to shed some light on the association between disclosure quality and independent directors on this regard using firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. This study uses the number of independent director sitting in the boardroom and ratio of independent directors in the board room to test if independent directors affect disclosure quality. For disclosure quality, this study uses the numbers of management forecast revisions and revising earnings forecasts after the fiscal year end to proxy for disclosure quality. Empirical results show that firm with higher independent director ratio are more likely to revise earnings forecasts for multiple times. Meanwhile, the results also show that firms with higher independent director ratio are more likely to revise earnings forecasts within 30 days prior to fiscal year end. The result show that firms with higher ratio of independent director are more likely to revise earnings forecasts for more times, i.e., firms with better corporate governance are more likely have better disclosure quality consistent with prior study.
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353115
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000557
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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