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    题名: 間接網路外部性對租稅歸宿之影響
    The Effect of Indirect Network Externality on Tax Incidence
    作者: 陳品心
    Chen, Pin-Hsin
    贡献者: 陳國樑
    陳品心
    Chen, Pin-Hsin
    关键词: 間接網路外部性
    雙邊市場
    租稅歸宿
    租稅轉嫁
    Indirect Network Externality
    Two-sided Market
    Tax Incidence
    Tax Shifting
    日期: 2020
    上传时间: 2020-07-01 13:55:12 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 根據Katz and Shapiro（1985）的定義，間接網路外部性指一個產品的消費者效用會隨著另一個產品消費者人數的增加而提高。本文拓展Armstrong（2006）邊際成本固定、服務兩個市場1、2的獨佔平台生產者模型，討論若對平台市場1課利潤稅或從價稅（銷售稅），間接網路外部性如何影響租稅轉嫁。結果發現：不論利潤稅或從價稅，首先，平台會藉由調降市場1稅後均衡價格、增加市場2稅後均衡價格，以將租稅旁轉至市場2的方式賺取更多利潤。其次，市場2承受的租稅負擔隨市場1稅後均衡人數越多而越多，並且除了兩市場人數增加的情況無法確定外之外，均有超額轉嫁的可能。最後，在從價稅發現，當市場1彈性小，平台需要調降越多市場1價格以刺激市場1需求，市場1稅後人數因此增加，使平台越能夠拉抬市場2價格，此與過去彈性理論指出彈性越小者會承擔越多租稅的結果不一致。
    According to Katz and Shapiro (1985), indirect network externality means the number of consumers of one product being an increasing function of the number of consumers of another product. This paper utilizes the model in Armstrong (2006) to discuss tax shifting when a constant marginal cost monopolistic platform producer serves two markets in the existence of indirect network effect. The results show that either market 1 is taxed by profits or by an ad valorem tax (sales tax), the price of market 1 reduces and the price of market 2 increases. By shifting the tax to market 2, the platform earns more profits when market 1 is taxed. The tax burden of market 2 depends on the after-tax number of consumers in market 1. A larger number of consumers in market 1 after taxation, results in more tax burden been shifted to market 2. In most cases, there exists excessive tax-shifting except when both markets have more consumers after taxation. Finally, with an ad valorem tax, if the demand elasticity of market 1 is small, the platform needs to downward adjusting market 1’s price more so that to increase the demand in market 1. A lower price in market 1 results in more consumers in market 1, and the platform gets easier to raise the price of market 2; this is at odds to the previous result that a smaller elasticity implies more tax burden.
    參考文獻: Armstrong, M.（2006）, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37, 668–691.
    Barzel, Y.（1976）, “An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation,” Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1177–1197.
    Besley, T. J. and, H. S. Rosen（1999）, “Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis,” National Tax Journal, 52, 157–178.
    Bishop, R. L.（1968）, “The Effects of Specific and Ad Valorem Taxes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 198–218.
    Bloch, F. and D. Demange（2016）, “Taxation and Privacy Protection on Internet Platforms,” Journal of Political Economic Theory, 20(1), 52–66.
    Fullerton, D. and G. E. Metcalf（2002）, “Tax Incidence,” NBER Working Papers, No. 8829.
    Harberger, A. C.（1962）, “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,” Journal of Political Economy, 70, 215–240.
    Katz, M. L. and C. Shapiro（1985）, “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,” American Economic Review, 75, 424–440.
    Kind, H. J., M. Koethenbuergery, and G. Schjelderup（2010）, “Tax Responses in Platform Industries,” Oxford Economic Papers, 62, 764–783.
    Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole（2003）, “Platform Competition in Two‐Sided Markets,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 990–1029.
    Rochet, J. C. and J. Tirole（2006）, “Two-Sided Markets a Progress Report,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37, 645–667.
    Rosen, H. S. and T. Gayer（2014）, Public Finance, Shoppenhangers Road: McGraw-Hill Education.
    Spoerer, M.（2008）, “The Laspeyres-Paradox: Tax Overshifting in Nineteenth Century Prussia,” Cliometrica, 2, 173–193.
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    謝章升（2018），「3種拿到FB廣告發票方法的優劣比較」，上網日期109年4月19日，檢自：https://www.tutortristar.com/?p=3050。
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    107255002
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255002
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000607
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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